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Abstract 
The issue of fault diagnostics is a dominant factor concerning current engineering systems. 
Information regarding possible failures is required in order to minimise disruption caused to 
functionality. A method proposed in this research utilises digraphs to model the information flow 
within an application system. Digraphs are comprised from a set of nodes representing system 
process variables or component failure modes. The nodes are connected by signed edges thus 
illustrating the influence, be it positive or negative, one node has on another. 
System fault diagnostics is conducted through a procedure of back-tracing in the digraph from a 
known deviating variable. A computational method has been developed to conduct this process. 
Comparisons are made between retrieved transmitter readings and those expected whilst the 
system is in a known operating mode. Any noted deviations are assumed to indicate the presence 
of a failure. 
The digraph diagnostic method is applied to three systems of increasing complexity; a simple 
water tank, an industrial based test stand of an aircraft fuel system and the Boeing 777-200 fuel 
system. This research includes transient system effects; the rate of change of a parameter is taken 
into consideration as a means of monitoring the system dynamically. The validity of the results 
achieved are evaluated, along with the development of a 'honing-in' strategy to highlight the 
most probable fault cause for a given abnormal scenario. Finally, the effectiveness and 
scalability issues associated with the application of the digraph method in system fault 
diagnostics are addressed. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
,';1.1 Fault Diagnosis Background 
Fault diagnosis has become a fundamental facet of engineering applications with the growing 
intolerance to failures within systems. It is concerned with the isolation of underlying causal 
faults that can lead to an observable effect in a monitored process. Within the increasingly safety 
and financial conscious climate of today's world, prompt detection, diagnosis and rectification of 
faults is imperative to the operation of a system. Effective detection of system faults decreases 
downtime and consequently enhances operational stability [1]. Most importantly, infonnation is 
required about possible failures which may disrupt the running of a system and thus decrease its 
effectiveness. 
A number of important characteristics, used to measure the effectiveness of a diagnostic system, 
are defined by Price [2]. Diagnostic problems vary widely and thus the importance of each of the 
named factors is dependent upon the system under investigation. There are seven factors which 
need to be taken into account: 
(i) Efficient Construction 
It is necessary for a diagnostic system to be used in an efficient manner, at low cost and 
in the minimum time frame required for obtaining an effective diagnosis. 
(ii) Reasonable Maintainability 
In order to ensure the effective detection of faults, diagnostic systems must be 
maintained. Furthermore, given the device being diagnosed may change over time, the 
diagnostic system should be adaptable and thus updating the system with any necessary 
modifications should be an uncomplicated process. 
(iii) Adequate Coverage 
A diagnostic system is required to be able to detect a reasonable percentage of the 
failures which occur. Ideally a diagnostic system should have 100% coverage, however, 
in practise this is traded against the development costs. 
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(iv) Correct Answers 
It is preferable for a diagnostic system to be able to diagnose all possible failure 
combinations for the system under investigation. 
(v) Minimum Effort from the User 
A diagnostic system should be straight-forward to use and request the least amount of 
information from the user. All data requested should be relevant to the tool obtaining a 
correct diagnosis. 
(vi) Appropriate Response Time 
The time taken for a diagnostic system to perform the required diagnosis is highly 
dependent on the system under investigation. Some systems need a diagnostic response 
within milliseconds of a fault being detected. An example of which is a chemical 
processing plant, whereby the reaction time in certain instances may be the difference 
between stabilising a situation and an explosion. 
(vii) Good Cost/Benefit Ratio 
The main aim of the costlbenefit ratio is to determine whether developing a diagnostic 
system is beneficial to a company. The key costs incurred are presumed to be 
implementation, maintenance and distribution of the diagnostic system, with the main 
benefit being in terms of reduced engineer time. An efficient diagnostic tool would 
reduce the time required to obtain a solution thereby increasing system availability and 
minimising system downtime. 
The technological advances which have been made over the past decades have brought about the 
development of systems with increased complexity. This in turn makes the fault detection, 
diagnosis and rectification processes more difficult to perform. The presence of a fault within a 
system can result in changes to system function, reduce system performance and cause 
operational downtime. The number of component malfunctions may range from a single fault to 
multiple failures. These can occur either individually or simultaneously, thus giving rise to 
permanently changing symptoms which may cause the effective diagnosis time to increase. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that faults may not be discovered until the relative section of the 
system is utilised. 
Given the occurrence of a system failure, it is necessary for the abnormal operating conditions of 
the system to be detected and the cause(s) diagnosed as soon as possible. On performing the 
diagnostic strategy, the system failure should be rectified through the repair or replacement of 
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faulty components, thus returning the system to normal operation. A fault[3] is commonly 
defined as a non-permitted deviation of a specific application, which in turn leads to its inability 
to perform its intended purpose. Faults may occur slowly over time due to component wear and 
tear; this would be the case in mechanical systems with moving parts. Alternatively, faults may 
occur intermittently with a given phase pattern, so resulting in cyclic failure. Other failures may 
cause significant changes to system operation, such as a tank rupture in a fuel system. 
Figure 1-1 (adapted from [3]) illustrates a generic supervision loop which may be followed given 
the appearance of a fault. Expanding the reasoning contained within the boxes in Figure 1-1 
reveals: 
• [A] A fault should be detected as early as possible, usually through a process of 
monitoring the system sensor readings. 
• [B] If necessary this is followed by fault diagnosis: the location of the fault and its 
relative cause is established. 
• [e] During fault evaluation an assessment of how the fault will affect the functioning of 
the system under investigation is conducted. Faults may then be classified into different 
hazard classes. 
• [D-H] Once the effect of the fault is known a decision is made as to whether the fault is 
, 
tolerable or intolerable. The operation of the system is stopped and the fault is 
eliminated if it is previously identified 'intolerable'. Alternatively, the operation of the 
system is altered should a fault be defined 'tolerable'. 
F 
Figure 1-1. Generic Supervision Loop 
The general idea surrounding fault diagnosis is ultimately concerned with the identification, 
isolation and rectification of system faults. The key aim of which is to minimise the disruption 
caused to system functionality. Methods employed to identify faults can be classified according 
to model-based, case-based, rule-based and real-time based strategies. 
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1.2 Types of Fault Diagnostic Strategies 
1.2.1 Rule-Based Methods 
Rule-based systems provide a powerful tool for knowledge specification and the development of 
practical applications [4]. A rule-based diagnostic tool thus traces the symptoms of a fault 
through utilising a knowledge base which is pre-determined by experts within the field in which 
the diagnostics is being conducted. This knowledge is represented in the form of 'IF-THEN' 
rules. The basic form of any rule is characterised by: 
Rule: [preconditions] -7 [conclusions] 
The [preconditions] section incorporates a formula which defines when the rule can be applied, 
whilst the [conclusions] segment describes the effect of applying the rule which may be a logical 
formula, decision or action. 
Rule-based diagnostic systems are regarded as being straight forward to use since the rules can 
be understood by programmers and experts alike; each rule provides more information on both 
the problem and prospective solutions. Each rule however encapsulates a separate 'chunk' of 
knowledge which collectively models the overall problem. Rules are also mutually exclusive and 
can be implemented in any order within the diagnostic tool. 
With regards to noted limitations of rule-based systems, it is often difficult to obtain a correct 
and full set of rules for a system under investigation. This may result from lack of expert time, 
miscommunication between the expert and knowledge engineer or simply due to the complexity 
of the system being diagnosed. Furthermore, rule-based systems are unable to learn from 
previous problems or experiences and so cannot automatically update their knowledge base. 
1.2.2 Case-Based Methods 
Case-based reasoning is described by Price [2] as a way of using past solutions to a particular 
kind of problem to solve similar new problems. A case is a contextualised piece of knowledge 
that accounts for an event. It comprises a problem, describing the state of the system under 
investigation on occurrence of the problem and a solution, which notes the derived diagnostic 
result. Since solutions from comparable experiences are utilised, a diagnostic decision is 
generally reached quicker as the current problem is not solved from the beginning. A case-based 
knowledge background constantly increases with the adaptation of previous solutions. 
4 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Case-based reasoning is considered a suitable method for developing diagnostic systems where 
there is a wide range of possible problems. There are some situations however, that do not favour 
the use of case-based reasoning. For complex systems which have just been designed, there is 
often insufficient data on past problems and solutions on which to build a case-base. 
Furthermore, efficient diagnosis may also demand the investigation of possible failures in a 
particular order. 
1.2.3 Model-Based Methods 
Model-based diagnosis uses models of a device or system as a basis for generating possible 
solutions for a given problem. A model indicating the expected behaviour of the system under a 
given set of operating conditions is created. Retrieved readings from the system are then 
compared with the model in order to reveal noted deviations, if present. It is assumed that 
registered deviations indicate the presence of a failure. Diagnosis is performed as a means for 
locating and determining the potential causes of the registered deviation. 
A number of different types of models are utilised within model-based diagnostic systems [2]. 
These include, to name a few, simple dependency, state-based, process and causal models. A 
simple dependency model illustrates the fact that the correct working of one component depends 
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on a number of others, a tree of dependencies is created with the most important components at 
the top of the tree. With regards to state-based models, systems may be characterised as a set of 
states; these states are linked by transitions in order to illustrate their possible movement within 
the application. Process models contain modules which can be linked in order to describe the 
system behaviour. This is useful within systems where the processes which are occurring are the 
most important feature. Causal models explicitly represent the behaviour of the complete system 
or device. 
Model-based diagnosis is most effective when different devices are composed of the same 
components. The user is required to determine which part of the system, be it physical 
components or system processes, is to be modelled. 
1.2.4 Real-Time Methods 
Whilst conducting real-time analysis a system is monitored continuously in order to detect the 
presence of faults or system deviations. A diagnostic procedure is usually prompted 
automatically, through the registering of an inconsistency by the continuous monitoring 
software, to obtain the most likely cause of failure. In some cases the diagnostic system may 
initiate the repair process whilst in others it is considered sufficient for the fault present to be 
identified and brought to the attention of an operator .. 
There are five main features which are solely associated with real-time diagnostic systems: 
(i) Continuous Monitoring and Problem Identification 
Strong emphasis is placed on detecting system deviations and problems as they 
develop. 
(ii) Changes in Monitoring Conditions 
Effective condition monitoring requires the system to be able to differentiate between 
states. 
(iii) Hard Real-Time Constraints 
Some applications demand that the required diagnostic action is conducted during a 
defined time period. 
J (iv) Reasoning about Uncertainty and Time 
Trends within a system become more apparent over time. Likelihoods are thus assigned 
to possible problems and further system information is obtained in order to confirm the 
trend as quickly as possible. 
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(v) Autonomous Decision Making 
A diagnostic system may need to decide what immediate action is to be taken without 
referring the decision to an operator. As a direct consequence it is necessary to have a 
high level of confidence in the fault identification skills of the system. 
Modem systems such as fly-by-wire aircraft are mission critical and thus require continuous 
monitoring. Continuous real-time fault detection and isolation aids in improving operational 
safety, availability and overall confidence in the serviceability of a system. From a maintenance 
perspective, a real-time diagnostic solution aids in reducing the ambiguity with regards to 
isolating failure causes. Ground level diagnostics is also reduced to a minimum; relaying the 
possible faulty components to the ground station during flight ensures that the necessary 
equipment is available in order to repair the aircraft and lead to a swift return to service. It is 
noted however, that embedded real-time systems often suffer from lack of power and are thus 
constrained by available memory and processing power. 
1.3 Fault Diagnostic System Features 
As a means for comparing and evaluating fault diagnostic strategies it is useful to identify a set 
of desirable characteristics which a diagnostic system should possess. Five features have been 
acknowledged by Price [2]. The significance of the noted features is dependent on the type of 
system for which the diagnostic strategy is being utilised. 
(i) Problem Identification 
The first stage in a fault diagnostic approach is to identify that a problem has actually 
occurred. A problem may be identified from system deviations, determined by 
comparing registered sensor readings with those expected under the normal operating 
conditions. Alternatively, a visual inspection of the system under investigation may 
yield the presence of a problem. 
(ii) Fault Localisation 
On determining the presence of a problem, the fault location can be identified with 
possible fault causes recorded. 
(iii) Fault Identification 
Once the fault location is determined the next phase is to identify the type of fault 
which exists. This may be conducted through using readings obtained from other 
sensors or by conducting a series of tests. 
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(iv) Fault Diagnosis 
Diagnosis involves identifying the component or components which are considered 
faulty and which may have given rise to the system problem. Diagnosis must be 
completed to the least replaceable unit. The least replaceable unit concept changes 
depending on the context within which it is used. For example, field diagnosis may 
treat a circuit board as a . least replaceable unit, however in a workshop the resistors 
within the circuit board are more likely to be considered a least replaceable unit. 
(v) Repair 
The repair process involves returning the system back to its normal operating mode. 
This is achieved by either repairing or replacing the faulty component(s), thus regaining 
system functionality. 
Venkatasubramanian et al. [6] note further desirable characteristics, in addition to those 
previously identified by Price. 
• Quick Detection and Diagnosis 
A diagnostic system is required to respond quickly to detecting and diagnosing 
malfunctions. 
• Multiple Fault Identification 
Due to the interacting nature of most faults it is often difficult to identify multiple fault 
combinations. However, with increased system complexity, system failure commonly 
results from the presence of more than one fault. 
• Isolability 
This incorporates the ability of a diagnostic system to distinguish between failures 
which may give rise to the same system deviation. 
• Adaptability 
System processes adapt and evolve due to either changes in external inputs or structural 
alterations. Operating conditions may also change due to environmental factors. It is 
therefore key for a diagnostic system to be adaptable to changes. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The emphasis of the research lies within model based diagnosis, where models of a system are 
used as the basis for performing fault detection. Model based diagnosis is particularly suited to 
systems whose architecture comprises either the same or similar components. The aim is to 
8 
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improve the application of digraph based models in the field of system fault diagnostics. Five 
aspects are taken into consideration. 
In previous research, digraphs have been used to model processes in chemical plants. In most 
cases the diagnostic process conducted, based partially on the digraph model, only deals with the 
identification of single faults and notes a varied response in terms of efficiency with regards to 
the results determined. The aim, is therefore to research using digraph models in fault 
diagnostics and to assess the consistency of the results achieved through application to a simple 
system. A method which may aid the effectiveness of the diagnostic strategy in determining 
correct results is developed. 
The second aspect explores the potential for expanding the steady-state analysis (considered in 
the first aim) to include transient effects. The main objective of this step is to prove that the 
diagnostic method, based on the application of the digraph approach, is valid and therefore can 
be used in determining faults which may be present in dynamic systems. 
The third aspect involves the application of the developed diagnostic strategy to two systems of 
increased complexity, when compared with the simple system used in the first aim. A simulation 
test stand of an aircraft fuel system is considered in addition to the Boeing 777-200 fuel system. 
The key objectives are to verify both the diagnostic results yielded and the effectiveness of the 
method. 
The fourth aspect is based on determining· a method for distinguishing between faults, thereby 
refining the retrieved diagnostic results list. Numerous results are yielded for some cases during 
application of the diagnostic strategy and so a 'honing-in' mechanism is considered. 
The final part of the research includes a proposed extension to the diagnostic method detailed. 
Implications for expanding the strategy to include all of the sub-systems contained within an 
application (e.g. complete aircraft set-up) are considered. 
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Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
A failure [7] occurs when an item (component) ceases to perform its required function. Failures 
can be classified according to their mode, cause, effect and mechanism: 
• Mode: This is the symptom (local effect) by which the failure is observed. 
• Cause: The cause may be intrinsic due to weakness or wear out of the item, or extrinsic 
due to errors or misuse during the design and production stages. 
• Effect: The effect or consequence of a failure is dependent on whether the failure is 
considered to be related to the item itself or at a higher system level. 
• Mechanism: A failure mechanism is a process which results in failure. An example of 
such a process would be cyclic fatigue in metal. 
Automated monitoring [8] has become more common with the generation of fault detection and 
isolation (FDI) subsystems meeting the necessity for increased reliability and safety, in addition 
to reduced operating costs of current complex and sophisticated engineering applications. The 
main aim is to accurately isolate problems and return the system behaviour to either the desired 
operating condition or a safe mode of operation. When furthering the development of automatic 
supervision within engineering, it is necessary that an early process fault detection system be 
present. In this manner an attempt is made to detect (and locate) faults by using measurable 
signals. This is achievable through the application of mathematical process models; a process 
model is defined as a mathematical description of the relationship between input and output 
signals in a system. 
During the monitoring procedure it is preferable that should a fault occur, it is detected as early· 
on in the process as possible. There are three logical steps which are followed: 
(i) Fault detection: established through comparing the measurable variable with the normal 
value. Fault detection methods are based on: 
10 
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- Measurable input and output signals used to directly monitor changes within a 
system. 
- Non-measurable process state variables used to estimate measurable signals 
through the process model. 
- Non-measurable characteristic quantities determined from measurable variables. 
Examples of characteristic quantities include efficiency and fuel consumption per 
unit production time. 
(ii) Fault diagnosis: fault is located and its relative cause established. 
(iii) Fault evaluation: assess how the fault will affect the engineering process. Once the 
effect of the fault is known a decision is made in the following manner: 
- Fault tolerable: operation continues. 
- Fault conditionally tolerable: change of operation. 
- Fault intolerable: operation stopped and fault eliminated. 
Accurate process models are required in order to apply fault detection methods efficiently. Since 
the fault detection procedure is based on deviations from the normal condition, the normal 
system processes must be explicitly defined and all changes tracked. With regards to faults, they 
may already exist at the time of the fault detection or appear at a later point, expected or 
unexpected. Furthermore, the appearance of the faults may vary from being abrupt to drifting. 
Consequently, an ideal fault detection method must be sensitive to the appearance of faults and 
insensitive to other variations such as noise and modelling errors. 
Failure analysis [9] is associated with the process of identifying the cause of a malfunction by 
observing the effect this has on a system at various monitoring (or observation) points. Four 
types of fault diagnostic methods are described in Chapter One; rule-based and model-based 
systems are discussed further in this section. 
2.2 Rule-Based Diagnostic Method 
Rule-based systems [4] provide a powerful tool for knowledge specification and development of 
practical solutions. The knowledge base is contained within a set of rules, each comprised from 
an 'IF-THEN' structure. Studying the basic form of the rule reveals that the 'IF' section 
corresponds to the precondition which must be met in order for the 'THEN' conclusion to be 
true. The activation of rules is usually dependent upon two main factors: 
(i) The preconditions of the rule are satisfied. 
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(ii) The rule is selected by the inference engine. 
The diagrammatic representation (adapted from [5]) of an example set of rules is illustrated in 
Figure 2-1. 
Example 
IF A THENB 
IF B THEN C 
IFCTHEND 
If the precondition A is true then it can be deduced or logically inferred that D is true through 
applying the three rules (reference Figure 2-1). 
Figure 2-1. Illustration of 'IF-THEN' Rules 
The application of rule-based reasoning is discussed further through consideration of some of the 
more common diagnostic strategies which involve sequential testing, Bayesian belief networks 
and diagnostic fault trees. 
2.2.1 Sequential Testing 
Sequential testing is employed to perform fault diagnosis; a sequence of tests are generated in 
order to provide a series of potential solutions to a given problem. There is a cost associated with 
each test and therefore the aim is to obtain an optimum diagnostic solution at the lowest possible 
cost. The test sequencing problem [10] in its simplest form is defined by the four-tuple (S, p, T, 
c). Where: 
(i) S = {So, SI, ... , Sm} is a set of m + 1 system states associated with the system, where So 
denotes the fault-free state of the system and Si (l :s i :s m) denotes one of the m 
potential faulty states ofthe system. 
(ii) P = [peSo), pes)~, ... , p(Sm)], where peSo) is the conditional probability that no fault 
exists in the system and P(Si) (1 :s i:S m) denotes the probability that Si has occurred. 
(iii) T = {t), ... , tn } is a finite set of n reliable binary outcome tests. A test fails (l) if one of 
the faulty states it can detect has in fact occurred. Similarly, a test passes (0) if one of 
the states it can detect has not occurred 
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(iv) C = {Cl, ... , cn } is a set of test costs measured in terms oftime, manpower requirements 
or other economic factors, where Cj is the cost of applying test y. 
The problem which requires resolving is generating a sequential testing strategy that clearly 
isolates the system states such that the expected testing cost (i.e. diagnostic cost), given by a 
predetermined function J [to, 11], is minimised. A solution to the test sequencing problem is 
provided in the form of a decision tree. The tree specifies the test to perform next depending on 
the outcome of the previously applied tests. 
Koren and Kohavi [12] considered the problem of generating sequential decision trees for fault 
diagnosis in digital combinatorial networks. Combinatorial logic employs a concept in which 
two or more input states define one or more output states. Their main interest lies in developing 
decision trees which contain the minimal detection path; all faults are assumed to be single and 
permanent. Non-equivalent faults are allocated a pre-decided probability and therefore the root 
of the decision tree descends from these probabilities. Faults are considered equivalent if a test is 
unable to distinguish between them. The two main objectives defined in generating a sequential 
decision tree are to reduce the cost of application and the computation time required. The 
algorithm used for generating the sequential decision tree is limited to fan-out-free (tree type) 
networks. However, the concept is applicable to general networks. 
Raghaven et al. [10] assess generalised test sequencing problems which incorporate practical 
features such as precedence constraints for tests, modular diagnosis and rectification. Precedence 
constraints are considered since it is necessary for some tests to precede others when taking 
practical applications into account. Precedence constraints are allocated to specific tests for the 
diagnosis process. During modular diagnosis a failure is isolated to a particular module; this 
process is ideal for field maintenance where diagnosis can occur above the component level. In 
rectification, potentially faulty components or modules are replaced before the diagnosis process. 
When developing the optimal test sequencing algorithm, it is assumed that the available tests can 
identify the system's states unambiguously. Raghaven et al. are successful in developing AO* 
and heuristic based algorithms to solve practical test sequencing problems. AO* is a popular 
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AND/ORt graph search algorithm which follows a best-first search strategy. It thus adopts the 
policy of expanding only those nodes that belong to a potential solution graph whose cost is 
equal or less than the optimal solution. A similar line of research conducted by Deb et al. [13], 
investigates a method which could aid in quickening the test sequencing algorithms used for 
solving larger problems. 
Shakeri et al. [11] expand on the results noted in both [10] and [14]; the problem of constructing 
optimal and near-optimal test sequences for multiple fault diagnosis is assessed. The 
computational complexity involved in solving optimal multiple fault isolation is highly 
exponential. A novel feature of the diagnostic method is that it produces a diagnostic directed 
'- . 
graph - digraph through the integration of concepts stemming from graph theory as well as 
heuristic search techniques. 
In [14] Shakeri et al. consider the problem of constructing optimal and near-optimal multiple 
fault diagnosis (MFD) in bipartite digraphs with unreliable tests. The method utilised impinges 
on test sequencing. A bipartite digraph consists of a set of graph vertices which have been split 
into two distinct disjoint sets such that no two graph vertices within the same set are adjacent. 
The novel feature of the diagnostic algorithms involves the use of Lagrangian relaxation and 
sub-gradient optimisation methods. Computational results indicate that the algorithm can be used 
in systems which have up to 1000 faults. The MFD problem solving is further extended to 
involve redundant or repetitive tests. Simulation results reveal that the MFD algorithm generates 
98% of the optimal solutions and so this method does not zoom-in exactly, but provides a list of 
possible solutions. Further work is proposed to involve assessing the problem of sequential MFD 
strategy testing with unreliable tests. 
Further research from Shakeri et al. [11] assumes that the failure states are independent whilst 
the tests are reliable. In this manner, multiple fault test sequencing involves the application of 
binary outcome tests to detennine the failure states of the system. Optimisation of both fault 
diagnosis and isolation of faults is based upon minimising the expected test cost or time. The 
t An AND/OR graph is a directed graph comprising of a root node (OR node) and a nonempty set of terminal leaf 
nodes corresponding to sub-problems with known solutions. Directed graphs are discussed in Section 2.3.2. 
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fundamental method (regarding single fault identification) used within [11] is advanced by 
Zuzek et al. [15] to include asymmetrical and multi-valued tests. 
Zuiek et al. develop a sequential diagnostic tool (SDT) which enables the user to generate 
solutions to the associated test sequencing problem. The solutions deal with symmetrical, 
asymmetrical, binary and multi-valued tests. In generating the solutions, concepts from 
information theory as well as AND/OR graph search methods are integrated into the approach. 
Before implementing the running the SDT, the system status is represented by a set of system 
states. The diagnostic procedure then executes and evaluates a sequence of tests to determine the 
actual state of the system. Since the evaluation of the tests is sequential, the choice of the i-th test 
to be performed is based upon the results of the previously run (i-I) test. Any measurable 
symptom or observable event is classed as a test. The diagnostic solution is presented in the form 
of a decision tree, where the nodes correspond to tests and leaves to the diagnostic solution. 
On conducting testing the system states are split into two subsets, where A denotes the set of 
system states when a test fails and B the states when a test passes. For symmetrical testing A n 
B = 0. When conducting asymmetrical testing A n B i= 0. Symmetrical tests can either be 
passed or failed whereas in asymmetrical testing [16] at least one state will occur in both subsets. 
Asymmetrical testing also induces multi-valued testing, whereby a test may have an arbitrary 
number of possible outcomes. The main aim defined by Zuzek et al. is to optimise the diagnostic 
process. This is defined as the procedure which when conducted has the minimum cost when 
compared with other diagnostic procedures. 
The AND/OR graph search algorithms used to implement the diagnostic procedure are classified 
into two groups; one-step look ahead and global search algorithms. On comparing the two 
algorithm groups, one-step look-ahead are faster at computing solutions than global search 
whose time and space requirements can be significant. Global search algorithms do however 
produce more optimal results. Further research regarding the algorithms considered by Zuzek et 
al. is provided by Drechsler and Zuzek [17]. 
A major step has been made by Zuzek et al. with the development of a sequential diagnosis 
software tool, which is able to provide solutions to generalised cases involving either 
symmetrical or asymmetrical and binary or multi-valued tests. The fact that these tests are 
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included in the tool is an important facet of the software since it automatically becomes a more 
realistic option when considering diagnosis of engineering applications. 
The research described by Koren and Kohavi [12], Shakeri et al. [14], Raghaven et al. [10] and 
Zuzek et al. [15] is limited to scenarios involving single fault diagnosis. It is assumed that testing 
occurs frequently enough to ensure that only one failure occurs during the time frame. The 
sequential testing technique is however extended by Shakeri et al. [11] to include multiple fault 
diagnosis. A procedure which generates a diagnostic directed graph as opposed to a diagnostic 
decision tree is considered. 
2.2.2 Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian Networks are used extensively within the artificial intelligence (AI) fraternity since 
they enable the use of probability theory. They are compact, expressive representations of 
uncertain relationships among parameters in a domain [18, 19]. Bayesian networks are also a 
practical method which can be utilised in order to deal with uncertainty in knowledge based 
systems that have a firm theoretical foundation in statistics. 
A simple Bayesian Network is illustrated in Figure 2-2. Node A represents the parent (or cause) 
node and node B the child (or effect) node. The arc joining the nodes represents the causal 
relationship between the variables. If A has two states: true or false, B may have three states: 
normal, above normal or below normal. Bayesian networks are therefore used as a method for 
obtaining information about certain variables given data on others. 
Figure 2-2. A Simple Bayesian Network 
Wolbrecht et al. [20] concentrate on applying Bayesian networks to a multi stage process 
containing numerous parts. All monitoring and diagnosis is performed on-line and in real time 
with the aim of determining the problems quickly and efficiently. The task set differs from 
conventional Bayesian networks where diagnosis is performed after a failure has occurred. The 
method is applied to a cap alignment process comprising four stages: (1) cap alignment, (2) pre-
join operations, (3) join process and (4) post-join operations. Cap alignment is a significant 
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manufacturing engineering process due to its applicability to a range of products, varying from 
bottles and jars to individual printer components and cartridges. 
Results from the model show that, in general, it can be applied to manufacturing processes where 
parts are produced in a sequential manner as well as having inspection points located at several 
positions along the production line. Correct diagnosis of process faults is provided in real-time 
with the shutting down of failed components upon detectiori. The diagnosis system can however 
only provide useful information given correct configuration settings. The main problem with the 
diagnosis system is related to the' updating of posterior probabilities. The current algorithm is of 
the order 'n', regarding the number of parts in the system and n2, with regards to the number of 
component nodes. This means that the system is not completely scalable to larger processes. 
Research is currently underway to solve this problem. 
Paasch and Durgi [21] consider applying Bayesian networks to the bleed air control system of a 
Boeing 737NR aircraft. Two Bayesian networks are generated to represent the system logically. 
A behaviour model illustrates the behaviour of the system including its dependence on the 
performance of relevant components and a general model considers the physical system 
components and their indication failure sets. Information regarding component failure modes and 
failure rates is obtained from a FMECA t analysis. 
From the application of Bayesian networks to the Boeing 737NR they are found to be a useful 
tool in decision making, with regards to the status of individual components within the systems. 
Inaccuracies in the method are believed to be due to the inherent assumption of there being 
conditional independence between nodes of the network. Once constructed, Bayesian networks 
can easily be adapted to accommodate minor changes in system data or configuration. They are 
however, too complex for obtaining an optimal multi-fault diagnosis strategy with current 
available software. 
t Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
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2.2.3 Diagnostic Fault Trees 
Price discusses the ways in which diagnostic fault trees are used in the representation of 
diagnosability problems due to the straightforward manner in which they can be interpreted [2]. 
A diagnostic tree (Fi~re 2-3) follows a simple trouble-shooting format. The tree extends from a 
diamond shaped box containing the first diagnostic test to be conducted. The next possible action 
is then drawn beneath it; a solution is represented by a rectangular box. The test and solution 
boxes are linked by answers (yes or no). In this manner, diagnostic fault trees follow a similar 
structure to that exhibited by decision trees formed from conducting sequential diagnosis. The 
issue surrounding diagnostic fault trees regards assessing scalability; they can rapidly become 
large structures and it is thus difficult to keep track of all the tests, solutions and branches. 
Yes TestA No 
I SolutionA 
Yes TestB No 
I SolutionB I I Solution C I 
Figure 2-3. A Simple Diagnostic Fault Tree 
2.2:4 Summary 
• The knowledge basis for a rule-based diagnostic system is comprised from a set of 
rules. These rules contain specific pieces of information which are relevant to the 
problem being solved and consist of an IF-THEN structure. 
• The rules are mutually exclusive and thus can be used in any order. 
• The data contained within the rules is assimilated in a clear and concise format. 
• The implementation of a rule-based diagnostic strategy revolves around the 
identification ofa knowledge base (set of rules). 
• With regards to the seal ability issues associated with extending rule-based reasoning to 
larger systems, the only requirement is that all of the rules considered necessary are 
defined. 
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• Rule-based systems are unable to learn from past experiences in a similar manner to 
case based systems. However, with regards to maintaining the knowledge base for a 
particular system, all that is required is for the rules to be updated if necessary. 
• Rule-based reasoning only assesses one condition at a time and thus the overall system 
is not taken into consideration. 
• With regards to larger systems, obtaining a complete set of rules is likely to be a 
complicated process due to the intricate nature of more complex systems. 
• In general, rule-based diagnostic systems deal with single fault isolation. Given the 
complexities associated with modem systems, the identification of multiple failure 
combinations is a necessity and hence this area is not considered further. 
2.3 Model-Based Diagnostic Method 
Model-based diagnostics is a deductive process. It involves using explicit system models as the 
central analysis scheme for the overall process of monitoring, hypothesising faults, prediction 
and fault isolation. Models of system behaviour are developed to describe normal operating 
conditions. The observed system behaviour is then compared with that modelled to determine the 
presence or absence of deviations. Potential causes of failure are established through conducting 
fault diagnosis, if system deviations have been previously noted. 
Model-based reasonmg thus commences from the symptoms (deviations) exhibited by the 
system behaviour and determines the underlying faults through 'tracing' within the model. Three 
model-based diagnostic strategies, which are further applied in Chapter Three, are discussed in 
this section. 
2.3.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FM EA is an inductive qualitative reliability analysis tool which uses a 'what happens if 
approach in order to identify potential system failure modes, their causes and effects on the 
operability of the system under investigation. The method involves breaking the system into 
component or sub-assembly blocks which can be investigated for possible failure modes. Each 
failure mode is classified according to the effect which it has on the overall running of the 
system. Through using reliability data, failure rates can be related to the failure modes for 
quantification requirements. Extensions to FM EA involve the inclusion of criticality analysis 
(FMECA). FMECA further ranks each failure mode according to the combined effect of both its 
severity classification and probability of failure. 
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Price [22] has based his research within the area of FMEA; more specifically, automated fault 
diagnosis from FMEA. The results generated from FMEA, when carried out by an engineer, tend 
not to be exploited to their full potential. This can be attributed to both the irregularities of 
descriptions for the same faults, as recorded by engineers, and lack of multiple fault information, 
since FMEA tends to be carried out for single faults only. 
AutoSteve [23, 24] is a tool which has been developed to automate the FMEA process. It 
performs single failure FMEA based on the simulation of a circuit design and produces a textual 
report with appropriate content for an engineer to understand. AutoSteve is a model-based tool 
which employs qualitative model-based reasoning. It is noted that diagnostic fault trees can also 
be developed from FM EA results since it is possible to identify all failures which cause the same 
effect on a specific system function [22]. 
AutoSteve performs automated electrical design analysis based on qualitative simulation and 
functional abstraction. Once the structure of a circuit is drawn within an electrical CAD tool, it 
can be extracted and used alongside the component descriptions in order to simulate the circuit. 
AutoSteve analyses the current flow patterns in the circuit when considering both working and 
faulty components. From this, AutoSteve is able to generate the behaviour of the overall circuit. 
Functional abstraction is used to interpret the results from the simulation stage. Functional 
reasoning characterises the significant overall behaviour of a system with regards to the specific 
system functions which are considered. AutoSteve uses functional labels to identify the most 
important attributes of the system. These labels may be used for recognising and interpreting 
circuit activity or as a basis for assigning severity and detection values [24]. The automated 
report which is produced is consistent of an FM EA format, stating possible failure modes and 
potential effects and causes. 
With regards to the limitations of the automated process it is not possible to generate all 
combinations of failures for large systems due to the vast calculation time required. AutoSteve 
further assumes that there is a clear separation between subsystems, this is a drastic assumption 
especially since a single fault could occur between two subsystems, if a failure is induced 
through interaction, it is likely that it would pass unnoticed. Finally, certain tests may not be 
specific enough to determine the exact fault, especially in the case of one which develops 
gradually. The automated approach does however generate a more complete coverage of 
potential faults. 
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The FM EA approach is further progressed by Price and Taylor [25] in order to produce an 
FMEA report which contains an analysis of the effects of significant multiple failures as well as 
single failures. It would be impractical to assume an engineer is capable of producing such an 
analysis and therefore by automating the procedure this ensures that more failure combinations 
can be explored. Two key issues are identified which must be overcome before successfully 
considering multiple failures: 
(i) Generating all combinations of failures is not a feasible option when considering larger 
circuits. 
(ii) Engineers are required to understand and act upon the automated FMEA results. 
However, it is considered unreasonable to assume they are capable of examining a 
report which contains thousands of multiple failures. 
The aim stated by Price and Taylor is to focus the multiple FMEA report on the significant 
failures. The first key issue is addressed through comparing the probability of a failure 
combination against a specified threshold. Any failure combination with a failure probability 
which is above the threshold is simulated. Failure probabilities are not generated for all 
combinations. Single failures are generated first, then pairs of failures; triple and higher failure 
combinations are only generated from pairs of failures which are still above the threshold. The 
next phase involves analysing the resulting FMEA report and removing all multiple failure 
results which could have been inferred by combining the single failure reports. 
The implementation of the multiple failure FMEA strategy in automotive electrical systems has 
been verified. The automated FMEA process describes the failures and effects precisely and 
consistently within the report. With regards to the removal of inferred multiple failures; the 
combined effect of faults, in some cases, is considered to be more severe than the effect of a 
single fault. Such combinations are not however reported in the given strategy. Two key 
advantages are identified from the research with regards to the use of design infonnation to 
construct a diagnostic system. Firstly, the models used for design are reused thus reducing the 
time required and effort involved in constructing a diagnostic system. Secondly, it leads to 
efficient runtime systems since the detailed model analysis is already complete. 
2.3.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FT A) 
FT A is a deductive approach. Fault trees (FT) are used extensively within reliability studies as a 
means for identifying the possible component failure combinations and operator errors which 
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may have caused a specific system malfunction. The tree is built from a top event (malfunction) 
downwards using logical AND/OR gates to combine the causal events (failure combinations). 
The lowest level component failure modes considered are represented by basic events. When 
considering a complete set of system failure modes (top events) it is necessary for more than one 
fault tree to be constructed since a single fault tree only considers one of the possible system 
failure modes. 
Research into automating FTA in order to address the subjectivity issue associated with their 
manual generation is conducted by Hogan et al. [26-28]; specific focus is placed on hydraulic 
systems. A reconfigurable program is developed which utilises a library of qualitative 
component models to enable FT A of arbitrary hydraulic circuit configurations. The qualitative 
component models describe the behaviour of separate and distinct pieces of hydraulic equipment 
under both normal and faulty operating conditions. The main variables considered are pressure 
and flow. As a means of facilitating qualitative reasoning, the parameters are studied in three 
ranges with the labels high, normal and low. An additional range labelled zero is taken into 
account for the flow variable. The automated strategy is successfully applied to an experimental 
rig. The qualitative reasoning strategy employed by Hogan et al. does however struggle to 
distinguish between low and zero values and therefore the user is required to make sure no 
component failure combinations are missed when analysing top events involving the parameter 
low. 
Papadopoulos [29] presents an application which has the ability to use fault trees as a reference 
model for a safety monitoring system conducting real-time diagnosis. In order to address the 
problem of component interdependency the fault trees are complemented with a dynamic model 
of system behaviour. In this manner, the fault trees can then be interpreted accurately by the 
diagnosis system within the correct context of the dynamic operation. The dynamic section 
illustrates the behaviour of the system and its sub-systems as well as identifying any transitions 
made by the components to deviant or failed states from the normal operating condition. A 
hazard and operability study analysis t is used to identify and record any abnormal functional 
t Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) are a qualitative method used within risk assessment. The fundamental 
concept being to identify hazards which may arise within a system. 
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states. The failure transitions represent the top events of fault trees. The model, unlike in normal 
fault trees, records sequences of failures; thus taking into account their chronological order so 
providing a simplified representation of the failures within the system. It is noted that NOT logic 
is excluded from the fault trees considered by Papadopoulos and therefore only component 
failures are taken into account when obtaining a diagnostic result. 
Paasch et al. [30-32] address system modelling based upon conceptual (and therefore undefined), 
partially defined and fully defined mechanical systems. A method aimed at evaluating the 
diagnosability of a product is considered. Diagnosability is defined as the ease with which a 
failure causing loss of function is isolated; this requires investigation of both systems and 
components. Poor diagnosability leads to an increase in life cycle costs through the additional 
maintenance time and thus cost required. A metric common to mechanical systems which 
enables the prediction of costs is Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals (MTBUR). 
MTBUR is a function of both system structure and line replaceable unit (LRU) failure rates. A 
FT model is assembled from a generic FMEA to include the failure rate of the LRU and the 
mode in which it fails. Consideration of system MTBUR values allows for immediate 
assessment of the LRUs that pose a threat to diagnosability as well as determining feasible 
improvements. Each LRU MTBUR value is compared in order to ascertain which LRU poses a 
worse diagnostic challenge. Alterations conducted on the system, based upon these values, thus 
lead to a decrease in cost. 
Further research regarding diagnosability is presented in [33-36]. Having the ability to predict 
system diagnosability during the early design phase leads to the production of systems with 
effi?ient fault isolation. The diagnosability model employed by Henning and Paasch [34] is 
developed through combining the FM EA and FT A of a system. FM EA and FT A provide a 
complementary picture of the reliability and structure of a system during the early stages of the 
design phase. The diagnosability model is thus formed through linking indication sets to 
corresponding system components. The indication sets are established through analysis of 
deviation information retrieved from FM EA. It is assumed that diagnosis occurs with all 
indications correctly observed. Results from the diagnosis reveals data on system characteristics, 
failure indications as well as on individual components which both improve diagnosis time and 
minimise the cost of fault isolation. Throughout their research, it is assumed that only one 
component is the cause of a particular system failure indication and that all system indications 
are binary, thereby only inferring pass or fail. 
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More recent research which has been undertaken in the field of fault diagnostics, based on the 
application of fault tree analysis [37, 38], is described in detail in Chapter Three. The method 
proposed by Hurdle et al. uses a model to identify the system state at any given point. Fault tree 
analysis is used to explain the presence of deviations between the observed system state and that 
expected by the model. The causes for a system failure mode are described in terms of specific 
component states. This is achieved through the employment of both coherent and non-coherent 
fault trees. A non-coherent fault tree takes NOT logic into account. In this manner, both 
component-failed and component-working states can be considered. 
2.3.2 Digraphs 
2.3.2.1 Introduction 
A digraph, also known as a directed graph, is comprised from a set of nodes and edges (or arcs). 
The nodes (V) represent system process variables or component failure modes of an application 
. system, whilst the edges (E) illustrate the relationships which exist between nodes. Digraphs 
demonstrate the 'cause-effect' associations present within a system [41]; a simple analogy is 
transcribed as 'input - output'. The general digraph model, in mathematical terms [40], is 
represented by Equation 2-1. 
DO = (V,E) (Eq 2-1) 
The edges (lines) connecting the nodes (circles) in a digraph represent the interrelationships 
between process variables, or between component failure modes and process variables, within an 
engineering application. Digraph nodes contain an alphanumeric label which illustrates the 
specific process variable or component failure mode under investigation. With regards to process 
variable nodes, the numeric section of the label corresponds to a precise location within the 
application system. The precursor to the numeric section indicates the type of process variable 
the node represents. Examples of process variables include temperature, mass flow, pressure and 
signals from sensors. Each edge has an associated number, termed gain [41, 42], which is used to 
represent the relationship between nodes. Where a number appears on its own, the relationship is 
normally true. In certain situations a condition may be noted which defines when the indicated 
relationship applies. The logic system used consists of five discrete numbers: -10, -1, 0, + 1, + 10. 
These are used in two distinct senses to represent both deviations in process variables and the 
gain associated with edges. A simple digraph is illustrated in Figure 2-4. 
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+1 
Figure 2-4. A Simple Digraph Representation 
In the simple digraph illustration nodes PI and P2 are connected by a single signed edge. The 
alphanumeric code PI represents pressure at location one. Since a directed edge connects P2 to 
PI, PI is noted the independent variable and P2 the dependent variable. The gain associated with 
the edge in Figure 2-4 is equal to 8(P2) / 8(P1). In this case, the edge signing '+1' indicates that 
pressure at location one has a positive effect on pressure at location two. 
From current research it is noted that digraphs are an attractive tool in fault diagnosis since they 
are relatively straightforward to understand and provide a pictorial representation (model) of the 
interactions between process variables and component failure modes. Digraphs have commonly 
been used in the chemical processing field due to their effective modelling of the cause and 
effect relationships between the process variables involved. Research [41, 43, 44] has also 
focussed on the use of digraphs in representing control loops. The fault diagnosis methods 
employed can be divided into forward search and backward search. These two search methods 
rely on a global view of the process data. In forward search possible root causes are proposed for 
the observed symptoms. Analysis then concentrates on back tracing through the digraph to 
compare the consequences of the proposed root causes with any abnormal measurements 
obtained. 
Disturbance propagation in a digraph is governed by a number of rules; these are further applied 
in Chapters Three and Four. In brief, a process variable which notes a deviation from the normal 
state is marked. The value '0' is considered to represent the normal state and the discrete values 
previously noted are utilised to identify the extent of the disturbance. For example, if mass flow 
is expected at a particular point in a system and no flow is retrieved from a sensor then the 
disturbance is considered to be 'large negative' and is thus represented by '-10'. The magnitude 
value' 10' is utilised to describe a disturbance, the correction of which cannot be accomplished 
by a control action. Conversely, the value' 1 ' represents a disturbance which can be corrected by 
a control action [41]. The signs' -' and '+' are used to indicate if the disturbance is less than or 
greater than normal. During a backwards search in the digraph, only the component failure mode 
nodes that could lead to the noted disturbance at the dependent node are taken into account. 
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Mathematically, the logic that describes the propagation of a disturbance is given by Equation 2-
2. 
Where; 
D(IndN) 
D(DepN) = D(IndN) x 5 (DepN) 
(IndN) 
Disturbance at the independent node 
D(DepN) Disturbance at the dependent node 
o(DepNlIndN) Gain associated with the edge connecting DepN to IndN 
(Eq 2-2) 
A backward search example is illustrated in Figure 2-5. In backward search possible root causes 
are ascertained through working backwards from the abnormal measurements to find common 
explanations. A large positive abnormal measurement (disturbance/deviation) is noted at node 
M3. This is represented by 'highlighting' the respective node in the model. Subsequent 
propagation of the disturbance through the system is denoted by marking all of the nodes which 
were affected by the initial highlighting. The absolute value of the disturbance of the dependent 
variable cannot exceed' 10' [42]. The faults determined are: 
(i) M3(+10) ~ Fault 3, 
(ii) M3(+1O) ~ M2(+10) ~ Ml(+10) ~ Fault 1. 
Figure 2-5. Backward Search Representation 
Tateno et al. [45] consider an algorithm with improved search capabilities. The method searches 
for sensors with 'stuck faults'. The effectiveness of the method is illustrated through application 
to a tank pipeline system. In the signed directed graph illustrated in [45] the relationships 
between the system variables are expressed in terms of '0', '+1' and' -1', representing normal, 
higher than nonnal and lower than normal respectively. However, the signing terminology 
causes certain difficulties when conducting any search. This is due to the difficulties involved in 
determining the right thresholds which can divide measured system parameters into normal and 
abnormal states. 
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Kokawa et al. [46] propose a fault location method which can deal with failure propagation time 
and failure propagation probability. The failure propagation data from the plant under 
investigation is used in order to evaluate the priority rankings of screened failure modes. Other 
proposed fault diagnosis methods that determine the fault set involve analysing the digraph 
model in steady-state, 'off-line' conditions and then constructing a series of 'if x happens then y 
will take place' rules [47]. These rules incorporate tests from measured variables and are then 
used for on-line diagnosis testing and thus incorporate rule-based reasoning. Digraphs are also 
used to model devices (or components) as opposed to process variables. In this case the nodes 
represent devices (or components) and the edges simply illustrate the propagation of failure 
between them. Failure propagation times and probabilities could also be assigned to edges, 
although problems may arise when attempting to allocate these if exact numbers are unknown. 
It is noted that should a fault diagnosis method consider dynamic effects, real-time diagnosis 
monitoring of complex systems would reap the benefits. In this respect digraphs show potential 
for being used in automated real-time fault diagnosis. If time constants were to be incorporated 
into digraph models then there would be the capacity to recognise incipient, intermittent and 
abrupt faults. Furthermore, the addition of an 'AND' gate would allow for the incorporation of. 
system redundancy features. The gate is represented by a bar, as illustrated by Figure 2-6; two or 
more directed edges terminate on one side of the bar (inputs) and a single directed edge projects 
from the other side (output). The output will however, only occur if all of the inputs are 
'marked'. Therefore, when conducting a backward search past the 'AND' gate, the diagnostic 
solution has to take into account possible failures from both lines feeding into the gate. 
Figure 2-6. 'AND' Gate Representation 
A digraph models how significant qualitative changes in a system affect the parameters under 
investigation. Further research involving digraphs within the field of system fault diagnosis is 
conducted in Chapter Three. The remaining parts of Section 2.3.2 expand on the different aspects 
associated with digraphs. 
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2.3.2.2 Signed Directed Graphs 
Signed Directed Graphs (SDG) are commonly used within the reliability engineering field. A 
SDG [43-57] provides a graphical representation of the system causal process information 
whereby the process variables are represented by nodes and their causal relationships by the 
directed arcs joining the nodes. SDG nodes are given a value of (0), (+) or (-) depending on 
whether the node represents normal, higher than normal or lower than normal steady-state 
values. Signs associated with the directed arcs define whether the cause and effect nodes change 
in the same direction (+) or opposite directions (-). 
Directed graphs were originally assumed to represent the cause-effect relationships in a model 
through the directed arcs which connected the relevant nodes. From this, SDGs were developed 
whereby a positive or negative sign is attached to the directed arcs [54, 55]. In recent years, 
however, digraphs and SDGs have come to represent similar principles. The main difference lies 
with the fact that the signed arcs in digraphs hold a numeric value so as to indicate a more 
precise relationship. This value is considered in terms of a magnitude with regards to large 
positive or small positive for example. 
Iri et al. [48] were the first to implement SDGs in system fault diagnosis through the application 
of graph theory to the diagnosis of system failures in a chemical process. The procedure 
followed involved generating a cause-effect (CE) graph from the SDG of the system under 
investigation. The SDG replaces the mathematical model of the system and simply illustrates the 
influences which exist between specific elements. The CE graph consists of nodes which 
represent an abnormality and consistent arcs detailing the possible propagation of a failure and 
thus the observed symptom pattern. Normal nodes are disregarded since they do not provide a 
path between sensor and fault nodes. 
With regards to the fault diagnosis process, either all or the majority of the process variables in 
the SDG are monitored. The indication of an abnormality being present leads to the 
consideration of the CE graph and thus identification of potential fault causes through following 
the pattern of propagation. Diagnostic reasoning ceases once the combinatorial search space is 
exhausted. For cases whereby not all process variables are monitored a CE graph with a partial 
pattern is developed. 
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Iri et al. [49] extend the research through considering both observed and unobserved nodes in 
locating the origin of a system failure. Observed nodes are those whose signs are measured. 
Conversely, the signs of unobserved nodes are unknown. It is detennined that the removal of 
unobserved nodes from the SDG results in loss of infonnation, which may cause the essential 
structure of the problem to be altered. Consequently, an SDG with a partial pattern is developed. 
It is also assumed that each system failure has a single point of origin, thereby restricting the 
possible locations as far as possible. 
Kokawa et al. [46] further investigate the use of SDGs in detennining the location of failures. 
Two factors are utilised alongside SDGs in identifying the fault location: 
(i) Partial system dynamics such as the time required for the fault to propagate from one 
process variable to another. 
(ii) Failure probability infonnation. 
The requirement for signing directed arcs is redundant in this case; however, the method is 
limited to systems with no feedback loops. 
Chang and Yu [50] consider three techniques for simplifying an SDG for fault diagnosis. 
Simplification is achieved through considering (1) measured and unrneasured variables,. (2) state 
of the system and (3) additional process knowledge. Chang and Yu consider unmeasured 
variables to be ineffective in fault diagnosis and therefore their respective nodes are removed. 
Arcs connected to unrneasured nodes are replaced by a single edge linking measured nodes. 
Infonnation related to known system states is utilised as a means of developing conditional arcs 
between specific nodes. In this manner, the diagnostic solution is considered to he modular. 
Finally, additional process knowledge is called upon in order to detennine the dominant effect in 
the fault propagation illustrated in the "sDG. Special attention is also paid toward control loops in 
[49], with rule-based equations used to solve known ambiguities associated with non-single 
transitions. 
Tarifa and Scenna [51] develop an algorithm for fault diagnosis in bio-insecticide production 
(batch processes) which is based on SDGs. The bio-insecticide production unit in question is 
decomposed into partial processes known as pseudo-continuous blocks (PCB). Process digraphs 
for each PCB are developed and qualitative simulation is conducted on these SDOs in order to 
obtain associated fault patterns for potential faults. The diagnosis issue is thus dealt with in a 
29 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
modular manner. Tarifa and Scenna chose the SDG method since relatively little information is 
required in order to set up the digraphs and perform the diagnosis. 
Vedam and Venkatasubramanian [52] concentrate on generating an SDG based algorithm for the 
multiple fault diagnosis problem. The probability of multiple faults occurring is often small; 
however, should multiple faults occur, it is difficult for the operator to identify the root causes. 
The algorithm developed is computationally expensive and the time required for performing the 
computational calculations increases exponentially with the nUIl)ber of root nodes. The algorithm 
therefore only explores and expands the multiple faults on an 'as needed basis' as a means of 
reducing the computational time required. It is applied to a fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU). 
FCCUs are a core component within the refining industry and convert heavier oils into lighter 
fractions. 
The multiple fault diagnosis problem is also addressed by Zhang et al. [53]. A new SDG multiple 
fault diagnosis method using real-time inverse inference is proposed. The research is in the early 
stages and the authors recognise that future work is necessary. The inference method commences 
from the adverse consequences and inversely conducts a complete search of the SDG in order to 
determine which causes led to the consequence and possible fault propagation paths. The main 
difference noted between [52] and [53] is in the basic idea behind diagnosis; the variable 
observations used by the algorithm developed by Vedam and Venkatasubramanian refer to 
offline simulation results as opposed to being conducted in real-time. 
Palmer and Chung [54, 55] further expand the research based in the field of chemical process 
plants and also consider the modular aspect. in developing SDGs. Process plants are built by 
connecting sets of smaller units to conduct the required functions. The behaviour of each unit is 
modelled generically so that it is applicable to any plant in which the unit is used. The plant SDG 
is generated by combining the relevant generic unit models. Two main issues are identified when 
constructing unit-based qualitative models: (1) difficulty in constructing the model and (2) 
ambiguities, due to multiple causal paths between nodes, may oCcur when combining units. 
Palmer and Chung develop a computer aided modelling tool to overcome the noted problems and 
thus allow a plant SDG to be constructed simply and correctly. Results obtained from conducting 
fault diagnosis using the SDG are compared with those retrieved from a HAZOP analysis both 
for verification purposes and to ensure that no ambiguous inferences are found. 
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Maurya et al. concentrate on the development of SDGs from underlying system mathematical 
descriptions with their research split into two sections. Firstly, the systematic development of 
graph models and the respective conceptual relationship is addressed [56]. Focus is then based 
on the development of SDG models for control loops and the application of graph based 
approaches at a flow sheet level [43, 57]. It is detennined that the reliability of SDG based 
analysis is highly dependent upon the accuracy of the mathematical model from which the 
system equations are generated. 
Maurya et al. [44] expand on past research through developing a new algorithm for steady-state 
fault diagnosis based on a system SDG model that employs a combination of forward and 
backward reasoning. In this manner, both forward and backward searching is conducted in the 
SDG. The proposed algorithm is able to detennine single fault scenarios. Further work is 
however required in order to extend the procedure to incorporate multiple fault situations. Faults 
displaying a similar pattern in the measured variables cannot be distinguished between without 
using quantitative infonnation. It is anticipated that the diagnostic algorithm will be applied to 
larger case studies of increased complexity in order to assess its true effectiveness. 
2.3.2.3 Algorithms Incorporating Digraph Methodology 
Rao [58] addresses the problem of diagnosing single faults in systems whose fault propagation 
can be modelled using directed graphs. The single fault diagnosis problem primarily deals with 
identifying the set of all likely fault sources which correspond to a given set of active· 'alanns' 
(outcomes). Rao considers two algorithms, Forward and Backward for computing all of the 
possible candidates (component failure modes) corresponding to a single fault which activates a 
. given outcome. The Forward algorithm simply moves forward from candidates assessing 
whether they satisfy the condition, whilst the Backward algorithm moves backwards. With 
regards to worst case complexities, results show that the Backward algorithm is better equipped. 
It is noted that the Forward algorithm could be improved through using the A * algorithm to 
implement the forward motion. An A * algorithm is an example of a best-first search: search 
algorithm which optimises the search of the design space by starting at the root node and 
exploring all neighbouring nodes through ordering the infonnation flow paths according to a 
certain heuristic. 
Rao analyses the perfonnance of the two algorithms by applying them to a unifonnly random 
generated system. More conclusive results would be obtained should the process be applied to an 
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actual engineering system. Furthermore, in current fault diagnostic strategies it is necessary for 
multiple faults to be taken into consideration in order to aid the production of more feasible 
results associated with real-life engineering products. 
Chessa and Santi [59] consider the problem of multiple fault diagnosis in safety-critical systems. 
In a similar manner to other research conducted in this area the system is represented as a 
directed graph, known as the system graph. The nodes of the system can also be equipped with 
'alarms' (representing a given sensor outcome) in one of two states: ringing or silent. The 
operative diagnosis problem is therefore dealt with; isolation of sources which cause faulty 
conditions within the operation of a system. In this manner, potential failure sources are 
identified based upon a set of 'alarms' attached to the system components (nodes). 
Chessa and Santi conduct their assessment through applying the MFD problem to a 19 element 
pump system used in a liquefied petroleum gas plant. Assuming that errors only propagate along 
the edges of the graph, two algorithms are proposed: 
(i) D-FAULTS: diagnosis of the system is possible through assuming that at most two 
nodes are faulty at anyone time. 
(ii) S-DIAG: diagnosis through using sequential diagnosis theory. The faulty system is 
restored to its normal operating conditions through repeatedly conducting the 
computational and testing phases. 
It is noted that further research [60] is required in order to evaluate the average performance of 
the two proposed algorithms and also at comparing both the double faults and sequential 
diagnosis approaches. 
Shakeri et al. [61] consider multiple fault isolation in redundant systems where the system is 
modelled by a digraph. A minimum fault algorithm is developed as a means of determining 
minimum faults and generating their failure signatures; this information is necessary in order to 
conduct fault diagnosis. The algorithm, along with a sequential test strategy represented in the 
form of an AND/OR graph, is extended for use in the Sure Strategies [11]. The methodology and 
algorithms used are integrated into a graphical user interface through using the TEAMS software 
tool [62-65]. 
Iverson and Pattersine-Hine [66] introduce an algorithm, named SourceDoubls, which efficiently 
solves singletons and doubletons of all the nodes in a digraph model. Should a particular failure 
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cause a target failure event, then that failure is known as a singleton of the given event. A 
doubleton is simply the combination of two failures via an AND gate. Singletons and doubletons 
are used in fault diagnosis since they represent possible causes for a given failure event and can 
be used as a means for calculating quantitative values in system reliability. The digraph solution 
is reached once all of the singletons are processed, along with the propagation of doubletons 
from each AND gate. 
SourceDoubls is incorporated into a tool which allows the analyst to interact with the digraph 
model through a graphical user interface. The algorithm operates on an object-oriented 
programming basis. Overall, SourceDoubls reduces the solution time required for digraph 
models when compared with older methodologies and therefore is considered effective in real-
time automated monitoring and diagnosis. Furthermore, the digraph model can be updated with 
system changes and so continuously used to find failure causes for a given failure. Due to the 
fast digraph processing time of the Sourcedoubls algorithm, it is possible to use a digraph model 
as a means for testing a failure scenario. Faults can thus be introduced into a digraph model and 
evaluated to produce a diagnostic solution. 
The object-oriented SourceDoubls algorithm reduces the solution time required for large digraph 
models of complex systems from days to minutes. It is currently in use at the NASAlJohnson 
Space Center USC). JSC used digraph models in the ground based fault detection and 
management system for the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom. The use of digraph 
models enables the flight controllers to quickly diagnose and correct problems. Most research 
involving digraphs is centred on the representation of a directed graph as DG = (V, E) in an 
algorithm. The SourceDoubls algorithm is however an exception, since it uses a digraph pictorial 
as an input into the program. 
2.3.2.4 Integration of Digraphs illtO Reliability 
Digraph models have been incorporated into, and used with, other reliability tools such as 
HAZOP analysis [67, 68], fault trees [69, 70] and Petri nets [71]. Andrews and Brennan [41] 
apply the digraph method of fault tree (FT) construction to a two stream gas regulating system. 
This work expands on previous research conducted by Andrews and Morgan [42] plus that of 
Kohda and Henley [72]. 
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Andrews et al. [41, 42] propose a method for generating FTs from digraphs. It is noted that FT A 
is a well known tool which is used extensively within fault diagnosis. However, should two 
engineers be given a system with the same undesired event, it is assumed highly probable that 
they will develop FTs with differing structures. FT construction from the system digraph is 
developed through the use of negative feedback and feedforward loop operators for any noted 
control loops. Developing a FT for a section of the digraph which does not incorporate a control 
loop is relatively straight forward as illustrated by Figures 2-:-7 and 2-8. Figures 2-9 and 2-10 
exemplify the process involved should control loop operators be employed. 
Figure 2-7. Simple Digraph 
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Figure 2-9. NFBL Operator 
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Figure 2-8. FT Generation from a Simple Digraph 
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Figure 2-10. NFFL Operator 
A negative feedback loop (NFBL) is able to correct any moderate disturbances which exist 
within process variables. The respective digraph path starts and ends at the same node, the 
product of all of the normal gains around the NFBL is negative. A negative feedforward loop 
(NFFL), in theory, is able to cancel any disturbances which may exist within process variables 
and thus stop the deviation from travelling any further within the system. However in practise, 
exact cancellation does not take place. A NFFL is modelled using two or more paths which 
extend from one node to another on a digraph. The sign of the product of all of the normal gains 
is different on each of the paths. 
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As part of diagnosis, digraphs are utilised within maintenance. Wani and Gandhi [73] develop a 
procedure which is based upon using digraphs and matrices as a means of generating a 
maintainability index for mechanical systems. Features of mechanical systems with regards to 
system maintainability are defined as attributes. Examples include accessibility, 
disassembly/assembly and identification. For each attribute (represented as a node) there is a 
corresponding unique characteristic feature. Interrelationships between attributes are developed 
\ 
through using these characteristic features. The digraph demonstrates an understanding of the 
system which can be exploited at the design phase. There is also a clear representation of the 
system maintainability. In order to retain a clear visualisation, only the main attributes are 
considered within the digraph. A maintainability index, which provides an evaluation of the 
system maintainability, is generated by transcribing the information contained within the digraph 
into a matrix format. 
Wani extends the digraph and matrix approach in conducting life cycle design and assessment of 
mechanical systems [74]. In this case attributes are defined as features which characterise the life 
cycle aspects of the system. Consideration of these attributes and their interrelations is of 
primary significance in order to evaluate the influence of factors on the life cycle of a product 
and thus identify weaknesses in the design. The digraph and matrix approach is successfully 
applied to fuel tank designs. Application to systems of increased complexity [75] will determine 
the overall effectiveness of the method. 
Further background information covenng the wider usage of digraphs within the field of 
reliability is expanded in Appendix A. 
2.3.3 Summary 
• 
• 
• 
Model-based diagnostic reasoning employs a deductive reasoning process. 
A model depicting the expected system behaviour is generated and compared with the 
observed behaviour in order to determine the presence or absence of parameter 
deviations. The presence of a deviation is assumed indicative of a failure having 
occurred. 
A system model is relatively straightforward to generate since information relating to 
the application system will already be in existence and thus be readily available. In 
addition, model modifications are only necessary should the system be altered or 
adapted. 
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• Model-based diagnostic methods are able to detect multiple failures for a given 
deviating variable and can also be implemented into real-time analysis. 
• The development of a model is highly dependent on the availability of relevant 
application data as well as the interpretation ofthat data by an analyst. 
• Despite current engineering drawings being of an extremely high standard there are 
often discrepancies between the model and physical structure of the system under 
investigation. 
• The majority of model-based diagnostic systems generate a new model for each 
specific application. Each model therefore provides a suitable representation of the 
process logic involved for the system under investigation. 
• Digraphs and fault trees are static failure space models such that when modelling a 
system the two reliability methods depict the effects of both faults and failures on a 
system. The methods vary in terms of the perspective which each provides with regards 
to expressing system behaviour through failure component combinations. Digraphs and 
fault trees are complementary; digraphs are better suited to illustrating fault 
propagation paths through a system whilst fault trees are superior in top-down analysis. 
Both methods in a combinatorial sense are, however, equivalent. 
• Model-based reasoning is researched further due to: 
- The identification of multiple failure combinations. 
- Information is readily obtainable from physical illustrations of the system under 
investigation in order to generate the model for analysis. 
- Sensor deviations are taken into consideration and it is possible to deal with the 
overall system as opposed to being compelled to conducting rules in a precise 
structure and thus only analysing specific sections. In other words, a complete set 
of system information is available from the relevant sensors which the 
diagnostician may wish to take into account. 
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Chapter Three 
System Fault Diagnostics of the Water 
Tank System 
The water tank constitutes a simple system which is used as a means of investigating the 
suitability of fault diagnostic methods. This chapter focuses on the application and review of four 
diagnostic methodologies; Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), the Sequential 
Diagnosis Tool (SDT), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and digraphs. Key areas, identified as 
requiring further research, are highlighted along with a proposed strategy at the end of the 
chapter. 
3.1 System Description 
The aim of the water tank system is to maintain the fluid height between two pre-determined 
levels monitored by the level sensors S I and S2. Under normal conditions it is expected for 
water to flow into the tank through Valve One (VI) and out through Valve Two (V2). Should the 
fluid level rise above a set point, the activated level control system in turn closes Valve One., 
Valve Three (V3), the system safety valve, is operated in the event of a level control system 
failure. An overspill tray is located underneath the tank to collect any 'lost' water during a 
potential overflow situation. An illustration of the water tank system is presented in Figure 3-1. 
'Vl (NO) 
,,0 .... · .... , .. ·@] 
... -------
PS P9 
V3(A/C) @ 
Figure 3-1. Water Tank System 
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3.1.1 Water Tank 
The water tank system illustrated in Figure 3-1 consists of three valves (Vl-3), two level sensors 
(S1I2) and their respective control units (C1I2), plus an overspill tray. There are also six labelled 
sections of pipe; Pl-2, P6-7 and P8-9. 
Valve One is an air-to-open (AlO) inlet valve controlled by Cl. SI monitors the level of the 
water within the tank and relays this information to Cl. Under normal conditions, should the 
level fall below a pre-determined lower limit then the controller unit (Cl) opens VI, thus 
allowing mains water into the tank. Conversely, should the water level rise above an upper limit 
the valve is closed. Valve Two is a manual (MAN) outlet valve which is operator controlled and 
therefore has no control loops directly associated with it. Valve Three is an air-to-close (AlC) 
outlet valve controlled by C2. V3 is part of the safety loop and under normal operating 
conditions is redundant. However, should a failure occur and the water level rise above a pre-
determined upper limit (monitored by S2) C2 opens V3 as a means of reducing the water level, 
so as to prevent an overflow situation. Water is collected in the tray underneath the tank should 
an overflow situation occur. Control Loop Two is deemed redundant until a failure occurs within 
Control Loop One. 
3.1.2 Sensor Locations 
The water tank system status is obtained through using data retrieved from three flow sensors. 
The flow sensors VFl-3 measure flow from valves Vl-3 respectively and are able to detect 
either the presence or absence of flow. A fourth sensor, referred to as SPl, is located in the 
overspill tray and indicates if water has leaked from the tank. These sensors are known as system 
observation points and it is assumed that, for the purposes of this research, the sensors are 
sufficient and reliable. 
3.1.3 Modes of Operation 
The water tank system operates in two modes. Namely, ACTIVE during which the operator 
opens V2, and DORMANT whereby V2 is closed. During the ACTIVE mode, water is removed 
from the tank via V2 and refilled by the mains supply through VI. It is expected for there to be 
no water flow through V3 and no indication of water in the overspill tray. In the DORMANT 
mode the system is simply in standby with no flow registering through any of the valves or water 
in the overspill tray. Table 3-1 illustrates the expected sensor readings for the given water tank 
system operating modes. 
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Operating Mode 
ACTIVE 
DORMANT 
VFl 
Flow 
No Flow 
VF2 
Flow 
No Flow 
VF3 
No Flow 
No Flow 
Table 3-1. Water Tank System Operating Mode Readings 
3.1.4 Water Tank System Scenarios 
SPl 
No Water 
No Water 
There are sixteen possible scenarios in which the water tank system could be when considering 
all potential sensor readings from VFl-3 and SPl. The scenarios are outlined in Table 3-2, where 
F - flow, NF - no flow, W - water and NW - no water. 
Scenario VFl VF2 VF3 SPl Scenario VFl VF2 VF3 SPl 
1 F F F W 9 F NF F W 
2 F F F NW 10 F NF F NW 
3 NF F F W 11 F F NF W 
4 NF F F NW 12 F F NF NW 
5 NF NF F W 13 NF F NF W 
6 NF NF F NW 14 NF F NF NW 
7 NF NF NF W 15 F NF NF W 
8 NF NF NF NW 16 F NF NF NW 
Table 3-2. Water Tank System Scenarios 
From Table 3-2, the tank ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes correspond to scenarios 12 
and 8 respectively. The remaining scenarios represent a deviation in the expected behaviour and 
hence indicate the presence of potential faults in the system. 
3.1.5 Component Failure Modes 
Table 3-3 contains the component failures considered to affect the functionality of the water tank 
system. In total, 37 component failure modes are taken into account. 
Code 
PjB (1-2,6-7,8-9) 
PjR (1-2,6-7,8-9) 
VjFC (IS i S3) 
VjFO (IS i S3) 
VjFS (IS i S3) 
SjFH (IS i::;2) 
SjFL (IS i ::;2) 
WOST 
Component Failure Code Component Failure 
Pipe Pj is blocked SjFS (IS i ::;2) Sensor Si fails stuck 
Pipe Pj is ruptured C;FH (1S i S2) Controller Cj fails high 
Valve Vi fails closed CiFL (IS i::;2) Controller Ci fails low 
Valve Vi fails open CjFS (IS i::;2) Controller Ci fails stuck 
Valve Vi fails stuck NMWS No mains water supply 
Sensor Si fails high TL Water tank leaks 
Sensor Si fails low TR Water tank ruptured 
Water in over-spill tray 
Table 3-3. Water Tank System Component Failures 
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3.2 Application of Diagnostic Methodologies 
Section 3.2 focuses on the application of four fault diagnostic methodologies. The methods 
employed are FMEA, SOT, FT A and digraphs. A review of the individual methods is conducted 
through assessing their ability in diagnosing the failures that may have led to a water tank system 
scenario incorporating noted deviations. 
The water tank system is in the ACTIVE state. A deviating scenario, labelled FS16 (Tab-le 3-4), 
is assumed as a means for determining the efficiency of the four methods in fault diagnostics. 
FS 16 encompasses sensor readings which have been obtained whilst the system is expected to be 
in the ACTIVE state. FS16 deviates from ACTIVE through sensor VF2 registering the status 'no 
flow'. It is assumed that since the remaining three sensor readings ofVF1, VF3 and SPl do not 
differ in FS 16 from the ACTIVE state, the faults present within the system are associated with 
V2. 
Operating Mode 
ACTIVE 
FS16 
VFl 
Flow 
Flow 
VF2 
Flow 
No Flow 
VF3 
No Flow 
No Flow 
Table 3-4. System Sensor Readings 
SPl 
No Water 
No Water 
The aim of applying the four methods to scenario FS 16 is to determine the manner in which each 
method varies in providing the fault causes for the given deviation from the normal operating 
mode conditions of the water tank system. The complete set of causes identified for the deviating 
scenario are split into two sections; failures directly associated with V2 and failures resulting in a 
'tank empty' state thereby leading to no flow at VF2. 
(i) No Flow Registering at VF2 
• .V2FC 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Operator closed V2 - no flow phase through V2 
P6R 
P6B 
P7B 
• Tank Empty (the failure causes which may lead to a tank empty state are expanded 
further). 
(ii) Tank Empty 
The tank empty situation introduces multiple faults and dynamic considerations. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
[VIFC / SIFH / CIFH] . [V2FO / P6R] 
[VIFC / SIFH / CIFH] . [V3FO / S2FH / C2FH / P8R] 
[VIFC / SIFH! CIFH] . [V2FO / P3R . V3FO / S2FH / C2FH / P8R] 
[PIB / PIR] . [V2FO / P3R] 
[PIB / PIR] . [V3FO / S2FH / C2FH / P8R] 
[PIB / PIR] . [V2FO / P6R] . [V3FO / S2FH / C2FH / P8R] 
[P2B] . [V2FO / P6R] 
[P2B] . [V3FO / S2FH / C2FH / P8R] 
[P2B] . [V2FO / P6R] . [V3FO / S2FH / C2FH / P8R] 
[NMWS] . [V2FO / P6R] 
[NMWS] . [V3FO / S2FH / C2FH / P8R] 
[NMWS] . [V2FO / P6R] . [V3FO / S2FH / C2FH / P8R] 
• TR 
• [NMWS / PIB / PIR / VIFC] . [TL] (where TL« TR) 
Where; 'I' represents the logic function OR and '.' represents AND. 
The faults listed within the tank empty category, excluding TR and TL, contradict the sensor 
readings obtained for scenario FS 16 and therefore are unlikely to occur unless a change in the 
water tank system scenario occurs. 
, 
3.2.1 FMEA 
FM EA is a 'bottom-up' approach, during which an analyst investigates and records the details 
and consequences of a failure on the operability o~ a system. The FMEA results are subsequently 
used during fault diagnosis. The application of FMEA is conducted manually due to 
unobtainable access to the automated FM EA tool, AutoSteve. The method followed is based 
upon research conducted by Price [2, 20, 21]. 
3.2.2.1 Procedure 
The procedure for following the FMEA process is outlined: 
(i) Define the system to be analysed. 
(ii) Construct a block diagram of the system, thus illustrating the relationships between 
components or sub-systems. 
(iii) Note all assumptions. 
(iv) List components and their respective failure modes. 
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(v) Complete an FM EA worksheet, analysing the effects components have on the system 
under investigation. 
(vi) An extension to FMEA considers criticality analysis (FMECA). If deemed appropriate 
for the system under investigation, severity rankings may be entered as a means of 
evaluating the criticality of each failure mode on the system performance: 
1: Minor - no significant effect. 
2: Major - reduction in operational effectiveness. 
3: Critical - significant reduction in functional performance with immediate change in 
system operating state. 
4: Catastrophic - total loss of system involving property damage and death. 
(vii) Review the worksheets to identify any critical components and thus develop 
recommendations for further design improvements. 
(viii)With regards to conducting fault diagnosis, failed component(s) within the system are 
determined from the failure effect information listed in the FMEA or FMECA 
worksheets. 
There is the potential to develop fault trees from the results obtained, since failures that lead to a 
given top event can be identified. This simply provides an alternate representation of the 
diagnostic results. 
3.2.1.2 Block Diagram Representation of the Water Tank System 
The water tank system, as illustrated by Figure 3-2, is separated into four main units. 
Namely: 
(i) The water tank. 
(ii) Control loop one encompassing VI (AIO), Cl, PI and P2. 
(iii) Manual loop encompassing V2(MAN), P6 and P7. 
(iv) Control loop two encompassing V3(AIC), C2, P8 and P9. 
1. Tank 
Figure 3-2. FMEA Water Tank System Block Diagram Representation 
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3.2.1.3 Water Tank System Worksheets 
The completed FMECA worksheet for Unit Three of the water tank system is detailed in Table 
3-5. The FMECA worksheets for the remaining three system units are documented in Appendix 
B. The component Valve 2 is the first item identified in Table 3-5. Reading across the worksheet 
from the point of identification yields information related to the function of the component and 
the failure modes considered. For each failure mode both local and system effects are listed. The 
methods for detecting the component failure modes along with corresponding severity rankings 
are also recorded. 
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cbstruction. 
Table 3-5. FMECA of Unit Three 
3.2.1.4 Application to Faulty Scenario 
The disturbance 'no flow', registered at VF2, is analysed through identifying the failure modes 
which could lead to the given deviation. 
(i) V2 is encompassed within Unit 3 of the water tank system block diagram representation 
(Figure 3-2). Hence, Table 3-5 is referenced, with attention paid to the 'local effect' 
column. 
(ii) The deviation 'no flow' is located and associated failure modes are marked. This is 
conducted by reading down the 'local effect' column and determining which effects 
match the given deviation in the following manner: 
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• No fluid transfer from the tank to P7 & V2 ~ .. ~ agree --~ V2FC. 
• Continuous fluid transfer from the tank to P7 & V2 ~,~ disagree. 
• Continuous fluid transfer from the tank to P7 & V2 ~.~ disagree. 
• No fluid transfer from the tank to P7 & V2 ~> agree ~O+ Operator, V2FC. 
• No fluid transfer from the tank ~ agree -> P3B. 
• No fluid transfer from the tank plus pipe leakage ~" agree ~> P3R. 
• No fluid transfer from V2 -?> agree ~ P4B. 
• Fluid leakage from P7 -9> disagree. 
(iii) Five causes for the deviation are determined: V2FC, Operator closed V2, P6B, P6R and 
P7B. 
(iv) Further faults, which are not determined through the analysis, are related to the 'tank 
empty state'. The fact that these faults are not identified can be attributed to analysing 
the system through the block diagram representation. Consequently, interrelationships 
between the separate units illustrated in Figure 3-2 are not considered. 
(v) In practice, the actual cause would be unknown and therefore, one of the faults from 
(iii) would have to be assumed. Taking the example of V2FC, if V2 is examined and 
found to be closed, then the fault identification choice is marked as correct. Otherwise, 
another fault cause from (iii) is assumed. This process is repeated until the actual cause 
is determined. The order in which a fault is assumed to be the cause is dependent on a 
priori knowledge of the system under analysis. 
3.2.1.5 Method Review 
Advantages 
• An analytical breakdown of the failure modes associated with the unit block diagram 
representation are presented in worksheets. 
• With the division of the system under investigation into units, the failures for each 
section are firstly reviewed and then the inter-relationships, which may be present 
between units, are determined through using engineering judgement. 
• The identification of both local and overall system effects is noted' concisely and 
clearly, thus providing an analyst with a complete overview of the failure scenarios. 
• FMEAlFMECA is a straightforward procedure. It is considered viable for a non-expert 
to be able to follow the analysis depicted in a FMEAIFMECA worksheet. 
• The severity column in the worksheets indicates the most critical failures and issues 
which are identified 'as affecting the application system. 
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• With regards to designing for improved reliability, engineering designers are provided· 
with a clear indication of the components or sub-systems which require adaptation. The 
design alterations can be determined from the given component failure mode results. 
Disadvantages 
• Only single failure modes are assessed at any given time for each unit. There is no 
provision for the indication of multiple failures. 
• FMEAlFMECA does not appear to consider combined fault - failure effects. 
• There is no clear illustration of the interrelationships that exist between faults in the 
separate units. Dependencies are not taken into account. 
• FMEAlFMECA is a subjective process and could be regarded as a long, drawn out 
approach. Furthermore, there is lack of consistency with regards to descriptions used 
within the worksheets. 
• The primary focus of FMEAlFMECA is faults and not the chain of events 
(cause/effect) that may have led to the actual fault. 
• FMEAlFM~CA, conducted manually, is not a real-time process . 
It is understandable how an automated version of this procedure, such as AutoSteve, is 
considered beneficial with regards to engineering applications. Primarily, there is scope to 
provide both consistency, in terms of failure descriptions, and inclusion of multiple fault 
combinations. Multiple fault data would be more readily available, since an automated procedure 
is able to investigate further failures and the effects for pairs or even groups of failures on the 
functionality of a system. 
Note: AutoSteve performs automated FMEA through simulating various system states and then 
compiling a list of the failures which could occur for the given system under investigation. The 
failures are then instigated within the application system as a means of obtaining the faulty 
behaviour patterns. The fault diagnostics procedure is based on comparing the expected 
operating mode readings with those retrieved from the system. Any noted discrepancies form the 
basis of the FM EA report, displaying potential failure modes, effects and causes. 
3.2.2 Sequential Diagnosis Tool (SDT) 
The SDT [15] is a diagnostic software tool which enables the user to generate solutions for an 
associated test sequencing problem. The system status is represented by a set of states. A 
sequence of tests is evaluated during the diagnostic procedure in order to determine the current 
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state of the system. Due to the sequential nature of the procedure, the ith test is dependent on the 
(i-I) tests previously executed. The final output from the SDT is an optimal diagnostic tree; the 
optimality of the tree is however dependent on specific search algorithms (discussed in Section 
3.2.2.1). The nodes of the decision tree correspond to the diagnostic tests, whilst the leaves 
represent the diagnostic conclusion or system state. For an in-depth review ofthe SDT developed 
by Zuzek et al. the reader is directed to Chapter Two. 
3.2.2.1 Procedure 
The procedure identified for applying the SDT to a system is outlined: 
(i) Define the system to be analysed. 
(ii) List all component failures and failure symptoms of the system. 
(iii) Form a trouble shooting table noting the relationships which exist between symptoms 
and failures. (Example is illustrated in Section 3.2.2.2). 
(iv) Transfer the data from the table onto the SDT matrix over the web interface at 
csd.ijs.si/applications/SDT/websdt. The transferral method simply involves replacing 
the blacked out boxes of the trouble-shooting table with '1' in the respective sections of 
the matrix. 
(v) Submit the inputted values according to the pre-chosen optimisation algorithm. The 
algorithm options are based on one-step look ahead and global search. One step look 
ahead algorithms are faster at computing solutions than global search algorithms whose 
time and space requirements can be significant. Global search algorithms do however, 
produce results of increased optimality. 
(vi) The output system diagnostic tree is reviewed to identify critical components and thus 
suggest reliability based recommendations. 
3.2.2.2 Block Trouble-Shooting Table 
The data contained within the trouble-shooting table illustrates the relationships identified by the 
user between system states and tests in the diagnostic matrix on the SDT web interface. System 
states correspond to failures, and tests to the symptoms. The water tank system failures and 
failure symptoms identified are: 
(i) Failures 
Vi Failed Closed (1:5 i :53) 
Vi Failed Open (1:5 i :53) 
Pi Ruptured (i = 1-2, 6-9) 
Si Failed High (1:5 i :52) 
Si Failed Low (1:5 i :52) 
Ci Failed High (1:5 i :52) 
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Pi Blocked (i = 1-2, 6-9) 
No Mains Water Supply 
Tank Leakage 
(ii) Failure Symptoms 
No Flow at VFi (l~ i ~3) 
Water in Overspill Tray 
Ci Failed Low (l~ i ~2) 
Tank Ruptured 
Pi Leaking (i = 1-2, 6-9) 
Tank Empty 
Table 3-6 illustrates the links between the listed water tank system component failures and their 
respective symptoms. Too few symptoms are identified to allow for specific failures or faults to 
be isolated when conducting testing, this can be attributed to the fact that there are a limited 
number of sensors. During the analysis, 'tank leakage' is considered separately as both a 
symptom and failure. This however, doe~ not alter the results with regards to isolating further 
faults. 
Whilst developing the trouble shooting table for the water tank system it is assumed that for a 
single failure all remaining components are fully functional. In this respect there is no scope for 
investigating multiple failures. The symptoms or tests t4 and tl2 from Table 3-6 could be true 
should more than one component fail. This results in an analysis of increased complexity since 
there are numerous variations of multiple failures which could cause either one of these 
symptoms. 
If considering the symptom t4 (water in the overspill tray) the potential causes expected are: 
(i) VIFO. V2FC . V3FC 
(ii) VIFO. P6B / P7B . P8B / P9B 
(iii) VIFO. V2FC . P8B / P9B 
(iv) VIFO. P6B / P7B . V3FC 
This example illustrates the difficulty associated with usmg the SDT to evaluate multiple 
failures. There is no comprehensible way in which all possible groups of failures can be 
accommodated in the diagnostic matrix. Test tl2, in a similar manner to t4, is true given the 
single failure 'TR'. However, it is reasonable to assume that the tank empty state could also 
occur given the presence of specific multiple failures. 
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The intennediary stages of low and high tank levels are disregarded as a listed symptom during 
the initial analysis. Low and high tank levels are, however, taken into account when considering 
valves failing open or closed. 
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Table 3-6. Water Tank System Trouble-Shooting Table 
As a means of exemplifying the manner in which Table 3-6 is deciphered, the possible causes for 
t1, no flow at VF I, are: 
• VI failed closed - prevents fluid transfer through VI into the tank. 
• V2 failed closed - no fluid transfer from the tank, control loop I closes VI. 
• V3 failed closed - no fluid transfer from the tank, control loop I closes VI. 
• No mains water supply - no fluid transfer through VI into the tank. 
• PII2 ruptured - no fluid transfer through VI into the tank. 
• P 112, 6/7, 8/9 blocked - no fluid transfer in or out ofthe tank. 
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3.2.2.3 System Diagnostic Tree 
The diagnostic tree illustrated in Figure 3-3 is generated automatically from the SDT over the 
web interface at http://www-csd.ijs.si/cgi-binlwebsdt.pl. The contents of the trouble shooting 
table (Table 3-6) are input into the diagnostic matrix. The state sO in Figure 3-3 relates to the 
ACTIVE mode of the water tank system. The 'remaining symptoms and states correspond to 
those noted in the trouble-shooting table. 
o 
Figure 3-3. Water Tank System Diagnostic Tree 
3.2.2.4 Application to Faulty Scenario 
Key: 
1: agree with test statement 
0: disagree with test 
The diagnostic decision tree illustrated in Figure 3-3 is used to detennine the failure(s) 
associated with the deviating state FS 16. The decision tree is utilised in the following manner 
during fault diagnostics: 
(i) Tests in the diagnostic tree are 'answered' to detennine the system states that may lead 
to the deviation ('no,flow') registered at VF2. 
• tl: No flow at VFl? Agree 
• tl2: Tank empty? Disagree 
• t2: No flow at VF2? Agree -7 s2, sI8, sI9. 
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(ii) From the infonnation flow illustrated, it is noticeable that for the given scenario, FS 16, 
there are three possible causes: V2FC, P6B and P7B. A single failure option is not 
output for test t2 due to insufficient symptom data to further distinguish between the 
system states s2, s18 & s19 related to 'No Flow at VF2'. 
(iii) Other potential faults, which are not detected using the sequential method, are P6R and 
those related to the 'tank empty state'. Whilst P6R does lead to the state 'no flow' at 
VF2, a clearer symptom of this fault is pipe three (P6) leaking. With regards to the 'tank 
empty' state, this is listed as a symptom rather than a failure in the trouble shooting 
table and therefore will not appear as a system state in the diagnostic tree. The multiple 
failure combinations which lead to the 'tank empty' state are not considered. As 
discussed in Section 3.2.2.2, multiple failures are not included in the trouble shooting 
table. 
(iv) In practice, the actual cause would be unknown and therefore, one of the faults from (ii) 
would have to be assumed. This procedure is followed in a similar manner to that 
described for the FMEA worked example in Section 3.2.1.4. 
3.2.2.5 Method Review 
Advantages 
• The graphical outcome, a diagnostic tree, is unambiguous in its illustration of the 
results. A non-expert is able to follow the diagnostic tree to detennine possible failures 
for a given system status. This is provided only single failures are of priority during the 
investigation. 
• The subjective area involved within the process is in the development of the initial 
trouble-shooting table. The table is developed by the analyst and the infonnation 
contained within transferred onto the SOT diagnostic matrix. The tool then generates an 
optimal diagnostic decision tree as an output which can be used within fault 
diagnostics. The ultimate diagnostic process is thus dependent on system information 
which is made available to the analyst. 
• Theoretically, the SDT could be used for diagnosing multiple failures so long as the 
failures are grouped together under one system state. For the example illustrated in 
Section 3.2.2.2 there are nine system states associated with the symptom of t4: 
(i) VIFO . V2FC . V3FO 
(iv) VIFO . P7B . P8B 
(ii) VIFO . P6B . P8B 
(v) VIFO . P7B . P9B 
(iii) VI FO . P6B . P8B 
(vi) VI FO . V2FC . P8B 
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(vii) VIFO. V2FC. P9B (viii) VIFO . P6B . V3FC (ix) VIFO . P7B . V3FC 
These would then require being input as separate 'failure groups' in the trouble-
shooting table under individual states. 
Disadvantages 
• As highlighted in Section 3.2.2.2, it is reasonable to assume that the symptoms of tests 
14 and tl2 from Table 3-6 could be comprised from multiple failure combinations. 
There are variations of multiple failures which could result in either one of these 
symptoms occurring. From the groups of possible failures which could cause the 
symptoms, there is no clear method for accommodating them within the diagnostic 
matrix. 
• It is considered beneficial for multiple failures to be incorporated into the diagnostic 
matrix since the method would then be more adaptable with regards to engineering 
applications. An attempt to manually input the symptoms and system states associated 
with multiple failure combinations has shown the process to be extremely time-
intensive with inconclusive results. 
• The symptom 'no flow' at the three valves yields more than one failure option. These 
failure options are single faults; however, there are no symptoms to further distinguish 
between the individual faults. Differentiating between the failures is considered viable 
should more sensor information be obtained from the system. 
• The initial trouble-shooting table considered failures associated with both the sensor 
and controller units of the water tank system control loops. These failures are omitted 
from Table 3-6 since they cannot be considered a final failure, rather a sub-cause of a 
final failure which involves either Valves One or Three. For example, if Sensor One 
fails high this would lead to Valve One being closed. A symptom of Sensor One 
registering a high level could be VI closed, however VIFC cannot be in both symptom 
and failure sets and therefore intermediate failures are omitted during this analysis. 
From the analysis, it would appear there is no method for accounting for intermediary 
causes within the SDT framework. 
The dynamic behaviour of the water tank system is not modelled in the trouble-shooting table. 
The lack of system complexity, and thus potential failures, paradoxically results in a complex 
and confusing trouble-shooting table for the given application system. 
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3.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
An overview of the research conducted by Hurdle et al. [35,36] into the application of fault trees 
to an identical water tank system, as described in Section 3.1, is discussed. Fault trees, using both 
coherent and non-coherent methods, are generated for six sensor readings [37]: 
(i) Flow through VI 
(iv) No flow through V2 
(ii) No flow through VI 
(v) Flow through V3 
(iii) Flow through V2 
(vi) Water in the tray 
Two further sensor readings encompassing 'no flow through V3' and 'no water in the overspill 
tray' are disregarded. These readings are considered to be within the normal water tank system 
operating mode conditions (reference Section 3.1.3). 
NOTE: Coherent fault trees use both AND and OR logic, thereby only considering component 
failure events, whilst non-coherent fault trees also use NOT logic, allowing for the inclusion of 
both failed and working component events. 
3.2.3.1 Method Overview 
Hurdle et al. model the water tank system using five schemes of differing complexity, as a means 
of constructing the fault trees for all deviating system scenarios. The schemes developed for the 
analysis are summarised: 
(i) Scheme 1 utilises coherent fault trees for expanding the causes of given sensor 
deviations. Observation points which provide deviating readings from the normal 
operating mode of the water tank system are considered. It. is discovered that coherent 
trees do not contain enough information regarding system behaviour and so some 
minimal cut sets obtained do not verify the fault tree top event. This is attributed to the 
absence of NOT logic and therefore conflicting potential causes are not removed. 
(ii) Scheme 2 also employs coherent fault trees. Consistency checks are however, 
introduced through including all sensor readings from the observation points into the 
fault tree. In this case; where a sensor reading has not deviated from its normal form it 
is referred to as a 'NOT failed event'. Scheme 2 is considered to be an improved version 
of Scheme 1 with regards to pinpointing the potential causes for a given top event. 
(iii) Scheme 3 marks the introduction of non-coherent fault trees. In a similar manner to 
Scheme 1, only sensor readings which have deviated from the normal operating 
conditions are considered. Results prove that the presence of NOT logic removes any 
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conflicting causes. However, some potential causes identified could be invalid due to 
the fact that not all sensor readings (deviated and non-deviated) are taken into account. 
(iv) Scheme 4 utilises non-coherent fault trees with the addition of consistency checks. The 
potential causes yielded by Scheme 4 match those obtained from Scheme 2. It is further 
noted from these results, that through only considering sensors which have deviated 
from the normal operating conditions (Schemes I & 3), not enough infonnation is 
provided for analysis. 
(v) Scheme 5 involves changing the operating mode (ACTIVE or DORMANT) of the 
system to determine potential 'un-revealed' failures and can be used in conjunction with 
Schemes I - 4. The advantage of using Scheme 5 is that it increases the accuracy of the 
potential causes yielded from Schemes I - 4. 
3.2.3.2 Application to a Faulty Scenario 
The condition 'no flow through V2' is assessed using the fault trees produced by Hurdle et al. 
The coherent and non-coherent fault trees generated for Schemes I and 4 respectively, are 
considered. The twelve minimal cut sets obtained from the coherent fault tree, with the given top 
event 'no flow through V2', are: 
(i) V2FC 
(v) TR 
(ix) NMWS 
(ii) P6B 
(vi) VIFC 
(x) PIB 
(iii) P6R 
(vii) SIFH 
(xi) PIR 
(iv) P7B 
(viii) CIFH 
(xii) P2B 
From the noted minimal cut sets it is evident faults (i) - (iv) lead to the status 'no flow' at VF2. 
Cut sets (v) - (xii) are fundamental to the tank being empty and therefore 'no flow at VF2' is 
considered a secondary effect of there being no fluid in the tank. However, from the sensor 
readings in FS 16 minimal cut sets (v) - (xii) are deemed incorrect. 
Some of the cut sets determined using Scheme 1 cannot singly cause the event 'no flow through 
V2' and also contradict the sensor readings for scenario FS 16. Eight minimal cut set results 
yielded through following Scheme 1 display inconsistencies. These anomalies reflect the lack of 
consistency between 'working' system sections, as indicated by the retrieved sensor readings, 
and fault causes yielded. It is noted that improved results are obtained from Scheme 4 with the 
introduction of both NOT logic and consistency checks. Four minimal cut sets are yielded from 
Scheme 4, all of which are deemed correct: 
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(i) V2FC (ii) P6B (iii) P6R (iv) P7B 
The additional consistency checks, introduced into Scheme 4, are considered advantageous when 
reviewing the anomalies illustrated by the results retrieved from Scheme 1. This is specifically 
relevant to the contradictory results highlighted between fault causes and system sensor readings. 
Application of the Fault Tree Schemes to a larger system would verify the effectiveness of the 
method were it to be tested on a real application. 
3.2.3.3 Method Review 
Advantages 
• Non-coherent fault trees, representing the causes for a registered sensor deviation, 
provide more reliable results. The NOT logic employed in schemes three and four 
allows for the removal of conflicting diagnostic results which are achieved when 
utilising coherent fault trees. 
• Further removal of conflicting results is achieved through combining expected and 
deviating sensor readings into the fault tree top event structure. This results in an 
accurate list of potential causes being yielded for a given scenario. 
• The fault tree diagnostic strategy can be utilised to identify multiple faults for given 
deviating sensor readings. 
Disadvantages 
• Whilst fault tree analysis is able to identify multiple failures, it is noted that for FS 16 
Schemes 1 and 4 do not generate any faults above the order one. 
• A standard coherent fault tree representation of a sensor deviation is not sufficient for 
the diagnostic process since conflicting component failure results are obtained. This is 
due to a coherent fault tree not containing enough information regarding system 
behaviour to yield an accurate list of potential causes. 
• System dynamics must be taken into consideration to improve the method and obtain 
more accurate results. 
3.3.3 Digraphs 
A digraph, as noted in Section 2.3.2 [41, 69, 70], is constructed from a set of nodes and edges, 
which are used to illustrate the 'cause-effect' relationships present within systems. The nodes 
represent system process variables or component failure modes and the edges connecting the 
nodes illustrate the inter-relationships which exist between components in a system. 
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A generalised procedure outlining the main steps involved in both developing a system digraph 
and conducting fault diagnostics is provided in this section. A diagrammatic description of a 
simple digraph and the fault diagnostic procedure is illustrated in Sections 3.3.3.1 and 3.3.3.2 
respectively. 
3.3.3.1 Digraph Formation 
The digraph formation phase, as documented in previous research (reference Section 2.3.2), is 
sub-divided into three steps, namely: 
(i) Step One: System Analysis 
Firstly, the system under investigation is defined. A specific number is allocated to 
each component, thus developing a straightforward location reference approach for 
process variables and component failure modes. All relevant system component failures 
are compiled and a failure mode code is attached to each. The system is then separated 
into sub-units. For example, a sub-unit in a water tank system could consist of a valve 
and associated pipe-work. If control loops are present, these are identified and 
classified accordingly. 
(ii) Step Two: Unit-Digraph Generation 
Unit digraph models for the sub-units, previously noted in step one, are generated. All 
process variable deviations which could have a potential effect on the variables in the 
model are taken into consideration. The extent of the effect any disturbance may have 
on the system with regards to the assigning of discrete values is also noted. 
(iii) Step Three: Digraph Generation 
The overall system digraph is formed by connecting the sub-unit models at common 
process variable nodes. 
As a means for illustrating the digraph formation procedure, a simple valve example is utilised. 
A manually operated valve and associated pipe-work is presented in Figure 3-4. Pipe One (PI) 
leads into the valve and Pipe Two (P2) exits the valve. 
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Valve (man) 
__ ~P~1~ __ ~r-~P~2~~~~ 
Figure 3-4. Valve Example 
Following Step One, the system is defined and location markers are allocated to PI and P2, as 
illustrated in Figure 3-5. Six component failure modes are considered to affect the functionality 
of the valve system. These are noted as valve failed open (VFO), valve failed closed (VFC), pipe 
one blocked (PIB), pipe one ruptured (PIR), pipe two blocked (P2B) and pipe two ruptured 
(P2R). 
Figure 3-5. Valve Example (Number Allocation) 
Steps Two and Three from the procedure are combined for the valve system since separating the 
example into sub-units is unnecessary. The process variable considered in the digraph is mass 
flow. It is determined that a pipe failing blocked and valve failing closed would lead to a large 
negative disturbance (-10) of mass flow. Conversely, the valve failing open would result in a 
large positive (+ 10) disturbance. A pipe rupture is assumed to cause a small negative (-1) 
deviation. The valve system digraph is illustrated in Figure 3-6. 
The digraph is constructed from eight nodes; two process variable nodes, representing mass flow 
at locations one (Ml) and two (M2), and six component failure mode nodes. The valve is 
represented by the relationship between nodes MI and M2 where a "+1' signed edge (normal 
edge) connects the process variable nodes. Under normal conditions it is expected that a positive 
. relationship exists between mass flow either side of the valve. Should the valve be closed this 
relationship is nullified as indicated by the signing of the conditional edge CO: V Closed'). It 
must be noted that only one edge can be true at any given time. The discrete signing of the edges 
connecting the failure mode nodes to the process variable nodes indicates the disturbance caused 
by the faults on the system at that point. 
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Figure 3-6. Valve Example Digraph 
3.3.3.2 System Fault Diagnostics 
Emphasis is placed on the application of the digraph method in fault diagnostics. The process is 
conducted using the system digraph previously developed following the procedure from Section 
3.3.3.1. System behaviour is monitored through compiling retrieved sensor data (e.g. via a level 
transmitter). In a given mode of operation there is an expected set of sensor readings associated 
with the application system under investigation. These are compared with the actual system 
readings during the diagnostic procedure (Steps 4 and 5) to identify if any deviations are present. 
(iv) Step Four: Detennination of System Deviations 
The system sensor readings which are expected whilst the system is in a known 
operating mode, for example mode ACTIVE, are noted. The retrieved (actual) sensor 
readings from the system are then compared with those expected to detennine the 
presence of any deviations. 
(v) Step Five: Back-tracing Process 
Fault diagnosis involves back-tracing through the system digraph from a specific sensor 
node which represents the location of the given deviation. Back-tracing refers to the 
manner in which an analyst moves from a deviating node through the digraph until all 
possible failure modes which could have contributed to the deviation are noted. For 
multiple deviating sensors the diagnostic results obtained through back-tracing from 
each deviating node are ANDed together. All potential failure causes are listed at the 
end ofthe fault diagnostics procedure. 
An unexpected process variable deviation within a system is represented by 'highlighting' the 
respective node in the digraph. Subsequent fault propagation of the deviation through the system 
is detennined by marking all of the nodes which were affected by the initial highlighting. A 
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simple example illustrating the back-tracing procedure is related to Figure 3-6. 'No flow', as 
opposed to the expected 'flow', is registered at the valve exit. The deviating flow reading is 
treated as a large negative disturbance and thus the back-tracing procedure takes into account 
failures that may lead to a '-10' disturbance. Back-tracing commences from the location of the 
given deviation, in this case the valve exit represented by node M2 in the digraph. The fault 
propagation is followed accordingly: 
(i) M2(-IO) -7 VFC, P2B. 
(ii) M2(-1O) -7 MI(-IO) -7 PIB. 
Three failure mode results are determined as possible causes for the 'no flow' deviation. The 
remaining failure mode nodes in the digraph illustration (Figure 3-6) are disregarded since the 
signing of the edges connecting the failure mode nodes to the process variable nodes indicates 
that they do not contribute to a large negative disturbance. 
3.3.3.3 Water Tank System Digraph 
The digraph formation procedure, outlined in Section 3.3.3.1, is followed in order to generate a 
digraph for the water tank system. The system has previously been defined and component 
failure modes identified in Table 3-2, thus addressing Step One from Section 3.3.3.1. A 
schematic of the water tank system with numbered location markers is illustrated in Figure 3-7. 
The numbered locations are used in order to aid the process of constructing the system digraph in 
Steps Two and Three. 
The tank system is divided into three sub-units: 
(i) Valve One, respective control loop and associated pipe-work. 
(ii) Valve Two and associated pipe-work. 
(iii) Valve Three, respective control loop and associated pipe-work. 
Unit digraph models are derived for the three valve sections. The models consider the manner in 
which the components function with regards to the basic physics laws governing mass, energy 
and momentum. The alphanumeric label within the nodes represents a process variable; the 
numeric section of the label corresponds to a specific location in the water tank system whilst the 
precursor to the numeric section represents one ofthe following process variables: 
• 'M': mass flow. 
• 'L': level. 
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• 'P': pressure (force). 
,_~··· .. ····u.· .. ··l Cl I 
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Figure 3-7.Water Tank System Illustration (Number Allocation) 
The process flow and control loop structure of the system is illustrated in Figures 3-8 - 3-11. 
The water tank system control loops are considered in their entirety with moderate and large 
disturbances taken into account. Inactive control devices along with controllers failing either 
high or low, so resulting in a disturbance entering the loop, are also considered. Should a loop be 
analysed as an incomplete entity, then in the case of Figure 3-8, back tracing in the loop from a 
large negative disturbance at node L4 would result in following the route L4( -I 0) ~ M2( -I 0) ~ 
P3(-10) ~ PS(+lO) ~ L4(+10), thus producing inconsistent results. Consequently, a loop 
operator [71] as previously described in Chapter Two, is utilised. 
Figure 3-8 illustrates the combined unit digraph of VI and its respective control loop. The air-to-
open control valve, VI, is represented by the relationship between nodes Ml, M2 and P3. The 
control loop associated with VI is illustrated by the negative feedback loop involving nodes M2 
- L4 - PS - P3; where the product of the normal gain around the loop is negative. The sensor and 
control unit possess an inverse acting relationship, therefore the normal edge connecting nodes 
PS and P3 is signed' -I'. Since VI is an air-to-open valve, the normal edge between nodes P3 
and M2 is signed '+ 1', thus indicating the presence of a positive relationship. 
There are three failure modes (PIB, PIR and NMWS) associated with mass flow entering VI 
(node MI). Each failure mode results in a large reduction in mass flow at location one. Mass 
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flow exiting VI, represented by node M2, is affected by either a disturbance within the control 
loop (M2 - L4 - P5 - P3), fault propagation from MI or by four failure modes directly 
associated with M2 (P2B, P2R, VIFC and VIFO). VIFO, unlike P2B, P2R and VIFC causes a 
large positive deviation in mass flow at location two. The relationship between nodes MI and 
M2 is nullified should VI be closed, as indicated by the conditional edge joining the two nodes. 
Figure 3-8. Valve One and Control Loop One Unit Digraph 
Nodes P5 and P3 are constituent elements of the NFBL incorporating nodes M2 and L4. The 
pressure of the output signal from the level sensor S I is positively dependent on the level of 
water in the tank. The relationship between the level sensor output node, P5 and the tank level 
node, L4 is nullified if the level sensor is stuck. Node P5 is positively affected by the failure 
mode SIFH and negatively influenced by SIFL. Node P3 represents the output from controller 
unit Cl to VI. The inverse relationship between P5 and P3 is nullified if Cl fails stuck. In a 
similar manner to P5 there are two failure modes associated with P3. P3 is positively affected by 
CIFL and negatively by CIFH. Mass flow exiting VI, represented by node M2 is positively 
dependent on P3. This positive relationship is nullified should VI fail stuck. 
The tank level node, L4, is directly affected by the failure modes TR and TL. The occurrence of 
either a rupture or leakage leads to water in the overspill tray, represented by node WOST. The 
conditional edge '+10: L4( + I 0)' illustrates the fact that a large positive relationship exists 
between nodes L4 and WOST in the event of an overspill situation. The tank level is positively 
dependent on mass flow entering through VI (node M2). 
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V2 is a manually operated valve and thus there is no control loop associated with the unit 
digraph model, as illustrated in Figure 3-9. The relationship between nodes M6 and M7 
represents the valve V2. Mass flow entering V2, represented by node· M6, is negatively 
influenced by two failure modes; P6B and P6R. M6 is also positively dependent on the tank level 
node L4. Conversely, the tank level (L4) is negatively dependent on M6, since mass flow 
through Pipe 6 and V2 results in a decrease in the noted level. Mass flow exiting V2 is 
represented by node M7. There are four failure modes associated with M7; P7B, P7R and V2FC 
result in a large negative effect on mass flow at location seven whilst V2FO causes a large 
positive deviation. The relationship between M6 and M7 is positive under nonna! conditions. 
However, this is nullified should V2 be closed and therefore non-operational. 
Figure 3-9. Valve Two Unit Digraph 
Figure 3-10 illustrates the combined unit digraph of V3 and its respective control loop. The air-
to-close control valve, V3, is represented by the relationship between nodes M8, M9 and PlO. 
The control loop is illustrated by nodes L4 - P11 - PlO - M8. Again, due to the inverse acting 
relationship between the level sensor and controller unit, the nonnal edge connecting nodes PlO 
and P 11 is signed '-1'. The nonnal edge between nodes PlO and M8 is also signed '-1 ' due to the 
fact that V3 is an air-to-close valve. 
Mass flow entering V3, represented by node M8, is affected either by a disturbance within the 
control loop L4 - Pll - PlO - M8 or by the failure modes P8B and P8R. Both failure modes 
result in a reduction in mass flow at location eight. Mass flow exiting V3, M9, is affected by four 
failure modes; P9B, P9R and V3FC cause a negative deviation whilst V3FO induces an increase 
in mass flow. If V3 is simply closed, then the relationship between nodes M8 and M9 is 
nullified, as indicated by the signing ofthe conditional edge joining the two nodes. 
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Figure 3-10. Valve Three and Control Loop Two Unit Digraph 
Nodes Pll and PlO are members of the loop incorporating M8 and L4. The pressure of the 
output signal from level sensor S2 is positively dependent on the level of water in the tan1e The 
relationship between the level sensor output node, P 11 and the tank level node, L4 is nullified 
should the level sensor be stuck. Node Pll is positively affected by the failure mode S2FH and 
negatively influenced by S2FL. Node PlO represents the output from controller unit C2 to V3. 
The inverse relationship between Pll and PlO is nullified should Cl be stuck. In a similar 
manner to PII there are two failure modes associated with PlO. PlO is positively affected by 
C2FL and negatively influenced by C2FH. Mass flow entering V3, represented by node M8, 
possesses an inverse relationship with PlO. This relationship is nullified should V3 fail stuck. 
From Figures 3-8 - 3-10 it is noted that there is a single shared common process variable node 
which is present in all three digraphs. Thus, the complete water tank system digraph illustrated in 
Figure 3-11, is generated by combining the unit digraph models at node L4. 
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Figure 3-11. Water Tank System Digraph 
3.3.3.4 Application to Faulty Scenario 
The fault diagnostics procedure is based upon the process outlined in Section 3.3.3.2. FS16, as 
illustrated in Table 3-4, deviates from the ACTIVE mode through sensor VF2 registering the 
situation 'no flow'. It is assumed that since the remaining three sensor readings from VFI, VF3 
and SPI display no variations, the only faults present within the system are associated with V2. 
Step Four (determination of system deviations) from the digraph procedure in Section 3.3.3.2 is 
thus addressed. The approach employed requires the user to fully back-trace through the digraph 
model from the node registering a deviation, until a point is reached where no further back-
tracing can be conducted. Following Step Five (back-tracing process), node M7 in the system 
digraph is addressed since it represents the status of mass flow exiting Valve Two; M7 is 
therefore 'marked'. The back-tracing procedure followed is outlined: 
• From Figure 3-12 the fault propagation leading to a large negative disturbance at M7 
[M7( -10)] is determined. A large negative disturbance is considered since this takes 
into account the 'no flow' registered by VF2. 
Note: Node M7 is shaded black in Figure 3-12 for illustration purposes. In a similar 
manner, relevant component failure mode nodes are highlighted in Figure 3-12 for ease 
of reference during the diagnostic procedure described in this section. 
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Figure 3-12. Water Tank System Digraph (Marked Nodes) 
• It is evident from the system digraph that the faults capable of causing a direct negative 
disturbance at node M7 are: V2FC, P7R and P7B. Following the fault propagation to 
node M6, failure modes P6R and P6B are listed as further causes for M7( -10). 
• The fault propagation follows the route M7( -10) -7 M6( -10) -7 L4( -10). Further back-
, tracing through the two NFBL's in the digraph model reveals additional faults. The 
NFBL operator referenced in Section 2.3.2.4 is utilised as demonstrated by the 
following stages: 
(i) Loop reversed is not considered since no reversed component failure modes are 
noted in the initial analysis. 
(ii) Large external disturbance enters the loop. 
Control loop one: TR, P2B, P2R, V1FC, PIB, P1R, NMWS, CIFH, SIFH. 
Control loop two: TR, C2FH, S2FH. 
(iii)Small external disturbance and loop inactive. 
Control loop one: TL.VIFS, TL.CIFS, TL.S1FS 
Control loop two: TL.V3FS, TL.C2FS, TL.S2FS 
Table 3-7 illustrates the validity, and inconsistency if exhibited, of the individual failure modes 
determined for the given deviating scenario using the diagnostic method based on the water tank 
system digraph. 
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Fault 
V2FC 
P7R 
P7B 
Validity 
TRUE 
TRUE 
TRUE 
Inconsistency 
(if FALSE) Fault 
TR 
PIR 
PIB 
Validity 
FALSE 
FALSE 
FALSE 
Inconsistency 
(if FALSE) 
No water registered at SPI. 
Flow registered at VF I. 
Flow registered at VFI. 
---··-··-·---·-·--··--··--·--·-·--···-·--·----·f-----------..... -... --.. ----.-.. ---.---
Flow registered at VFI & no 
water in SPI. P6R TRUE TL.VIFS FALSE 
... ___ .......... _ ...... H. _____ .......................... __ ... _ .. _. __ .... _._ ...... __ ..... __ ........ __ ._ ......... _._._. ___ ......................... __ ......... ___ . __ . __ . __ .............. __ ... _ ... __ ..... ____ .. _ .......... __ .. _._._ ...... H._._ ................. _ ....... _ ....... _. _____ .. .. 
P6B TRUE 
VIFC FALSE Flow registered at VFI. 
P2R FALSE Flow registered at VF I. 
P2B FALSE Flow registered at VF I. 
---_._-_._--_ ... _--_ ......... _-_._ .. _-_._--
CIFH FALSE Flow registered at VFI. 
TL.CIFS FALSE 
TL.SIFS FALSE 
C2FH FALSE 
S2FH FALSE 
Flow registered at VFI & no 
water in SPI. 
Flow registered at VFI & no 
water in SPI. 
_._-----
No flow registered at VF3. 
No flow registered at VF3. 
1------------...... ---.-------
TL.V3FS FALSE No flow registered at VF3 & 
no water in SPI. 
..... _--_._ .. _----------_._-------_ .. __ . ------... __ .. _ ... -_._-_._ .. _-----_ ... _._----_. 
SIFH FALSE Flow registered at VFI. 
NMWS FALSE Flow registered at VFI. 
TL.C2FS FALSE 
TL.S2FS FALSE 
No flow registered at VF3 & 
no water in SPI. 
........................ _ .... _-_................ . ........................ _ ................ _---
No flow registered at VF3 & 
no water in SPI. 
Table 3-7. Validity of Digraph Diagnostic Results Retrieved for FS16 
3.3.3.5 Method Review 
Advantages 
• An uncomplicated diagram is generated, by following the procedure outlined in Section 
3.3.3.1, with regards to the representation of the relationships between input and output 
variables. 
• The development of a digraph is considered an efficient procedure since it is built up 
from individual sub-units, thus simplifying the process of analysing a system. 
• There is the provision to represent system control loops in a digraph model. Following 
on from this, loops are easily identifiable in a digraph should they be present. 
• Digraphs effectively illustrate the fault propagation through a system as they closely 
reflect the physical structure of the system under investigation. Fault propagation is 
depicted though direct and indirect influences of component failure modes. 
• It is possible to 'zoom-in' on sections within the digraph model thereby concentrating 
on specific variable inter-relationships, if required. This introduces the ability to 
visualise the extent of the effect a failure may induce on a process variable. 
• Through the application. of digraphs in system fault diagnostics, there is the ability to 
back trace within an information flow model to locate the failures associated with a 
given event (registered deviation). 
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Disadvantages 
• The development of a digraph model is subjective and highly dependant upon available 
drawings of the physical structure of the system under investigation. 
• There is a requirement for the development of a consistency check similar to that 
employed by Hurdle at al. in conducting fault tree analysis. This would enable the 
removal of inconsistent failure modes for a given scenario. 
• Digraphs generated for systems of increased complexity may appear overly 
complicated and hence confusing depending on the number of inter-relationships which 
are to be depicted. 
• It is not clear if all multiple fault options for a given scenario would be determined 
when analysing a system of increased complexity, compared with the water tank. 
• The digraph models illustrate the relationships between system variables in steady-
state. The diagnostic strategy therefore requires adapting in order to consider dynamic 
conditions. 
A non-deviating sensor reading is assumed to indicate the absence of failures within a specific 
system section. A simple check to highlight non-detected failures could involve altering the 
system operating mode. In the water tank system example, only VF2 notes a deviation in FS 16 
from the ACTIVE mode. Switching the tank system to the DORMANT mode would yield the 
presence of failures, if present, with VF1, VF3 and SPI. This is relevant to those components not 
displaying a deviation when in the normal operating mode of the system. 
3.4 System Fault Diagnostic Methodology Review 
A review of the four fault diagnostic methodologies considered in Chapter Three is conducted. 
The methods compared are FMEA, SDT, FTA and digraphs. A comparison of the methods is 
performed based upon the diagnostic results achieved when considering the water tank system 
scenario FS 16. Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the sensors are sufficient with no 
added complexity. 
On assessing the faults determined by the four diagnostic methods for FS 16, three identical 
failures are noted (V2FC, P6B and P7B) for the deviation registered by VF2. The SDT produces 
the minimal number of causes for the given deviation through eliminating the possibility of 
either P6 or P7 being ruptured by conducting tests t8 and t9 (P6/P7 ruptured). The results 
obtained from FMEA differ from SDT only with respect to the identification of P6R and the fact 
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that the operator may have closed V2. P7R is not considered a potential cause for the deviation 
during FMEA since flow would be achieved through the valve, it simply would not be directed 
where required but leak through the rupture in the pipe (P7) after V2. P7R is however listed as a 
basic event in the FT A conducted by Hurdle et al. since it affects flow at VF2, the noted top 
event. Ruptured pipes are modelled as causing a large negative disturbance in mass flow within 
the digraph model developed for the water tank system. The faults P6R and P7R are therefore 
derived at when determining the fault propagation that leads to no flow through V2. In the water 
tank system digraph, V2 is represented as the inter-relationship (edge) between nodes M6 and 
M7 in Figure 3-11 (representing mass flow in Pipes 6 and 7 from Figure 3-1). 
FMEA generates a further cause for scenario FS 16, this is related to the operator closing V2. It 
may be argued that this is not an actual 'system fault'. For the initial diagnostic analysis, failures 
due to operator error are ignored owing to their non-dependence on component faults. In the 
FTA conducted by Hurdle et aI., the condition 'operator controlled flow phase' is placed within a 
'house' event and therefore does not appear as one of the minimal cut sets for the top event 'No 
flow through V2'. 
It is noted from the application of digraphs and fault trees that the diagnostic results produced 
display a complementary perspective. Both methods introduce the possibility for the presence of 
failures within the water tank system control loops, more specifically related to either the sensor 
or control units. Digraphs are encompassed in the remit of qualitative analysis with the 
identification of related faulty components, whilst FT A is considered quantitative since it is used 
to calculate the numerical reliability of a system. Furthermore, digraphs illustrate the failure 
propagation route through a system whereas fault trees focus on a certain combination of events 
which can lead to a given top event (noted deviation). 
Digraphs and fault trees have illustrated potential with regards to the identification of multiple 
failure combinations, FMEA and the SDT focus on single faults. It is considered feasible [22] for 
multiple faults to be incorporated into an automated FM EA procedure. In the SDT, it is 
necessary to pre-determine the multiple failures as specific system states under the failure 
column in the trouble-shooting table. Digraphs and fault trees consider the chain of events 
associated with a fault whilst FMEA and the SDT primarily focus on the fault. Neither strategy is 
incorrect since it depends upon the situation as to which is deemed most appropriate. 
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The most potential is assumed to lie with the application of digraphs since it is felt that they cater 
for the demands of modem day systems, especially with regards to identifying multiple failure 
combinations and dynamic conditions. 
3.5 Summary 
• A simple system (water tank) is utilised in order to enable non-complex analysis and 
comparison of three diagnostic methodologies. 
• All investigations are conducted in steady state. 
• The performance of FMEA, SDT, FTA and digraphs are assessed with regards to the 
diagnostic results retrieved for a given noted scenario (FS 16). 
• System sensors are assumed sufficient and reliable. 
• The SDT produces the minimal number of potential causes whilst digraphs produce the 
maximal. 
• The causes yielded using FTA (Scheme 1) and digraphs display conflicting results with 
regards to the noted consistency between component failures and sensor readings. 
• FM EA is the only diagnostic strategy to co.nsider the operator as a potential failure. The 
operator is contained within a 'house' event in FT A and ignored during the 
development of the SDT trouble shooting table and digraph model. 
• FMEA and SDT primarily focus on single faults only. FT A and digraphs consider the 
chain of events associated with a fault and can also identify multiple failure 
combinations. 
• The need for the clear identification of fault propagation through a system is identified. 
Emphasis is thus to be placed on extending the application of digraphs: 
- A digraph presents a clear representation of the relationships that exist between 
components and their respective failure modes in a system. 
- Digraphs are suited to illustrating the fault propagation through a system as they 
closely reflect the physical structure of the system under investigation. 
- Component failure modes are identified through conducting back-tracing in the 
system digraph from a particular node that represents the location of a given 
deviation. 
- Research is to be conducted based on the fact that non-deviating sensor readings 
are assumed to indicate the absence of associated component failure modes, 
thereby removing inconsistent diagnostic results for a given faulty scenario. 
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• The dynamics of the water tank system are disregarded; initial analysis only considers 
the system in steady-state. Consequently, the four diagnostic methodologies considered 
do not take into account transient effects. The introduction of dynamic analysis 
potentially allows for a more realistic investigation of the system. Digraphs illustrate 
evident fault propagation routes through a system and therefore in an automated 
environment (real-time analysis) it would be possible to generate a constantly changing 
model with regards to the system under investigation. The inclusion of AND gates into 
a digraph model could further allow for the consideration of redundancy mechanisms 
and multiple faults. 
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Chapter Four 
Application of the Digraph Method in 
System Fault Diagnostics 
The main focus ofthe research in Chapter Four documents the improved application of digraphs, 
in a diagnostic manner, to the water tank system previously described in Chapter Three. The key 
aim of the diagnostic procedure is to remove the possibility for retrieving inconsistent results for 
a given faulty scenario. Furthermore, the potential for employing the digraph procedure in real-
time fault diagnostics is discussed along with the development of a proposed strategy. 
4.1 Improved System Fault Diagnostics Procedure 
Emphasis, regarding current research, is placed on improving the application of the digraph 
model in system fault diagnostics. The process is conducted using the system digraph previously 
developed following the procedure documented in Section 3.3.3.1. System behaviour is recorded 
through monitoring retrieved sensor data (e.g. via a level transmitter). In a given mode of 
operation the application system under investigation is known to possess an expected set of 
sensor readings. As previously described in Section 3.3.3.2 these are compared with the actual 
system readings during the diagnostic procedure to identify if any deviations are present (Step 4). 
The diagnostic strategy (Steps 4-6) described in this section aims to remove the inconsistent 
failure results retrieved in Section 3.3.3.4, through considering a process termed <flagging' (Step 
5). 
(vi) Step Four: Determination of System Deviations 
(Remains unaltered from Section 3.3.3.2). 
(vii) Step Five: Flagging of Non -Deviating Sections 
Information from sensor readings is used to flag nodes (and in some cases whole 
digraph sections) representing process variables which are known to be non-deviating. 
It is assumed that a non-deviating reading indicates the absence of failures in a 
70 
Chapter Four: Application of the Digraph Method in Fault Diagnostics 
corresponding system section. The development of the 'flagging' process is discussed 
in more detail in Section 4.2. 
(viii)Step Six: Back-tracing Process 
Fault diagnosis involves back-tracing through the system digraph from a specific sensor 
node which represents the location of the given deviation. Back-tracing refers to the 
manner in which an analyst moves from a deviating node through the digraph until all 
possible failure modes which could have contributed to the deviation are noted. The 
back-tracing process ceases once either (i) a flagged section is reached or (ii) no further 
back-tracing is possible. For multiple deviating sensors the diagnostic results obtained 
through back-tracing from each deviating node are ANDed together. All potential 
failure causes are listed at the end of the fault diagnostics procedure. 
4.2 Water Tank System Fault Diagnostics 
From the diagnostic procedures outlined in Sections 3.3.3.2 and 4.1, it is evident that two 
methods are considered for assessing the application of digraphs in system fault diagnostics. The 
methods differ in their approach to back-tracing through the digraph. The logic employed by 
each method is summarised in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. A review of methods one and two is 
conducted in Section 4.2.3. 
The water tank system scenario FS16 is utilised as a 'step-by-step' example to describe how the 
two methods are employed in fault diagnostics. FS 16, previously referenced in Chapter Three, 
encompasses sensor readings which are obtained whilst the system is assumed to be in the 
ACTIVE state. FSI6, as illustrated in Table 4-1, deviates from the ACTIVE mode through 
sensor VF2 registering the situation 'no flow'. It is assumed that since the remaining three sensor 
readings from VF 1, VF3 and SP 1 display no variations, the only faults present within the system 
are associated with V2. Step Four from the digraph diagnostic procedure is thus addressed. 
Operating Mode 
ACTIVE 
FSl6 
VFI 
Flow 
Flow 
VF2 
Flow 
No Flow 
VF3 
No Flow 
No Flow 
Table 4-1. FSl6 Deviating Sensor Readings 
SPI 
No Water 
No Water 
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4.2.1 Method One 
The approach erriployed by method one requires the user to fully back-trace through the digraph 
model from the node registering a deviation, until a point is reached where it is not possible for 
further back-tracing to be conducted. (Reference Sections 3.3.3.2 and 3.3.3.4). 
4.2.2 Method Two 
Method two is considered as a means for removing inconsistent failure modes which are 
determined for a deviating process variable. In this manner, the possibility of generating 
conflicting results for a particular system deviation is eradicated. In the approach employed by 
method two, information from sensor readings is used to flag nodes (and in some cases whole 
digraph sections) representing process variables which are known to be non-deviating. Back-
tracing from a known deviating node ceases either once the analyst reaches a flagged section or 
if no further back-tracing is possible. The steps involved in method two are illustrated through 
application to scenario FS 16. 
In a similar manner to Section 3.3.3.4 node M7 is addressed since it represents the status of mass 
flow exiting Valve 2. 
(i) From Table 4-1 it is noted that only VF2 registers a deviation from the ACTIVE mode. 
Consequently, three sections of the digraph are flagged; those incorporating control 
loop one, control loop two and water in the overspill tray. Back-tracing from the 
deviating node M7 therefore ceases at node L4. The deviating node M7 and the 
subsequent back-tracing route is highlighted in Figure 4-1, the flagged sections are also 
marked using diagonal lines. 
Figure 4-1. Water Tank System Digraph (Method Two) 
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(ii) From reviewing the system digraph, the faults capable of causing a direct negative 
disturbance at node M7 are: V2FC, P7R and P7B. Following the fault propagation to 
node M6 reveals the failure modes P6R and P6B. No additional faults are documented 
due to the flagging of specific digraph sections, the back-tracing process ceases at L4. 
The recorded failure mode results are noted TRUE~ with regards to their validity. 
4.2.3 Comparison between Methods One & Two 
The main difference observed between the results achieved from the application of methods one 
and two is in the number of failure mode options yielded. This fact is exhibited by the data in 
Table 4-2 where the percentage accuracy for the number of faults determined is calculated (given 
the system in is the ACTIVE mode). A detailed list of the diagnostic results yielded for the water 
tank system scenarios FS 1-15 is contained in Appendix C. 
No. of Failure No. with No. of Actual % Accuracy Scenario Combinations Determined Validity TRUE Possible Failure 
Ml M2 ml m2 Combinations mllMl m21M2 
FSl 12 6 6 6 6 50% 100% 
FS2 6 3 3 3 3 50% 100% 
FS3 272 66 66 66 66 24% 100% 
FS4 96 24 24 24 24 25% 100% 
FS5 4224 396 396 396 396 10% 100% 
FS6 2112 120 120 120 120 7% 100% 
FS7 704 132 132 132 132 19% 100% 
FS8 352 40 40 40 40 11% 100% 
FS9 264 36 36 36 36 14% 100% 
FSlO 132 15 15 15 15 11% 100% 
FSll 2 2 2 2 2 100% 100% 
FS12 ACTIVE mode ACTIVE mode --- --- ACTIVE mode --- ---
FS13 32 22 22 22 22 69% 100% 
FS14 16 8 8 8 8 50% 100% 
FS15 44 12 12 12 159 27% 100% 
FS16 22 5 5 5 5 23% 100% 
Table 4-2. Comparison of Results between Methods One and Two 
The accuracy of the diagnostic results achieved is calculated by forming a ratio between the 
number of fault combinations yielded from the individual methods and the respective number 
which are assumed to have the validity TRUE. For the specific water tank system example, the 
results obtained from method two (M2) illustrate 100% accuracy, whereas those obtained from 
method one (Ml) indicate it is less effective at determining correct solutions. The failure 
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combinations which may give rise to the listed tank scenarios are evaluated through meticulous 
assessment of Figure 3-1. The complete number of determined combinations for each scenario is 
noted in the 'No of Actual Possible Failure Combinations' column in Table 4-2. 
The diagnostic analysis reveals that method one determines increased fault options over method· 
two. This is directly attributed to the amount of back-tracing conducted in each method. The 
results produced by following method one, as illustrated by those obtained for M7( -10) in 
Section 3.3.3.4, contain certain inconsistencies when compared with the sensor readings for the 
given scenario. For example, C2FH is listed as a potential fault for FS 16, yet there is no flow 
registered at VF3. Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the retrieved sensor readings are 
correct, therefore the proposed fault C2FH is deemed incorrect. Consequently, as a means of 
removing erroneous inconsistencies the assumption followed in method two states: 
• On assessing a node that indicates a non-deviating reading from the normal operating 
mode conditions of the system, the effects of that node are disregarded and respective 
sections in the digraph are flagged. This prevents following fault propagation routes in 
the system digraph which are assumed 'working'. 
In this manner, fault propagation in the case of FS 16 in Section 4.2 is not fully back-traced 
through the whole digraph and known non-deviating nodes are not considered. For a known 
deviating sensor, the effects at the three observation points not directly associated with that 
sensor are disregarded and all focus is concentrated on the primary failures associated with the 
given deviation. The flagging of non-deviating sections during the back-tracing process acts as a 
form of consistency check. This removes the chance for determining conflicting results which 
may display certain inconsistencies when compared with retrieved sensor ~eadings. 
In method two, a condition is pre-written into the water tank digraph model allowing for the 
removal of flags if necessary. This is of significant relevance when conducting fault diagnostics 
on the tank system in the ACTIVE mode with sensor readings indicating scenario FS 15. 
Scenario FS 15 represents both a tank rupture and overflow. Given the situation incorporating a 
failure associated with Control Loop One, Control Loop Two is required. If however a failure 
occurs within loop two, the retrieved sensor readings register the expected state, i.e. no flow at 
V3, when in fact a fault is present. This occurs for a single state which encompasses an overflow. 
As a means of overcoming the issue, the flagging response is inhibited with back-tracing from all 
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sensor location nodes ceasing at L4. This enables a larger diagnostic solution since it is likely 
that the overflow situation is brought about through an error involving both control loops. If the 
pre-written condition is taken into account, 159 failure combinations are determined using 
method two. This provides a diagnostic solution which notes the same number of actual possible 
failure combinations as recorded in Table 4-2. With regards to the general case it is anticipated 
that the highlighted issue is only of concern within a system incorporating both: 
(i) A specific scenario which involves a safety loop leading to a critical situation (e.g. tank 
overflow). 
(ii) Retrieved readings from the safety section indicate normal running conditions. 
The presence of the condition is successful with regards to the diagnostic results yielded. 
Overall, the changes made in the diagnostic procedure to form method two have proved 
successful. The application of methods one and two in Sections 3.3.3.2 and 4.2 have shown the 
elaborated procedure, involving flagging, provides significant improvements as illustrated in 
[76]. 
4.3 Consideration of Transient Effects 
The work described in Chapter Three and the preceding sections of this chapter, regarding the 
application of four diagnostic methodologies, disregards the presence of transient effects. The 
potential for the application of digraphs using dynamic data is to be investigated using the water 
tank system. 
To enable a more complete and thorough system analysis, consideration of dynamic effects is 
required. The main area of focus when considering the water tank dynamics, relates to abrupt 
fault analysis [77]. Abrupt faults represent a dramatic change in a system and can therefore result 
in significant visible deviations, known as transients, from the normal system operating mode. In 
time, the system is reported to have moved into a new 'steady state'. This is synonymous with 
the water tank system changing scenario when assumed to be in one of two operating modes, 
'ACTIVE' or 'DORMANT'. A necessary strategy involves analysing the system behaviour at 
frequent intervals and then, should the system have shifted from its normal operating mode, 
conducting fault diagnostics. 
An example illustrating the benefits for considering system dynamics is related to the ABS 
system in a modern car. If the ABS is based on static information retrieved from relevant sensors 
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then it is likely to release the brakes every time the car slows to a stop at a set of traffic lights. 
This is as a direct result of the ABS sensing a 'skid' scenario. Equally, if the ABS does not 
monitor the operation of the car brakes, then in a real emergency there would have to be a pre-
programmed sequence. This set-up is clearly not optimal for safety. 
The method employed in Section 4.3.1, allowing for the inclusion of transient effects, involves 
monitoring the water tank and determining if the system is in an abnormal scenario through 
analyzing retrieved system data. From the sensor readings it is noted if, and how, the system 
deviates from the normal operating mode. System dynamics are involved in the diagnostics 
process through the monitoring of a specific parameter with respect to time; this parameter is 
dependent on the system under analysis. The back-tracing procedure is performed in an identical 
manner to that described in Section 4.2 for steady state analysis. The sensors are deemed reliable 
if their readings are representative of a viable scenario. The diagnostics procedure is expanded in 
Section 4.3.1 using the water tank system for application. The dynamic effects of faults are 
investigated through monitoring the rate of change in tank level. 
4.3.1 Water Tank System Fault Diagnostics 
This section summarises the investigation route considered when taking into account the water 
tank system dynamics. In addition to the statements outlined in the development of the water 
tank system digraph in Section 3.3.3.3, it is assumed: 
• Mass flow through V3» Mass flow through VI > Mass flow through V2. 
• Water tank level height, HT, is c.alculated from: 
(i) Data covering the duration of mass flow in and out of the tank from the flow and 
tray sensors; VFl-3 and SPI. 
(ii) Level sensor readings from SI and S2. 
• If the readings obtained from the level sensors are reliable then the sensors can be used 
to indicate whether the tank level is decreasing, increasing or not changing. 
• Only one set of sensors which provide a tank level reading are able to fail at a specific 
time. The situation whereby both level sensors could be faulty is not considered in this 
initial analysis. 
• The tank level is maintained between two pre-determined points labelled Land H (L :s 
normal water tank level band :s H). If the fluid height < L, a low level is noted, 
conversely if the tank height> H, a high level is recorded. A tolerance bandwidth of ± 
6y is taken into account when comparing retrieved sensor data. 
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A similar fault diagnostics procedure is followed, to that identified in Section 4.2, when taking 
into account dynamic effects. Procedural adaptations considered are described in this section. 
The system operating readings for a specific mode vary and are dependent on the fluid level in 
the tank. In steady state, the water tank system ACTIVE mode is defined by VFI and VF2 
registering the state 'flow'; flow entering the tank at VI and exiting at V2. However, when 
considering the dynamics of system there are four viable ACTIVE mode states, as illustrated by 
Table 4-3. A similar process is presented for the 'DORMANT' mode. 
ACTIVE Scenario VFl VF2 VF3 SPl Tank Level (h) oh/ot 
A4 NF F F NW High <0 
Al2 F F NF NW Low >0 
Al6 F NF NF NW Empty >0 
Al4 F F NF NW Normal >0 
DORMANT Scenario VFl VF2 VF3 SPI Tank Level (h) oh/ot 
D6 NF NF F NW High <0 
Dl6 F NF NF NW Low >0 
Dl6 F NF NF NW Empty >0 
D8 NF NF NF NW Normal =0 
Table 4-3. Water Tank System Dynamic Operating Mode Readings 
The height of the tank level is used to determine whether the system is in the expected operating 
mode. For example, ACTIVE A4 is valid for the scenario incorporating a tank height which lies 
within the high range. On taking into account the tank system description from Chapter Three, it 
is expected for VI to be closed and V3 open. In this manner the tank level, as reflected by ohlot 
< 0, decreases to within the two pre-determined levels, as monitored by the level sensors S I and 
S2. 
Step Four from Section 4.2 is altered to allow for the comparison between the two tank level 
readings obtained from the water tank system. The tank water height is retrieved from level 
sensors S I and S2. The assumed height of water in the tank (HT) is then calculated from flow 
rate information (duration of flow in and out of the tank). The tank level registered by the level 
sensors is compared with the height of water obtained from the flow data. It is required that two 
out of the three tank level readings correlate in order to verify the height of fluid in the tank. If 
the level sensors SI and S2 provide identical readings but disagree with that calculated from the 
flow data, then a fault associated with the flow sensors and/or tray sensor is assumed to exist. 
During this scenario, no fault diagnostics is conducted due to the system sensors being deemed 
unreliable and therefore information regarding sensor deviations is considered non-dependable. 
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If, however, the level sensor readings conflict but one of the readings correlates with the 
calculated height HT, then it is assumed that the lone level sensor is faulty. The situation 
whereby different tank level readings are obtained from SI, S2 and HT is noted a critical 
scenario. It is not possible to take the diagnostics procedure further for a given ,critical scenario 
since it is unknown which sensors provide a faulty reading. 
The rate of change in the tank level (i.e. increasing, decreasing or zero) is also determined during 
Step Four. Table 4-4 illustrates the rate of change in height (oh/ch) which is expected for the 
scenarios previously identified in Section 3.1.4. The oh/ot value is firstly used to determine the 
specific operating mode phase ofthe system and then to verify the retrieved sensor readings. For 
some scenarios it is only possible to record one type of height change. For example, in Scenario 
3 with no flow entering the system and only flow exiting a negative oh/ot is expected. 
Scenario VFl VF2 VF3 SPl oh/ot Scenario VFl VF2 VF3 SPl oh/ot 
1 F F F W <0 10 F NF F NW <0 
2 F F F NW <0 11 F F NF W >0 
3 NF F F W <0 12 F F NF NW >0 
4 NF F F NW <0 13 NF F NF W <0 
5 NF NF F W <0 14 NF F NF NW <0 
6 NF NF F NW <0 15 F NF NF W <0 
7 NF NF NF W <0 =0 
8 NF NF NF NW =0 >0 
9 F NF F W <0 16 F NF NF NW >0 
Table 4-4. Water Tank System Scenarios with Expected oh/ot 
A brief example is outlined demonstrating how Table 4-4 is utilised: 
• Tank level readings obtained - SI: O.5m, HT: O.504m, S2: O.65m . 
• It is assumed that the SI and HT readings are within the ± O.02m tolerance bandwidth . 
S2 is assumed to be faulty and therefore only SI is used to detect the rate of height 
change in the tank. S2 faulty is noted in the diagnostic results along with the failure 
combinations for the given scenario. 
• The flow and tray sensor readings indicate the system is in scenario FS6. 
• A decreasing level is noted from level sensor SI. For the given scenario, FS6, Table 4-4 
verifies that a decreasing level would be expected. Further analysis assumes that the 
tank level is in fact low from the information obtained from SI and HT. 
• The tank is assumed to be in the ACTIVE mode. A low tank level reading gives rise to 
ACTIVE mode A12. 
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Fault diagnostics is then perfonned for known deviating sensor readings through a process of 
back-tracing from nodes in the system digraph which represent the location of a given deviation, 
as described in Section 4.2. 
4.3.2 Application to a Faulty Scenario 
A water tank system scenario is assessed as a means of simulating the manner in which the fault 
diagnostics procedure would function if dynamic conditions are to be taken into account. This is 
used as a 'step-by-step' example for illustration purposes. For this example it is assumed the tank 
level markers 'L' and 'H' correspond to a height of 0.6m and 0.8m respectively. The tolerance 
bandwidth is assigned the value ± 0.02m. 
(i) A level reading outside the nonnal boundary between 0.6 - 0.8m is recorded. The 
system is in the' ACTIVE' operating mode. The abnonnal level reading indicates the 
presence of a failure(s). The precise 'ACTIVE' mode readings expected are processed 
from data regarding the tank level. 
(ii) The readings retrieved from the tank level sensors are: SI = 0.55m and S2 = 0.548m. 
From data regarding the flow in and out of the tank it is calculated that the height of the 
level should be 0.55m. It is noted that all of the readings are within the 0.02m tolerance 
bandwidth. On comparing the sensor readings with HT the level and flow sensors are 
deemed reliable. 
(iii) From the low level reading the tank operating mode is determined as ACTIVE A12 
(reference Table 4-3). 
(iv) The actual readings recorded by the tank flow and tray sensors indicate the system is in 
scenario FS 1 O. 
(v) Scenario FSIO deviates from ACTIVE Al2 through sensor VF2 registering 'no flow' 
and sensor VF3 registering 'flow'. It is assumed that since the remaining two sensor 
readings obtained from VFl and SPI do not differ in FSIO when compared with the 
ACTIVE mode, the only faults present within the system are associated with V2 and 
V3. Table 4-5 illustrates the differences noted between the sensor readings in FS 1 0 and 
ACTIVE A12. 
Operating Mode VFl VF2 VF3 SPl 
ACTIVE Al2 Flow Flow No Flow No Water 
FSlO Flow No Flow Flow No Water 
Table 4-5. FSIO Deviating Sensor Readings 
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(vi) A decreasing tank level is recorded. From Table 4-4 it is noted that in 'FS 1 0' a negative 
rate of change in tank height is acceptable and therefore the decreasing level is deemed 
correct. Under normal circumstances ACTIVE A12 comprises an increasing level. 
(vii) The water tank system digraph, Figure 3-11, is addressed in order to determine which 
faults have attributed to the deviating sensor readings obtained from VF2 and VF3 
whilst the tank is purported to be in the ACTIVE mode. The diagnostic results yield ten 
second order faults, as illustrated by Table 4-6. 
4.3.3 Method Review 
Cause for Deviating Sensor Readings 
VF2 AND VF3 
V2FC' V3FO 
P7B 
P7R 
P6B 
P6R 
C2FH 
Table 4-6. Probable Faults Leading to FSIO 
There are two critical scenarios not considered in the analysis: 
(i) The level sensor readings obtained from SI and S2 correlate but disagree with HT. 
i.e. SI = S2 i= HT. 
(ii) All tank level readings differ, i.e. SI i= S2 i= HT. 
Their omission is linked to the fact that HT is calculated from data obtained from the flow 
sensors, VFI-3 and tray sensor, SPl. A varying HT indicates the presence of potential failures 
with either the sensors and/or tank system components. If one of the flow or tray sensors 
registers an unreliable reading it is difficult to identify which specific sensor(s) has failed. 
Consequently, the operator has to assume that all of the sensors have in fact failed. Further 
investigation is then required to determine which sensor(s) is inoperative. 
The ACTIVE and DORMANT modes are defined depending on the status of the tank level. The 
steady state ACTIVE mode incorporates the assumption that flow permanently enters the tank at 
VI and exits at V2. This produces errors when considering a varying tank level due to the 
assumption that the water tank level is kept between two pre-determined points. Consequently, 
specific ACTIVE and DORMANT phase readings are determined for the dynamic analysis, 
since varying tank heights are taken into account. 
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From the simplified application of the outlined procedure it is noted that there is potential for 
digraphs to be used within the field of fault diagnostics of dynamic systems. More specifically, 
this is characterised by systems containing a dynamic medium such as the fluid in either an 
aircraft fuel system or hydraulic system. The results obtained from following the procedure are 
plausible for this early stage. The consistency check involving validation of the tank level 
heights acts as a credible test in aiding the development of correct failure mode results. It is 
required however, that further work be conducted in real-time using systems of increased 
complexity in order to prove that the method utilised can be scaled up and the procedure 
automated. 
4.4 Summary 
• The introduction of the flagging procedure to remove inconsistencies between the 
diagnostic results achieved has proved successful. An inaccuracy associated with the 
method when applied to the water tank system has been identified and addressed. 
• More than one possible failure cause is highlighted for the water tank system scenarios 
considered. It is anticipated that it will be necessary to research 'honing-in' on the exact 
cause for a given system deviation. 
• The diagnostic strategy has been easily modified to incorporate transient effects. Thus 
the consideration of both system dynamics and the consistency checks conducted in 
method two lend themselves towards developing a novel fault diagnostic technique. 
• Application of the method to systems of increased complexity will provide a clearer 
, 
means for determining the potential of the procedure in fault diagnostics in both steady-
state and with the inclusion of transient effects. The effectiveness of the method with 
regards to increased scalability is unknown and thus requires further research. 
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Chapter Five 
Fuel Rig System 
The initial research conducted in Chapter Four is expanded through considering an application 
system of increased complexity. A BAE Systems simulation test stand of an aircraft fuel system 
(fuel rig) is employed. The fault diagnostic process, based on back-tracing within a digraph 
model from a deviating node to determine viable component failure mode combinations, is 
automated through running scripted code in Matlab. Dynamic transmitter data is obtained from 
the fuel rig system to test the validity of the procedure. Guidelines are also provided for 
extending the scope to include integrated control loop features. The topic areas addressed in 
Chapter Five are referenced in [78-80]. 
5.1 Aircraft Fuel System 
The purpose of a fuel system is to reliably provide the required amount of clean fuel at the right 
pressure to the aircraft engines during all phases of flight and manoeuvres. An aircraft fuel 
system can be split into four major sections, namely: 
(i) Fuel storage. 
(ii) Fuel distribution. 
(iii) Fuel dump. 
(iv) Fuel level indicators. 
5.1.1 Fuel Storage 
With regards to fuel storage, tanks are located in the wings, fuselage, horizontal stabilizers (tail) 
and/or fin of an aircraft. Most aircraft use the fuel contained within the tanks for centre of gravity 
control; subsonic aircraft are able to use the 'trim' tanks in the horizontal stabilizers to maintain 
an optimum centre of gravity (CG) during cruise. The trim tank transfer system controls the CG 
of the aircraft. When the aircraft is in cruise, the system optimizes the CG position to increase 
the fuel economy by reducing the drag of the aircraft through either transferring fuel to the trim 
tank (aft transfer) or from the trim tank (forward transfer). It is this movement of fuel which 
alters the CG of the aircraft. Similarly, the weight of fuel in the wings induces the balancing of 
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lift. This reduces wing bending moments, which in turn allows for the design of a much lighter 
structure, producing less stress on the wing-fuselage fairings. 
The transfer of fuel is usually initiated from the centre tank and then from the outer tanks during 
the final phases of flight. This is primarily due to the reduction in aircraft weight through fuel 
consumption which in turn results in reduced lift during the final stages. It is considered 
unreasonable to assume that all of the fuel on-board is used during the flight and so any amount 
of fuel which does remain is referred to as 'unusable fuel'. Aircraft manufacturers aim to reduce 
the amount of 'unusable fuel' left after a flight and so have incorporated a system of scavenger 
pumps into the system. These collect fuel from all areas of the tank and deposit it in the main 
wing tanks. 
A fuel tank venting system maintains an acceptable pressure differential between the interior and 
exterior of the tank during aircraft operation. Both overpressure and under pressure can cause 
structural damage to fuel tanks. The latter can also result in engine starvation. Large aircraft 
connect the main tanks via vent pipes to a surge tank for tank venting and overflow scenarios. 
Surge tanks then redirect 'overflow fuel' back to the main tanks through vent float valves. 
5.1.2 Fuel Distribution 
Fuel distribution is comprised from four systems: 
(i) Engine feed system i.e. fuel flow to engines 
(ii) Fuel transfer system 
(iii) Cross-feed system 
(iv) Refuel / de-fuel system 
Engine feed occurs via two possible methods: gravity or pressure feed. In gravity feed the force 
of gravity 'pushes' the fuel flow to the engines. This is only viable if the tanks are at a great 
enough height above the engines. It is a common method which is used on smaller (lighter) high-
wing aircraft and also in emergency circumstances on larger aircraft when fuel pumps are rated 
inoperable. With pressure feed, fuel pumps are used to transfer fuel through the fuel system. 
There is usually one main pump for each engine and one emergency pump to supply fuel to the 
engines if the main pump fails. There are various principles used which include centrifugal and 
ejector pumps with fuel selector valves. 
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There are two refuel procedures which can be followed: over wing and pressure refuelling. Over 
wing refuelling is used on smaller aircraft. It is a slow and simple method which utilises gravity -
rarely used on larger aircraft since it may be difficult to locate the filler cap. Pressure refuelling 
utilises pressure from the fuelling station or truck to force fuel into the aircraft tanks. It is usually 
conducted through a fuelling coupling located under the right wing leading edge and is 
considered to be a fast and easy method, mainly due to the coupling mechanism. De-fuelling is 
simply the opposite of refuelling. Fuel is pumped out of the aircraft tanks and back into the 
refuelling station or truck. 
5.1.3 Fuel Dump 
Fuel jettison allows for the dumping of fuel overboard (except reserve fuel). Fuel weight 
amounts to a large proportion of an aircraft's gross weight, especially at the beginning of a long 
haul flight. If an emergency should occur after take off, the aircraft is not able to land due to 
exceeding the maximum landing weight. Consequently, fuel dumping has to occur. An 
overweight landing would cause unjustifiable added stress and endanger the crew and passengers 
on-board the aircraft. Further more, heavily laden aircraft are not able to successfully fly a go-
around and manoeuvre within a steep climb rate. 
There are two main principles involved in fuel dumping. A gravity jettison system utilises large 
dump chutes which are deployed at the ends of both wing tips. The chutes provide the pressure 
differential required for the flow of fuel from the tanks. A pump jettison system utilises dump 
nozzles/valves, at the ends of both wing tips, through which the fuel exits. 
5.1.4 Fuel level Indicators 
There are three main fuel indicators used in aircraft: mechanical, resistance and capacitance 
quantity indicators. With regards to capacitance quantity indicators, a condenser is installed in 
the fuel tank whereby the fuel and air act as a di-electric material. A dry probe provides a low 
capacitance. Conversely, with increasing fuel content the capacitance also increases. A controller 
then converts the capacitance value into a fuel volume. Other fuel indicators involve magnetic 
level indicators. A magnetic 'dipstick' is unlocked and slowly lowered from under the wing. A 
magnetic float on the fuel surface becomes attached to the top of the stick and the fuel level is 
determined by the relative position of the float. 
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5.2 Fuel Rig System Description 
The fuel rig comprises a stainless steel frame which supports four tanks and their respective 
pumps (eight), valves, sensors and connecting pipe work. The rig recreates the function of a 
general aircraft fuel system through using water instead of kerosene. The rig can be connected to 
a 'control board' which undertakes automatic control. The general layout of the fuel rig is 
illustrated in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1. Fuel Rig Schematic 
From Figure 5-1 it is noticeable that the three active supply tanks; wing, collector and main, each 
have two associated pump trays. The trays contain a peristaltic pump, pressure relief valve, 
powered and manual isolation valves and a pressure regulating valve. The instrumentation 
connected with the trays consists of a pressure switch and pressure transmitter on the transfer 
lines. Instrumentation for each tank comprises high and low level switches and level transmitters. 
Flow transmitters are also positioned at all tank exit locations. The sensor signals, linked to the 
fuel rig, pass through a central control panel. This allows for the monitoring of signals and aids 
in the manual operation of the rig. 
The main tank represents the core group of tanks in an aircraft and has a capacity of 270 litres. 
Two pumps, connected in parallel, pump fuel from the main tank to the collector tank which has 
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a capacity of 90 litres. The auxiliary storage tanks of an aircraft fuel system are represented by 
the wing tank which also has a 90 litre capacity. In a similar manner to the main tank, two 
parallel pumps transfer fuel from the wing tank to the collector tank. A large single tank at the 
base of the fuel rig represents an aircraft engine. 
Fuel feeding to the engine (represented by the engine tank) is conducted via fuel transfer from 
the collector tank through a pair of parallel connected pumps. On an actual' aircraft the engine 
would utilise the fuel. In the fuel rig however, there is no engine and therefore the engine tank is 
used as a store. A final pump, the centrifugal refuel pump transfers fuel into the active supply 
tanks from the engine tank. Complete drainage of the fuel rig system is conducted through 
utilising the engine tank drain valve. Each of the three active supply tanks are connected to the 
engine tank via a manually operated dump valve. 
A detailed piping and instrumentation illustration of the fuel rig is provided in Figure 5-2. The 
components in the system diagram are described in more detail in Section 5.2.1. A 
comprehensive account of the fuel rig operating modes, sensor readings and component failure 
modes are discussed in Sections 5.2.2 - 5.2.4. 
Note: The numbered location markers in Figure 5-2 are utilised in the application of the digraph 
methodology in Section 5.3. 
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5.2.1 Fuel Rig Components 
Table 5-1 contains a list of the specific components illustrated in Figure 5-2. It provides a key to 
the symbols used in the system illustration. Relevant component descriptive comments are also 
noted in the table. The identification numbers used in Figure 5-2 correspond to a specific tank 
section or function: 
• 01 ***: Main Tank 
• 02***: Wing Tank 
• 03***: Collector Tank 
• 04***: Engine Tank 
Symbol Description Description Notes 
Main Tank 270litres Design Capacity 
I I Tank Wing Tank 90litres Design Capacity Collector Tank 90litres Design Capacity Engine Tank 450litres Design Capacity 
~ Main Tank Peristaltic Pump I Main Tank Peristaltic Pump 2 Peristaltic pump Wing Tank Peristaltic Pump I Wing Tank Peristaltic Pump 2 Collector Tank Peristaltic Pump I 
Collector Tank Peristaltic Pump 2 
---EI Centrifugal pump Engine Centrifugal Refuel Pump Centrifugal Transfer Pump 
Main Tank Isolation Valve I 
Main Tank Isolation Valve 2 
Main Tank Pump Tray Isolation Valve I 
Main Tank Pump Tray Isolation Valve 2 
Main Tank Inter-Tray Isolation Valve I 
Main Tank Inter-Tray Isolation Valve 2 
Main Tank Trays Output Isolation Valve 
Main Tank Drain Valve 
Wing Tank Isolation Valve I 
Wing Tank Isolation Valve 2 
Wing Tank Pump Tray Isolation Valve I 
Wing Tank Pump Tray Isolation Valve 2 [Z] Wing Tank Inter-Tray Isolation Valve I 
Isolation valve Wing Tank Inter-Tray Isolation Valve 2 All Manual Wing Tank Trays Output Isolation Valve 
Wing Tank Drain Valve 
Collector Tank Isolation Valve I 
Collector Tank Isolation Valve 2 
Collector Tank Pump Tray I Isolation Valve 
Collector Tank Pump Tray 2 isolation Valve 
Collector Tank Inter-Tray Isolation Valve I 
Collector Tank Inter-Tray Isolation Valve 2 
Collector Tank Inter-Tray Isolation Valve 3 
Collector Tank Trays Output Isolation Valve 3 
Collector Tank Drain Valve 
Engine Tank Drain Valve 
Transfer Pump Tray Isolation Valve I 
Transfer Pump Tray Isolation Valve 2 
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Symbol Description Description Notes 
Main Tank Pump Tray I Spring Pressure Relief Valve 
Main Tank Pump Tray 2 Spring Pressure Relief Valve 
~ Wing Tank Pump Tray I Spring Pressure Relief Valve Pressure relief valve Wing Tank Pump Tray 2 Spring Pressure Relief Valve Collector Tank Pump Spring Tray I Pressure Relief Valve Collector Tank Pump Tray 2 Spring Pressure Relief Valve 
Engine Tank Pump Tray I Spring Pressure Relief Valve 
Transfer Pump Tray Spring Pressure Relief Valve 
Main Tank Pump Tray Pressure Regulating Valve I 
Main Tank Pump Tray Pressure Regulating Valve 2 
~ Pressure regulating Wing Tank Pump Tray Pressure Regulating Valve I valve Wing Tank Pump Tray Pressure Regulating Valve 2 
Collector Tank Pump Tray I Pressure Regulating Valve 
Collector Tank Pump Tray 2 Pressure Regulating Valve 
Main Tank Pump Tray Powered Isolation Valve I 
Main Tank Pump Tray Powered Isolation Valve 2 
Main Tank Pump Tray Powered Isolation Valve 3 
Reconfiguration Isolation Valve I 
~ Wing Tank Pump Tray Powered Isolation Valve I Powered isolation Wing Tank Pump Tray Powered Isolation Valve 2 valve Reconfiguration Isolation Valve 2 
Collector Tank Pump Tray Flow Control Valve I 
Collector Tank Pump Tray Flow Control Valve 2 
Main Tank Refuel Valve 
Wing Tank Refuel Valve 
Collector Tank Refuel Valve 
[5I(J Manual globe valve Manual Globe Valve Leak simulation! Repositionable 
Main Tank Tray I Reconfiguration Valve (L Port 90° Actuation) 
~ Main Tank Tray 2 Reconfiguration Valve (L Port 90° Actuation) Reconfiguration Wing Tank Tray I Reconfiguration Valve (L Port 90° Actuation) valve Wing Tank Tray 2 Reconfiguration Valve (L Port 90" Actuation) Collector Tank Tray I Reconfiguration Valve (L POIt 90° Actuation) 
Collector Tank Tray 2 Recontiguration Valve (L Port 90° Actuation) 
G Main Tank Level Transmitter I Level transmitter Main Tank Level Transmitter 2 Main Tank Level Transmitter 3 Main Tank Level Transmitter 4 
G Main Tank High Level Limit Switch I High level switch Wing Tank High Level Limit Switch I Collector Tank High Level Limit Switch I 
Engine Tank High Level Limit Switch I 
G Main Tank Low Level Limit Switch I Low level switch Wing Tank Low Level Limit Switch I Collector Tank Low Level Limit Switch 1 Engine Tank Low Level Limit Switch I 
Main Tank Pump Tray Pressure Transmitter 1 
G 
Main Tank Pump Tray Pressure Transmitter 2 
Wing Tank Pump Tray Pressure Transmitter I 
Pressure transmitter Wing Tank Pump Tray Pressure Transmitter 2 Collector Tank Pump Tray Pressure Transmitter 1 
Collector Tank Pump Tray Pressure Transmitter 2 
Transfer Pump Tray Pressure Transmitter 1 
Transfer Pump Tray Pressure Transmitter 2 
Main Tank Pump Tray Pressure Switch I 
8 
Main Tank Pump Tray Pressure Switch 2 
Wing Tank Pump Tray Pressure Switch I 
Pressure switch Wing Tank Pump Tray Pressure Switch 2 
Collector Tank Pump Tray Pressure Switch 1 
Collector Tank Pump Tray Pressure Switch 2 
Transfer Pump Tray Pressure Switch 
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Symbol Description Description Notes 
-kJ-- Check valve Engine Tank Check Valve Transfer Pump Tray Check Valve 
-1~ Union Union 
8 Flow Transmitter I Re-positionable Flow transmitter Flow Transmitter 2 Re-positionable Flow Transmitter 3 Re-positionable 
[2] Strainer Strainer 
Replaceable section 
-H~f- for insertion of flow Replaceable Section for Insertion of Flow Transmitter transmitter 
Block Bleed Valve Main Tank Tray 1 
Block Bleed Valve Main Tank Tray 2 
Block Bleed Valve Wing Tank Tray I 
I><J--1 Block bleed valve Block Bleed Valve Wing Tank Tray 2 Max pressure 6000 PSI Block Bleed Valve Collector Tank Tray 1 
Block Bleed Valve Collector Tank Tray 2 
Block Bleed Valve 1 Transfer Tank 
Block Bleed Valve 2 Transfer Tank 
-D- Reducer Reducer 
I > Input/out put tag 
Table 5-1. List of Fuel Rig Components 
5.2.2 Sensor Locations 
The fuel rig system status is obtained using infonnation retrieved from three types of sensors and 
switches associated with the tanks. Level, flow and pressure transmitters are employed in 
addition to high and low level switches and pressure switches. Individual tank specific 
transmitters and switches are noted in Table 5-2. There are four standard flow transmitters within 
the system which are able to read flows of up to 13 l/min; these are re-positionable and can be 
placed either after the connection between the two flow routes from each tank or next to the 
active supply tank drain valves. For ease of analysis it is assumed that a flow transmitter reading 
is obtainable from all noted locations; these locations are highlighted in Figure 5-2. 
The sensor readings considered detectable by the transmitters and switches are: 
• Level transmitter: High, low, required level, acceptable section, pump shut off or 
empty. (Reference Figure 5-4 for noted tank levels). 
• Pressure transmitter: Pressure, no pressure or partial pressure. 
• Flow transmitter: Flow, no flow or partial flow. 
• High level switch: High tank level. 
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• Low level switch: Low tank level. 
• Pressure switch: presence of pressure. 
Tank Level Flow Pressure High Level Low Level Pressure Transmitter Transmitter Transmitter Switch Switch Switch 
Main LT0110 FTOlOO PTO 11 0 HLS0110 LLSOllO PS0110 
FTOllO PT0120 PS0120 
Wing LT0210 FT0200 PT0210 HLS0210 LLS0210 PS0210 
FT0210 PT0220 PS0220 
Collector LT0310 FT0300 PT0310 HLS0310 LLS0310 PS0310 
FT0310 PT0320 PS0320 
Engine LT0410 FT0400 HLS0410 LLS0410 
Table 5-2. Fuel Rig System Sensor Locations 
Modern systems do not always possess both switches and transmitters measuring the same 
variable in a similar location. Consequently, during the initial analysis only transmitter readings 
are considered. 
5.2.2.1 Pressure Readings 
Pressure readings are obtained both before and after the pumps in the active supply tanks. Figure 
5-3 illustrates the manner in which a pressure reading is retrieved regarding the main tank 
section. The pressure measured at the pumps is dependent on the positioning of the 'TVL' 
valves. In order to take a pressure reading before pumps PPOIlO and PP0120, valves TVL0120 
and TVLOIlO are set in positions two and one respectively. Conversely, for pressure readings 
after pumps PPOII0 and PP0120, valves TVLOII0 and TVL0120 are set in positions two and 
one. The same procedure for obtaining pressure readings can be applied to both the wing and 
collector tanks. 
Standard pressure switches used in aircraft fuel systems are of the automatic resetting snap 
action disc spring type which indicate either a presence or absence of pressure. 
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'TVL' Valve Port Actuation Key: 
The direction of flow through the 'TVL' valves, illustrated in Figure 5-3, is dependent on their 
position. The 90° actuation valve can be placed in two positions as illustrated by flow routes in 
the key: 
Position 
I 2 
L Port !IO° Attuation 
3 
Main Tank 
Main tank Ii11e two 
PPOl20 
TVLO 11 0 IH::::::f----l 
TVLOl20 
l:! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Pressure Readings Kry 
TVL0110 Position One 
----c> TVLOIIO Position Two 
TVLO 120 Position Two 
--- .... 
TVLO 120 Position One 
Figure 5-3. Illustration of Obtaining Pressure Readings from Main Tank Section 
5.2.2.2 Tank Level Readings 
The fluid levels. for the four tanks are obtained from the level transmitters in conjunction with the 
high (HLS) and low level switches (LLS). The switches are constructed from a hinge/flap 
fonnation. As the tank level rises the HLS flap section lifts and breaks contact with the switch 
mechanism, thus indicating a high level. Conversely, with the LLS as the water level falls the 
flap section forms a contact with the switch mechanism. Figures 5-4 and 5-5 illustrate the tank 
levels which are considered during the initial analysis of the fuel rig. 
An acceptable section is identified between the required level and low. The required level is the 
height at which it is assumed refuelling can be considered complete. The pump shut off level is 
noted as the height at which the pumps can no longer run; this is to ensure no airlocks are created 
in the system. 
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Level 
Low 
.......................................................................... 
Pump Shut 0 ff ...................................................................... . .. . 
Empty.... .. .. 
Figure 5-4. Main and Wing Tank Levels 
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100% Tank Capacity 
90% Tank Capacity 
Acceptable Section 
15% Tank Capacity 
8% Tank Capacity 
0% Tank Capacity 
In the collector tank the acceptable section is subdivided using two further thresholds (identified 
as Thresholds One and Two in Figure 5-5). These are utilised in detennining specific phases of 
the ACTIVE operating mode (reference Section 5.2.3). 
High 
Required 
Level 
Threshold One - -
Threshold Two--
Low 
.......................................................................... 
Pump Shut Off .............................................................. : ......... .. 
Empty .. .. 
Figure 5-5. Collector Tank Levels 
5.2.3 Modes of Operation 
Four modes of operation are identified. Namely: 
100% Tank Capacity 
90% Tank Capacity 
66% Tank Capacity 
Acceptable Section 
33% Tank Capacity 
15% Tank Capacity 
8% Tank Capacity 
0% Tank Capacity 
(i) ACTIVE: fuel is transferred from the collector tank to the 'engine' (engine tank). As 
the collector tank level decreases, the transfer of fuel from the main and wing tanks to 
the collector tank commences in the following manner: 
- Collector tank level greater than threshold one (Tl), transfer fuel from collector to 
'engine'. 
- Collector tank level below Tt and above threshold two (T2), transfer fuel from 
wing to collector given the wing tank level is above pump shut off. 
- Collector tank level below T2, transfer fuel from main to collector given the main 
tank level is above pump shut off. 
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Before the ACTIVE mode commences it is assumed that the tanks are refilled to the 
required level. During ACTIVE operation the tank pumps are switched on and powered 
isolation valves opened. 
(ii) DORMANT: system is in standby mode, no transfer of fuel occurs between the active 
supply tanks and the engine. The tank pumps are switched off and powered isolation 
valves shut. 
(iii) REFUEL: As DORMANT plus fuel transfer from the engine tank store to the three 
supply tanks in anticipation of the 'ACTIVE' mode commencing. It is assumed that 
during refuelling the engine tank is connected to the active supply tanks through the 
powered isolation refuel valves only. The engine tank is therefore treated as a tanker. 
(iv) FUEL DUMPING: system is drained of fluid. Fuel is transferred, from the main, wing 
and collector tanks to the engine tank via their specific drain valves and then removed 
via the engine drain valve. Individual tank section fuel transfer ceases once the 
respective tank level reaches the 'low' level. 
The sensor readings associated with each mode of operation and specific tanks are outlined in 
Tables 5-3 - 5-6. The abbreviated notation allocated to the sensor readings is clarified in the key. 
Sensor Reading Key: 
• Level Transmitter: RL - required level, H - high, L -low, E - empty, AS - acceptable 
section, PSO - pumps shut off. (Collector tank readings also include three subdivisions 
within the acceptable section: >Tl - greater than threshold one, <Tt & >T2 - less than 
threshold one and greater than threshold two, <T2 - less than threshold two). 
• Flow Transmitter: F - flow, PF - partial flow, NF - no flow. 
• Pressure Transmitter: P - pressure, PP - partial pressure, NP - no pressure. 
Collector Tank Main Tank Wing Tank 
LT0310 !'T0300 !'T0310 PT0310 LTOIIO !'TO I 00 FTOIIO PTO I 10 I LT0210 FT0200 FT0210 PT0210.' PT0320 PTOl20 PT0220 
(Tank (Drain (Tray (Tray (Tank (Drain (Tray (Tray (Tank (Drain (Tray (Tray 
level) flow) flow) pressure) level) flow) flow) pressure) level) flow) flow) pressure) 
>T1 NF F P RL NF NF NP RL NF NF NP 
<TI & NF F P RL NF NF NP >PSO NF F P 
>T2 
<T2 & NF F P >PSO NF F P PSO NF NF NP 
>L 
>PSO NF F P PSO NF NF NP PSO NF NF NP 
Table 5-3. ACTIVE Mode Transmitter Readings 
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From the fuel rig sensor readings in Table 5-3 it is noted that there are four 'phases' associated 
with the 'ACTIVE' operating mode with regards to fuel transfer. The phases are primarily 
dependent on the collector tank level and thus the collector tank readings are placed in the first 
column. 
Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
LTOllO FrO 100 FrO I 10 PTO I 10 / LT0210 Ff0200 Ff0210 PT021O/ LT0310 Fr0300 Fr0310 PT031O/ PTO I 20 PT0220 PT0320 
- NF NF NP - NF NF NP - NF NF NP 
Table 5-4. DORMANT Mode Transmitter Readings 
Tanker Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
Ff0400 LTOIIO FfOIOOI PTOIIOI LT0210 Ff02001 PT02101 LT0310 Ff03001 PT0310 I FfOIIO PTOl20 Ff021 0 PT0220 Ff0310 PT0320 
F E/LlASI NF NP El LI ASI NF NP El LI ASI NF NP RL RL RL 
Table 5-5. REFUEL Mode Transmitter Readings 
The main aim of the DRAIN mode is to empty the tanks of fluid to the 'low' level. Table 5-6 
illustrates the readings associated with the viable scenarios for the given operating mode. The 
scenarios incorporate all possible tank level options. For a tank level above 'low', it is expected 
that flow and pressure be registered in the respective feed lines. 
Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
LTOIIO FTOIOO FTOIIO PTOI 10 / LT0210 Ff0200 FT0210 PTO 2 10 I LT0310 FT0300 Fr0310 PT0310 I PTOl20 PT0220 . PT0320 
>L F NF NP >L F NF NP >L F NF NP 
L NF NF NP >L F NF NP >L F NF NP 
>L F NF NP L NF NF NP >L F NF NP 
>L F NF NP >L F NF NP L NF NF NP 
L NF NF NP L NF NF NP >L F NF NP 
L NF NF NP >L F NF NP L NF NF NP 
>L r NF NP L NF NF NP L NF NF NP 
Table 5-6. DRAIN Mode Transmitter Readings 
Fuel rig scenarios which represent a deviation from the expected operating mode behaviour 
indicate the presence of potential faults in the system. These deviations are used in Section 5.4 
during the application of digraphs in fault diagnostics. 
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5.2.4 Component Failure Modes 
Table 5-7 illustrates the component failure modes considered to affect the functionality of the 
fuel rig system. The usage of '***' in the component failure mode codes represents the 
component identification numbers listed in Table 5-1. 
Note: 
The first '0' from the component identification numbers is omitted from the nodes in the 
digraphs illustrated in Section 5.3. For example, the component identification number for the 
main tank is (TK)OllO. However, the failure mode 'main tank ruptured' is represented by the 
component failure code TKIlOR as opposed to TKOII0R. 
Code Component Failure Code Component Failure 
TK***L Tank leakage TK***R Tank rupture 
P***L Pipe leaks P***B Pipe blocked 
P***R Pipe ruptured P***PB Pipe partially blocked 
PP***O Peristaltic pump failed on / too high PP***L Pipe in peristaltic pump leaks 
PP***S Peristaltic pump failed otT PP***M Mechanical failure ofperistaltic pump 
CP***O Centrifugal pump failed on Cp***S Centrifugal pump failed ofT 
PSY***B Pressure relief valve blocked CP***L Centrifugal pump leaks 
PSY***PB Pressure relief valve partially blocked PSy***S Pressure relief valve stuck (intennediate) 
PSY***L Pressure relief valve leaks PSY***O Pressure relief valve opened at incon-ect pressure 
IYP***B Powered isolation valve blocked PSy***C Pressure relief valve closed at incorrect pressure 
IYP***PB Powered isolation valve pattially blocked IYP***S Powered isolation valve stuck (intermediate) 
IYP***L Powered isolation valve leaks IYP***O Powered isolation valve failed open 
CK***B Check valve blocked IYP***C Powered isolation valve failed closed 
BP***L Pressure regulating valve leaks CK***PB Check valve pattially blocked 
BP***B Pressure regulating valve blocked CK***L Check valve leaks 
BBY***B Block bleed valve blocked BP***PB Pressure regulating valve pattially blocked 
BBY***L Block bleed valve leaks BBY***O Block bleed valve failed open 
TYL***L Recontiguration valve leaks BBY***C Block bleed valve failed closed 
IY***O Drain valve failed open TYL***PB Reconfiguration valve pattially blocked 
IY***C Drain valve failed closed TYL***B Recontiguration valve blocked 
IY***L Drain valve leaks IY***PB Drain valve paltially blocked 
FT***F Flow transmitter fails registering flow IY***B Drain valve blocked 
FT***PF Flow transmitter fails registering pmtial flow FT***N Flow transmitter fails registering no flow 
LT***L Level transmitter fails registering low level LT***H Level transmitter fails registering high level 
LT***RL Level transmitter fails registering required level LT***E Level transmitter fails registeling tank empty 
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(v) Pressure readings are taken after the pumps only. Valves TVLOII0, TVL0210 and 
TVL0320 are set in position two whilst valves TVLOI20, TVL0220 and TVL0320 are 
set in position one. 
5.3.2 Digraph Deviations 
With the inclusion of partial failure modes into the fuel rig analysis, an additional two discrete 
values are developed to be used in conjunction with the five standard values referenced in 
Chapter 2. The discrete values which are used to describe process variable deviations and the 
gains associated with the edges connecting failure modes are noted: . 
• + 10: large high 
• +5: moderate high 
• + 1: small high 
• 0: nullification 
• -1: small low 
• -5: moderate low 
• -10: large low 
The moderate deviation is used in cases where there is a partial failure, illustrated by the example 
in Figures 5-6 and 5-7. This research development thus allows for more specific analysis of 
failure modes. 
Valve (man) 
---'P'-'I'----INr----'P'-"'2'---'""o_ 
Figure 5-6. Valve Example 
The example (Figure 5-6) consists of a valve (Valve man) with two sections of pipe; pipe one 
(PI) leads into the valve and pipe two (P2) exits. Two failure modes are considered for this 
example: pipe one partially blocked (P 1 P8) and valve one partially blocked (V I P8). 
+1 
Figure 5-7. Valve Example Digraph (Moderate Deviation) 
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From the valve illustration it is evident that mass flow at location one, MI, has a positive effect 
on mass flow at location two, M2. The digraph (Figure 5-7) illustrates this process flow 
structure. The failure mode PI PB leads to a moderate negative disturbance in mass flow at 
location one. VIPB also results in a moderate disturbance in mass flow at location two. The edge 
connecting nodes VIPB and M2 is however signed '±5' since, given the occurrence of the 
failure mode, the valve continuously allows partial flow through. Depending on the required 
flow settings the failure mode VIPB may lead to either a positive or negative deviation. Two 
diagnostic examples are described to further highlight the use of '+/- 5' in digraphs. In both cases 
partial flow is registered after node M2. 
(i) The system is in the DORMANT mode with no flow expected at M2. In this case the 
noted deviation is M2(+5), where +5 represents the registered increase in flow. Back-
tracing from node M2 reveals one fault option. 
M2(+5) -7 VIPB. 
(ii) The system is in the ACTIVE mode with flow expected at M2. In this case the noted 
deviation is M2(-5), where -5 represents the registered reduction in flow. Two fault 
options are yielded whilst back-tracing from node M2. 
M2(-5) -7 VIPB. 
M2(-5) -7 MI(-5) -7 PIPB. 
5.3.3 Main Tank Unit Digraph 
Figure 5-8 illustrates the unit digraph for the main tank section in the fuel rig system. The 
digraph is developed through a process of 'building'-up' from the tank level node, L1 01. A 
detailed explanation covering the development of the unit digraph is provided along with 
illustrative examples. 
Two near identical branches extend from LlO!. These represent the flow of fuel from the tank 
through the peristaltic pumps. The upper branch, illustrated in Figure 5-8 encompasses mass 
flow at location .I 02 (M I 02) to mass flow at location 108 (M I 08). It represents the flow of fuel 
through the main tank feed line one. All of the mass flow nodes are positively dependent on 
mass flow from the previous location and hence are connected by edges signed '+ 1'. Mass flow 
at location 102 divides and can pass through pipes at locations 103 and 127. Mass flow at 103 
(MI03) has a positive effect on the force powering the peristaltic pump, node PPPII0. There are 
four failure modes associated with the peristaltic pump. A mechanical failure (PP 11 OM) or pump 
99 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter Five: Fuel Rig System 
leakage (PPIlOL) leads to a small negative disturbance. The pump failing on or pumping at too 
high a pressure (PP 11 00) leads to a large positive disturbance, whilst the pump failing off or 
pumping at a low pressure (PPII0S) results in a large negative disturbance. A complete pump 
failure is included within the failure mode pp 11 OS. 
Figure 5-8. Main Tank Unit Digraph 
At node M I 04 a 'mechanical' loop allows the fuel to pass back into the tank. This is illustrated 
by nodes M104 - Ml21 - Ml22 - LIOl. Nodes MI21 and MI22 represent the pressure relief 
valve (PRV) PSVOllO. The relationship between MI21 and Ml22 encompasses a conditional 
edge which states the relationship is only positive when the pressure in the pipes is above an 
amount X. Six failure modes are noted to affect mass flow after the PRY at node MI22. Should 
the pressure relief valve close at the wrong pressure (PSVll OC) or fail blocked (PSVll OB) then 
this has a large negative disturbance in mass flow. Conversely, the PRY opening at the wrong 
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pressure (PSVII00) causes a large positive disturbance. A small negative deviation in the mass 
flow is as a result of the PRY leaking (PSVIlOL). Two further disturbances involve the pressure 
relief valve failing partially stuck (PSVII0S) or partially blocked (PSVII0PB), thus causing 
partial flow. 
In a similar manner to location 102, mass flow at location 105 divides and is able to flow through 
pipes at locations 106 and 133. The relationship between nodes MI06 and M107 represents the 
powered isolation valve IVPOllO. If the valve is closed by the operator then the relationship 
between MI06 and MI07 is nullified. Node MI07 has three associated failure modes which can 
affect mass flow. Should the valve fail closed (lVPI10C) or blocked (lVPllOB) this has a large 
negative disturbance in mass flow. Conversely, the valve failing open (lVPllOO) results in a 
large positive disturbance. A small negative deviation involves the valve leaking (lVPI10L). The 
valve failing stuck (lVPllOS) or partially blocked (IVPllOPB) induces partial flow. The back 
pressure valve, BPO 11 0, located after the powered isolation valve in the feed line is represented 
by the relationship between MI07 and M108. In a similar manner to MI07, mass flow at 108 is 
also affected by failure modes. These are associated with the back pressure valve failing closed, 
open, leaking, blocked or partially blocked: BPll OC, BPll 00, BPll OL, BPII0B, BPIIOPB. 
The lower branch of the main tank unit digraph, represented by Figure 5-9, illustrates flow 
through the main tank feed line two. It encompasses mass flow from locations 109 to 116. Again, 
all of the mass flow nodes are positively dependent on mass flow from the previous location and 
so are connected by edges signed '+1'. Mass flow at location 110 is able to flow in two 
directions and hence node MIlO branches to nodes Mill and M132. Mass flow at location I11 
has a positive effect on the force powering the second peristaltic pump, node PPP 120. There are 
four similar failure modes associated with the peristaltic pump PPOl20 as with PPOllO; 
mechanical failure (PPI20M), pump leakage (PPI20L), pump failing on (PPI200) and pump 
failing off (PP 120S). 
In a similar manner to the upper branch section, a 'mechanical' loop allows for the transfer of 
fuel back into the tank as illustrated by the nodes M 112 - M 123 - M 124 - L1 01. Nodes M 123 
and MI24 represent the pressure relief valve (PRV) PSVOI20. The positive relationship between 
MI23 and M124 is conditional based on the pressure in the pipes at the respective locations. Six 
failure modes affect the mass flow after the PRY at node M124. Should the pressure relief valve 
close at the wrong pressure (PSVI20C) or fail blocked (PSVI20B) then this leads to a large 
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negative disturbance in mass flow. Conversely, the PRY opening at the wrong pressure 
(PSVI200) causes a large positive disturbance. A small negative disturbance in mass flow is as 
a result of the PRY leaking (PSVI20L). Two further disturbances involve the pressure relief 
valve failing stuck (PSVI20S) or partially blocked (PSVI20PB), thus leading to partial flow. All 
remaining relationships illustrated by the nodes in Figure 5-9 exhibit similar properties to those 
in the upper branch section. 
Figure 5-9. Main Tank Lower Branch Digraph Section 
The two mass flow routes from the tank, TKOII0 join at node M117. This is illustrated in Figure 
5-10. Nodes MI08 and M116 are connected using an 'AND' gate since a failure would have to 
occur in both main tank feed lines if no mass flow is to pass through to node M 117. Mass flow 
from location 118 leads to the collector tank level node L301. 
Figure 5-10. Main Tank Digraph Section Incorporating the Joining of the Tank Feed Lines 
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The flow transmitter (PFT11 0) can fail in any of the states detected: flow, no flow or partial 
flow. Incorrectly detecting the presence of flow (FT11 OF) results in a large positive disturbance 
whilst incorrectly detecting no flow (FT11 ONF) leads to a large negative disturbance. Should the 
transmitter falsely detect partial flow (FT11 OPF) this results in gains of -1 or ±5. Two discrete 
values are used to describe partial flo~ as a means of correlation between the failure and noted 
flow sensor deviations. Non-complete flow deviations (i.e. exclude flow or no flow) are 
considered partial disturbances. 
Figure 5-11 illustrates the main process variables involved in developing the pressure transmitter 
section of the main tank unit digraph. Pressure readings are taken from the main tank both before 
and after pumps PP0110 and PP0120. This process is illustrated by the mass flow nodes M127 to 
M136. Nodes M127, M128 and M129 represent the 'L' port actuation valve TVL0120. 
TVL0120 is usually set in position one and therefore nodes M128 and M129 possess a positive 
relationship (pressure reading taken after PP0120). This relationship is nullified if TVL0120 is 
set in position two. 
Figure 5-11. Main Tank Digraph Section Incorporating the Pressure Reading Components 
The block bleed valve BBV0120 is represented by the relationship between nodes M 129 and 
M130. The valve is usually closed, as indicated by the normal edge being 'signed' o. Should the 
operator open the valve then a positive relationship exists between the mass flow nodes. Mass 
flow after the valve is affected by four failure modes. The valve failing closed (BBVI20C) or 
blocked (BBVI20B) results in a large negative disturbance in mass flow, whilst failing open 
(BBVI200) causes a large positive disturbance. The valve leaking (BBV120L) triggers a small 
negative disturbance. Mass flow at location 131 positively affects the pressure transmitter, 
PPT120. There are four failure modes associated with PPTI20, all related to pressure transmitter 
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faults. Identical relationships are exhibited by the pressure transmitter layout for the upper 
branch (tank feed line one). The route ends at PPT120 since the fluid is then drained by the fuel 
rig operator. This operator function is omitted from the fuel rig piping and instrumentation 
diagram and as such is not included in the digraph model. 
The development of the main tank unit digraph from the tank level is illustrated in Figure 5-12. 
The tank level, L101, is directly affected by two failure modes causing negative deviations: tank 
leaking (TK110L) and tank rupture (TK11OR). Mass flow entering the tank (MlOO) from the 
refuel valve has a positive influence on the level in TK0110. The level transmitter (LT0110) is 
also positively dependent on the tank level. 
"'10 
Figure 5-12. Main Tank Digraph Section Incorporating the Level Node 
Drainage of the tank is conducted though the main tank drain valve IVO 180 and thus the tank 
level node LlOl leads to mass flow at location 137. The relationship between nodes M137 and 
M138 represents the drain valve, IV0180. Nodes M138 and M137 possess a positive relationship 
only if the operator opens IVO 180, as illustrated by the conditional edge connecting the nodes. 
Mass flow after IVO 180 is affected by five failure modes. The drain valve failing closed 
(IVI80C) or blocked (IVI80B) leads to a large negative disturbance, whilst failing open 
(IV1800) resultsin a large positive disturbance in mass flow. Should the valve leak (IVI80L) 
this causes a small negative disturbance. The valve failing partially blocked (lVI80PB) induces 
partial flow. The flow transmitter (FTOIOO) between locations 138 and 139 is positively 
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dependent on the mass flow and in a similar manner to FTO 110, can fail in any of the detected 
states. Mass flow from location 139 leads to the engine tank level node L401. 
In total the main tank section unit digraph is formed from 263 nodes; of which there are 43 
process variables and 220 component failure mode nodes. 
5.3.4 Wing Tank Unit Digraph 
Figure 5-13 illustrates the wing tank section unit digraph. The digraph is developed in a similar 
manner to that for the main tank, through a process of 'building-up' from the tank level node, 
L210. All relationships formed in the wing tank are comparable with those exhibited in the main 
tank digraph represented in Figure 5-8. 
In total the wing tank section unit digraph is formed from 263 nodes; of which there are 43 
process variables and 220 component failure mode nodes. 
Figure 5-13. Wing Tank Unit Digraph 
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5.3.5 Collector Tank Unit Digraph 
Figure 5-14 illustrates the collector tank section unit digraph. The digraph is generated using the 
same technique which is employed in Figures 5-8 and 5-13. When comparing the relationships 
exhibited in Figure 5-14 with those in Figures 5-8 and 5-13 the main noted difference involves 
the fact that the collector tank level, L301 is positively dependent on two additional mass flow 
inputs. Fuel from feed lines one and two, of the main and wing tanks, flows into the collector 
tank; this is illustrated by the feeding of nodes M118 and M218 into L301 (shaded nodes in 
Figure 5-14). 
In total the collector tank section unit digraph is formed from 260 nodes; of which there are 44 
process variables and 216 component failure mode nodes. 
Figure 5-14. Collector Tank Unit Digraph 
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5.3.6 Engine Tank Unit Digraph 
The engine tank unit digraph is represented by Figure 5-15. The digraph illustrates the flow of 
fuel from tank TK0410 through the refuel pump CP0410 to the individual tank refuel valves. 
During the fault diagnostics procedure in the REFUEL mode, it is assumed that the engine tank 
is a tanker; since this set-up better represents an actual aircraft system refuel. Mass flow from 
pipes in locations 139, 237, 317 and 336 feed into the engine tank (node L401). Under the 
ACTIVE mode only fuel from the collector tank feed lines one and two (M317) flows into the 
engine tank. During the DRAIN mode fuel from the active supply tanks is transferred into the 
engine tank, hence flow from locations 139,237 and 336 have a positive effect on the tank level. 
The four mass flows, M139, M237, M317 and M336 are amalgamated to simply form supply in 
during the 'REFUEL' mode. 
Two direct failure modes associated with the tank level deal with either a rupture (TK410R), in 
which case there is a large negative disturbance, or a leak (TK410L), thus creating a small 
negative disturbance. The level transmitter (L T041 0) is positively dependent on the tank level. 
Figure 5-15. Engine Tank Unit Digraph 
The tank is drained t~rough the drain valve IV041 O. This valve is represented by the relationship 
between nodes M416 and M417. The nodes have a positive relationship in the event that the 
operator opens the valve, as illustrated by the conditional edge joining M417 to M416. There are 
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five failure modes associated with the drain valve, all of which could have an effect on mass 
flow after the valve. The drain valve failing closed (IV41OC) or blocked (IV41OB) leads to a 
large negative disturbance whilst failing open (IV 4100) results in a large positive disturbance in 
mass flow. Should the valve leak (IV41OL) this causes a small negative disturbance and a partial 
blockage (IV 41 OPB) of the valve induces partial flow at location 417. 
Mass flow from the tank has a positive effect on the centrifugal pump CP0410, as shown by the 
relationship between the 'nodes L401 -7 PCP41O. There are three failure modes associated with 
the centrifugal pump. A pump leakage (CP41OL) leads to a small negative disturbance, the pump 
failing on or pumping at too high a pressure (CP4100) leads to a large positive disturbance 
whilst the pump failing off or pumping at a low pressure (CP41OS) causes a large negative 
disturbance in mass flow. The relationship between nodes M407 and M408 represents the check 
valve CK0410. The check valve possesses three failure modes which could affect mass flow at 
408. The valve leaking (CK410L) results in a small negative disturbance on flow whilst a 
blockage (CK410B) causes a large negative disturbance. Partial flow results from the check 
valve failing partially blocked (CK410PB). A flow transmitter (FT0400) between locations 408 
and 409 is positively dependent on mass flow. 
At node M404 a 'mechanical' loop allows the fuel to pass back into the tank. This is illustrated 
by nodes M404 - M405 - M406 - L401. Nodes M405 and M406 represent the pressure relief 
valve (PRV) PSV0410; a conditional edge which links the nodes states that the relationship is 
only positive when the pressure in the pipes is above an amount X. Six failure modes are noted 
to affect mass flow after the PRY at node M406. Should the pressure relief valve close at the 
wrong pressure (PSV 41 OC) or fail blocked (PSV 41 OB) then this has a large negative disturbance 
in mass flow. Conversely, the PRY opening at the wrong pressure (PSV4100) causes a large 
positive disturbance. A small negative deviation in the mass flow is as a result of the PRY 
leaking (PSV41OL). Two further disturbances involve the pressure relief valve failing partially 
stuck (PSV 41 OS) or blocked (PSV 41OPB), thus causing partial flow. 
The three -refuel valves IVP0410, IVP0420 and IVP0430 permit the transfer of fuel between the 
'tanker' and the active supply tanks during the REFUEL mode. The valves are denoted by the 
relationships between M414 -7 MI00, M413 -7 M200 and M412 -7 M300 respectively. The 
relationship between the mass flow nodes is nullified in the event that the valve is closed by the 
operator. There are five failure modes associated with each refuel valve which could affect mass 
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flow into the tanks. The valves failing open (lVP4100, IVP4200, IVP4300) induces a large 
positive disturbance whilst failing closed (IVP410C, IVP420C, IVP430C) or blocked (lVP41 OB, 
IVP420B, IVP430B) causes a large negative disturbance. A small negative disturbance results 
from a valve leakage (IVP410L, IVP420L, IVP430L). Partial flow is induced by the valves 
failing either stuck (lVP410S, IVP420S, IVP430S) or partially blocked (IVP410PB, IVP420PB, 
IVP430PB). 
In total the engine tank section unit digraph is formed from 162 nodes; of which there are 27 
process variables and 135 component failure mode nodes. 
5.3.7 Digraph Comments 
There are four failure modes associated with all mass flow nodes in the fuel rig digraphs. These 
failure modes are not illustrated in Figures 5-8 - 5-15 so as not to overcomplicate the diagrams. 
The four failure modes and their respective induced disturbances are: 
• Pipe blockage - large negative disturbance (-10). 
• Pipe rupture -large negative disturbance (-10). 
• Pipe leakage - small negative disturbance (-1). 
• Pipe partial blockage- moderate negative disturbance (-5). 
In total the fuel rig system digraph is generated from 903 nodes; of which there are 148 process 
variables and 755 component failure mode nodes. The system digraph model has been verified 
through consultation with the fuel rig operators at the Systems Engineering and Innovation 
Centre at Holywell Park, Loughborough University. 
5.4 System Fault Diagnostics 
The approach employed to determine specific diagnostic results for known fuel rig system 
deviations is expanded. Fuel rig scenarios noting system deviations in the four operating modes 
are considered in Section 5.4.2. The method derived for using digraphs in fault diagnostics is 
based upon comparing sensor readings with those which are expected whilst the system is in a 
known operating mode. The presence of a deviation is assumed to indicate the occurrence of a 
system failure. The back-tracing and flagging procedures, previously described in Section 4.2, 
are further utilised. 
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The following assumptions are employed during the investigation to determine which faults 
could lead to a specific deviation: 
(i) All transmitters provide reliable readings. 
(ii) For registered full flow and no flow deviations at the transmitters FTO 100, FT0200 and 
FT0300, a fault must occur in either both tank feed lines before the 'AND' gate in the 
digraph or in the single line that extends from the' AND' gate. 
(iii) For registered partial flow deviations, of gains ±5 and ±I, at FTOIOO, FT0200 and 
FT0300 a failure must have occurred in either one of the tank feed lines before the 
'AND' gate in the digraph or in the single line that extends from the 'AND' gate. 
(iv) All back-tracing ceases at the tank level node when considering individual transmitter 
readings. For example, back-tracing from node PPTIIO in Figure 5-8 ceases at node 
LIOl. 
The fuel rig system tank digraphs illustrated in Figures 5-8 & 5-13 - 5-15 are addressed during 
. the diagnostics procedure. 
Back-tracing Example 
A simple single deviating sensor reading is considered. Flow is registered by FTO I 00, however, 
under the given operating mode conditions of the fuel rig no flow is expected. Node PFTII 0 is 
addressed in the digraph, highlighted in Figure 5-16. Since the deviation is flow, faults leadings 
to PFTII 0(+10) are sought. From the assumptions, a fault must have occurred in both tank feed 
lines. Back-tracing past the 'AND' gate leads to nodes MI07(+10) and M115(+10) (and the two 
failure modes IVPIIOO and IVPI200). Two further failure modes which could lead to the 
registered deviation are PPIIOO and PP1200. Back-tracing past nodes PPPllO(+IO) and 
PPP 120(+ 10) leads to the tank level node, L 10 I, and therefore ceases. The nodes referenced are 
marked in Figure 5-16. 
The results yielded for FTII 0(+ 10) reveal four second order failure modes: 
Feed Line One 
IVPIIOO 
PPIIOO 
AND Feed Line Two 
IVPI200 
PPI200 
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Figure 5-16. Back-tracing Example Digraph 
S.4.1 Fuel Rig Scenario Transmitter Reading Consistency Checks 
Fuel rig scenarios are developed through taking into account all viable transmitter readings. This 
is conducted in a similar manner to that described for the water tank system in Section 3.1.4. 
Tables 5-8 - 5-10 compile a list oflogic rules which can be addressed as a means of determining 
if a specific scenario is feasible. In this manner the tables may also aid in highlighting unreliable 
sensor readings. 
The logic rules that are applied to the main and wing tank transmitter readings are illustrated in 
Table 5-8. As a means of describing the manner in which the tables should be addressed, the first 
row from Table 5-8 is expanded. Should the main or wing tank level transmitters (LTOllO and 
L T021 0) register an empty level (E) then no flow (NF) and no pressure (NP) readings are 
expected at the remaining observation points. The registering of flow during this case would 
therefore highlight a potential sensor inconsistency: 
LTOllO FTOIOO FTOllO PTOllO PT0120 
LT0210 FT0200 FT0210 PT0210 PT0220 
E NF NF NP NP 
LI RLI FS I H F NF NP NP 
LI RLI FS I H F NF P P 
LlRLlFS/H PF NF NP NP 
LlRLlFS/H PF NF P P 
LlRLlFS IH NF F P P 
LI RLlFS/H NF PF pp pp 
Table 5-8. Main Tank and Wing Tank Consistency Checks 
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Tables 5-9 and 5-10 detail the consistency checks associated with the collector and engine tanks . 
respectively. The sensor codes utilised in the tables follow the same format as those identified in 
Section 5.2.5. 
LT0310 FT0300 FT0310 PT0310 PT0320 FTOllO FT0210 
E NF NF NP NP NF NF 
L/RL/FS IH F NF NP NP NF/F/PF NF IF IPF 
L/RL/FS IH F NF P P NF/F/PF NF/F/PF 
L/RL/FS IH PF NF NP NP NF INF IPF NF IF IPF 
L/RL/FS IH PF NF P P NF INF IPF NF IF IPF 
L/RL/FS IH NF NF NP NP NF/F/PF NF IF/PF 
L/RL/FS IH NF NF P P NF/F/PF NF/F/PF 
L/RL/FS IH F F P P NF/F/PF NF IF IPF 
L/RL/FS IH PF F P P NF/F/PF NF IF IPF 
L/RL/FS IH NF F P P NF INF IPF NF/F/PF 
L/RL/FS IH F PF pp pp NF/F/PF NF/F/PF 
L/RL/FS IH PF PF pp pp NF/F/PF NF IF IPF 
L/RL/FS IH NF PF pp pp NF INF IPF NF IF IPF 
Table 5-9. Collector Tank Consistency Checks 
LT0410 FT0200 FTOIOO, FTOllO, FT0200, FT0210, FT0300, FT0310 ALL PT 
L I RL I FS I H F NF NP/P 
LI RL I FS I H PF NF NP/P 
E NF NF NP 
Table 5-10. Engine Tank Consistency Checks (during REFUEL only) 
5.4.2 Application of Fault Diagnostic Strategy 
Eight steady-state scenarios, expanded in Sections 5.4.2.1 - 5.4.2.4, are utilised to assess the 
capability of the diagnostic method. The scenarios vary in the number of registered sensor 
deviations from the assumed fuel rig operating mode. In some scenarios only failures within one 
specific tank section are considered whilst in other scenarios failures exist across sections. In this 
manner, a range of situations can be assessed during the demonstration of the diagnostics 
method. Two examples are provided for each fuel rig operating mode. The example scenarios 
include the possibility of partial flow, thus allowing for the realistic addition of partial blockage 
failure modes. A discussion covering the validity of the diagnostic results achieved is conducted 
in Section 5.4.3. 
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The pressure transmitter readings from both tank feed lines and the flow reading from after the 
joining of the two lines are analysed in the following manner (where 'X' in the transmitter codes 
can be replaced by 1, 2 or 3 representing respectively main, wing or collector): 
• FTOXI0: F, PTOXI0 and PTOX20: P 
Indicates presence of 'normal' flow in both tank lines. 
• FTOXI0: PF, PTOXI0: P and PTOX20: pp 
Indicates presence of 'normal' flow in line one and partial flow in line two. 
• FTOXlO: PF, PTOXI0: pp and PTOX20: pp 
Indicates presence of partial flow in both tank lines. 
• FTOXlO: PF, PTOXlO: P and PT0X20: NP 
Indicates presence of 'normal' flow in line one and no flow in line two. 
• FTOXI0: NF, PTOXI0 and PTOX20: NP 
Indicates presence of no flow in both tank lines. 
5.4.2.1 ACTIVE Mode 
The expected sensor readings whilst the fuel rig system is operating in the 'ACTIVE' mode are 
outlined in Table 5-3. As described in Section 5.2.5, during the 'ACTIVE' mode fluid is 
transferred from the collector tank to the engine. As the collector tank level decreases transfer of 
fluid from the wing and main tanks to the collector tank commences. 
Example One 
The sensor readings obtained are as outlined in Table 5-11. From the readings it is evident that 
both FT0310 and PT0320 from the collector tank register a deviation from the expected 
behaviour given in the first row of readings. The 'actual' readings differ from those expected 
through the flow transmitter FT031 0 registering partial flow and pressure transmitter PT0320 
registering partial pressure as opposed to full flow and pressure respectively. 
Collector Tank Main Tank Wing Tank 
LTOIIO FT0300 FT0310 PT0310,' LTOIIO FTOIOO FTOIIO PTOIIO/ LT0210 FT0200 FT0210 PT0210 ' PT0320 PTOl20 PT0220 
>T1 NF F P RL NF NF NP RL NF NF NP 
>T1 NF PF(-S) PT0310: RL NF NF NP RL NF NF NP P 
PT0320: 
PP(-S) 
Table 5-11. Transmitter Readings (ACTIVE Example One) 
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Since 'nonnal' pressure is registered at PT03l0 (pressure transmitter in feed line one) it is 
deduced that partial flow results from a failure in the collector tank feed line two. Furthennore, 
no deviation is registered by the transmitters in the wing and main tanks and so it is assumed that 
they function as nonnal. Consequently, sections of the collector tank digraph incorporating the 
tank feed line one (nodes M302 -7 M308), drain valve line (nodes M334 -7 M336) and tank 
level (node L30l) are flagged along with the complete main and wing tank digraphs. The 
diagnostic results are determined through back-tracing from nodes PFT3l0 and PPT320. Back-
tracing commences from these specific nodes since the transmitter nodes in the digraph represent 
the given locations at which the deviations are registered, illustrated by the highlighted nodes in 
Figure 5-17. 
Figure 5-17. Example One Back-tracing 
In both cases a '-5 'deviation is considered in the diagnostics procedure. This is due to the 
transmitters registering a value which is deemed 'moderately less' than expected. There are a 
total of 87 possible failures; 4 single order and 83 second order. It is deemed more likely for a 
single order fault (P312PB, P311 PB, P31 OPB or P309PB) to occur. The multiple failure modes 
are not to be disregarded however. 
The faults giving rise to the deviations are: 
AND 
pH9pH 
TVimB 
P326PB 
P325PB 
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Example Two 
The sensor readings are as outlined in Table 5-12. From the obtained readings it is noted that two 
transmitters register a deviation: FTO 100 and FT031O. In the main tank flow is registered after 
the drain valve IVO 180 whilst in the collector tank no flow is registered after the joining of the 
tank feed lines. Due to the registered deviating transmitter readings being the opposite from 
those expected, the gain' 1 0' is used during the diagnostics procedure. 
Collector Tank Main Tank Wing Tank 
LT0310 Fr0300 IT0310 PT03JOI LTOIIO ITOJOO FrO 11 0 PTOl JO I LT02JO Fr0200 Fr0210 PT02JO I PT0320 PTOl20 PT0220 
<T2& NF F P >pso NF F P pso NF NF NP 
>L 
<T2& NF NF(·IO) P >pso F(+IO) F P pso NF NF NP 
>L 
Table 5-12. Transmitter Readings (ACTIVE Example Two) 
In the case of FTO 1 00, PFTl 00(+10) is used to signify that a positive deviation has occurred 
since no flow is expected after IVO 180. '-10' is used at node PFT0310 due to the registering of a 
negative deviation at the collector tank transmitter. Since no flow is detected at FT031 0 and from 
the assumptions listed in Section 5.4, a fault is assumed to have occurred in both collector tank 
feed lines. No deviations are registered by the transmitters in the wing tank and so the wing tank 
digraph is flagged. The main tank digraph, apart from the drain valve line (nodes M137 ~ 
M139), is also flagged. The only sections of the collector tank digraph to be flagged are those 
incorporating the drain valve line (node M334 ~ M336), tank level (node L301) and pressure 
transmitters (nodes PPT310 ~ M302, PPT320 ~ M309). 
The faults giving rise to the deviations, as detennined through back-tracing, are: 
PFTOI00(+ 10) AND PFT0310(-10) 
IV1800 P316BIR 
P308B/R P315B/R 
BP310B BP320B 
P307B/R P314B/R 
IVP310C AND IVP320B 
IVP310B IVP320C 
P306B/R P313B/R 
There are a total of 83 viable failures; 2 second order and 81 of the order three. The large number 
of combinations results from the failure modes which could give rise to the registering of no 
flow at FT0310. Should the failure in the collector tank occur after the joining of the feed lines 
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then there are two possible failure mode options: IV1800.P316B or IV1800.P316R. The 
operator is able to decide, upon inspecting the fuel rig as to whether the pipe at location 316 is 
blocked or has in fact ruptured. This is true for any failure mode comprising a blocked or 
ruptured pipe at a given location. Failure modes of the order three arise if a failure occurs in both 
tank feed lines, for example, IV1800.P308B.IVP320B. 
5.4.2.2 DORMANT Mode 
The expected sensor readings whilst the fuel rig system is operating in the DORMANT mode are 
outlined in Table 5-4. As described in Section 5.2.5, during the DORMANT mode no transfer of 
fuel occurs between the active supply tanks and the engine. The system is in standby mode with 
the pumps switched off. 
Example One 
The sensor readings are as outlined in Table 5-13. From the retrieved readings it is evident that 
FT0100 registers a deviation (flow) from the expected behaviour (noted in the first row). 
Consequently, back-tracing commences from node PFT100. A gain of '+ 10' is utilised since this 
represents the large positive deviation registered by the transmitter. 
Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
LTO! 10 FrOIOO FrO!!O PTO! 10 I LT0210 Fr0200 Fr02IO PT0210 I LT03!0 FT0300 Fr03!0 PT0310 I PTO! 20 PT0220 PT0320 
>PSO NF NF NP >PSO NF NF NP >PSO NF NF NP 
>PSO F(+I0) NF NP >PSO NF NF NP >PSO NF NF NP 
Table 5-13. Transmitter Readings (DORMANT Example One) 
No deviations are registered by the transmitters in the wing and collector tanks and therefore 
their respective digraphs are flagged. In the main tank digraph the only section not to be flagged 
is that incorporating the drain valve line, nodes M137 -7 M139. One failure mode is determined 
for the given deviation at FTO 1 00: IV 1800. 
Example Two 
The Sensor readings are as outlined in Table 5-14. From the retrieved readings, FT0210 and 
PT0210 both register deviations from the expected behaviour. The readings differ from those 
expected through the flow transmitter FT0210 registering partial flow and pressure transmitter 
PT0210 registering pressure instead of no flow and no pressure respectively. 
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Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
LTOIIO FTOIOO FTOIIO PTO I 10 I LT0210 FT0200 FT0210 PT02101 LT0310 FT0300 FT0310 PT03101 PTO I 20 PT0220 PT0320 
>PSO NF NF NP >PSO NF NF NP >PSO NF NF NP 
>PSO NF NF NP >PSO NF PF(+S) PT0210: >PSO NF NF NP P(+JO) 
PT0220: 
NP 
Table 5-14. Transmitter Readings (DORMANT Example Two) 
Since no pressure is registered at PT0220 it is deduced that partial flow results from a failure in 
the wing tank feed line one. No deviations are registered by the transmitters in the main and 
collector tanks and so the tanks are assumed to be functioning as normal. Sections of the wing 
tank digraph incorporating the tank feed line two (nodes M210 -7 M216), drain valve line (nodes 
M235 -7 M237) and tank level (node L201) are flagged along with the complete main and 
collector tank digraphs. 
The diagnostic results are determined through back-tracing from nodes PFT210 and PPT21O. In 
the case of the flow transmitter, a '+5' gain is utilised in the diagnostics procedure. This 
represents the moderate positive deviation registered at the flow transmitter. After the 'AND' 
gate in the wing tank digraph a gain of '+ 10' is considered. This is due to the assumption that 
'full' flow is present in the wing tank feed line one. This, combined with no flow in feed line 
two, gives rise to the registered partial flow. A '+10' gain is assumed regarding the pressure 
transmitter, thus signifying the large positive deviation noted. 
The faults giving rise to the registered deviations are: 
PFT210(+5) 
IVP2100 
PP2100 
AND PPT210(+10) 
BBV2100 
PP2100 
There are a total of four failure modes; one first order and three second order. Upon inspecting 
the fuel rig the operator is able to determine which failure mode combination has occurred. 
5.4.2.3 REFUEL Mode 
The expected sensor readings whilst the fuel rig system is operating in the REFUEL mode are 
outlined in Table 5-5. As described in Section 5.2.5, during the REFUEL mode fuel is 
transferred to the active supply tanks from the engine tank store in anticipation of the ACTIVE 
mode commencing. No transfer occurs from the main and wing tanks to the collector tank. 
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Example One 
The sensor readings are as outlined in Table 5-15. From the retrieved readings it is evident that 
only FT0400 (tanker section) registers a deviation. The reading differs from that expected (noted 
in the first row) through the flow transmitter FT0400 registering no flow as opposed to flow. 
Tanker Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
Fr0400 LT0110 FrO 1001 PT01\O I LT0210 FT02001 PT0210 I LT0310 Fr03001 PT0310 I FTOll0 PT0120 Fr021 0 PT0220 Fr0310 PT0320 
F ElL! AS/ NF NP ElL! ASI NF NP E/L/ASI NF NP RL RL RL 
NF >L NF NP >L NF NP >L NF NP 
Table 5-15. Transmitter Readings (REFUEL Example One) 
Back-tracing to determine the failure modes which could lead to the registered deviation 
commences from node PFT400(-10) since this represents the location at which the deviation is 
first noted. The gain '-10' illustrates the noted large negative deviation. It is assumed that the 
transmitters in the main, wing and collector tanks function as normal and therefore the respective 
digraphs are flagged. No sections in the engine tank digraph are flagged. 
The fault(s) giving rise to the deviation are: 
P408BIR 
CK410B 
P407BIR 
PFT400(-10) 
P404B/R 
CP410S 
TK410R 
P403BIR 
P402BIR 
No supply in 
A total of 14 failure modes (all single order) are yielded. Upon inspection the operator is able to 
either discount or accept the failure modes incorporating a form of rupture. 
Example Two 
The sensor readings are outlined in Table 5-16. From the retrieved readings it is noted that three 
transmitters register deviations: FTOllO, PT0120 and FT0300. The readings differ from the 
expected behaviour through the flow transmitter FTOII0 registering partial flow, pressure 
transmitter PToi20 registering pressure and flow transmitter FT0300 registering flow as opposed 
to no flow and no pressure. 
Since no pressure is registered at PTOIlO it is deduced that flow exists in the main tank feed line 
two only. The faults giving rise to the deviations are determined by back-tracing from nodes 
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PFTIIO(+5), PPTI20(+ 10) and PFT300(+ 10). A '+10' gain is utilised whilst back-tracing from 
PPTOl20 and PFT0300 in the main tank and collector tank digraphs respectively; '+10' 
represents the large positive deviation noted by the transmitters. 
Tanker Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
Fr0400 LTOllO FrO 1001 PTOIIOI LT0210 Fr02001 PT0210 I LT0310 Fr03001 PT03101 FrO I 10 PTOl20 Fr0210 PT0220 Fr0310 PT0320 
F E/LlASI NF NP El LI ASI NF NP El LI ASI NF NP RL RL RL 
F >L FrO 100: PTOllO: >L NF NP >L FT0300: NP NF NP F(+lO) 
FTOllO: PT0120: Fr031O: 
PF(+5) P(+lO) NF 
Table 5-16. Transmitter Readings (REFUEL Example Two) 
In the case of FTOllO a '+5' gain is utilised, representing the moderate positive deviation 
registered. After the 'AND' gate in the main tank digraph a '+10' gain is considered. This is due 
to the assumption that no flow is present in the wing tank feed line one. This, combined with 
flow in tank feed line two, gives rise to the registered partial flow. Since no deviations are noted 
by the transmitters in the wing tank or engine, their respective digraphs are flagged. The 
collector tank digraph, apart from the section incorporating the drain valve route (nodes M334-7 
M336) is also flagged. The only sections of the main tank digraph to be flagged are those 
featuring the tank level (node LIOl), drain valve route (nodes M137-7 M139) and feed line one 
(nodes MI 02 -7 MI08). 
The faults giving rise to the registered deviations are: 
PFT110(+5) 
IVP1200 
PP1200 
AND PPT120(+10) 
BBV2200 
PP1200 
AND PFT300(+10) 
IV3800 
There are a total of four possible failure modes; one second order and three ofthe order three. 
5.4.2.4 DRAIN Mode 
The expected sensor readings whilst the tank is operating in the DRAIN mode are outlined in 
Table 5-6. As described in Section 5.2.5, the fuel rig is drained of all fuel during the DRAIN 
mode. Fluid in the active supply tanks is removed via their drain valves and transferred to the 
engine tank store. 
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Example One 
The sensor readings are outlined in Table 5-17. From the retrieved readings it is evident that 
FTOlOO and FT0300 register deviations. Partial flow is registered at FTOlOO and no flow is 
registered at FT0300. The state flow is the expected reading at both locations (noted in the first 
row). 
Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
LTOIIO FTOIOO FTOIIO PTOIIOI LT0210 IT0200 IT0210 PT02101 LT0310 IT0300 IT0310 PT03101 PTO I 20 PT0220 PT0320 
AS F NF NP AS F NF NP AS F NF NP 
AS PF(-l) NF NP AS F NF NP AS NF(-IO) NF NP 
Table 5-17. Transmitter Readings (DRAIN Example One) 
Back-tracing commences from the location of the transmitters in the digraphs. With regards to 
FTOlOO the fault propagation leading to the deviation is sought from PFTI00(-I). The gain '-1' . 
represents the small negative disturbance noted. Tracing starts at PFT300(-1O) for FT0300. In 
this case, '-10' represents the large negative disturbance registered at the transmitter. The 
complete wing tank unit digraph is flagged. All sections of the main and collector digraphs, apart 
from the drain valve routes are also flagged. 
The faults leadings to the registered deviations are: 
PFTlOO(-I) 
P138L 
IV180L 
P137L 
AND PFT300(-10) 
P335B/R 
IV380B 
IV380C 
P334B/R 
A total of 18 failure modes are yielded; all second order. Upon inspecting the fuel rig it should 
become apparent as to which components in the main tank are leaking. The same is true 
regarding a rupture in the collector tank drain valve line. 
Example Two 
The sensor readings are outlined in Table 5-18. From the retrieved readings it is noted that 
LTO 11 0 and FT0200 register deviations. L TO 110 registers an empty tank level and FT0200 
records flow as opposed to the expected no flow. 
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Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
LTOllO IT0100 ITOIIO PTOllO / LT0210 IT0200 FT0210 PT0210/ LT0310 IT0300 IT0310 PT031O/ PT0120 PT0220 PT0320 
AS F NF NP AS F NF NP AS F NF NP 
E(-10) NF NF NP L F(+lO) NF NP AS F NF NP 
Table 5-18. Transmitter Readings (DRAIN Example Two) 
Back-tracing commences from node PLTOIIO(-lO) in the main tank unit digraph and from node 
PFT200(+lO) in the wing tank unit digraph. The gain '10' represents the large deviation noted by 
both transmitters. The sign in front of the gain simply indicates whether the noted deviation is 
negative or positive. The complete collector tank unit digraph is flagged. All sections, excluding 
the tank level, are flagged in the main tank unit digraph. The only section of the wing tank 
digraph not be flagged is that incorporating the drain valve route. 
A total of six failure modes are retrieved; all second order. In a similar manner to the diagnostic 
results yielded for Example One, the operator is able to determine if a rupture fault is present. 
The faults leading to the registered deviations are: 
PLTllO(-10) AND 
TKI IOR 
5.4.3 Results Review 
PFT200(-10) 
IV280C 
IV280B 
P236B/R 
P235BIR 
In a similar manner to the diagnostics conducted on the water tank system in Chapter Four, it is 
assumed that if a transmitter does not register a deviation from the known operating mode of the 
fuel rig then no failure has occurred. Consequently, non-deviating sections of the digraph are 
'flagged' and are not included in the diagnostics procedure since it is presumed that all 
associated components function as normal. Through incorporating 'flagging' into the diagnostics 
process, potential inconsistent failure mode results and anomalies are removed. 
From the examples described in Section 5.4.2, there are multiple possible failure modes which 
may lead to a given faulty scenario. There is no ranking hierarchy involved in the process and 
therefore it is assumed that failure mode combinations of the lowest order are the most probable 
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cause for a given deviation. Honing-in on the 'most-likely' failure combination that l~ads to a 
given deviation is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. 
The diagnostic results yielded from deviating transmitters in the same tank section (e.g. main 
tank) may produce both identical and differing failure modes for a scenario. This results from the 
properties associated with back-tracing and is highlighted by Example One in Section 5.4.2.1. 
Back-tracing from PFT0310 takes into account the section of the fuel rig incorporating nodes: 
M316, M315, M314, M313, M312, M311, PPP320, M310 and M309, whilst back-tracing from 
PPT0320 incorporates: M328, M327, M326, M325, M312, M311, PPP320, M310 and M309. 
The overlap involved with back-tracing from both transmitters commences at location 312. All 
other failure modes are located (a) between the flow transmitter and pressure transmitter and thus 
detected by the flow transmitter or (b) between the pipe work connecting the pressure transmitter 
to the collector tank feed line two and thus detected by the pressure transmitter 
The validity of the diagnostic results retrieved for the example scenarios noted in Sections 
5.4.2.1 - 5.4.2.4 are verified through consultation with the fuel rig operators. The failure 
combinations yielded are viable for the given transmitter deviations. No further faults have been 
identified for the scenarios over those noted by the diagnostic strategy. The only example 
scenario incorporating a potential unidentified fault is Example Two in Section 5.4.2.4. The 
empty tank level may be due to the drain valve having failed open. However, it is felt that this 
failure is likely to have been noted at an earlier point in time when the tank level is above empty 
with flow registering at FTO 1 00. 
The fuel rig scenarios analysed in Section 5.4.2 consider the system in steady-state. All modes of 
operation are however taken into account. The diagnostic procedure is expanded in Section 5.5; 
the process is automated and actual system data obtained from the fuel rig is utilised to further 
analyse the failure results yielded. 
s.s Automated System Fault Diagnostics (Fuel Rig System) 
The main area of focus involves generating a computer program to conduct automated system 
fault diagnostics. This stage builds on the fault diagnostic strategy previously described in 
Chapter Four. The process of back-tracing within a digraph model, from a deviating node to 
determine possible failure combinations, is automated through running scripted code in Matlab. 
The program is developed specifically for the fuel rig system described at the beginning of this 
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chapter. Minor adaptations are assumed with regards to specific operating mode conditions. 
These changes are described in later relevant sections. 
5.5.1 Program Description 
The program is sub-diyided into four main sections; namely, input, comparison, fault diagnostics 
and output. These four sub-divisions are discussed further in Sections 5.5.1.1 - 5.5.1.4. The 
requirements for both steady-state and dynamic analysis in terms of automating the diagnostic 
procedure are highlighted. The alterations deemed necessary in order to take transient effects 
into consideration are discussed at the end of each individual program section. The dynamic 
program runs a 'for' loop structure which ceases upon reading the fuel rig transmitter data from 
the final time interval. An interval is defined as the period between data acquisition cycles. 
The results achieved from applying the automated procedure are noted in Section 5.5.2. 
Throughout Section 5.5 specific transmitter and registered transmitter readings are referenced. 
These codes have previously been defined in Section 5.4. 
5.5.1.1 Input 
The first part of the procedure involves reading the fuel rig transmitter data from a text file using 
the 'dlmread' function as illustrated by the code in Figure 5-18. 
% Operating mode selection made by fuel rig operator. 
OP = input ('What operating mode is the fuel rig system in? Enter 1: ACTIVE, 
2: DORMANT, 3: DRAIN '); 
%ACTIVE: 
AC1 [-10 -10 -10 -10; -10 -10 -10 -10; -10 10 10 10]; 
AC2 [-10 -10 -10 -10; -10 10 10 10; -10 10 10 10]; 
AC3 [-10 10 10 10; -10 -10 -10 -10; -10 10 10 10]; 
AC4 [-10 -10 -10 -10; -10 -10 -10 -10; -10 -10 -10 -10]; 
%DORMANT: No flow in or out of system. 
DO = [-10 -10 -10 -10; -10 -10 -10 -10; -10 -10 -10 -10]; 
%DRAIN: Used by operator to drain system, only flow out of drain valves. 
OR = [10 -10 -10 -10; 10 -10 -10 -10; 10 -10 -10 -10]; 
%Read transmitter readings from text file - tank levels. 
MTL dlmread('transmitterreadings.txt'," [0000]); 
WTL dlmread('transmitterreadings.txt'," [10 1 0]); 
CTL dlmread('transmitterreadings.txt'," [2020]); 
%Read transmitter readings from text file - flow and pressure readings. 
MTTR dlmread ( , transmi t terreadings. txt " " [0 1 0 4]); 
WTTR dlmread('transmitterreadings.txt'," [1114]); 
CTTR dlmread ( , transmi t terreadings . txt " " [2 1 2 4]); 
Figure 5-18. Operating Mode and Tank Level Script 
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In this manner, the interface which would normally exist between the program and fuel rig, 
should the two be linked, is re-enacted. The transmitter readings are then split into (i) level 
readings and (ii) flow and pressure readings. Valid scenarios incorporating transmitter readings 
which display either a single or multiple deviation are developed for the fuel rig operating 
modes. These scenarios are generated by applying specific assumptions to the complete list of 
transmitter reading combinations: 
(i) Leak and partial blockage are mutually exclusive events. 
(ii) A maximum of four failures in individual tank units are considered. The occurrence of 
more than four is deemed unlikely. 
(iii) For 'full' flow at FTOII0, FT0210 & FT031O, flow must exist in both tank feed lines. 
(iv) During a tank empty state the readings no pressure and no flow are expected. 
(v) A further twenty-three logical consistency checks involving transmitter readings 
regarding tank level, flow and pressures are applied. These are described through 
application to the main tank in Table 5-23. The same rules are applicable to the wing 
and collector tanks, where the relevant tank level is greater than the pump shut offlevel. 
LTOllO FTOllO PTOllO PT0120 
>PSO NF NP NP 
>PSO NF P PP(-I) 
>PSO NF PP(-I) P 
>PSO NFIPF NP pp 
>PSO NF/PF pp NP 
>PSO PF P NP 
>PSO PF NP P 
>PSO PF(-5) PP(-5) P(-5) 
>PSO PF(-5) PP(-5) P 
>PSO PF(-5) P PP(-5) 
>PSO PF(-5) P P 
>PSO PF(-5) PP( -I) PP(-5) 
>PSO PF(-5) PP(-5) PP( -I) 
>PSO PF(-5) P NP 
>PSO PF(-5) NP P 
>PSO PF(-5) PP( -I) NP 
>PSO PF(-5) NP PP( -I) 
>PSO PF(-5) PP(-5) NP 
>PSO PF(-5) NP PP(-5) 
>PSO PF(-I) PP(-I) PP( -I) 
>PSO PF(-I) P PP( -I) 
>PSO PF(-I) PP(-I) P 
>PSO PF(-I) P P 
Table 5-23. Consistency checks Applied to the Main Tank 
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A failure matrix [FM] is generated from the retrieved data. The matrix contains the main tank 
readings in row 1, wing tank readings in row 2 and the collector tank readings in row 3 as 
shown: 
lFTOlOO FTOll0 PTOllO PT0120] FT0200 FT02l0 PT02l0 PT0220 FT0300 FT03l0 PT03l0 PT0320 
The readings contained within the matrix are represented in terms of an associated digraph 
deviation value: 
• +10: Flow / pressure. 
• +/- 5: Partial flow / partial pressure. 
• +/- 1: Partial flow / partial pressure. 
• -10: No flow / no pressure. 
The fuel rig system is assumed to operate in three modes: 
(i) ACTIVE 
(ii) DORMANT 
(iii) DRAIN 
The selection of a specific mode by the operator informs the program of the expected fuel rig 
transmitter readings. These are contained within a matrix, [OM]. The expected fuel rig operating 
mode readings are illustrated in Table 5-24. 
Collector Tank Main Tank Wing Tank 
Mode PT0310 PTOIIO PT0210 LT0310 FT0300 FT0310 PT0320 LTOIIO FTOIOO FTOIIO PTOl20 LT0210 FT0200 FT0210 PT0220 
ACTIVE <RL&> NF F I' RL NF NF NI' RL NF NF NP I TJ 
ACTIVE <TJ &> NF F I' RL NF NF NI' < RL&> NI' F I' 2 T2 PSO 
ACTIVE <T2 &> NF F P < RL&> NF I' I' PSO NI' NI' NI' 3 PSO PSO 
ACTIVE 
>PSO NF F I' PSO NI' NF NI' PSO NI' NI' NI' 4 
DORM. 2PSO NF NF NI' 2:P50 NF NI' NI' 2:1'50 NI' NI' NP 
DRAIN 2PSO I' NF NI' 2PSO I' NF NI' 2:1'50 I' NI' NP 
Table 5-24. Expected Operating Mode Transmitter Readings 
The REFUEL mode is omitted due to the difficulties involved in relating the operating mode to 
an actual aircraft refuel when utilising the simulation test stand. The REFUEL mode is therefore 
not analysed further during the diagnostic procedure. The fuel rig status during the ACTIVE 
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mode is variable and thus is sub-divided into phases in order to incorporate sub-dynamic 
conditions. The precise ACTIVE phase is dependent on the collector tank level (reference 
Section 5.2.3). Under normal cOJ?ditions it is expected that fuel transfer into the collector tank 
equals flow out. 
Specific rules are employed in the program as a means of providing consistency. These rules 
relate to the tank levels and in turn the flow readings which are permitted for a given situation. 
The expected readings for an inputted operating mode may be altered depending on the level 
information: 
(i) If any tank level is at or below PSO, expect no flow at FTOAOO and FTOAI0 plus no 
pressure at PTOAI0 and PTOA20 (where A represents 1,2 or 3 - main, wing or collector 
tank). 
(ii) If the collector tank is high, expect no flow out of the main and wing tanks. 
(iii) If there is flow 'out of a tank and the level is below PSO, all failures are assumed to be 
due to the flow out not an actual tank failure (e.g. tank fracture). 
The dynamic version of the program reads a text file containing data regarding the operating 
mode of the fuel rig system plus level, flow and pressure readings from the individual tank 
sections. The transmitter data retrieved for each time interval is arranged in rows in the following 
format: 
[
OperatingMOde ] 
Time LTIIO FTlOO FTIIO PTlIO PTl20 LT210 FT200 FT210 PT210 PT220 LT310 FT300 FT310 PT310 PT320 
The rate of change in the tank levels is calculated after interval one. During the ACTIVE mode 
the rate of change value is used along with the individual tank levels to determine which specific 
phase the fuel rig is in. The rate of change in tank levels is also used in later sections to 
determine if faults are present in the system. 
5.5.1.2 Comparison of Variables 
The second stage of the program is concerned with comparing the retrieved transmitter data with 
those readings which would be expected under the assumed fuel rig system operating mode. A 
deviation matrix [0] is generated on comparing the readings for each specific transmitter. 
The information contained in the matrices [OM] and [FM] is analysed. If the readings are 
identical then an element in the deviation matrix corresponding to a relevant transmitter is 
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allocated the value '0'. This indicates the presence of a non-deviating sensor and so it is assumed 
that no failures are present within the corresponding section of the fuel rig. Should a reading 
deviate then the respective element in [D] is assigned a value which is consistent with the 
deviation (e.g. +10) as illustrated by Figure 5-19. 
% Compare element by element for active, dormant and drain modes. 
if OP<4 
end 
for i 1:3 
end 
for j = 1: 4 
end 
if OM(i,j) -= FM(i,j) 
D(i,j) = FM(i,j); 
else D(i,j) = 0; 
end 
disp('Fuel rig deviation matrix: ') 
disp(D) 
Figure 5-19. Comparison Script 
On generating the deviation matrix, the next phase in the process revolves around determining 
the transmitter flags for non-deviating readings. This is split into two steps. Firstly whole tank 
section flags are allocated to specific tanks that indicate no deviations in [D]. If deviations are 
outlined in [D] for a specific tank then its corresponding tank flag (reference Table 5-25) is 
assigned the value '1'. The second stage in the process involves assigning 'flag' values to 
individual transmitters in tank sections which are flagged '1'. This aids the back-tracing 
procedure conducted in the fault diagnostics section. 
Tank Section 
Main 
Wing 
Collector 
Flag 
MTFlag 
WTFlag 
CTFlag 
Table 5-25. Tank Section Flags 
The dynamic version of the automated procedure sub-divides the comparison of transmitter 
readings into (1) tank levels and (2) flow and pressure readings. The active supply tank levels are 
used to verify the status of the fuel rig and determine ifan actual tank fault (e.g. tank rupture) is 
present through detecting either: 
(i) A tank level within an abnormal boundary (e.g. low, empty). 
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(ii) A tank level within a normal boundary with either an increasing or decreasing rate of 
change, given no flow is expected at the tank exit routes. 
In both of these cases a specific tank level deviation is noted by assigning a value which is 
consistent with the deviation (e.g. -10) to a related tank deviation variable. The deviation matrix 
and flagging process is performed in an identical manner to that in steady-state. 
After the first interval the current deviation matrix [D] is compared with the deviation matrix [d] 
from the previous interval. For identical matrices it is noted that there has been no change in 
status and the remainder of the program loop is bypassed leading to the next interval. 
5.5.1.3 Fault Diagnostics 
The fault diagnostics section of the program is split into two segments due to the fact that there 
are no visible dependencies between the possible failure mode combinations for both the tank 
drain and feed lines. The results from the two sections are then combined. 
(i) Diagnosing faults in the drain valve routes 
(ii) Diagnosing faults in the tank feed lines. 
A number code is allocated to the component failure modes highlighted in Section 5.2.6. The 
back-tracing procedure is re-enacted through using matrices which contain individual component 
failure mode number codes. A specific matrix exists containing the back-tracing results for all 
detectable transmitter deviations. These results are then combined depending on the individual 
tank scenarios and fuel rig system operating mode. 
The fault diagnostics procedure performed on the tank feed lines is split into three main units for 
each tank. The process is sub-divided in terms of the number of transmitter flags which are 
signed '1' for a particular tank section. An illustration of this is provided in Figure 5-20 for the 
main tank section. In this case, the diagnostic procedure commences so long as the overall tank 
flag (MTFlag) is signed '1', thus indicating the presence of a fault within the tank section. The 
actual diagnostics process is dependent upon which sensor flags indicate the presence and 
absence of faults. This information affects the amount of back-tracing conducted and in turn the 
allocation of component failure mode data. 
The rate of change in tank height is the only variable which alters the format ofthe dynamic fault 
diagnostics process over steady-state. The varying rate of change is utilised to detect actual tank 
failures as noted in Section 5.5.1.3 or to distinguish between failure results which may have been 
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the cause for a given deviation. For scenarios with deviations of no flow or no pressure the rate 
of change in tank height is used to differentiate between blockage or rupture failures. A 
decreasing rate of change indicates a pipe has ruptured whereas an increasing or zero rate of 
change implies the presence of either blocked pipes, shut off pumps or blocked /closed valves. 
if MTFlag == 1 
%Three noted deviations 
%FTIIO, PTIIO and PT120 
if MTF2Flag && MTPIFlag && MTP2Flag 1 
%Two noted deviations 
%FTOIIO, PTOIIO, PT0120 
if MTF2Flag && MTPIFlag 
if MTF2Flag && MTP2Flag 
if MTPIFlag && MTP2Flag 
%Single deviation 
%FTOllO 
if MTPIFlag && MTP2Flag 
end 
1 && MTP2Flag 
1 && MTPIFlag 
1 && MTF2Flag 
o && MTF2Flag 
o 
o 
o 
1 
Figure 5-20. Example Usage of Main Tank Transmitter Flags in Feed Line Fault Diagnostics Script 
5.5.1.4 Results Output 
The diagnostic results are displayed whilst the program runs. Initial display features involve 
outputting the expected operating mode readings ([OM]), retrieved transmitter data ([FM]) and 
the deviation matrix ([DD. Information regarding the presence or absence of failures in 
individual tank sections is also displayed. If a complete tank flag is signed '0' then a statement is 
output noting the absence of any deviations in the specific tank section. The drain valve 
diagnostic results are output separately from those for the tank feed line. 
With regards to the output of the diagnostic results associated with tank feed lines a complex 
'for' loop structure is constructed in order to display the results in an ANDed format. In this 
manner multiple faults are displayed in an array. The diagnostic results determined for multiple 
transmitter readings are thus combined. The script in Figure 5-21 illustrates a section of code 
associated with ANDing the failure modes determined for a deviating wing tank scenario. 
Variables 'a - d' are allocated a number which is dependent on the number of component failure 
modes contained within the failure matrices. The running of the nested 'for' loop is linked to the 
variables 'a - d'. The ANDed component failure mode data is contained within arrays [WTR] 
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and [WTR2]. A local counter (i_Ioc) is utilised as a means of listing the ANDed data in separate 
rows. 
% Output ANDed Wing Tank Feed Line results 
if WTF2Flag I I WTP1Flag I I WTP2Flag == 1 
WTS2 = 0; 
disp('Wing Tank Feed Line Diagnostic Results in text file -
wingtankresults.txt') 
if WTF2M && WTF2M1 && WTF2M2 && WTP1M && WTP2M == 1 
a numel(WTF2F1); 
b numel(WTF2F2); 
c = numel(WTP1F); 
d numel(WTP2F); 
i loc = 1; 
for i = l:a, 
for j = l:b, 
for k = l:c, 
for I = 1: d, 
WTR(i loc,:) = [WTF2F1(i) WTF2F2(j) WTPIF(k) 
WTP2F(I)] ; 
i loc 
end 
end 
end 
end 
WTS2 = 1; 
a numel(WTF2F); 
b = numel(WTP1F); 
c = numel(WTP2F); 
i loc = 1; 
for i = l:a, 
for j = l:b, 
for k = l:c, 
i loc + 1; 
WTR2(i loc,:) [WTF2F(i) WTP1F(j) WTP2F(k)]; 
i loc i loc + 1; 
end 
end 
end 
elseif WTF2M && WTF2M1 && WTF2M2 && WTP1M 1 
dlmwrite('wingtankresultsl.txt', WTR, 'delimiter', '\t') 
if WTS2 == 1 
dlmwrite('wingtankresults2.txt', WTR2, 'delimiter', '\t') 
end 
Figure 5-21. Wing Tank Feed Line Diagnostic Results Output 
There are two possible result groups for the code illustrated in Figure 5-21. Consequently two 
solution arrays are generated. The first solution ([WTR]) ignores the possibility of a failure 
occurring after the two feed lines have joined and is therefore concerned with flow and pressure 
failures in both lines. The second solution ([WTR2]) highlights faults which are associated with 
pressure deviations in both lines and a flow deviation after the lines are connected. In this 
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manner the failure combinations of different orders are separated. The results which are attained 
are displayed in a text file format. Each fuel rig tank section is linked to specific text files 
containing the diagnostic results for the given transmitter deviations. The only difference noted 
between the output sections in the steady-state and dynamic programs is that under dynamic 
conditions the rate of change in the tank heights is displayed on screen. 
5.5.2 Example Scenarios 
Example scenarios, employed In Sections 5.5.2.1 and 5.5.2.2, are utilised as a means of 
exhibiting how the program functions. Section 5.5.2.1 covers scenarios analysed in steady-state 
conditions. Transmitter readings retrieved at set intervals from the simulation test bed are used to 
fully test the diagnostic strategy in Section 5.5.2.2. 
5.5.2.1 Steady-State Scenarios 
In all example cases it is assumed that the fuel rig is in the ACTIVE operating mode. The 
examples vary with regards to the number of registered transmitter deviations. 
Example One 
The fuel rig transmitter readings (Table 5-26) are read into the program from a text file. The 
command window illustration (Figure 5-22) exemplifies the process followed. 
LTOllO 
RL 
Main Tank Wing Tank 
FrO 1 00 FrOllO PTO I 10 LT0210 Fr0200 Fr0210 PT0210 LT0310 PTOl20 PT0220 
NF NF NP RL NF NF NP <RL& 
>Tl 
Table 5-26. Transmitter Readings (Example One) 
lIazlln'9: IJne.ble to re',ll!!ter ['Hec:ti: ~'O!l'I-'<:'rl<cllt (:\I<[O\il[<Vl' rllel!\I'UTLU\toolb'n:\Il,atlabiO!luchoYldeo\pcl.v"'te\natlo:;b[ie.taSlnk.dll 
trarnlng: Un!lble to reql~ter f'lrectY. co",p.,nen~ (:'. Progf.-.n, rlle~\ I'lAn,.E.\ ~ oolboll"\\'I'>!!ot lab\ ""Idlovideo\ private, "/!It lab['at",Soutce.dll 
["pecled "I'er<otlng /fIi)de te",dlt"J3: 
-10 -10 -10 -10 
-IQ -10 -11) -10 
-10 to 10 10 
-10 -10 -1') -10 
-10 -10 -1') -10 
-10 10 ICI 10 
fuel rIg devllulon rloIIItrlH: 
o 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 
(lOO 0 
no r.oted devl"'tior,lI [egl~tered In the ''''''In t .. nlt 
No r.(lted devi .. t1Qn~ ,eq1~te'l!!d in the "lnq tank. 
No notl!!d d~VlatIOn ... tl!!g"'tl!!rl!!d In the C"olle<."tor ~ .. nl< 
Figure 5-22. Command Window (Example One) 
Collector Tank 
Fr0300 Fr0310 PT0310 PT0320 
NF F P 
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The expected operating mode readings, retrieved transmitter readings and the deviation matrix 
are displayed on screen. For Example One it is determined that no deviations exist and therefore 
statements returned by the diagnostics section relate to the absence of deviations and failures 
within the tank 
Example Two 
The transmitter data entered into the program is outlined in Table 5-27. The deviation matrix 
displayed in the command window (Figure 5-23) indicates the presence of a single transmitter 
deviation in the wing tank section. 
LTOllO 
RL 
Main Tank Wing Tank 
FrO lOO FrOllO PTOllO LT021 0 Fr0200 Fr02lO PT02lO LT031 0 PT0120 PT0220 
NF NF NP <RL NF NF P <TJ & 
>T2 
Table 5-27. Transmitter Readings (Example Two) 
E.M, ~dt. Doe0-9 i;."esltop :tlJ>dow, I:1eip 
CI~::t.~Q~·);" ar:J ,t Cl.O'r~C9ed~~}~~~.~~~~~~ .. ~~Otn 
Shorto.ts:.eJIirJ'<¥IoACId.!l~st~ 
.. - - .. . 
To get :ltarted, 5elect 'U,TL1B Help 01' Del'tlOs !I::OIll the Help II1eD.U. 
! 
: Ilarninq: Unable to reO'l:lter DlcectX cOlI1ponene C:\ProO'r_ Fl1e,,\!UTL1B\ eoolbox\_elab\audlovldeo\private\KatlabDataSink.dll 
lIarninq: Unable too reg15ter DlIc",ctX cOJIlponent C:\Pcoqr_ rlles\KATL1B\toolbox\_tlab\audiovldeo\prlvate\!latlabDataSouree.dl! 
iWa"'t Operat11lq DIOde 15 the fuel 1::10' :lystem 1n1 [ntel:: 1: ACTIVE, Z: DOR!IJ.NT, 3: DJLUN 1 
[lI:peceed operating mode reading!!: 
-10 -10 -10 -10 
-10 10 10 10 
-10 10 10 10 
Petrleve<:l tuel I::lq hulw:e readlnqs: 
-10 -10 -10 -ID 
-ICl ·10 lCl ICl 
-10 10 10 10 
Tuel riq devIation l\'If\trlX: 
Cl Cl 0 0 
tlo noted dev1atlon3 reO'19tered 1D. the !<>alII tank: 
. Pevlat.lon.s re<;;t.stered 1n the 'nnQ' tank: 
No note,j deVIation" reql"tered lU the collector t!lnk 
VInO' Tank Feed LIne Dlayno!Otlc Pe5u1t" In text tIle 
Figure 5-23. Command Window (Example Two) 
Collector Tank 
Fr0300 Fr0310 PT03lO PT0320 
NF F P 
From the displayed matrix it is detennined that the deviation is related to the flow transmitter 
FT0210 registering the situation no· flow. The results displayed by the diagnostics section 
indicate the absence of any deviations or failures in the main and collector tariks. Deviations are 
noted in the wing tank section with the results contained in two text files: wingtankresults 1.txt 
and wingtankresults2.txt. The diagnostic results yield eighty-one second order failures and two 
first order. 
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Example Three 
The transmitter data from Table 5-28 is entered into the program. Two transmitter deviations are 
noted from the displayed deviation matrix (Figure 5-24). The first noted deviation is in the main 
tank section and concerns the flow transmitter FTOll 0 registering the status no flow. The second 
deviation is located in the collector tank with regards to the flow transmitter FT0300 registering 
partial flow. 
Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
LTOllO FTOIOO FTOIIO PTO 1 10 LT0210 FT0200 FT0210 PT0210 LT0310 FT0300 FT0310 PT0310 PTO 1 20 PT0220 PT0320 
<RL& NF NF P PSO NF NF NP <Tt & PF(+5) F P >PSO >PSO 
Table 5-28. Transmitter Readmgs (Example Three) 
ShortclAs [!J How IQ Add II ~'s New 
r:0~F;7;~-~~.·.·.~·.-".~·~-··AX- r;c'---""C'~"--;""---'-""-'------'---"--------'---.-----------.----.---..... --------------, ... --.. ---------... --.. ---.. -.. -----------.~---.-------------; .. --;;. 
i~~.:;:TD~.:'9F~31.;I .. F.:;: mm T;~: Vh:: :::,::::·:d:·::e:~l::: :::P,::e::~:::::.:b:::::,:~U:, 'O"lNT'3mDR1~- 1 <. i Expected operating mode readings: -10 10 10 10 o -10 -10 -10 -10 [: -10 10 
. i Pet[leved fuel [llll hill lure reading:s: 
mCTF1Flag -10 -10 10 10 
ffiCTflM -10 -10 -10 -10 lE CTf2Flag 5 10 10 10 
ffiCTF2M 
lBCTF2Ml ! fuel rtQ' devIation l1'Iatrilt: 
B3CTF2M2 . 0 -10 0 0 
ffiCTFlag 1 
!BeTL 3 . 
ffiCTP1Flag 
!BCTP1M 
fECTP1ML 
JBCTP2Flag 
ffiCTP2M 
tECTP2Ml 
!BCTTR 
fED 
!BOCTl 
fEOMTL 
!Boo 
mOO 
o : Deviation" regl"tered 1n the l1l(I10 tank 
~ l ~:v:::::n~e;:;::~::e~e~:~:~:e~o;:e:~:r v::~~ tan)t 
o PO!!!'Ilble failure!! le8dlng to reql!'ltered deViation at fTOJOO: 
429 o 
I' ( Jlhun Tank feed. Line Diagno:!ltic Pe:!lUlt5 In text file 
mainlankrttsulls2.lxI 
Sleadyslalem 
transmrtlerreadlngstxt 
Iransmlllerreadings1_hl 
tr,liMmrtIFmp~rlinn<;ln h1 
Figure 5-24. Command Window (Example Three) 
The output diagnostic results indicate the absence of deviations and failures in the wing tank 
section and highlight the failures which may lead to the registered deviations in the main tank 
and collector tank sections. A single cause is noted for the deviation at FT0300. This is displayed 
in the command window as the numerical code 429. The diagnostic results determined from the 
deviation in the main tank feed lines are output in two text files: maintankresults 1.txt and 
maintankresults2.txt. In total there are eighty-three failure mode combinations associated with 
the main tank section: eighty-one second order failures and two first order. On combining the 
results from both the main and collector tanks there are eighty-one third order failures and two 
second order. 
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Example Four 
The transmitter data (Table 5-29) entered into the program contains varying tank levels when 
compared with Examples One - Three. The results output (Figure 5-25) indicates a deviation 
matrix which only contains zeros. No deviations are illustrated in the matrix since the registered 
deviations only relate to the tank levels (tank level data is not contained within [DD. The main 
and wing tank level deviations are noted alongside the specific tank failure causes determined in 
the fault diagnostics section. 
LTOIlO 
L 
Main Tank Wing Tank Collector Tank 
FTOIOO FTOllO PTO I 101 LT0210 FT0200 FT0210 PT02101 LT0310 FT0300 FT0310 PT03101 PTO I 20 PT0220 PT0320 
NF NF NP L NF NF NP <T\ & NF F P >PSO 
Table 5-29. Transmitter Readings (Example Four) 
!""'·"'>,;>.k'<' .... "~.".~.f...cc..-.-".=~,-------------------------------~...:.:, ~~ .. :.l~~="ii··».··.·: To Q"et .,tatted • .,elect J'I.lTLA.B Help or ~ tt"om the Help _nu. 
mAC1 CA! 
iBAC2 C . i What operat1Dq I1'IOcte 1., the fuel r1q l!'Y.,teJI in? Enter 1: ACTIVE, 2: i)ORJllNT, 3: [I}lAIN 1 
mAC3 c .! Expected operating mode reading.,: 
iB A
CA
C4 C _. -la -10 -10 -10 lE OC .'i -10 -10 -10 -10 
E3CTO fC: -10 10 10 10 
iBCTF1M 0 ,.",~.d fu.l "0 '.ilure ".d"O" 
ffiCTF2M -10 -10 -la -10 
iBCTF2Ml 
mCTF2M2 
mCTFlag 
meTl 
iBCTP1M . 
lHCTP1Ml 
ffiCTP2M 
mCTP2ML 
mCn" 
iBo 
mOCTl 
mOMTl 
iBoo 
iBoR 
mOWTl 
m'M 
IBFTlOJF 
ffiFT100Nl 
J+lFTlm,.,...; 
-10 -10 -10 -10 
-10 10 la 10 
::J Tuel rlg devlatioD ~tt"ix: 
o 0 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 
[leviation3 registered in the IiJlng tank 
o IJo noted d.evle.t10n., registered. in the collector tank 
.1 Jlaln tank: "f.olllure CI'lU3e(!"I): 
, 
_I Wlng tftnk fallure ce.uses: 
'" 
".);, Cunent Directory· C;-.>ocurnents and Set ... IJtI]~ 
fIIoEdt'9'\et'fDebtJo~w.-.do¥rt~ 
[.~~·.·:~;.~.~i~.:~:~·~.~~·.·:~:! . . : .~ .... ~ .. ~. ~ .. ~8.·.· 
~~-:---,--,~ __ --,"'T"" 
FueJRlglxlll'lputsleadyslale m M-file 
[j$i~~J~t~.I~!!l:1 M-lile 
:~ transffilnerreadlngs Ixl TXT FIle 
.. ~ lransffilllerreadlngs1 Ix! TXJ File 
.:~ IranSffiitlerreadingsl0 Id TXT File 
~~ lransffilUerreadlngs111d TXT File 
.;J Ir:'ln~mlllprrp~rlln,,~' ht nrr Fill' v 
~~,-.----.~----.-- ............................................ - .............. ,,!. ... . 
Figure 5-25. Command Window (Example Four) 
5.5.2.2 Dynamic Fuel Rig Scenarios 
Transmitter readings retrieved from the fuel rig system, are utilised to fully test the diagnostic 
program developed based on the application of digraphs in system fault diagnostics. Faults are 
manually injected into the test bed in order to determine the efficiency of the diagnostic method 
in diagnosing specific failures. During all test cases the fuel rig is run in the ACTIVE mode. The 
retrieved transmitter readings are transcribed into a readable format for the program. The flow 
and pressure readings are categorised according to set boundaries which describe the groups 
'full' flow (or pressure), partial flow (or pressure) and no flow (or pressure). The testing interval 
period for examples one and two is selected at 5 seconds in order to provide an accurate 
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representation of the data. However, in examples three to five this interval period is set to 10 
seconds as a means of maintaining conciseness since the overall test duration is increased. The 
test states and their respective transmitter readings are described along with the diagnostic results 
obtained at each stage. 
Example One 
The main and wing tank sections of the fuel rig are shut off with only the collector tank section 
in operation, thus setting the scene for ACTIVE phase 1. At t = 15s, the main tank section is 
switched on. The fuel rig transmitter readings are retrieved at five second intervals, as illustrated 
in Table 5-30. 
The diagnostic results obtained for intervals one to four simply note the status of the individual 
tank levels and state that there are no deviations present in the fuel rig. A change ·in status is 
noted at interval five with deviations registered in the main section tank only. 
Trans. Time (sec) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
LTOllO 0.2899 0.2899 0.2899 0.2899 0.2911 0.2936 0.2858 0.2832 0.2852 0.2840 0.2839 
FTOI00 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FTOllO NF NF NF NF F F F F F F F 
PTOllO NP NP NP NP P P P P P P P 
PT0120 NP NP NP NP P P P P P P P 
LT0210 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
FT0200 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0210 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
PT0210 NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP 
PT0220 NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP 
LT0310 0.6068 0.5999 0.5293 0.5896 0.5836 0.5749 0.5792 0.5750 0.5734 0.5786 0.5801 
FT0300 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0310 F F F F F F F F F F F 
PT0310 P P P P P P P P P P P 
PT0320 P P P P P P P P P P P 
Table 5-30. Transmitter Readings (Example One) 
The diagnostic results are output into text files. There are sixteen multiple failure combinations; 
one second order, six third order and nine of the order four. The failure combinations are: 
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PP1100.PP1200 
IVP1100.PP1200.BBV1100 
IVP1100.PP1200.PP1100 
PP1100.lVP2100.BBV1100.PP1200 
PPII00.lVP2100.BBVII00.BBV1200 
IVPII00.PP1200.PPI100.BBV1200 
PPI100.lVP2100.BBV1200 
IVPI100.PP1200.BBVII00.BBV1200 
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PPII00.lVP2100.PP1200 
IVP11 OO.IVP21 OO.PP11 OO.PP1200 
PPII00.PP1200.BBVI100 
IVP1100.lVP1200.PPII00.BBV1200 
PPII00.PP1200.BBV1200 
IVPII00.lVP2100.BBVII00.PP1200 
PPI100.PP1200.BBVII00.BBV1200 
IVPII00.lVP2100.BBVII00.BBV1200 
The actual failure combination which led to the noted deviations originated from switching on 
the main tank pumps (PPOII0 and PP0120) and opening the powered isolation valves (lVPOl10 
and IVP0120). This failure combination is highlighted in bold in the failure list. 
The output data for intervals six to eleven simply notes the presence of the same deviations as in 
interval five and thus records no change in status with regards to the diagnostic results. 
Example Two 
The main tank section in the fuel rig is shut off. The wing and collector tank sections are 
operating as required in the ACTIVE mode phase 2. The wing tank is at approximately 50% 
capacity and the collector tank level is between thresholds one and two. At t = lOs, a no flow 
reading is retrieved from the flow transmitter FT0210 in the wing tank section. The fuel rig 
transmitter readings are retrieved at five second intervals, as illustrated in Table 5-31. 
The diagnostic results obtained for intervals one to three simply note the changes in individual 
tank levels heights along with the absence of deviations. A change in status is recorded at 
interval four with a flow deviation registered for the wing tank. The results are output in text file 
format. There are nine failure combinations; one first order fault and eight second order faults: 
P217R 
P209R.P216R 
P209R.P214R 
P208R.P216R 
P208R.P215R 
P208R.P214R 
P207R.P216R 
P217R.P215R 
P207R.P214R 
The actual failure leading to the registered deviation at FT021 0 is P217R. A rupture is simulated 
in pipe 217, located between the joining of the two tank feed lines and the flow transmitter. 
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The output data for intervals five to seven simply notes the presence of an identical deviation 
from interval four and thus records no change in status with regards to the diagnostic results. 
Trans. Time (sec) 0 5 10 15 20 
LTOllO 0.3009 0.3009 0.3009 0.3009 0.3009 
FTOI00 NF NF NF NF NF 
FTOllO NF NF NF NF NF 
PTOllO NP NP NP NP NP 
PT0120 NP NP NP NP NP 
LT0210 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
FT0200 NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0210 F F F NF NF 
PT0210 P P P P P 
PT0220 P P P P P 
LT0310 0.6068 0.5999 0.5293 0.5896 0.5836 
FT0300 NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0310 F F F F F 
PT0310 P P P P P 
PT0320 P P P P P 
Table 5-31. Transmitter Readings (Example Two) 
Exam12le Three 
The fuel rig system is run under identical operating mode conditions to Example Two. At t = 
lOs, the drain valve in the main tank is opened as a means of simulating a tank rupture. The fuel 
rig transmitter readings are retrieved at ten second intervals, as illustrated in Table 5-32. 
The diagnostic results obtained for interval one record no deviations in the fuel rig system. 
During interval two a decreasing main tank level is noted and the faults which may lead to the 
deviation are output on screen. There are two viable diagnostic results, both of which are single 
faults: 
TKOllOR TKOIIOL 
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The actual failure leading to the registered deviation at LTOII0 is caused by a simulated rupture 
in the tank (highlighted in bold). The output data for intervals three to seven notes the presence 
of the same deviation from interval two and thus records no charige in status with regards to the 
diagnostic results. 
Trans. Time (sec) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
LTOllO 0.3284 0.3238 0.3299 0.3084 0.2765 0.2403 0.2143 
FT0100 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FTOllO NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
PTOllO NP NP NP NP NP NP NP 
PT0120 NP NP NP NP NP NP NP 
LT0210 0.3330 0.3231 0.3062 0.3010 0.2883 0.2751 0.2681 
FT0200 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0210 F F F F F F F 
PT0210 P P P P P P P 
PT0220 P P P P P P P 
LT0310 0.4810 0.4837 0.4780 0.4870 0.4880 0.4874 0.4868 
FT0300 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0310 F F F F F F F 
PT0310 P P P P P P P 
PT0320 P P P P P P P 
Table 5-32. Transmitter Readings (Example Three) 
ExamQle Four 
The main tank section in the fuel rig is shut off. The wing and collector tank sections initially 
operate as required for the ACTIVE mode phase 2. At t = Os, the drain valve in the main tank is 
opened and at t = 20s the powered isolation valve IVP031 0 in the collector tank is shut. The fuel 
rig transmitter readings are retrieved at ten second intervals, as illustrated in Table 5-33. 
The diagnostic results obtained for interval one record the fuel rig system to be runmng 
normally. During interval two, in a similar manner to Example Three, a decreasing main tank 
level is noted. The faults which may lead to the deviation are output on screen: 
TKOllOR TKOIlOL 
138 
Chapter Five: Fuel Rig System 
Again, the actual failure leading to the registered deviation is a simulated tank rupture. The 
output data for interval three records no further deviations. During interval four deviations are 
registered in the collector tank along with the previously noted decreasing main tank level. The 
flow transmitter FT031 0 notes a negative partial flow deviation. 
Trans. Time (sec) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
LT0110 0.2958 0.2554 0.2223 0.1822 0.1571 0.1468 0.1361 
FTOI00 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0110 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
PTO 110 NP NP NP NP NP NP NP 
PT0120 NP NP NP NP NP NP NP 
LT0210 0.2416 0.2302 0.2197 0.2016 0.1950 0.1852 0.1751 
FT0200 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0210 F F F F F F F 
PT0210 P P P P P P P 
PT0220 P P P P P P P 
LT0310 0.3517 0.3638 0.3837 0.3924 0.4149 0.4337 0.4511 
FT0300 NF NF NF NF NF NF . NF 
FT0310 F F F PF(-5) PF(-5) PF(-5) PF(-5) 
PT0310 P P P P P P P 
PT0320 P P P P P P P 
Table 5-33. Transmitter Readings (Example Four) 
The complete set of diagnostic results obtained note two single faults for the decreasing main 
tank level and 49 failure combinations for the collector tank deviation. The collector tank 
diagnostic results are output in text file format. There are 13 single order faults and 36 second 
order faults: 
P316PB P315B P308PB.BP320PB 
P308B BP320B P308PB.lVP320S 
BP310B P314B P308PB.lVP320PB 
P307B IVP320C P308PB.P314PB 
IVP310C IVP320B P308PB.P313PB 
IVP310B P313B BP310PB.P315PB 
P306B P308PB.P315PB BP310PB.BP320PB 
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BP310PB.lVP320S P307PB.P313PB IVP310S.lVP320PB 
BP310PB.lVP320PB IVP310PB.P315PB IVP310S.P314PB 
BP31 OPB.P314 PB IVP310PB.BP320PB IVP310S.P313PB 
BP310PB.P313PB IVP310PB.lVP320PB P306PB.P315PB 
P307PB.P315PB IVP31 OPB.P314 PB P306PB.BP320PB 
P307PB.BP320PB IVP310PB.P313PB P306PB.IVP320S 
P307PB.lVP320S IVP310S.P315PB P306PB.lVP320PB 
P307PB.lVP320PB IVP310S.BP320PB P306PB.P314PB 
P307PB.P314PB IVP310S.IVP320S P306PB.P313PB 
The actual failure leading to the partial flow deviation at FT0310 is caused by closing the 
powered isolation valve in the collector tank feed line one. The specific failure is highlighted in 
bold in the detennined failure list. No further deviations are noted during intervals five to seven. 
Example Five 
A similar fonnat is followed to that described in Example Four. At t = Os, the main tank section 
is switched on and at t = 20s the powered isolation valve IVP031 0 in the collector tank is shut. 
The fuel rig transmitter readings are retrieved at ten second intervals, as illustrated in Table 5-34. 
The expected operating mode is ACTIVE phase 2. 
The diagnostic results obtained for interval one note the presence of deviations in the main tank 
section only. The deviations registered at PT0110, PT0120 and FTOII0 are identical to those 
recorded in Example One. The results are output in the same text file fonnat. There are sixteen 
multiple failure combinations; one second order, six third order and nine of the order four: 
PPII00.PP1200 
IVPII00.PP1200.BBVII00 
IVP1100.PP1200.PPII00 
PP1100.lVP2100.BBV1100.PP1200 
PP1100.lVP2100.BBV1100.BBV1200 
IVPI100.PP1200.PPI100.BBV1200 
PPI100.lVP2100.BBV1200 
IVP1100.PP1200.BBVI100.BBV1200 
PPI100.lVP2100.PP1200 
IVP11 OO.IVP21 OO.PP11 OO.PP1200 
PPI100.PP1200.BBV1100 
IVP1100.lVP1200.PP1100.BBV1200 
PPI100.PP1200.BBV1200 
IVPII00.lVP2100.BBV1100.PP1200 
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The actual failure combination leading to the noted deviations originates from turning on the 
main tank pumps PPOllO and PP0120 and opening the powered isolation valves IVPOllO and 
IVP0120. No further deviations are registered until interval four. The registered collector tank 
deviations are identical to those noted in Example Four and thus reveal the same diagnostic 
. results. 
Trans. Time (sec) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
LTOllO 0.2958 0.2554 0.2223 0.1822 0.1571 0.1468 0.1361 
FTOI00 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FTOllO F F F F F F F 
PTOllO P P P P P P P 
PT0120 P P P P P P P 
LT0210 0.2416 0.2302 0.2197 0.2016 0.1950 0.1852 0.1751 
FT0200 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0210 F F F F F F F 
PT0210 P P P P P P P 
PT0220 P P P P P P P 
LT0310 0.3517 0.3638 0.3837 0.3924 0.4149 0.4337 0.4511 
FT0300 NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
FT0310 F F F PF(-5) PF(-5) PF(-5) PF(-5) 
PT0310 P P P P P P P 
PT0320 P P P P P P P 
Table 5-34 Transmitter Readings (Example Five) 
5.5.3 Method Review 
The flagging process, previously described in Chapter Four, is further progressed when 
considering the dynamics of a system. For scenarios whereby a tank level is noted to be within 
an abnormal boundary in consecutive intervals: if the rate of change in height of the tank level is 
not negative it is assumed that the tank failure has been rectified and therefore the deviation is 
masked. 
The rate of change in height of a particular tank level is utilised to distinguish between and 'hone 
in' on failures which may be the cause for a given deviation. This has proved successful in cases 
where there are registered deviations of no flow and no pressure. If a negative rate of change is 
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noted this highlights a pipe rupture fault whereas a positive or zero rate of change indicates 
failures incorporating blockages or closures. Further 'honing in' on diagnostic results is 
conducted through considering observation features. For example, it is possible to visually 
inspect the system and note which section is leaking or ruptured should one of these faults be 
listed. The rate of change in height is also used to detect actual tank failures, such as tank 
ruptures. During steady state analysis, a decreasing tank level is not flagged as a deviation should 
the retrieved and expected readings of no flow and no pressure correlate. The tank level is only 
flagged should it fall within the low or empty boundaries. When considering dynamics however, 
it is possible to note the decreasing level and highlight viable fault causes. 
The diagnostic results determined for the collector tank deviations in Examples Four and Five 
highlight the need for further research in the area of 'honing in' on actual fault causes. For the 
specific examples in Section 5.5.3, the partial flow reading at FT031 0 could be due to: 
(i) A single complete failure (e.g. blockage or closure) in either feed line one or two. 
(ii) A multiple partial failure (e.g. partial blockage) in both feed lines one and two. 
Consequently, numerous diagnostic results are obtained through back-tracing from the initial 
deviation. 
The readings obtained from the fuel rig system are sub-divided into categories depending on the 
transmitter variable under investigation. In order to overcome the issue regarding the sensitivity 
of fuel rig transmitter readings to high frequency influences such as noise, set boundaries are 
constructed for normal pressure (or flow), no pressure (or no flow) and partial pressure (or 
partial flow). Thresholds for the level, flow and pressure readings are determined so as to prevent 
'false alarms' with respect to registered deviations. 
The consideration of dynamic effects during the fault diagnostic analysis encompasses: 
• Comparing fuel rig data retrieved between consecutive sampling intervals. 
• Altering the ACTIVE operating mode. If the collector tank level is just above threshold 
one and the rate of change in tank height is decreasing, fluid transfer from the wing 
tank commences. 
• Using the rate of change in tank height to differentiate between blockage, closure or 
shut off failures and rupture faults for registered 'no flow' deviations. 
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Altering the flagging of certain tank level deviations. A tank level below 'pump shut 
off indicates the presence of a failure. Should a tank level be: 
(i) below PSO in consecutive sampling intervals and 
(ii) comprise a positive or zero rate of change in tank height 
then the tank deviation is masked. 
• For a continuously decreasing rate of change in tank height and associated set of 
transmitter deviations, an actual tank failure (e.g. tank rupture) is noted if all other 
possible failures are found not to be the cause for the registered deviations. 
5.6 A Comparison of Two Fault Diagnostic Methods: Digraphs and Fault Tree 
Analysis 
Research presented by Bartlett et al. [81] focuses on the application of two fault diagnostic 
strategies; digraph and fault tree based approaches. The evaluation of both methods is based 
upon their application to the fuel rig system. The methods considered include the capability to 
evaluate multiple fault causes from a given system deviating state, plus the inclusion of transient 
effects and specific adaptations to perform consistency checks for the diagnostic results obtained. 
The procedure followed, regarding the fault tree based approach, is described in Section 5.6.1. A 
detailed application of both methods is conducted in Section 5.6.2. The steps involved in 
developing a system digraph and the subsequent fault diagnostics performed have previously 
been expanded in Chapter Four and Sections 5.3 - 5.5. 
5.6.1 Fault Tree Diagnostic Method 
Fault tree analysis has been around as a reliability assessment technique since the 1970s. It is 
concerned with the analysis of failures and provides a diagrammatic description of the various 
causes of a specified system abnormality in terms ofthe relevant component failure modes. 
Utilising fault tree analysis for fault diagnostics involves six steps 
(i) Step 1 - Component and Sensor Identification 
Identify the components contained within the system and the failure modes of each. 
Identify the sensors contained or needed within the system to be used to monitor system 
behaviour. 
(ii) Step 2 - Construct fault trees for observable system deviations 
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The behaviour of the system can be monitored by sensors located at specific points, i.e. 
flow meters. Fault trees are constructed to represent the failure modes at these 
locations, i.e. High Flow. Non-coherent fault trees are constructed which include failure 
and success states of the components, which removes inconsistencies between working 
and failed components. 
(iii) Step 3 - Detennination of System Status 
Compare the readings indicative of the current system behaviour with those that are 
expected given the mode of operation. Deviations are representative of faults present. 
(iv) Step 4 - Diagnostic Fault Tree Construction 
Construct a top event structure from the sensor deviations identified in step 2. 
Combine all readings using an AND gate if there are more than one. Perfonn a standard 
qualitative analysis to obtain potential causes of failure. 
(v) Step 5 - Consistency Verification 
Check the potential causes of system failure obtained in step 3 against the sensors 
reading true to the operating mode. Any potential causes of failure that could cause 
these true sensor readings to be false can be removed. 
(vi) Step 6 - Fault Cause Ranking 
In the instance of multiple faults, importance rankings can be used to detennine the 
most likely cause of failure. 
5.6.2 Application of Diagnostic Methods 
In perfonning system fault diagnostics, both methods consider deviations from the expected 
operating behaviour of the system. As a means of illustrating and comparing the diagnostic 
process employed by each method, they are applied to a faulty fuel rig scenario. The system is 
assumed to be in the ACTIVE mode, phase three. This encompasses flow from the main tank to 
the collector tank. A single deviating reading is obtained from the main tank flow transmitter 
FTOII0 where no flow is registered (as opposed to the expected flow). All other transmitter 
readings confonn to expectation (reference Table 5-3). 
5.6.2.1 Fault Tree Approach 
To utilise this method a fault tree is constructed to represent the causes of unexpected system 
behaviour. The inputs to this diagnostic tree depicting the actual system functionality are the 
fault trees for the necessary sensor failure modes (step 1). Considering the main tank, there 
would be three fault trees for the failure modes of the flow transmitter monitoring flow from the 
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main tank to drain (FTOI00), representing the causes of No Flow, Flow and Partial Flow. The 
same three fault tree failure modes would be constructed for the flow transmitter monitoring the 
state of flow from the main tank to the collector tank (FTO 110). Each pressure transmitter 
(PTOIIO and PTOI20) would have three fault trees representing the failure modes High Pressure, 
No pressure, Partial pressure. 
All fault trees contain failure and success events, therefore use AND, OR and NOT logic 
(referred to as non-coherent fault trees). The inclusion of the success events (or equivalent NOT 
logic) helps to remove failure causes that are not possible when more than one sensor failure 
mode is combined. Given the actual behaviour of the system, deviations from the expected state 
are indicative of a fault or faults within the system. To establish the faults, the causes are 
extracted by combining the individual fault trees constructed in step I, representing the deviated 
readings, using AND logic. 
From the assumed actual system behaviour the deviated reading from the normal active 
behaviour involves the flow from the main tank to the collector tank (monitored by FTOllO). 
The retrieved reading is No Flow, therefore the top event structure for the deviated state will just 
involve 'No Flow at FTOllO', as shown in Figure 5-26 
Figure 5-26. Fault Tree Representing No Flow at FTOllO 
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No flow at FTOll 0 is caused by either a failure immediately before the sensor, namely in the 
section of pipe labelled Pl17, or a failure in both lines 1 and 2 of the tank. When considering the 
failure at Pl17, it can fail blocked or ruptured. As the fault trees also consider the working states, 
then if the pipe is ruptured it cannot be blocked, partially blocked or leaking .. Hence the 
intermediate gate combination will involve two input combinations: 
(i) Pl17 blocked ANDed with NOT the other failure modes for Pl17. 
(ii) Pl17 ruptured ANDed with NOT the other failure modes for Pl17. 
A failure will occur in the main tank line one if there is a blockage or a rupture in PI 02, P 104, 
PI0S, P106, P107, or PI08. IfP102 is blocked then it can not be ruptured, partially blocked or 
leaking, similarly if it is ruptured it can not be blocked, partially blocked or leaking. The same 
analogy can be made for the other five pipes (PI04-108). The isolation valve, IVPOllO, could be 
blocked, or failed closed, and NOT failed open, stuck, partially blocked or leaking. The back 
pressure valve, BPOII0, could be blocked and NOT partially blocked or leaking, or the pump 
itself (PPOll 0) could have failed shut off and NOT failed mechanically, leaking or failed on. 
Similarly a failure will occur in the main tank line two ifthere is a blockage or a rupture in P109, 
PII0, Pl12, Pl13, Pl14, PllS or Pl16. They can not be ruptured, leaking or partially blocked if 
blocked. Ifthe pipes are ruptured then they can not be blocked, partially blocked or leaking. The 
IVP0120 valve could be blocked or failed closed and NOT failed open, leaking or stuck. The 
back pressure valve BP0120 could be blocked and NOT partially blocked or leaking, or the 
pump (PP0120) could be shut off and NOT failed mechanically, leaking or failed on. The tank 
also could be the problem area having ruptured. 
When analysing the fault tree using the standard qualitative procedures prime implicants are 
produced. These are combinations which include failure and success events. For example, one 
combination from 'No flow at FTOIIO' is: P102B.Pl 09B.-Pl 02R.-P102PB.-Pl 02L.-P109R.-
PI09PB.-PI09L where the '-' symbol means NOT that failure event. This combination involves 
eight pipe failure modes (referenced as P then three numbers corresponding to the pipe section). 
The modes of failure for these pipes are blocked (B), partially blocked (PB), leaking (L) or 
ruptured (R). As the purpose of the diagnosis is to yield the failure events, a coherent 
approximation is conducted (remove the success states) to yield the combinations of failure 
causes. Therefore, the coherent approximation of the example prime implicant would be 
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PI02B.PI09B. In total, for this given system state there are 292 failure causes for having No 
Flow at FTOII0. 
Information can be gained by considering those sensors that are true to the operating mode, 
hence reducing any causes from the list which cannot be possible as they are functioning to 
permit non-deviating outcomes. Performing this consistency check results in 83 fault 
combinations. Two are single component failures, pipe 117 blocked (PI17B) and pipe 117 
ruptured (PI17R). The remaining 81 combinations all involve the failure of two components 
together. 
To try and establish the most likely cause of failure, importance measures can be used. The 
Fussell-Vesely prooabilistic measure of minimal cut set importance has been used in this 
research. Each potential failure cause combination (cut set) can be given a numerical rating, 
with the highest rating being deemed the most likely cause of failure. This value is calculated by 
evaluating the probability of cut set failure divided by the diagnostic tree probability of failure. 
For this example, the single order cut sets rank first and second, with the pipe rupture cause 
being ranked highest due to its higher probability of occurrence. 
In order to improve the accuracy of the results the dynamics of the system need to be taken into 
account. The diagnostic process follows the same steps as illustrated for the steady state case, 
although step 2 is modified slightly. In this step comparison of actual and expected behaviour 
occurs via observation of patterns from the sensors over time rather than specific values. It is 
only the shape of the sensor reading patterns that need to be identified. Fluctuations or noise is 
permitted within a certain boundary in order to account for small discrepancies in the results. 
Considering the whole flight phase for certain operating modes has shown that the number and 
complexity of patterns is extremely large to deal with effectively. In order to overcome this, 
these modes have been split into 'sub-modes' that depend upon the level in the collector tank. 
For instance the ACTIVE operating mode has been split into six sub-modes, each indicating 
expected behaviour of the system for the given level in the collector tank. Table 5-35 shows 
typical patterns for the three tanks with accompanying water levels for one phase of the active 
mode operation (RL refers to required level of water and Tl the level where additional fluid is 
required from the collector tank). Initially patterns are compared for the individual tank units, 
along with the water level. The tank or tanks identified as inconsistent with the expected 
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readings are then examined in more detail. Here, patterns for the sensors located in the deviating 
tank sections are compared. Step 3 then continues with the combination of relevant fault trees for 
the differing patterns. 
MAIN MAIN WING WING COLLECTOR COLLECTOR 
LEVEL LEVEL LEVEL 
FTOllO LTOIlO FT0210 LT0210 FT0310 LT0310 
ACTIVE 1 L ~C L "'C 1= ~t= T1-
Table 5-35. Tank Level DynamIc Sensor Patterns 
To illustrate by extending the steady state faulty scenario of No Flow at FTOllO, the outflow 
from the main tank, with the added knowledge of evidence of a constant level in the tank 
removes invalid fault possibilities. Deviations would be evident in the patterns from the main 
tank. From the previous investigation potential failure causes included possible ruptures. 
However, the information from the level sensor contradicts this. Combining the fault trees for the 
deviated sensor readings within the main tank together with those working successfully yield 37 
potential failures. 
5.6.2.2 Digraph Approach 
The digraph based diagnostic process involves back-tracing through the system digraph from a 
specific node which represents the location of the given deviation, as described in Section 4.2. 
The retrieved system behaviour for the fuel rig system deviates from the known operating mode 
conditions through the registering of 'no flow' at the flow transmitter FT011O. The diagnostic 
results obtained from the digraph are thus explained. A simplified version of the main tank 
digraph referenced is illustrated in Figure 5-27. 
• Given the flow deviation at FT0110, back-tracing takes into consideration failure 
modes resulting in a large negative disturbance. A large negative disturbance correlates 
with the situation of 'no flow' e.g. M 117( -10). 
• From the non-deviating transmitter readings, the following segments of the main tank 
digraph can be flagged: upper and lower branches incorporating the pressure 
transmitters PTOllO and PT0120, as well as the sections related to the level transmitter 
LT0110 and flow transmitter FTOl 00. 
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• From the component failure mode nodes directly related to node M117, two failure 
modes are highlighted as leading to a large negative disturbance in mass flow at 
location 117. These are pipe 117 blocked or ruptured (P117B or PI17R). Further back-
tracing from M117( -10) leads to M116( -10) AND MI 08(-10). 
• Back-tracing past the 'AND' gate on the upper branch reveals failures leading to 
Ml 08(-10). There are three failure modes which could lead to a large negative 
disturbance at node MI08; pipe 108 blocked or ruptured (PI08B/R) and the back 
pressure valve BP0110 blocked (BP 11 OB). Further failure modes are determined 
through following the fault propagation to nodes Ml 07(-10) and Ml 06(-10). Back-
tracing ceases at node MI06 due to reaching the flagged section associated with 
PTOI10. 
• Back-tracing past the 'AND' gate on the lower branch reveals failures leading to 
M116(-IO). There are three failure modes which could lead to a large negative 
disturbance at node M116; pipe 116 blocked or ruptured (PI16B/R) and the back 
pressure valve BP0120 blocked (BPI20B). Further failure modes are determined 
through following the fault propagation to nodes M 115(-10) and M 114( -10). In a 
similar manner to the procedure described in the previous bullet point, back-tracing 
ceases at node M 114 due to reaching the flagged section associated with PTO 120. 
'-~\,. 
MII4 -MII) -UI16· 
Figure 5-27. Simplified Main Tank Digraph 
The diagnostic results achieved through the process of back-tracing from the registered deviating 
node in the main tank digraph are illustrated in Table 5-36. For the given scenario it is possible 
that either a single fault or multiple fault may have led to the registered deviation; the diagnostic 
results confirm this. In total there are 83 failure mode options; 2 single order and 81 second 
order. Final human intervention, with the ability to call on engineering knowledge and 
experience will target the most probable failure modes. The list of failure modes can be further 
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reduced by changing the operating mode of the system and comparing the causes for any 
registered sensor deviations noted in the two phases. In the case of multiple deviating sensors, 
the diagnostic results for each sensor are ANDed together to determine the possible failure 
cause(s). 
Before 'AND' gate I P117B/R 
OR 
Upper Branch 
AND 
Lower Branch 
PI08BIR, BPIlOB, P107BIR, IVPIlOC, 
IVPIlOB, PI06BIR 
P116BIR, BPI20B, P115BIR, IVPI20C, 
IVPI20B, P114BIR 
Table 5-36. Faulty Scenario Diagnostic Results. 
Taking into consideration dynamic system effects enables a more thorough system analysis. The 
suggested strategy is to analyse system behaviour at frequent intervals in order to perform 
diagnostics and therefore identify if the system has shifted from its normal operating mode. This 
involves monitoring the fuel rig system from data retrieved at a set sampling rate and 
subsequently determining if the system is in an abnormal scenario. There are now a number of 
different expected readings in the active mode determined by the level of water in the tank, 
which ultimately affects from which tank fuel may be distributed. The dynamic effects of faults 
are investigated through examining the tank levels, in particular the rate of change in levels. 
The same dynamic example used for the fault tree approach in Section 5.6.2.1 is considered; it is 
assumed that the deviating transmitter readings remain the same between sampling intervals in 
addition to a recorded static tank level. The back-tracing procedure is identical to that previously 
described. The rate of change in height of the main tank level is used to distinguish between and 
hone-in on failures that may be the cause for the given deviation. The zero rate of change in tank 
level indicates the occurrence of faults incorporating blockages or closures. Conversely, a 
negative rate of change along with 'no flow' at FTOll 0 would suggest rupture faults. Taking the 
rate of level change into consideration generates 37 failure combinations; one first order and 36 
second order. 
Taking into account dynamic effects for the same faulty scenario allows for a reduction in the list 
of possible failure combinations. When comparing the diagnostic results from Table 5-36 with 
the dynamic results it is noted that the number of fault causes listed is more than halved. The use 
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of the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance can also be used, in a similar manner to the fault 
tree approach, to hone-in further on the most probable fault cause from the list of possible 
options produced. 
5.6.3 Review 
The digraph and the fault tree approaches are noted as displaying a complementary perspective. 
Digraphs display the failure propagation route through a system whereas fault trees focus on a 
certain combination of events which can lead to the top event (noted deviation). Both methods 
require diagnostic models (either a fault tree or a digraph) to be constructed prior to any analysis. 
In addition, the similarities extend to requiring the difference to be calculated between actual 
system behaviour and that which is expected. With the large number of sensors throughout the 
whole system there is the potential for thousands of deviations from the expected behaviour. It 
has not been possible to test both techniques on all possible system state alternatives, however 
consideration of single, two failures and a collection of more than two failures has yielded 
encouraging results. 
Both methods have produced realistic results for steady state behaviour. They yield no difference 
in predictive potential for the fuel rig application system, however, the digraph method conducts 
consistency checking within the approach. The research for dynamic behaviour has illustrated a 
modular technique can be used during the application of the fault tree approach which means that 
the problem is solved in manageable step sizes. In the digraph method, the rate of change of a 
specific parameter is utilised to extend the original steady state procedure. Both methods are 
straightforward to apply once the models are created. The techniques have tackled the 
characteristics of multiple faults, transient and dynamic behaviour and considered consistency 
checks for the validation of results. The importance of sensor location to aid diagnosis is an area 
in which it is considered both methods would benefit from. 
5.7 Control Loop Incorporation 
In previous research, documented in Chapter Four, it is stated that through using digraphs there 
is the capacity to model systems and their associated control loops. Results attained from 
conducting fault diagnostics on the simple water tank system, using the digraph approach, 
proved favourable for a system with integrated control loops. The main tank from the fuel rig 
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system is adapted to incorporate two control loop structures. The noted adaptations along with 
the revised fault diagnostic results are discussed. 
5.7.1 Revised System Description 
A revised schematic of the main tank section of the fuel rig system is illustrated in Figure 5-28. 
The tank level is maintained between two pre-determined points, monitored by the level switches 
HLS (high level switch) and LLS (low level switch). The signals from the level switches are 
transmitted to an associated controller unit; CL for LLS and CH for HLS. The controller units 
determine the positioning of the powered isolation valves, IVPOllO and IVP0120. The same 
component notation described in Section 5.2 is maintained. The component codes utilised in 
Figure 5-28 are identical to those defined in Table 5-1. 
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Figure 5-28. Main Tank Ilhistration (Control Loop Integration) 
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The main adaptations to the main tank section, previously described in Section 5.2, involve: 
(i) Removal of the complicated pressure transmitter section from the fuel rig illustration of 
Figure 5-2. For demonstration purposes it is assumed that the pressure transmitter 
element in Figure 5-28 incorporates all associated constituents required in order to 
obtain a reading from the given location. 
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(ii) The addition of two further flow transmitters in the pressure relief valve routes. These 
transmitters are deemed necessary due to changes made to the operating mode 
conditions (Section 5.7.1.2). 
(iii) Two control loops are incorporated into the main tank section. Both of the loops are 
classified as negative feedforward. In this manner, a sensed upstream variable is used to 
manipulate a downstream variable. In the case of the main tank section, the tank level 
dictates when the powered isolation valves IVPOII0 and IVP0120 are to be opened and 
closed. Each control loop has an associated level switch, controller unit and controller 
device. A noted level at the high level switch (HLS) results in the opening of the valves 
IVPOII0 and IVP0120 by the controller CH. Conversely, once the tank level reaches 
the low level switch (LLS) the previously stated valves are closed by the controller unit 
CL. 
There are 29 types of component failure modes which are considered to affect the functionality 
of the revised main tank section. Table 5-37 illustrates additional failure modes which have not 
been taken into account in previous analysis. 
Code Component Failure Code Component Failure 
HLSH High level switch stuck lifted (high) HLSL High level switch stuck closed (low) 
LLSL Low level switch stuck closed (low) LLSH Low level switch stuck lifted (high) 
CHH HLS controller failed high CHL HLS controller failed low 
CLH LLS controller failed high CLL LLS controller failed low 
Table 5-37. Additional Fuel Rig Component Failure Modes (Main Tank Control Loop Integration) 
5.7.1.1 Sensor Locations 
The main tank section status IS obtained from retrieved transmitter data. Three types of 
transmitters are employed, providing level, flow and pressure readings. In total, there are four 
flow, one level and two pressure transmitters. There are also two level switches, one detecting a 
high level and the other a low level. The transmitters, their associated codes and locations are 
noted in Table 5-38. 
The readings obtained from the transmitters are classified into pre-detennined groups: 
• Level transmitter: High, within acceptable region, low and empty . 
• Pressure transmitter: Pressure (P), no pressure (NP) or partial pressure (PP) . 
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• 
• 
• 
Flow transmitter: Flow (F), no flow (NF) or partial flow (PF). 
High level switch: High tank leveL 
Low level switch: Low tank leveL 
Transmitter / Variable Code Location Switch 
Transmitter Level LTOllO Tank 
FTOlOO Drain valve route 
FTOllO After joining offeed lines one 
Transmitter Flow & two 
FT0120 Pressure relief valve route 1 
FT0130 Pressure relief valve route 2 
PTOII0 Feed line one 
Transmitter Pressure 
PT0120 Feed line two 
HLS Tank 
Switch Level 
LLS Tank 
Table 5-38. Mam Tank TransmItter and SWItch LocatIons (Control Loop IntegratIOn) 
5.7.1.2 ACTIVE Operating Mode 
A single mode of operation is investigated to examine the validity of conducting fault 
diagnostics on the revised main tank section using the digraph approach. The ACTIVE operating 
mode from Section 5.2.5 is redefined to encompass the feedforward control loops. The pumps 
are permanently switched on; it is the opening and closing of the powered isolation valves 
IVPO 110 and IVPO 120 that determines the passage of flow through the feed lines. There are two 
ACTIVE mode phases that incorporate the level switches. Once the HLS is activated flow is 
registered in the feed lines. As the level decreases to the LLS flow is re-routed through the 
pressure relief valves. The transmitter readings associated with the two ACTIVE mode phases 
are illustrated in Table 5-39. 
Level 
HLS 
LLS 
FTOIOO 
NF 
NF 
FTOllO 
F 
NF 
FT0120 
NF 
F 
FT0130 
NF 
F 
PTOllO 
P 
P 
PT0120 
P 
P 
Table 5-39. ACTIVE Mode Transmitter Readings (Control Loop Integration) 
5.7.2 Main Tank Digraph 
The revised main tank digraph follows a similar format to that described in Section 5.3.3. The 
revised digraph, illustrated in Figure 5-29, is constructed from 176 nodes; of which 37 are 
process variable nodes and 139 are component failure mode nodes. The process flow structure 
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exhibited by the two branches incorporating nodes M102 -7 M107 and MlO8 -7 Ml13 
represents the fuel transfer through pump trays 0110 and 0120 respectively. NodesMlO7 and 
Ml13 are joined via an AND gate (represented by a vertical line), thus illustrating the joining of 
feed lines one and two before the flow transmitter FTOllO. The pressure relief valve routes 
extend from mass flow nodes MlO3 and M109, located after the peristaltic pumps (nodes 
PP110IPP120), and loop back into the tank level node, LlOl. 
Figure 5-29. Revised Main Tank Digraph 
The process variable nodes S132, P130 and P131 form the feedforward control loop associated 
with the HLS. The precursors'S' and 'P' correspond to the signal sent by the level switch to the 
controller and the pressure applied by the controller on the valve position respectively. The 
action provided by the control loop alters the mass flow after the powered isolation valves 
lYPO 110 and lYPO 120 at locations 106 and 112. The powered isolation valves are termed air-to-
open valves and therefore an increase in the pressure applied by the controller unit CH results in 
increased mass flow at locations 106 and 112. Subsequently, the normal edges joining the 
controller unit to the powered isolation valves (P130 -7 M106 and P131 -7 Ml12) are signed 
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'+ 1'. Since the controller provides the corrective action from the signal it receives, the normal 
gain between the HLS and the controller unit (S 132 ~ P l30 and S l32 ~ P 131) is signed' -1'. 
An increasing tank level results in an increase in the signal from the HLS, this is represented by 
the '+1' signing of the edge connecting node LIOI to Sl32. 
The LLS feedforward control loop (nodes SI42, PI40 and PI4I) contains similar relationships to 
the ones described for the HLS. The normal gain between the controller unit CL and the powered 
isolation valves is signed '-1' since a decrease in the pressure applied, results in decreasing mass 
flow at locations 106 and 112. In a similar manner to CH, CL provides a corrective action from 
the received signal and therefore the normal edges connecting S142 to P140 and PI41 are signed 
'-1'. The relationship between the LLS and the tank level (L101 ~ S142) is also signed '-1' 
since the signal from the LLS reduces with a decreasing tank level. Conditional edges are 
employed in the digraph representation of the feedforward loops. Should the powered isolation 
valves fail reversed then it is assumed that the relationship between the controller units and 
valves is opposite to that under normal conditions. For example, under normal conditions the 
relationship between node Pl30 and MI06 is signed '+1'. However, IVPOllO failing reversed 
results in a relationship of '-1'. The relationship between the pressure and mass flow nodes is 
nullified in cases where the powered isolation valves are deemed stuck. Should the controller 
, 
units fail reversed then the relationship between the signal from the level switches and the 
controller units is also reversed, as illustrated by the '+1' signing of the conditional edges 
connecting S132 to Pl30 / P131 and S142 to P140 / PI41. 
There are two failure modes associated with the level switches; failing high or failing low. The 
given disturbance' caused by the failure modes is illustrated by the sign attached to the edge 
connecting the failure mode and process variable nodes. For example, the LLS failing high has a 
large positive disturbance on the signal node S 142. Similarly, there are two failure modes 
connected to each controller unit. 
5.7.3 System Fault Diagnostics 
The fault diagnostics procedure of back-tracing through the digraph from a known deviating 
node is continued in a similar format to the procedure described in Section 4.1. The only 
variation concerns the feedforward control loops which have been incorporated into the digraph 
and their subsequent related back-tracing. A negative feedforward loop is identifiable by two 
main features: 
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(i) Two or more paths extend from one node to another. 
(ii) The sign of the products of the normal gains in the two paths is different. 
The illustration in Figure 5-30 is a digraph representation of a negative feedforward loop 
(NFFL). Disturbances propagate along the causative branch and are controlled or cancelled by 
the corrective branch. The causative branch contains a net positive gain whilst the corrective 
branch has a net negative gain. In the given example, the causative branch is represented by 
nodes Ml ~ M2 ~ M3 and the corrective branch by nodes Ml ~ SlO ~ Pll ~ M3. Back-
tracing through the NFFL is split into two sections concerning: 
(i) Inputs which do not activate the NFFL. 
(ii) Failing of the NFFL corrective branches along with the input value which activates the 
NFFL. 
For cases whereby the switches and controller units are deemed reliable, the back-tracing 
procedure does not consider the corrective branches of the NFFLs. A simple static case is 
discussed. The scenario is not considered dynamically since it is simply utilised to determine the 
potential for scaling up the diagnostic method for application to an aircraft fuel system with 
integrated control loops. 
Figure 5-30. Example Digraph Representation of a Negative Feedforward Loop 
Scenario 
The controller units and level switches are deemed unreliable. The retrieved transmitter data is 
illustrated in Table 5-40. From the retrieved data it is noted that the tank level is low. The 
powered isolation valves IVPO 110 and IVPO 120 are assumed to be incorrectly open, thus 
allowing flow though FTOIlO. 
State 
Expected 
Retrieved 
Level 
LLS 
LLS 
FTOIOO 
NF 
NF 
FTOllO 
NF 
F 
FT0120 
F 
NF 
FT0130 
F 
NF 
PTOllO 
p 
p 
Table 5-40. Transmitter Readings (Integrated Control Loop Scenario) 
PT0120 
p 
p 
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From the low level reading it is detennined that the failure lies within the LLS NFFL. Five 
sections of the digraph corresponding to the transmitters FT0100, FT0120, FT0130, PT0110 and 
PT0120 are flagged. It is assumed that FT0120 and FT0130 indicate the deviation no flow due to 
the failure leading to flow at FTO 11 0 and therefore their deviations are masked. Back-tracing 
commences from node PFT110(+10) since the flow deviation is noted at FT0110. The results 
attained through back-tracing from PFT110 through the NFFL are contained within three groups. 
The back-tracing routes for detennining the results are highlighted: 
(i) Error with controlled device: IVPII00.IVP1200 
Back-tracing route: PFT110(+10) -7 M114(+10) -7 M107(+10) AND M113(+10) -7 
M106(+1O) AND M112(+1O) -7 IVPllOO AND IVP1200. 
(ii) Error in NFFL 
Line One 
CLFH 
LLSFH 
IVPOII0Rev.CLFL 
IVPOI10Rev.LLSFL 
LLSFL.CLRev 
AND Line Two 
CLFH 
LLSFH 
IVP0120Rev.CLFL 
IVPO 120Rev.LLSFL 
LLSFL.CLRev 
Back-tracing route: PFT110(+10) -7 ...... -7 M106(+10) AND MI12(+10). 
Back-tracing from node MI06 through the LLS NFFL, associated with the main tank 
feed line one, takes into account the nodes MI06, P140 and S142. Similarly, nodes 
M112, P141 and S142 are taken into consideration for the lower digraph branch 
incorporating the main tank feed line two. The fault propagation followed from node 
M106 is expanded further for explanatory purposes: 
M1 06(+1 0) -7 PI40(-1O) -7 CLFH. 
M106(+10) -7 P140(-1O) -7 S142(+10) -7 LLSFH. 
M1 06(+ 1 0) [consider IVPOllO failing reversed] -7 PI40(+ 10) -7 IVP011 ORev.CLFL. 
M106(+10) [consider IVPOll0 failing reversed] -7 P140(+10) -7 SI42(-10) -7 
IVPOllORev.LLSFL. 
M106(+10) -7 P140(-10) [consider CL failing reversed] -7 S142(-10) -7 
CLRev.LLSFL. 
(iii) Loop inactive through IVPO 110 and IVPO 120 being stuck. 
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5.7.4 Method Review 
The digraph, generated for the revised mam tank section incorporating a control loop 
configuration, successfully models the process flow structure of the system under investigation. 
Preliminary research is encouraging from the determined back-tracing results when considering 
both reliable and unreliable level switches and control units. The diagnostic results retrieved for 
the given example scenario are considered complete and do not display any inconsistencies. The 
method ultimately illustrates the potential for application to an actual aircraft fuel system 
comprising an integrated control loop structure, thus responding to the issues surrounding 
scalability. The control loop diagnostics have not been incorporated into the diagnostic 
programme described in Section 5.5. Considerations associated with its integration are however 
addressed in Chapter Six. 
5.8 Summary 
• An application system of increased complexity over the water tank is considered for 
analysis ofthe digraph approach to fault diagnostics. 
• The research looks in detail at the application of the digraph diagnostic method to an 
industrially based test stand of an aircraft fuel system, whereby experimental results are 
utilised. 
• Four modes of operation are taken into account, thus adding to the increase m 
complexity and scalability of the system under investigation. 
• With the inclusion of partial failure modes into the fuel rig analysis, an additional two 
discrete values (+1-5) are developed and successfully used to model the moderate 
disturbance caused by such failures. 
• Transient effects are considered as a means of monitoring the system dynamically, in 
particular the rate of change in tank levels. 
• The diagnostic procedure is automated through running scripted code in Matlab. The 
program is able to manage input data associated with varying system operating modes. 
• Manually injecting faults into the fuel rig system has allowed for the testing of various 
scenarios using the fault diagnostic strategy. Valid failure mode results are obtained 
when considering single or multiple faults in either individual tank sections of the fuel 
rig or across the whole system. Research is to be conducted in the area of 'honing-in' 
on the actual fault from the retrieved list however. 
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• With the potential for modelling integrated control loop structures using digraphs the 
next stage in the research is to assess the applicability of the method using an actual 
aircraft fuel system. 
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Chapter Six 
Boein·g 777-200 Fuel System 
Chapter Six addresses the issues surrounding scalability with regards to the application of the 
fault diagnostic strategy. Following the natural progression from the water tank in Chapter Four 
to the fuel rig in Chapter Five, an aircraft fuel system is considered. Three modes of operation 
are investigated for the Boeing 777-200 fuel system. The engine feed and fuel jettison modes 
incorporate pilot operated control loops whilst the pressure refuel mode encompasses a fully 
integrated control loop structure. A review of both the application and validity of the results 
achieved from following the diagnostic strategy are discussed at the end of Chapter Six. 
6.1 System Description 
The Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group introduced the Boeing 777 family of aircraft in 1989. 
The 777-200 was the first version to enter into revenue service in the middle of 1995. This 
variant has a range of up to 10900km and seats a maximum 440 passengers. The 777-200 fuel 
system is investigated for application of the digraph based diagnostic method previously 
described in Chapter Four. The five sub-systems of primary importance are: 
(i) Fuel Storage 
(ii) Fuel Indicating 
(iii) Engine Feed 
(iv) Pressure Refuel 
(v) Fuel Jettison 
Engine feed, pressure refuel and fuel jettison are considered as individual operating modes and 
thus, are discussed in more detail in Sections 6.2 - 6.4. 
There are three storage tanks located in the aircraft wings. These are labelled left main, centre 
and right main. Situated next to each main tank is a surge tank which is used to collect fuel 
overflow in the event of either a failure or steep manoeuvre. The total fuel tank capacity is 
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117340 litres; of which the main and centre tanks hold 70400 and 46940 litres respectively. The 
Boeing 777-200 tank layout is illustrated in Figure 6-1. 
Left main tank Right main tank 
Left surge tank Right surge tank 
Figure 6-1. Boeing 777-200 Tank Layout 
The fuel tanks are contained in sealed sections of the wing structure. An illustrative description 
of an aircraft wing structure is provided in Figure 6-2. The left main tank is found in the left 
wing and similarly the right main tank in the right wing. The upper and lower wing skin, front 
and rear spar and wing ribs fonn the tank housings. The wing ribs sub-divide the tanks into bays 
thus reducing the amount of fuel movement during flight manoeuvres. The centre fuel tank is 
located between rib 8 of the left and right wings. The main tanks are portioned between ribs 8 
and 32 in each wing. The forward sections of the main tanks between rib 8 and rib 11 are known 
as dry bays. No fuel is kept in the dry bays so as to prevent fuel spillage onto the engines in the 
event of an engine burst. The surge tanks are located between ribs 32 and 34 in each wing. 
Dry bay -------., 
Left main -------... 
tank 
" 
) 
I 
~-----Rib8 
r------Front spar 
...----Rib 1 
.... -O.;t---t-----Centre tank 
~~-----------------ReMspM 
Figure 6-2. Wing Structure Illustration 
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The wing ribs have lower and upper openings between the stringers (longitudinal structural 
members) so as to allow the flow of fuel and air. The fuel vent system maintains a tank fuel 
pressure similar to that of the outside atmosphere since a large pressure differential may cause 
structural damage to the aircraft wings. Drains allow fuel in the vent system to return to the fuel 
tanks and flame arrestors ensure that a flame outside of the aircraft does not enter the fuel tanks 
through the vent system. 
The fuel indicating section comprises four subsystems: 
(i) Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) 
The FQIS measures the fuel quantity in the aircraft tanks. Any calculations and the 
monitoring of signals are performed by the fuel quantity processing unit (FQPU). This 
information is displayed using the primary display system (PDS) and the integrated 
refuel panel (lRP). The FQIS contains four types of sensors; tank units, densitometers, 
water detectors and a fuel temperature sensor. The tank units measure the fuel height. 
There are 52 tank units split between the three tanks; 20 in each main tank and six in 
each side of the centre tank. The tank units are constructed from an ultrasonic· 
transmitter/receiver and a stillwell. The FQPU sends a signal to the ultrasonic receiver 
which causes a pulse to propagate through the still well to the fuel surface and back to 
the receiver. The FQPU measures the time taken for the pulse to travel and 
subsequently calculates the fuel height. 
Densitometers are present in each tank. A vibrating cylinder transducer is utilised to 
measure the fuel density; the frequency of the vibrations is proportional to the density. 
A water detector is located at the lowest point in each fuel tank. The water detectors are 
constructed in a similar manner to the tank units and also use ultrasonic technology. 
Should water be detected in the tank, a message is noted in the fuel quantity 
maintenance pages. A single temperature sensor is located in the left main tank. It is a 
form of resistance sensor which fits inside a sleeve between rib 9 and rib 10 of the left 
wmg. 
The engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS) notes the total fuel quantity 
and fuel temperature in the lower right corner of the display. The fuel synoptic display 
indicates the individual tank quantities and total fuel quantity along with both the fuel 
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temperature and the minimum acceptable fuel temperature. An example of a fuel 
synoptic display is illustrated in Figure 6-3. 
(ii) Fuel Measuring Sticks 
Manual measurement of th~ fuel quantity in each tank is enabled when the aircraft is on 
the ground. The value obtained from using the fuel measuring sticks acts as a form of 
validation for maintenance personnel. 
(iii) Fuel Temperature Indicating System 
The temperature indicating system measures the temperature In the left wing and 
displays the information through the PDS. 
(iv) Fuel Pressure Indicating System 
The pressure indicating system notes the presence of low pressure at the fuel pump 
outlets. A pressure light on both the boost pump and override/jettison control switches 
indicates the presence or absence of low pressure. This is further described in the 
Engine Fuel Feed section (Section 6.2). 
TOTAL 708 
FUEL . 
LJlMIN KGS X 1000 R lvl.<l.IN 
FWD FVro 
28.5 28.5 
AFT CROSSFEED AFT 
L R 
13.8 
CENTER 
MIN FUEL TElvlP -37C 
FUEL TEMP +15C 
Figure 6-3. Fuel Synoptic Display 
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A generalised functional drawing of the Boeing 777-200 fuel system is illustrated in Figure 6-4_ 
The components of relevance are described in Sections 6.2 - 6.4. 
Outlotfloat Jottison 
isolation 
Jottison Crossfeed valves Crossfeed manifold Refuelljottison Defue! valve 
isolation manifold drain 
check valve (2) valve (2) 
M de MU fuel Jettison/override CT Water Fuel scavenge Inlet float Aft boost MT Water 
isolation pump shutoff pumps (2) scavenge jot pump (2) operated shutoff pump (2) scavenge pump (2) 
check valve valve jet pump (2) valve (2) jet pump (2) 
Figure 6-4. Functional Boeing 777-200 Fuel System Illustration 
6.2 Engine Feed 
The engine fuel feed system controls and supplies fuel to the engines. It uses inputs from the fuel 
panel, fuel control switches, engine fire switches and the electrical load management system 
(ELMS). The main components utilised to supply fuel to the engines are fuel pumps, fuel pump 
pressure switches, cross-feed valves and spar valves. The engine fuel feed system is comprised 
from the following components: 
• Fuel Suction Bypass Valves 
There is one in each main tank, attached to the engine feed manifold. Bypass valves are 
utilised during suction feeding, described later in this section. 
• Outlet Float-Operated Shut-off Valves 
There is one in each main tank, connecting the discharge line of the fuel scavenge 
pump to the main tank. (Function described under scavenge jet pumps). 
• Cross feed V al ves 
Both valves are on the left side of the centre tank. The forward and aft cross feed valves 
isolate the left and right sides of the engine feed manifold. Fuel is transferred from 
165 
Chapter Six: Boeing 777-200 Fuel System 
opposite tanks through the cross-feed valves in order to correct any imbalance which 
may exist. The boost pumps in the tank to which fuel is being transferred must be 
switched off during the procedure. 
• Engine Feed Manifold 
The manifold connects the output of the fuel pumps to the main fuel supply line. 
• Override/J ettison Pumps 
There are two pumps, one in each section of the centre tank supplying fuel from the 
centre tank to the engine feed manifold. The pumps also transfer fuel to the 
refuel/jettison manifold during fuel jettison. Pressure lights on the override/jettison 
control switches indicate the presence of low pressure. The pressure light is only 
activated when the override/jettison pumps are commanded ON. 
• Scavenge Jet Pumps 
There are four water scavenge and two centre tank fuel scavenge jet pumps. A water 
scavenge pump is located on the rear spar of each main tank. Both centre tank sections 
incorporate a water and fuel scavenge pump. The water jet pumps remove fluid to the 
jettison pump inlets so preventing the build up of water at the bottom of the tanks. The 
fuel scavenge pumps transfer fuel from the lowest points in the centre tank to the main 
tanks, thus increasing the amount of usable fuel. The jet pumps operate automatically 
whilst the boost pumps are on. Once the main tanks are full, the outlet float operated 
shut-off valves close so preventing fuel through the jet pump discharge lines to the 
main tanks. The inlet float operated shut-off valves stop motive flow to the jet pumps 
until the centre tank is almost empty, so preventing fuel from flowing into the main 
tanks too early. 
• Inlet Float-Operated Shut-off Valves 
• 
There is a float operated valve in each side of the centre tank connecting the motive 
flow lines of the forward and aft boost pumps to the fuel scavenge jet pump. (Function 
described under scavenge jet pumps). 
Boost Pumps 
There is a forward and aft boost pump located on the rear spar in both main tanks. The 
boost pumps supply main tank fuel to the engine feed manifold. Pressure lights on the 
boost pump control switches indicate the presence oflow pressure. 
• Spar Valves 
There is one present in each main tank. Spar valves permit the flow of fuel from the 
main tanks to the engine feed manifold. The spar valves are controlled by a fuel control 
166 
Chapter Six: Boeing 777-200 Fuel System 
switch. The valves open when the switch is in the RUN position and close when in the 
CUTOFF position. The overhead panel ARINC (Aeronautical Radio Inc) system 
(OP AS) monitors both the spar valve and spar valve control relay positions. Should the 
positions vary a signal is sent to the airplane information management system (AIMS), 
resulting in a fault being displayed on the EICAS. 
Under normal conditions, fuel is first supplied from the centre tank during engine fuel feed 
operations. Once the centre tank is empty, fuel is then transferred from the main t.anks. There are 
four forms of engine feed: 
(i) Centre Tank Engine Feed 
When the override/jettison pumps are on and there is fuel in the centre tank, fuel is 
transferred from the centre tank to the engine feed manifold. 
(ii) Main Tank Engine Feed 
Once the centre tank is empty and the boost pumps are on, fuel is transferred from the 
main tanks to the engine feed manifold. 
(iii) Cross Feed 
The cross-feed valves isolate the left and right sides of the engine feed manifold. 
Opening a cross-feed valve allows an engine to receive fuel from the fuel pumps on the 
opposite side. 
(iv) Suction Feed 
Suction, or gravity, feed occurs when all of the pumps on one side are off and the cross-
feed valves are closed. During suction feeding, the engine receives fuel through the 
suction bypass valve. Suction feeding can only take place through the main tanks. 
The fuel panel (PS overhead panel) in the cockpit contains alternate-action switches that control 
the fuel pumps and the cross-feed valves. A schematic of the panel is shown in Figure 6-S. There 
are two indication lights for each fuel pump; 'ON' for when the switch is on and a pressure light, 
'PRESS', for noting the presence of low pressure at the pump outlets. Pressure switches, located 
on the fuel pumps, close during the presence of Iow pressure at the pump outlets. A signal is sent 
from the switch to the ELMS and OP AS resulting in the low pressure light turning on. The cross-
feed valves are controlled through an associated switch on the PS panel. There are also two cross 
feed valve indication lights; a 'bar' light for when the cross-feed valve switch is on and a valve 
light, 'VALVE', for if the switch and valve positions disagree. Should both the valve position 
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and switch position disagree for more than 10 seconds a signal is sent from the ELMS to the 
AIMS and a warning is displayed on the EICAS. 
fUEL 
LPUMPS I RPUMPS 
CROSSFEED 
FWD fWD fWD 
~ - ~ - ~ f- ~ PRESS PRESS I-- -
~ ~ - AfT -PRESS ~ PRESS "-- -AfT AfT 
crnrER 
L PUMPS R 
~ ~ - I-PRESS PRESS 
Figure 6-5. PS Fuel Panel (Engine Feed) 
6.2.1 Sensor Locations 
A mixture of sensors and switches are utilised to provide system information regarding flow, 
pressure and tank levels. Data related to component control switches and their respective 
component positions is also obtainable and thus compared to highlight inconsistencies. 
(i) Tank Levels 
The tank levels in the left and right centre and main tanks are obtained via the fuel 
quantity and indicating system. Whilst conducting the fuel system analysis, the tank 
levels are described using the numbers 0 - 10 to help facilitate the diagnostics 
procedure; where zero indicates empty and ten, full. Some key levels utilised during the 
diagnostics procedure in later sections are noted in Figure 6-6 . 
IJJl Full .J..O. Full 
Centre Tank Main Tank 
---.!L Outlet Float Valve Level 
p- Inlet Float Valve Level -.L Bypass Valve Le,"el 
0 Empty 0 Emptv 
Figure 6-6. Centre and Main Tank Levels 
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(ii) Engine Inlet Flow 
Flow meters are located at both engine inlets. The flow readings are classified into 
three groups; flow (F), no flow (NF) and reduced flow (RF). 
(iii) Presence of Low Pressure at Fuel Pump Outlet 
Low pressure at the fuel pump outlets is highlighted on the fuel panel (PS panel). There 
is a low pressure light for the left and right aft boost, forward boost and 
jettison/override pumps. 
(iv) Switch Positions 
The fuel pumps and valves are controlled via their respective switches by the pilot. 
(v) Valve Positions 
Should an actual valve position and the position indicated by its respective valve switch 
disagree a warning is issued. This occurs via the EICAS for the spar valves and via the 
fuel panel for the cross-feed valves. For example, ifthe switch for cross-feed valve one 
is ON, but the actual valve position is noted as being closed, then the 'VALVE' light on 
the PS fuel panel indicates this discrepancy. 
6.2.2 Operating Mode Readings 
The main purpose of the engine feed operational phase is to supply fuel to the engines from the 
main and centre tanks. The pilot operates the engine feed system from the fuel panel on the PS 
overhead panel in the cockpit. 
The engine feed operating mode is subdivided into five phases. These five phases represent the 
manner in which engine feed is conducted: 
• Phase One: Fuel is pumped from the centre tank (CT) into the engine feed manifold by 
the jettison/override pumps. 
• Phase Two: Once the centre tank is nearly empty fuel is pumped from the main tanks 
(MT) into the engine feed manifold by the main tank boost pumps. 
• Phases Three & Four: Fuel is transferred from one wing section to the other by opening 
a cross-feed valve and shutting the pumps off on the side to which fuel is being 
transferred. 
• Phase Five: For cases where the fuel pumps are switched off and cross-feed valves 
closed, engine feed occurs through suction via the bypass valves in the main tanks. 
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The readings associated with the five phases are noted in Table 6-1, where FW: flow and AGR: 
agree. The variables considered concern sensor readings and fault indicating methods, such as 
low pressure lights, as well as the expected switch positions. It is noted that the switch positions 
are determined by the pilot. 
Engine Feed Phase 
1 (eT feed) 2 (MT feed) 3 (Cross-feed 4 (Cross-feed 5 (MT suction L-R) R-L) feed) 
Variable L R L R L R L R L R 
CTLevel >0 >0 $1&>0 $1&>0 --- -- - - - -
MT Level LSV LSV >0 >0 >0 >0 >0 >0 ~2 ~2 
lettisonlovenide pump switch ON ON OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF 
lettisonlovenide pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Aft boost pump switch OFF OFF ON ON ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF 
Aft boost pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Forward boost pump switch OFF OFF ON ON ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF 
Forward boost pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Engine flow meter FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW 
Spar valve switch (fuel control switch) RUN RUN RUN RUN RUN RUN RUN RUN RUN RUN 
Spar valve & spar relay position AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR 
Cross-feed valve I (CFVI) switch OFF -- OFF - ON - ON -- OFF --
Cross-feed valve I switch position light OFF -- OFF - OFF - OFF - OFF --
Cross-feed valve 2 (CFV2) switch OFF - OFF - ON if CFVIC ON if CFVIC OFF --
Cross-feed valve 2 switch position light OFF - OFF - OFF -- OFF - OFF -
Table 6-1. Engme Feed Operatmg Mode Readings 
All switches have two possible positions, ON and OFF. In the case of the spar valve switches 
this is altered to RUN and CUTOFF. The pump low pressure indication lights are expected to be 
off during the engine feed operating mode phases. The cross-feed valve position lights are on 
only if a disagreement occurs between a cross-feed valve and its respective switch position. The 
tank level readings are noted using the arbitrary values previously described in Section 6.2.1. 
6.2.3 Component Failure Modes 
The component failure modes considered to affect the functionality of the Boeing 777-200 fuel 
system include failures associated with fuel pumps, valves, tanks and both manifolds. The failure 
modes and their respective codes are illustrated in Table 6-2. A specific number is allocated to 
each component failure mode. In a similar manner to the fuel rig analysis these numbers are 
utilised in the diagnostic program. 
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Code Failure Mode Code Failure Mode 
XMB Engine feed manifold blocked CFMB Cross-feed manifold blocked 
XMPB Engine feed manifold partially blocked CFMPB Cross-feed manifold partially blocked 
XMF Engine feed manifold fractured CFMF Cross-feed manifold fractured 
CTXF Centre tank fractured MTXF Main tank fractured 
PXB Pipe blocked PXF Pipe fractured 
PXPB Pipe partially blocked SVXI Spar valve failed in intermediate position 
SVXO Spar valve failed open SVXC Spar valve failed closed 
IFVXO Inlet float operated shut off valve failed OFVXO Outlet float operated shut off valve failed open 
open 
IFVXC Inlet float operated shut off valve failed OFVXC Outlet float operated shut off valve failed closed 
closed 
IFVXI Inlet float operated shut off valve failed in OFVXI Outlet float operated shut off valve failed in intermediate position intermediate position 
CVIFO Cross-feed valve one failed open CV2FO Cross-feed valve two failed open 
CVIFC Cross-feed valve one failed closed CV2FC Cross-feed valve two failed closed 
JCVXC Jettison isolation check valve failed closed JOXR Jettison/Override pump run 
FBXR Forward boost pump run JOXNR Jettison/Override pump no run 
FBXNR Forward boost pump no run ABXR Aft boost pump run 
FSXR Fuel scavenge pump run ABXNR Aft boost pump no run 
FSXNR Fuel scavenge pump no run (Where X is replaced by left or right) 
Table 6-2. Component Failure Modes (Engine Feed) 
6.2.4 Digraph Development 
The procedure followed for developing the digraphs for the Boeing 777-200 fuel system is 
identical to that utilised in Chapters Four and Five. Figure 6-7 illustrates the main components of 
interest when considering the engine feed operational mode. As per the system analysis stage of 
the digraph procedure outlined in Section 3.3.3.1, the system under investigation is defined and a 
speCific number is allocated to the components. In this manner, it is possible to create a 
straightforward location reference approach for process variables and component failure modes. 
ToAPU 
Figure 6-7. Numbered Boeing 777-200 Fuel System Layout for the Engine Feed Operational Phase 
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The next stage in the procedure involves dividing the system into sub-units and thus generating 
unit digraph models. All process variable deviations are taken into consideration. The extent of 
the effect any disturbance may have, with regards to the assigning of discrete values to the edges 
connecting the nodes in the digraph, is also noted. The Boeing 777-200 fuel system is divided 
into three groups: 
(i) Left wing section. 
(ii) Right wing section. 
(iii) Cross-feed section. 
In total the fuel system digraph associated with the engine feed operating mode is constructed 
from 282 nodes; of which eighty-eight are process variable nodes and 194 are component failure 
mode nodes. 
6.2.4.1 Centre Tank and Main Tank (Left Wing) 
The unit digraph for the left wing centre and main tank fuel pump and manifold structure (Figure 
6-8) is developed through a process of 'building-up' from both the centre and main tank level 
nodes, LCTL and LMTL. A detailed illustrative explanation covering the digraph development 
phase is provided in Appendix D. 
The upper branch in Figure 6-8, incorporating mass flow nodes M44 to M50, represents mass 
flow along the left engine feed manifold. The direction of flow in the manifold, and hence the 
direction of the' edges connecting the mass flow nodes, is towards the spar valve which allows 
fuel to pass to the left engine. The left spar valve is denoted by the relationship between nodes 
M49 and M50. If the spar valve is closed then this normally positive relationship is nullified, as 
indicated by the conditional edge signing '0: SPVL Closed'. The conditional edges between 
mass flow nodes M44 to M47 symbolise the situation whereby the cross-feed system has been 
engaged and the right fuel pumps are not running (+ 1: RPNR & CFO). In this scenario, both of 
the engines receive fuel from the left tanks. 
Three· branches extend from the main tank level node. Two of these branches represent the 
information flow structure associated with the forward and aft boost pumps (both branches 
exhibit identical relationships). In the case of the forward boost pump branch, mass flow is 
drawn from the main tank via pipe 59 (M59) and then pumped into the engine feed manifold 
through pipe 56 (M56). With regards to the aft boost pump, fuel is drawn through pipe 58 (M58). 
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The third branch which extends from the main tank level node (LMTL - M40) encompasses the 
suction bypass valve. 
Figure 6-8. Centre & Main Tank Fuel Pump and Manifold Digraph (Left Wing) 
Figure 6-9 illustrates the related signal information flow structure for Figure 6-8. The signal flow 
structure depicts the control relationships that are assumed from the possible pilot inputs. The 
pilot input is represented through the switch nodes since no human operator process variable 
node is utilised. The fault indicating method and switch relationships are described: 
• The fuel control switch (SFCSW) controls mass flow entering the engine via the left 
spar valve. If the pilot sets the switch in the 'run' position then the relationship 
exhibited is positive. Conversely, if the switch is set in the 'cut-off position then a 
negative relationship is exhibited. 
• All fuel pumps are controlled using an associated fuel pump switch as represented by 
the nodes SFBLSW - PFBL (forward boost pump), SABLSW - PABL (aft boost 
pump) and SlPSWL - P1PL (jettison/override pump). In all three cases, the relationship 
between the switch and pump nodes is positive for the switch open condition and 
negative when the switch is closed. 
The fuel pumps encompass a low pressure switch. When the condition low pressure at the pump 
outlet is met, the switch closes and a low pressure signal is sent from the pump to the respective 
low pressure light on the PS fuel panel. This relationship is illustrated by nodes PFBL - SFBLPS 
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- FBLPL for the left forward boost pump. Similar links are noted for both the left aft boost pump 
and jettison/override pump. 
To Ien engitle 
(fuwlI'I!ter) 
Figure 6-9. Centre and Main Tank Signal Digraph (Left Wing) 
6.2.4.2 Centre Tank and Main Tank (Right Wing) 
M4l 
The right wing centre and main tank unit digraphs are illustrated in Figures 6-10 and 6-11. The 
digraphs are developed in a similar manner to those described for the left wing and therefore the 
components exhibit identical relationships. 
TP 
To ",ht 8'11DN 
(flowrnettr) 
Figure 6-10. Centre & Main Tank Fuel Pump and Manifold Digraph (Right Wing) 
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Figure 6-11. Centre & Main Tank Signal Digraph (Right Wing) 
6.2.4.3 Cross-Feed Section 
Torighl~~ 
(fuwmeler) 
The cross-feed section unit digraph is illustrated in Figure 6-12. The edges connecting the mass 
flow nodes indicate that flow is able to travel in two directions. This is dependent on which 
conditions are satisfied. The upper branch incorporating nodes M1 - M41 - M42 - M43 - M44 
symbolises mass flow in the cross-feed manifold using cross feed valve one. The cross-feed 
manifold links both the left and right engine feed manifolds. As a form of redundancy, mass flow 
is able to follow a second path in the cross-feed section should a failure occur in the route which 
incorporates cross-feed valve one. The second path encompasses nodes M41 - MS1 - M52 -
M44, with the relationship between MS1 and MS2 representing cross-feed valve two. A more 
detailed explanation covering the development of Figure 6-12 is provided in Appendix D. 
Figure 6-12. Cross-feed Section Digraph 
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6.2.5 System Fault Diagnostics 
6.2.5.1 Diagnostic Program 
The process of back-tracing within the Boeing 777-200 fuel system digraph model, from a 
deviating node to detennine possible component failure mode combinations, is automated 
through running scripted code in Matlab. This is perfonned in a similar manner to that conducted 
for the fuel rig system in Chapter Five. The diagnostic program is sub-divided into four main 
sections. Namely; input, comparison, fault diagnostics and output. 
During the 'input' stage the individual fuel system transmitter readings, switch positions and 
assumed engine feed operating mode phase are 'read into' the program by way ofthree text files. 
The program then detennines the expected system readings from the noted operating mode 
phase. The data contained in the text files represents: 
(i) Tank levels: [Time CTLL CTLR MTLL MTLR] 
(ii) Switch positions, as detennined by the pilot: [Phase Time JOPL ABPL FBPL 
SparL CFt CF2 JOPR ABPR FBPR SparR] 
(iii) Indication data: [Time JOPL ABPL FBPL FlowL SparL CFt CF2 JOPR 
ABPR FBPR FlowR SparR] 
Where, 
CTLL Left centre tank level 
CTLR Right centre tank level 
MTLL Left main tank level 
MTLR Right main tank level 
JOPL Left jettison/override pump 
JOPR Right jettison/override pump 
ABPL Left aft boost pump 
FBPL Left forward boost pump 
ABPR Right aft boost pump 
FBPR Right forward boost pump 
SparL Left spar valve 
SparR Right spar valve 
CFt Cross-feed valve t 
CF2 Cross-feed valve 2 
FlowL Left engine flow inlet 
FlowR Right engine flow inlet 
Two deviation matrices, [D] and [DI], are fonned during the 'comparison' phase by comparing 
the retrieved data with those readings which are expected under the assumed engine feed 
operating mode phase. If the readings are identical then a corresponding element in the deviation 
matrix is allocated the value '0'. This indicates the presence of non-deviating data and so it is 
assumed no failures are present in the associated specific section of the fuel system. Should a 
reading deviate then the respective element in the matrix is assigned a value which is consistent 
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with the deviation (e_g. +10). [D] considers deviations associated with switch positions as 
determined by the pilot, whilst [DI] contains deviations noted by the indication system, such as 
low pressure at a specific pump outlet. 
On generating the deviation matrices the next phase is the 'flagging' process. Firstly, values are 
allocated to flags representing the cross-feed, left wing and right wing sections. Each section has 
two associated flags related to the deviation matrices. If deviations are outlined in [D] or [DI] for 
a specific section then its corresponding flag is assigned the value '1'. The next stage involves 
allocating values to the flags used to represent the individual transmitter elements noted in the 
deviation matrices. 
The fault diagnostics process involves re-enacting the procedure of back-tracing through using 
matrices which contain the component failure mode results for a registered deviation. The 
number of flags signed ' 1 " representing system deviations for given tank sections and 
transmitters, dictates which back-tracing results are to be ANDed. Diagnostics ofthe fuel syste~ 
during the engine feed operating mode is split into two sections: 
(i) No deviations registered by the flow meter at the engine inlet. 
(ii) Deviations registered by the flow meter at the engine inlet. 
This sectioning is decided upon due to the fact that the main purpose of the engine feed operating 
mode is to provide fuel to the engines. 
The tank level data is used to calculate the rate of change in the fuel system tank levels. These 
calculations are performed after data is retrieved from the second sampling interval. The tank 
level rate of change data is utilised when performing fault diagnostics of the fuel scavenge 
section. Once the operating mode is switched from phase one to phase two the fuel scavenge 
pumps are switched on. As the main tank level decreases, the remaining fuel in the centre tank is 
transferred to the main tank. 
The diagnostic results are displayed -whilst the program runs. Initial display features involve 
noting the status of the fuel system sections with regards to the presence or absence of noted 
deviations. If deviations are noted, the determined fault diagnostic results are displayed on screen 
for each section. 
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6.2.5.2 Diagnostic Considerations 
As an initial means of 'honing-in' on the most probable fault cause for a given set of deviations, 
the following 'logic' statements are applied to the diagnostic strategy: 
• Should a pump switch deviation be present then it is assumed that a pump 'no run' or 
'run' failure has occurred. For scenarios containing a '-10' pump switch deviation and 
noted low pressure by the indication system, the failure leading to the disturbance is 
documented as pump 'no run'. When considering only a pump low pressure deviation a 
list of failures associated with both the pump and associated pump pipe-work are 
recorded. 
• When taking into account the situation 'no flow' at the engine inlet, other component 
data is utilised to determine the possible system failures that may have led to the 
variation in flow. The 'spar valve closed' failure is only considered on its own when 
either the valve switch or valve position notes a deviation of' -10'. Should no deviation 
be noted in the switch and valve positions, all failures determined through back-tracing 
from the location of the flow meter are considered. For cases where both a flow meter 
and pump deviation are noted, it is assumed a single failure associated with the pump is 
the most likely cause. However, multiple failure combinations associated with both of 
the deviations are also recorded. The same logic is employed for registered 'reduced 
flow' at the engine inlet. 
• The fuel scavenge system is considered once the first interval data is retrieved, due to 
the fact that both tank levels and the rate of change in tank levels are utilised to 
determine if any deviations are present. A failure is assumed to have occurred in the 
fuel scavenge section if: 
(i) Centre tank (CT) level :::; 2, CTdhdt = 0, 
(ii) Main tank (MT) level < 6, MTdhdt < o. 
• Actual cross-feed valve faults are taken into account when either a deviation is noted 
with the cross-feed valve switch or cross-feed valve position. 
The back-tracing conducted by the program is dependent on the specific engine feed operating 
mode phase, as determined by the pilot. Consequently, sections of the digraph can be 'turned on 
or off accordingly. 
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• Phase one covers engine fuel feed from the centre tanks via the jettison/override pumps. 
Back-tracing from the engine flow meter transmitters follows the route from node M50 
~ M45 ~ PJPL for the left wing and from node M6 ~ M2 ~ PJPR for the right wing. 
• Phase two is concerned with engine fuel feed from the main tanks via both the aft and 
forward boost pumps. Back-tracing from node M50 in the left wing digraph follows the 
path M50 ~ M47, M48 ~ PFBL AND M47 ~ PABL. A similar path is followed in 
the right wing digraph; M6 ~ M3, M4 ~ PFBR AND M3 ~ PABR. 
• Phases three and four relate to situations involving an engaged cross-feed system. 
Under these circumstances, the cross-feed manifold mass flow nodes are also included 
in the back-tracing procedure from the flow meter on the side to which fuel is being 
transferred. 
• Phase five involves engine fuel feed via the suction bypass valves in the main tanks. 
Back-tracing from the engine flow meters therefore covers nodes M50 ~ M49 ~ M40 
in the left wing digraph and nodes M6 ~ M5 ~ Mll in the right wing digraph. 
All control aspects of the engine feed phase are instigated through the pilot - switch interface. 
The pilot conducts informed decisions based on the data retrieved from the flow meters and 
tanks levels, as well as the indication lights. As a result, when back-tracing along the routes 
between the switches and controlled components there is no need to consider the paths 
separately. Loop operators need not be employed since they do not form 'complete' control 
loops. This would however, not be the situation were the pressure refuel operating mode 
considered since upstream variables are used by the system to regulate downstream variables 
without the involvement of a human operator. 
6.2.5.3 Example Scenarios 
Seven sets of test data are used to validate the results yielded using the fault diagnostics strategy. 
For each test case illustrated, both the expected and 'retrieved' readings are noted. The actual 
system readings are retrieved in 30s steps for five intervals. Tables 6-3 - 6-9 indicate both the 
expected and retrieved data. The time at which the system deviations are noted, if present, is 
highlighted in the data. (Tables 6-4 - 6-9 only indicate the noted deviating variables). 
The back-tracing route followed in the engme feed system digraph for test case two is 
documented in Appendix D. The illustration exemplifies the fault propagation path utilised in 
order to determine the diagnostic results for the given scenario. 
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Test Case One 
The retrieved data, as illustrated in Table 6-3, contains no registered deviations. Inputting the 
interval readings into the diagnostic program yields the expected results with the following 
message output on each occasion: 
• No deviation present in the left wing. 
• No deviation present in the right wing. 
• No deviation present in the cross-feed section. 
Expected Retrieved 
Variable Left Right Left Right 
CT Level >0 >0 >0 >0 
MTLevel LSV LSV LSV LSV 
Jettison/override pump switch ON ON ON ON 
Jettison/override pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Aft boost pump switch OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Aft boost pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Forward boost pump switch OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Forward boost pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Engine flow meter FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW 
. Spar valve switch (fuel control switch) RUN RUN RUN RUN 
Spar valve & spar relay position (EICAS) AGREE AGREE AGREE AGREE 
Cross-feed valve I (CFVI) switch OFF OFF 
Cross-feed valve I switch position light OFF OFF 
Cross-feed valve 2 (CFV2) switch OFF OFF 
Cross-feed valve 2 switch position light OFF OFF 
Table 6-3. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Engine Feed Test Case One) 
Test Case Two 
The fuel system in test case two is initially in phase one of the engine feed operating mode. The 
system alters to phase two after 60s, as illustrated in Table 6-4. After 90s the deviation 'no flow' 
is noted at the inlet to the left engine. Consequently, the flags for the right wing and cross-feed 
section are signed '0' whilst the left wing flag is signed' 1 " thus indicating the presence of a 
failure in the left wing. Due to. the registered deviation, the left wing section flag which 
corresponds to the mass flow nodes that feed directly into the left engine flow meter is signed 
'1' . 
Expected Retrieved Expected Retrieved 
(until 60s) (until 60s) (after 60s) (after 90s) 
Variable Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right 
Engine flow meter FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW NO FLOW FLOW 
Table 6- 4. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Engine Feed Test Case Two) 
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Two diagnostic results are detennined when inputting the retrieved readings into the program, 
one first order and one second order: 
LMB P56B.P55B 
The diagnostic results are indicative of the deviation being registered whilst the fuel system is in 
phase 2 of the operating mode. The deviation could have been caused either by a pipe blockage 
in the pipes connecting both the left aft and forward boost pumps to the engine feed manifold, or 
by a blockage in the left engine feed manifold. On considering the failure mode results alongside 
engineering knowledge, it assumed more likely for a single blockage to occur over a blockage in 
two pipes. It is deemed highly unlikely for there to have been two foreign bodies present, both 
large enough to block pipes 55 and 56. 
Test Case Three 
The expected and retrieved readings for test case three follow a similar fonnat to those in test 
case two. The only difference, as shown in Table 6-5, is the presence of three registered 
deviations: 'no flow' at the inlet to the left engine and low pressure at both the left aft and 
forward boost pumps. 
Expected Retrieved Expected Retrieved 
(until 60s) (until 60s) (after 60s) (after 90s) 
Variable Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right 
Aft boost pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF, OFF ON OFF 
Forward boost pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF ON OFF 
Engine now meter FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW NO FLOW FLOW 
Table 6-5. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Engine Feed Test Case Three) 
The obtained diagnostic results are displayed in three groups. There are four second order fault 
combinations and sixteen fault combinations of the order three and four: 
1) ABLNR.FBLNR 
2) LMB.ABLNR.FBLNR 
LMB.ABLNR.P59B 
LMB.ABLNR.P59PB 
LMB.ABLNR.P59F 
LMB.P58B.FBLNR 
LMB.P58B.P59B 
ABLNR.P59B P58B.FBLNR 
LMB.P58B.P59PB 
LMB.P58B.P59F 
LMB.P58PB.FBLNR 
LMB.P58PB.P59B 
LMB.P58PB.P59PB 
LMB.P58PB.P59F 
P58B.P59B 
LMB.P58F.FBLNR 
LMB.P58F.P59B 
LMB.P58F.P59PB 
LMB.P58F.P59 
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3) P56B.P55B.ABLNR.FBLNR 
P56B.P55B.ABLNR.P59B 
P56B.P55B.ABLNR.P59PB 
P56B.P55B.ABLNR.P59F 
P56B.P55B.P58B.FBLNR 
P56B.P55B.P58B.P59B 
P56B.P55B.P58B.P59PB 
P56B.P55B.P58B.P59F 
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P56B.P55B.P58PB.FBLNR 
P56B.P55B.P58PB.P59B 
P56B.P55B.P58PB.P59PB 
P56B.P55B.P58PB.P59F 
P56B.P55B.P58F.FBLNR 
P56B.P55B.P58F.P59B 
P56B.P55B.P58F .P59PB 
P56B.P55B.P58F.P59F 
Back-tracing through the left wing digraph from the given deviations yields results that take into 
consideration all possible failure combinations. In test case three the back-tracing procedure 
follows routes in the digraph that contain both of the boost pump nodes (M50 -7 PFBL -7 
LMTL and M50 -7 PABL -7 LMTL). This is attributed to the fact that the registered deviations 
occur whilst the system is in phase two of the engine feed operating mode. 
The faults noted in group one are those identical results which are determined when back-tracing 
from node M50( -10), representing the location of the flow deviation, and nodes PFBL( -10) AND 
P ABL( -10), representing the locations of the boost pump pressure deviations, to the main tank 
level node (LMTL). The fault combinations documented in groups two and three display the 
separate failures which may have led to the flow deviation ANDed with the failures associated 
with the pump deviations. With regards to the flow deviation, this could have been caused by 
either a pipe blockage in the pipes connecting both the left aft and forward boost pumps to the 
engine feed manifold or by a blockage in the left engine feed manifold. 
It is assumed that the most probable cause for the deviations, lies within the diagnostic results 
containing the lowest fault combination (results listed in group one). 
Test Case Four 
In a similar manner to previous test cases, the system changes from running in operating mode 
phase one to phase two. The only deviation registered records a non-decreasing right centre tank 
level at 90s (reference Table 6-6). Since the rate of change in the centre tank level is zero, this 
indicates that a failure is present in the right fuel scavenge section of the fuel system. The 
scavenge section 'drains' the centre tank of its remaining fuel into the main tank. Back-tracing 
commences from node M21 a( -10) and ceases at nodes P ABR and PFBR, since the flags 
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associated with the right wing boost pump sections are signed '0', thus indicating the absence of 
failure. 
Expected Retrieved Retrieved 
(after 60s) (after 60s) (after 90s) 
Variable I Left Right Left Right Left Right 
CT Level I :S2 &>0 :S2 & >0 :S2 &>0 :s2&>0 1.9 2 
Table 6-6. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Engine Feed Test Case Four) 
The diagnostic results yield three single order faults and three multiple failures: 
OFVRC 
P20B.IFVRI 
P21B 
P20B.P22B 
FSRNR 
P20B.P23B 
Retrieved 
(after 120s) 
Left Right 
1.7 2 
The single failures originate from faults that may have occurred between the right fuel scavenge 
pump and the fuel scavenge exit line feeding the main tank. The multiple failure results take into 
consideration the occurrence of possible failures before the fuel scavenge pump. These include 
the ANDing of faults between (i) the right boost and fuel scavenge pumps AND (ii) the pipe-
work connecting the centre tank to the fuel scavenge pump. 
A failure in the fuel scavenge system does not affect the main aim of the engine feed operating 
mode and therefore the presence of anyone of the above listed failures could be withstood 
without compromising fuel feeding to the engines. 
Test Case Five 
The retrieved readings in test case five exhibit a single deviation during engine feed phase three. 
The left and right wing flags are signed '0' whilst the cross-feed section flag is signed' 1', 
representing the presence of the registered deviation. From the retrieved readings in Table 6-7, 
cross-feed valve one is noted as ON and the 'VALVE' light on the PS fuel panel is also 
illuminated. This indicates a discrepancy between the cross-feed valve control switch and valve 
position. A single diagnostic result is therefore yielded: CVl FC. 
Variable 
Cross-feed valve I (CFY I) switch 
Cross-feed valve I switch position light 
Expected 
Left Right 
ON 
OFF 
Retrieved 
(after 90s) 
Left Right 
ON 
ON 
Table 6-7. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Engine Feed Test Case Five) 
183 
Chapter Six: Boeing 777-200 Fuel System 
Test Case Six 
In test case six the system is recorded in engine feed phase four. From the retrieved readings, 
illustrated in Table 6-8, there are four recorded deviations; reduced flow at both engine inlets and 
low pressure at the right aft and forward boost pumps. Back-tracing commences from nodes 
M50( -1), M6( -1) and PFBR( -1) AND P ABR( -1) and ceases at the right main tank level node 
(LMTR). There are numerous fault combinations that can occur, giving rise to the registered 
deviations. The diagnostic results yielded illustrate this fact. 
Expected Retrieved (after 90s) 
Variable Left Right Left Right 
Aft boost pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF ON 
Forward boost pump pressure light OFF OFF OFF ON 
E . fl FLOW FLOW REDUCED REDUCED ngme ow meter FLOW FLOW 
Table 6-8. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Engine Feed Test Case Six) 
With regards to the right flow meter deviation there are four second order failures, eight third 
order failures, and sixteen failure combinations of the order four: 
1) P13PB.P14PB 
P13F.P14PB 
2) RMPB.P13PB.P14PB 
RMPB.P13F.P14PB 
RMF.P13PB.P14PB 
RMF.P13F.P14PB 
3) P9PB.PIOPB.P13PB.P14PB 
P9PB.P10PB.P13F.P14PB 
P9PB.P10F.P13PB.P14PB 
P9PB.P10F.P13F.P14PB 
P9F.P 1 OPB.P 13 PB.P 14 PB 
P9F.P10PB.P13F.P14PB 
P9F.P lOF.P13PB.P 14PB 
P9F.P10F.P13F.P14PB 
P13PB.P14F 
P13F.P14F 
RMPB.P13PB.P14F 
RMPB.P13F.P14F 
RMF.P13PB.P14F 
RMF.P13F.P14F 
P9PB.P 1 OPB.P 13PB.P 14F 
P9PB.P10PB.P13F.P14F 
P9PB.P10F.P13PB.P14F 
P9PB.P10F.P13F.P14F 
P9F.P10PB.P13PB.P14F 
P9F.P10PB.P13F.P14F 
P9F.P lOF.P 13 PB.P 14 F 
P9F.P10F.P13F.P14F 
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In a similar manner to the results listed for test case three, the first group of failures contains a 
list of identical faults yielded through back-tracing from the nodes M50( -1) and P ABL( -1) AND 
PFBL( -1). The fault combinations documented in groups two and three display the failures 
which may have led to the flow deviation ANDed with the failures associated with the boost 
pump deviations. 
Due to the given engine feed operating mode phas~, the left engine feed manifold receives fuel 
via the cross-feed manifold from the right side. Therefore, the deviation registered at the left 
engine inlet could be caused by either: 
(i) The same failure leading to the reduced flow deviation at the right engine inlet. 
(ii) One of four single order faults: LMPB LMF CFMPB CFMF 
Despite the cross-feed flag being signed '0', cross-feed manifold failures are considered in (ii) 
since it is only known that no cross-feed valve failures exist, the status of the manifold is 
unknown. 
It is assumed that the most probable cause for the registered deviations lies within the diagnostic 
results containing the lowest fault combination. Faults associated with the noted low pressure at 
the right aft and forward boost pumps are hence deemed to be the most likely causes. 
Test Case Seven 
The retrieved readings, displayed in Table 6-9, note a single deviation from the expected 
readings in engine feed phase five. 'No flow' is registered at the inlet to the left engine. The right 
wing and cross-feed section flags are signed '0' whilst the left wing flag is signed' 1 '. Back-
tracing commences from node M50( -10), and given the stated operating mode, takes into account 
the process flow structure in the digraph that represents the left engine feed manifold and suction 
bypass valve. 
Expected 
Variable Left Right 
Retrieved 
(after 90s) 
Left Right 
NO Engine flow meter FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW 
Table 6-9. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Engine Feed Test Case Seven) 
The diagnostic results yield three single fault solutions: 
LMB BVLe P40B 
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The test cases considered cover all of the engine feed operating mode phases mentioned in 
Section 6.2.2. The diagnostic results yielded for the majority of cases reveal more than one 
possible failure combination. It is noted however, that the retrieved fault lists contain valid 
failures for the given deviating scenarios. The fact that numerous results are obtained for some 
test cases re-iterates the fact that a honing-in mechanism is required in order to locate the most 
likely fault cause. 
6.3 Pressure Refuel 
The pressure refuel system transfers fuel from the refuel adapters to the airplane tanks. The 
refuel system is operated using the integrated refuel panel (IRP) on the left wing. The system is 
controlled using the FQPU and the electrical load management system (ELMS). The pressure 
refuel system is constructed from refuel stations and valves, a refuel/jettison manifold and 
refuel/jettison manifold valves. 
A refuel station is located on the leading edge of each wing, outboard of the engines. Both refuel 
stations contain an access door and two refuel adaptors. Refuel adaptors connect the refuel hose 
nozzles to the refuel station. An adaptor check valve prevents fuel in the refuel/jettison manifold 
from flowing back through the adaptors. The left station also has an IRP used to control the 
refuel and de-fuel operations. 
In total there are six refuel valves, two in each tank. The refuel valves permit the flow of fuel 
from the refuel/jettison manifold into the fuel tanks. Each valve has a valve body and control unit 
which regulates the opening and closing motion. When the solenoid in the control unit is 
energised, pressurised fuel is supplied to the actuator which opens the valve. The valve position 
switch sends a signal to the ELMS when the valve is open (resulting in the turning on of a light 
on the IRP). If fuel is noted in the surge tank a surge tank float switch sends a signal to close all 
refuel valves. The surge tank float switches are comprised from a magnetic reed float switch 
which closes once fuel in the surge tank reaches a specific level. 
There are two types of refuel manifold valves: refuel manifold drain valves and refuel manifold 
vacuum relief valves. The drain valves drain fuel from the refuel/jettison manifold into the main 
tanks. Once the main tanks are full, the valves prevent more fuel from flowing into the tanks 
from the manifold. The vacuum relief valves simply prevent the occurrence of a vacuum in the 
manifold so allowing fuel to drain. Whilst fuel drains through the refuel manifold drain valve the 
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pressure in the manifold becomes less than that in the fuel tank. This causes the vacuum relief 
valves to open and allows air to enter the manifold and thus increase the pressure. 
Fuel flows from the refuel adaptors into the refuel/jettison manifold. Once the refuel valves are 
open, fuel transfers from the manifold into the tanks. A flow tube, located at the end of each 
refuel valve, decreases the exit force of the fuel and disperses the fuel. Fuel flow ceases once the 
refuel valves close. Any fuel which is left in the refuel/jettison manifold flows into the main 
tanks via the manifold drain valves. Should a failure prevent the refuel valves from closing, fuel 
flows into the surge tanks. If the fuel level rises and activates the surge tank float switches a 
signal is sent to the ELMS and all refuel valves are closed. 
During automatic refuelling the IRP is used to set the required fuel load and open the refuel 
valves. This data is sent to the FQPU which then closes the valves onc~ the tank quantity reaches 
either the load select value (LSV) or the volumetric top-off value (VTO). The FQPU contains the 
VTO values for each tank. Once a specific tank quantity equals its VTO value, the tank is 
considered full. The FQPU then removes the refuel-valve-open commands for that tank. During 
manual refuelling the refuel valve control switches on the IRP are used to open and close the 
refuel valves. 
The IRP contains four fuel quantity indicators, one for each tank and a total quantity indicator 
that can be used as a back-up should one of the tank indicators fail. The quantity indicators 
display both the actual tank and the load select quantity values. There are also six refuel lights 
located next to the refuel valve switches. For each refuel valve that is open an associated blue 
light turns on. 
6.3.1 Sensor Locations 
A mixture of sensors and switches are utilised in the fuel system to provide system information 
regarding tank levels and valve positions. Specific refuel valve position data is obtained from 
their respective valve switches. 
(i) Tank Levels 
The tank levels in the main and centre tanks are displayed in the fuel quantity indicator 
section on the IRP. Whilst conducting the fuel system analysis, the tank levels are 
described using the numbers 0 - 10; where zero indicates empty and ten, full. 
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(ii) Refuel Valve Control Switch Positions 
The refuel valves are controlled via their respective switch on the IRP by the operator. 
There is a control switch for each pair of refuel valves present in the main (left and 
right) and centre tanks. 
(iii) Valve status 
There are six refuel valve lights on the IRP. A signal is sent to the ELMS by a valve 
position switch when its respective valve is open. This results in the turning on of an 
associated light on the IRP by the FQPU. It is assumed that the light indicates the 
respective refuel valve line status. 
6.3.2 Operating Mode Readings 
The main purpose of the pressure refuel operational phase is to transfer fuel from the refuel 
adaptors to the airplane tanks. The refuel system is operated using the IRP on the left wing where 
either manual or automatic refuel are selected. In the case of manual refuel, the operator controls 
the flow of fuel into the tanks by opening and closing the refuel valves. During automatic refuel, 
the required tank levels are set by the operator and control loops detennine when the system 
should remove power from the refuel valves, thus resulting in their closure. 
The pressure refuel operating mode is divided into two main phases and a single override phase. 
The expected readings for each phase are dependent on the pressure refuel control mode; 
different readings are obtained for automatic and manual refuel. 
Phase One: Fuel is pumped from the refuelling source into the main and centre tanks via the 
refuel manifold. Whilst the tank levels are below their load select values the refuel valves are 
expected to be open with their respective refuel lights on. When conducting manual refuel the 
operator is required to turn the refuel valve control switches into the OPEN position. The control 
switches are not utilised in the automatic mode. 
Phase Two: Once the main and centre tanks reach their respective LSV's the refuel valves are 
closed; either by the operator during manual refuel or automatically via the level control loop. 
Override Phase: Should fuel flow from either main tank into their associated surge tanks and 
activate the surge tank reed switches, a signal is transmitted to remove power from all of the 
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refuel valves. This results in their closure and the non-transferral of fuel from the refuel manifold 
to the main and centre tanks. 
The readings associated with the phases are noted in Table 6-10. The variables considered 
concern tank level readings and fault indicating methods, such as valve lights, as well as the 
expected control switch positions. The switch positions are determined by the operator. All 
switches have two positions, OPEN and CLOSED. The refuel valve indication lights are 
expected to be on whilst fuel flows from the refuel manifold into the tanks. The tank level 
readings are noted using the arbitrary values described in Section 6.3.1. It is noted that the three 
tank levels may not reach their specified LSV's at the same time. Therefore, it is possible to have 
the situation whereby some refuel valves are closed whilst others are open. 
Pressure Refuel 
Variable Manual Automatic Phase 1 Phase 2 Override Phase 1 Phase 2 Override 
CT Level <LSV LSV LSV <LSV LSV LSV 
Left MT Level (LMTL) <LSV LSV LSV, > LSV if <LSV LSV LSV, > LSVif RMTL= LSV RMTL= LSV 
Right MT Level (RMTL) <LSV LSV LSV, > LSVif <LSV LSV LSV, > LSVif LMTL=LSV LMTL= LSV 
CT Refuel Valve Control Switch OPEN CLOSED 
Left MT Refuel Valve Control Switch OPEN CLOSED 
Right MT Refuel Valve Control Switch OPEN CLOSED 
Left CT Refuel Valve Light ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF 
Right CT Refuel Valve Light ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF 
Left MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF 
Left MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF 
Right MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF 
Right MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON OFF OFF ON OFF OFF 
Table 6-10. Pressure Refuel Operating Mode Readings 
6.3.3 Component Failure Modes 
The component failure modes considered to affect the functionality of the Boeing 777-200 fuel 
system include faults associated with valves, tanks, switches and the refuel manifold. The failure 
modes and their respective codes are illustrated in Table 6-11. In a similar manner to the engine 
feed analysis, a specific number is allocated to each component failure mode. These numbers are 
utilised in the diagnostic program described in Section 6.3.5. 
189 
Chapter Six: Boeing 777-200 Fuel System 
Code Failure Mode Code Failure Mode 
CMB Centre manifold blocked XMB X manifold blocked 
CMPB Centre manifold partially blocked XMPB X manifold partially blocked 
CMF Centre manifold fractured XMF X manifold fractured 
XMORFO X main outboard refuel valve open XMIRFO X main inboard refuel valve open 
XMORFC X main outboard refuel valve closed XMIRFC X main inboard refuel valve closed 
XMORFI X main outboard refuel valve XMIRFI X main inboard refuel valve intermediate position intermediate position 
CLRFO Centre left refuel valve open CRRFO Centre right refuel valve open 
CLRFC Centre left refuel valve closed CRRFC Centre right refuel valve closed 
CLRFI Centre left refuel valve intermediate CRRFI Centre right refuel valve intermediate position position 
XMOFTB X main outboard flow tube blocked XMIFTB X main inboard flow tube blocked 
XMOFTPB X main outboard flow tube partially XMIFTPB X main inboard flow tube partially blocked blocked 
XMOFTF X main outboard flow tube fractured XMIFTF X main inboard flow tube fractured 
CLFTB Centre left flow tube blocked CRFTB Centre right flow tube blocked 
CLFTPB Centre left flow tube partially blocked CRFTPB Centre right flow tube partially blocked 
CLFTF Centre left flow tube fractured CRFTF Centre right flow tube fractured 
XOVSO X main outboard refuel valve position XIVSO X main inboard refuel valve position 
switch open switch open 
XOVSC X main outboard refuel valve position XIVSC X main inboard refuel valve position 
switch closed switch closed 
CLVSO Centre left refuel valve position switch CRVSO Centre right refuel valve position 
open switch open 
CLVSC Centre left refuel valve position switch CRVSC Centre right refuel valve position 
closed switch closed 
XRSO X refuel valve switch open CRSO Centre refuel switch open 
XRSC X refuel valve switch closed CRSC Centre refuel switch closed 
XVRVO X vacuum relief valve open XMDVO X manifold drain valve open 
XVRVC X vacuum relief valve closed XMDVC X manifold drain valve closed 
XVRVI X vacuum relief valve intermediate XMDVI X manifold drain valve intermediate position position 
XFSH X surge tank float switch failed high XFHL X surge tank float switch failed low 
XMTUH X main tank unit failed high CTUH Centre tank unit failed high 
XMTUL X main tank unit failed low CTUL Centre tank unit failed low 
XMTF X main tank fractured CTF Centre tank fractured 
P B Pipe _ blocked P PB Pipe _ partially blocked 
P F Pipe fractured Where X is replaced by left or right. 
Table 6-11. Component Failure Modes (Pressure Refuel) 
6.3.4 Digraph Development 
The procedure followed for developing the Boeing 777-200 fuel system digraphs, for the 
pressure refuel operating mode, is identical to that utilised in Chapters Four and Five. Figure 6-
13 illustrates the main components of interest when considering the pressure refuel operational 
. mode. As per the system analysis stage of the digraph procedure outlined in Section 3.3.3.1, the 
system under investigation is defined and a specific number is allocated to each component. 
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The next stage in the procedure involves dividing the system into sub-units and thus generating 
unit digraph models. The Boeing 777-200 fuel system, with regards to the pressure refuel 
operating mode, is divided into three groups: 
• Left wing section 
• Right wing section 
• Associated control loops and signal structure 
In total the fuel system digraph associated with the pressure refuel operating mode is constructed 
from 228 nodes; of which 50 are process variable nodes and 178 are component failure mode 
nodes. 
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Figure 6-13. Numbered Boeing 777-200 Fuel System Layout for the Pressure Refuel Operational Phase 
6.3.4.1 Centre Tank and Main Tank (Left Wing) 
The unit digraph illustrated in Figure 6-14 incorporates the manifold and flow structure 
associated with both the main and centre tanks in the left wing. The unit digraph is developed 
through a process of 'building-up' from the centre and left main tank level nodes, LCTL and 
LMTL, and 'building-down' from the fuel supply node. Mass flow nodes Ml to M7 represent 
fuel flow through the refuel manifold. Three branches extend from the refuel manifold mass flow 
nodes leading to the left main (M2 - MI6 - M26 - LMTL and M4 - M17 - M27 - LMTL) and 
centre tank (M5 - M 18 - M28 - LCT) level nodes. These branches illustrate the direction of fuel 
flow from the refuel manifold to the tanks via their respective refuel valves. Further infonnation 
detailing the development of the digraph is presented in Appendix D. 
191 
Chapter Six: Boeing 777-200 Fuel System 
Figure 6-14. Centre and Main Tank Digraph (Left Wing) 
6.3.4.2 Centre Tank and Main Tank (Right Wing) 
The right tank section unit digraph is illustrated in Figure 6-15. The digraph incorporates the 
manifold and flow structure associated with both the main and centre tanks in the right wing. The 
development process is similar to that described for the left wing section and therefore the 
components exhibit identical relationships. 
Figure 6-15. Centre and Main Tank Digraph (Right Wing) 
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6.3.4.3 Control Loop and Signal Structure 
Figure 6-16 illustrates the control signal structure associated with the six refuel valves when 
considering the manual operation of the pressure refuel operating phase. Emphasis is placed on 
the control structure related to the left outboard refuel valve [SIRP -7 SFQPU-7 SELMS -7 
M26]. It is noted however, that all refuel valves exhibit similar relationships. 
The IRP and FQPU possess a positive relationship as illustrated by the signed edge connecting 
the signal nodes from the IRP to the FQPU (SIRP -7 SFQPU). There are two failure modes 
associated with the node SIRP. Both of the failure modes are related to a valve control switch 
fault; switch failed open (LRSO) leading to a large positive disturbance and switch failed closed 
(LRSC) giving rise to a large negative disturbance. The exhibited relationships between the 
FQPU, ELMS (SELMS) and the mass flow exiting the refuel valve (M26) are dependent on the 
conditions set by the operator. The '+ l' signed conditional edges are true given the operator has 
turns the left main tank refuel valve control switch to the OPEN position. In this case, the valve 
open command results in power being provided to the left main outboard refuel valve, which in 
turn h,:!s a positive effect on the mass flow exiting the refuel valve. The opposite is true given the 
operator turns the control switch to the CLOSED position. 
~(' +10 ~lval'v"e--onCOl\'llt1alld +If'roY depoW'et SIRP +1 FQP El.lv[ M29   -l"R.ernoveopencol'l'\llWld -I. F.eI'flL .... "epowet 
+1 Va1ve.o~nc()mmand 
SIF,p)---+::L' ~o1F' 
-1: Rell'lO'll'e opencomJ'Ml'ld 
Figure 6-16. Manual Refuel Valve Control Digraphs 
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Figure 6-17 illustrates the control signal structure associated with the six refuel valves when 
considering the automatic operation of the pressure refuel operating phase. This is conducted 
through the use of level control loops. For descriptive purposes, emphasis is again placed on the 
control loop structure related to the left outboard refuel valve [LMTL -7 SLMTU -7 SFQPU-7 
SELMS -7 M26]. 
Figure 6-17. Automatic Refuel Valve Control Digraphs 
The retrieved left main tank level data controls the output from the left main tank outboard refuel 
valve. The main tank level node and associated main tank unit signal node possess a positive 
relationship (LMTL -7 SLMTU). The relationship between the tank unit and the FQPU is 
however inverse acting (SLMTU -7 SFQPU). The FQPU compares the retrieved tank height 
with the LSV and therefore the exhibited relationships between the FQPU, ELMS (SELMS) and 
the mass flow exiting the refuel valve (M26) are dependent on the conditions set by the FQPU. A 
valve OPEN command signal is sent if the tank level is below the LSV, otherwise the OPEN 
command is removed. 
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There are four failure modes associated with the negative feedback control loop. The left main 
tank unit failing low (LMTUL) produces a large negative effect on the node SLMTU whilst the 
tank unit failing high (LMTUH) results in a large positive disturbance. Should the left main 
control switch fail open then this leads to a large positive disturbance at node SFQPU. 
Conversely, the control switch failing closed results in a large negative disturbance. 
Figures 6-18 and 6-19 illustrate the signal structure associated with the override phase. Figure 6-
18 concentrates on the relationship between the left surge tank switch and the refuel valves. 
Figure 6-19 highlights the effects caused by the activation of the right surge tank switch. 
Descriptive emphasis is placed on the connection between the left surge tank level and the flow 
output from the left main tank outboard refuel valve. Similar associations are however true 
between both the left and right surge tank levels and all six refuel valves. 
+I'LSTLaISWlh:h +1 LSwllcltdDsed 
~~~o~~~o~~.~~~ 
Figure 6-18. Override Phase Digraphs (Left Surge Tank Switch Activated) 
The left surge tank level (LSTL) and left surge tank switch (SLSTS) possess no relationship 
under normal circumstances. A positive relationship is exhibited if the surge tank level reaches 
the float switch, as indicated by the conditional signing of the edge, '+1: LSTL at switch'. 
Similarly, the relationship between the left surge tank switch and the ELMS (SLSTS ~ SELMS) 
is only positive if the float switch closes. There are two failure modes associated with the left 
surge tank switch node; surge tank switch failing high resulting in a large positive disturbance 
195 
Chapter Six: Boeing 777-200 Fuel System 
and surge tank switch failing low leading to a large negative disturbance. Under nonnal 
conditions the section of the ELMS that corresponds to the surge tank switch activatiorr has no 
effect on mass flow exiting the left main outboard refuel valve (SELMS 7 M26). The valve 
OPEN command is however removed should the left surge tank switch be activated, as 
illustrated by the conditional edge marking, '-1: Remove valve-open command' . 
-I: RtrnovevalYe-
+i:Rnalswilch +l:RSwitchclosed opencotnlMl\Cl 
~~~o~~~~~~-L~~ 
Figure 6-19. Override Phase Digraphs (Right Surge Tank Switch Activated) 
Figure 6-20 illustrates the relationships exhibited by the signal structure connecting the position 
switch on the refuel valves with their "respective indication lights on the IRP. Mass flow exiting 
the left main tank outboard refuel valve has a positive effect on the respective valve position 
switch as indicated by the '+ l' signing of the edge connecting M26 7 SLOVS. There are two 
failure modes associated with the node SLOVS: position switch failed open (LOVSO) giving 
rise to a large positive disturbance and position switch failed closed (LOVSC) resulting in a large 
negative deviation. Under nonnal refuelling conditions it is expected that the refuel valve is open 
and consequently the relationship between the position switch, the ELMS, FQPU and indication 
light on the IRP is positive [SLOVS 7 SELMS 7 SFQPU 7 LOVL]. Ifthe valve is closed then 
the previously mentioned relationships are nullified, as indicated by the conditional edge signing 
'0: Valve closed'. 
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Interactions, similar to those described for the left main tank outboard refuel valve are fonned 
for the remaining five refuel valves in the fuel system. 
Figure 6-20. Refuel Valve Signal Indicating Digraphs 
6.3.5 System Fault Diagnostics 
6.3.5.1 Diagnostic Program 
The automation of the back-tracing procedure in the pressure refuel phase is conducted in a 
similar manner to that in Section 6.2.5 for the engine feed mode. 
During the 'input' stage the individual tank level transmitter readings, refuel valve switch 
positions and indication lights as well as the manual/automatic status are 'read into' the prObJfam 
by way of three text files. The program detennines the expected system readings from the noted 
operating mode phase. The data contained within the text files represents: 
(i) Tank levels: [Time LMTL CTL RMTL LLSV CLSV RLSV] 
(ii) Refuel valve switch positions and indication lights: [Man/Auto LSwitch LOL LIL 
CSwitch CLL CRL RSwitch ROL RIL] 
(iii) The override phase data and detail regarding the status of the surge tanks is contained 
within a separate text file. 
Where, 
LMTL Left main tank level CTL Centre tank level 
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RMTL Right main tank level 
LLSV Left main tank LSV 
CLSV Centre tank LSV 
RLSV Right main tank LSV 
CSwitch Centre refuel valve control switch 
CLL 
CRL 
Centre left indication light 
Centre right indication light 
RSwitch Right refuel valve control switch 
LSwitch Left refuel valve control switch ROL 
RIL 
Right outboard indication light 
Right inboard indication light LOL Left outboard indication light 
LIL Left inboard indication light 
The expected refuel valve switch positions and the status of their respective valve indication 
lights are determined from the retrieved tank levels. Therefore, for each tank section a fixed set 
of expected readings are produced accordingly: 
• For a tank level below the LSV, the corresponding refuel valve indication lights are 
expected to be on. If the system is running in manual mode then the valve control 
switch is to be in the OPEN position. 
• Conversely, if a tank level is equal to or greater than the LSV, the corresponding refuel 
valve indication lights should be off with the valve control switch in the CLOSED 
position. 
The expected readings are used in the comparison phase in order to form the deviation matrix 
[D] by comparing the retrieved data with those readings which would be expected under the 
assumed pressure refuel operating mode. The elements in the matrix are related to the status of 
the tank section refuel valves as illustrated by the following representation of [D]: 
[
LSWitCh 
CSwitch 
RSwitch 
LOL 
CLL 
ROL 
LIL] 
CRL 
RIL 
During the first interval the retrieved tank levels are simply compared with their respective load 
select values to determine if a deviation is present. Once information is received from the second 
sampling interval, the tank level data is used to calculate the rate of change in the fuel system 
tanks. The tank level rate of change data is utilised, along with the comparison between the 
actual tank levels and LSV's, to determine the presence of further deviations. Deviations are 
noted for any of the following level scenarios: 
• Below LSV and not increasing at the required rate. 
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• Below LSV and not increasing. 
• Above LSV and increasing. 
The next phases (flagging, back-tracing and results output) in the procedure are conducted in an 
identical manner to those previously described for the Boeing 777-200 engine feed operating 
mode in Section 6.2.5. 
6.3.5.2 Diagnostic Considerations 
The control aspects associated with the pressure refuel operating mode are subdivided into three 
segments; one of which is completely manual and instigated through an operator-switch 
interface whilst the remaining two are automatic. During the manual operation of the pressure 
refuel mode, the operator conducts informed decisions based on retrieved tank level data. As a 
result, when back-tracing along the routes between the valve control switches and the controlled 
components there is no need to consider the paths separately. Conversely, during automatic 
operation of the refuel mode a downstream variable, the tank level, is used by the system to 
regulate the refuel valves (upstream variables). Therefore, whilst back-tracing through the 
negative feedback loop, the loop must be considered as an entire entity, as previously described 
in Chapter Four. The third 'control loop' is related to the override function of the surge tank 
level switches and consequently forms an override control route as opposed to a loop. Therefore, 
depending on the precise mode of the pressure refuel phase, sections of the digraphs are 'turned 
on and off accordingly. For example, should the system be running in manual with all tank 
levels below their LSV's "and no noted refuel valve deviations, the override and automatic refuel 
mode control sections are disregarded. 
As an initial means of 'honing-in' on the most probable fault cause for a given set of deviations, 
specific logic statements are considered whilst developing the diagnostic strategy for refuel valve 
section flags and tank flags signed '1 ' . 
The following take into account refuel valve section flags that are signed' 1 ': 
• Refuel valve control switch failures are deemed to be the only fault present if an 
identical deviation is noted by the valve control switch and the corresponding 
indication lights on the IRP, in the deviation matrix. 
• For cases where no refuel valve control switch deviations are noted and only indication 
light deviations are recorded, the faults documented are associated with the 
corresponding indication light valve line. 
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• Tank unit failures are noted in the previously stated case when the pressure refuel phase 
is in the automatic operating mode. This is attributed to the fact that the tank unit 
provides a level reading to the FQPU in the tank level control loop. 
The following statements are of specific relevance when considering a precise number of tank 
flags signed '1': 
One Flag 
• For a given tank level below the LSV with no noted refuel valve section deviations, it is 
assumed that any faults present originate from the lines connecting the refuel valves to 
the refuel manifold. The back-tracing process is adapted for the pressure refuel 
operating mode. Back-tracing ordinarily ceases upon entering a section of the digraph 
flagged '0'. In this case however, back-tracing from the tank level node (location of a 
given tank deviation) traverses through the refuel valve section to other sections of the 
digraph. Refuel valve faults are simply ignored during the process should the 
corresponding valve flags be signed '0'. 
Two Flags (Left or right main and centre tank level deviations) 
• For two given tank level deviations below the LSV with no noted refuel valve section 
deviations, it is assumed that any faults present originate from either the line connecting 
the refuel valves to the refuel manifold on the main tank side or from manifold failures 
in the main and centre tank sections. 
Two Flags (Left and right main tank level deviations) 
• The same assumption listed for a single tank flag is followed for noted deviations in 
both main tank sections. 
• If the centre tank level is at the LSV and there is no flow out of the centre tank refuel 
valves, then faults associated with the lines connecting the fuel source to the refuel 
manifold as well as faults in both the left ~nd right sections of the refuel manifold are 
considered. 
Three Flags 
• Refuel manifold failures and faults in the lines connecting the fuel source to the 
manifold are deemed the most likely causes for a triple tank deviation, given the tank 
levels are below the LSV and no deviations are noted in the respective refuel valves. 
• For tank levels above the LSV and fuel registered in the surge tank, only surge tank 
switch failures are noted. Other faults are not considered once a surge tank switch 
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failure is identified since it is difficult to differentiate between all possible causes ofthe 
given deviations before the final safety override failure. 
• It is assumed highly unlikely that three varying tank level deviations (e.g. Left main 
tank: empty, Centre tank: not increasing at the right rate, Right main tank: overfilling) 
would be retrieved from the system and therefore this scenario is not considered. It is 
not expected for multiple failures to occur during the same sampling interval to the 
extent required for the noted scenario. 
6.3.5.3 Example Scenarios 
Seven sets of test data are used to validate the results yielded from using the fault diagnostics 
strategy for the pressure refuel phase. The specific details of each test case are illustrated in 
Appendix D. A brief overview of the scenarios considered and the failure results retrieved is 
provided in this section. 
Test 
Case 
2 
No. of Registered Deviations 
No deviations 
3 
- Left main tank level: Static 
- Left main tank outboard refuel valve light: Off 
No. of Failure Combinations 
o 
4 
- 4 second order 
- Left main tank inboard refuel valve light: Off 
....... _ .... _ ...... _ ... _ ...... j_ .... :_.= ... :c::..: ... :.:.c.c:.:c::: ... c:.:.:.::.: ... :.::.: .... :..:: .. : ... :: .... : .. _: .. :.:: ... : .. :._._ ... ::_: .. ..: ... : .... :.: .. 9..:::..:.:. ...... : __ ::.: ............. _ ... _ ... __ ............ _ .............. _ .................. _........... I 
1 2 3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
..:}~!g_~!_~~!!!~~_!~_!l~~~_~<:!!~~!y~l}g~t:_Qi( __ .. _ ....... __ ........................__ ...... _.__..__ .. _: ... ? ..~~~_~!!~_~~_~er 
2 4 
- Centre tank level: Low rate of increase - 3 first order 
- Left main tank level: Static - 1 second order 
•• __ •• _._. __ •• H._ ••• __ ..... H •••• ___ ••••• _ •• H ....... H ••••••• _ ••••• _ •••••••••• ___ .... _ .......... _._ .... _ •••••• _ •• _ •• ___ ."_ 
••••• __ ... H •• • •• ·H ••• _ ....... __ ._. __ 
7 
- Centre tank level: Static 
- Left & right main tank levels: Static 
- Left & right main tank outboard refuel valve lights: Off - I second order 
- Lc:ft & right main tank inboard refuel valve Jights: Of(..................................... .............................................................._ 
16 3 
- Centre tank level: Static 
- Left & right main tank level: Static 
- 9 second order 
- 6 third order 
- I fourth order 
... ········· .. ··1···· ..................................................... - ..................................... _ ....... -
9 
- All tank levels increasing despite reaching LSV 
- Centre tank refuel valve control switch: Open 
- Left & right main tank refuel valve control switches: Open 
- Left & right centre tank refuel valve lights: On 
- Left & right main tank outboard refuel valve lights: On 
- Left & right main tank inboard refuel valve lights: On 
Final deviation registered at end: Left surge tank level at float switch. 
I (after initial 9 deviations) 
- I third order 
I (after final surge tank 
deviation) 
- I first order 
Table 6-12. Summary of Pressure Refuel Example Scenarios 
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Table 6-12 illustrates the range of deviations considered and the number of associated failure 
combinations obtained. The diagnostic procedure is successful in dealing with the integrated 
control loop structures which are present in the pressure refuel mode. Depending on the precise 
pressure refuel phase which is assumed for the scenario under investigation, relevant sections of 
the digraph are turned on and off accordingly. The majority of the pressure refuel scenarios taken 
into account indicate a deviating tank level. This is because actual component failures, excluding 
those associated with indicating lights and transmitters, will ultimately result in an abnormal tank 
reading and can simply be attributed to the design of the pressure refuel section. 
Test cases five and seven display the most noted deviations and yet yield the fewest failure 
combinations. The recorded abnormal readings in both cases are assumed indicative of a 
fundamental fault having occurred as opposed to being caused by a number of' small' faults. It is 
assumed that had the deviations resulted from a collection of faults then this would have had a 
progressive effect on the system since it is further assumed that not all ofthe 'small' faults would 
occur at once. 
6.4 Fuel Jettison 
The fuel jettison system dumps fuel overboard to reduce the aircraft landing weight. The jettison 
system is operated via the fuel jettison panel in the PS overhead panel in the cockpit and 
controlled through the ELMS. The jettison system is comprised from five main components: 
(i) Overridel1ettison Pumps 
As previously noted in the Engine Fuel Feed description, there is one located in each 
section of the centre tank. 
(ii) Fuel Jettison Pumps 
Each main tank contains a fuel jettison pump on the rear spar. The jettison pumps 
transfer fuel from the main tank to the refuel/jettison manifold during fuel jettison. 
(iii) Fuel Jettison Isolation Valves 
Isolation valves are located in each section of the centre tank. The valves open during 
jettison operation and allow fuel flow from the override/jettison pumps into the 
refuel/jettison manifold. 
(iv) Jettison Isolation Check Valve 
There is a check valve in each section of the centre tank preventing the left and right 
main tank fuel boost pumps from conducting fuel jettison. 
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(v) Refuel/Jettison Manifold 
The manifold extends through the main tanks and surge tanks in both wings. 
(vi) Fuel Jettison Nozzle Valves 
A nozzle is located at each end of the manifold. The nozzle valves permit fuel jettison 
during flight. Fuel is dispersed near the wing tip. 
For the jettison nozzle valves to open the aircraft must be in the air to dump fuel overboard. If 
the jettison system is activated whilst the aircraft is in ground mode then the main tank fuel 
jettison pumps and jettison isolation valves operate immediately. During fuel jettison the fuel 
synoptic display is altered to illustrate the jettison route along with the total time remaining for 
completion. 
6.4.1 Sensor Locations 
A mixture of sensors and switches are utilised in the fuel system to provide system information 
regarding tank levels and valve positions. Specific jettison nozzle valve position data is obtained 
from their associated valve switches. 
(i) Tank Levels 
The tank levels in the left and right centre and main tanks are obtained via the FQIS. 
Whilst conducting the fuel system analysis, the tank levels are described using the 
numbers 0 - 10; where zero represents empty and ten, full. 
(ii) Jettison Nozzle Outlet Flow 
A flow reading is retrieved from both nozzle outlets. The flow readings are classified 
into three groups; flow (F), no flow (NF) and reduced flow (RF). 
(iii) Jettison Nozzle Switch 
Arming the jettison system and positioning the control switches in the ON position 
results in the opening of the jettison nozzle and isolation valves. The fuel jettison 
pumps are turned on in addition. There is a separate control switch for both the left and 
right sections of the fuel system. 
(iv) Jettison Nozzle Valve Status 
Should an actual valve position and the position indicated by the respective jettison 
nozzle switch disagree, a warning is issued. This occurs via the fuel panel. For 
example, if the jettison nozzle switch is ON, but the actual valve position is noted as 
being closed then the 'valve' light on the P5 jettison fuel panel highlights the 
discrepancy 
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(v) Jettison/Override Pump Switch 
The left and right jettison override pumps are controlled via their respective switches 
by the pilot. 
(vi) Presence of Low Pressure at Pump Outlet 
Low pressure at the fuel pump outlets is noted by a light on the fuel panel (PS panel). 
There is a low pressure light for both left and right jettison and jettison/override pumps. 
6.4.2 Operating Mode Readings 
The main purpose of the fuel jettison operational phase is to dump fuel overboard in order to 
reduce the landing weight. Aircraft are required to jettison fuel in the event of an emergency 
which requires either returning to the airport recently departed or landing at another airport short 
of the original intended destination. The fuel jettison operating mode is divided into two main 
phases. The expected readings for each phase are dependent on actual tank levels when 
compared with the maximum landing weight (ML W). The readings associated with the two 
phases are noted in Table 6-13. The variables considered concern tank level and fault indicating 
methods, such as valve lights. A combination of the two phases may occur if tanks reach the 
required ML W at differing rates. 
Fuel Jettison . 
Phase One Phase Two 
Variable Left Ril!ht Left Ril!ht 
CT Level >MLW >MLW SMLW SMLW 
MTLevel >MLW >MLW SMLW SMLW 
Jettison Nozzle Switch ARMED/ON ARMED/ON D'ARMED/ OFF D'ARMED/OFF 
JettisonlOveJTide Pump Switch OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED 
Jettison Nozzle Valve Position light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Jettison Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
JettisonlOvelTide Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Table 6-13. Fuel Jettison Operating Mode Readings 
Phase One: Fuel is pumped from the main and centre tanks to the jettison nozzle valves via the 
refuel/jettison manifold. Whilst the tank levels are above their equivalent maximum landing 
weight values the jettison pumps are on and jettison valves open. The pilot is required to arm the 
jettison system. During Phase One it is expected for flow to be registered at the jettison nozzle 
outlet. 
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Phase Two: Once the main and centre tanks have reached their respective maximum landing 
weight values the jettison valves are closed and jettison fuel pumps switched off. The jettison 
system is disarmed by the pilot. During Phase Two it is expected for no flow to be registered at 
the jettison nozzle outlets. 
6.4.3 Component Failure Modes 
The component failure modes considered to affect the functionality of the Boeing 777-200 fuel 
system include faults associated with valves, tanks, switches and the refuel/jettison manifold. 
The failure modes and their respective codes are illustrated in Table 6-14. 
Code Failure Mode Code Failure Mode 
CMB Centre manifold blocked XMB X manifold blocked 
CMPB Centre manifold partially blocked XMPB X manifold partially blocked 
CMF Centre manifold fractured XMF X manifold fractured 
JOXR Jettison/override pump run JOXNR Jettison/override pump no run 
JPXR Jettison pump run JPXNR Jettison pump no run 
JNVXO Jettison nozzle valve open JNVXC Jettison nozzle valve closed 
JNVXI Jettison nozzle valve intermediate JIVXI Jettison isolation valve intermediate position position 
JIVXC Jettison isolation valve closed JIVXO Jettison isolation valve open 
XJNSO Jettison nozzle switch in open pos. XJNSC Jettison nozzle switch in closed pos. 
XJPSH Jettison pump pressure switch stuck XJPSL Jettison pump pressure switch stuck high low 
XJOSH Jettison/override pump pressure switch XJOSL Jettison/override pump pressure switch 
stuck high stuck low 
XJOSO Jettison/override pump switch in open XJOSC Jettison/override pump switch in closed position position 
XMTF Main tank fractured XCTF Centre tank fractured 
P B Pipe_ blocked P PB Pipe _ partially blocked 
P F Pipe _ fractured Where X is replaced by left or right. 
Table 6-14. Component Failure Modes (Fuel Jettison) 
6.4.4 Digraph Development 
The procedure followed for generating the Boeing 777-200 fuel system digraphs, for the fuel 
jettison operating mode, is identical to that utilised in the engine feed and pressure refuel 
sections. Figure 6-21 illustrates the main components of interest when considering the fuel 
jettison operational mode. As per the system analysis stage of the digraph procedure outlined in 
Chapter 3, a specific number is allocated to each component. 
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The next stage in the procedure involves dividing the system into sub-units and thus generating 
unit digraph models. All process variable deviations which may have an effect on the variables 
in the digraph are also taken into consideration. The Boeing 777-200 fuel system is divided into 
three main groups for the fuel jettison operating mode analysis: 
• Left wing section 
• Right wing section. 
• Associated control loops and signal structure. 
~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -.! 
,--------- ---- -- --- -_., 
. . 
. . 
: . 
,--------------- ______ 1 
Figure 6-21. Numbered Boeing 777-200 Fuel System Layout for the Fuel Jettison Operational Phase 
In total the fuel system digraph associated with the fuel jettison operating mode is constructed 
from 143 nodes; of which 41 are process variable nodes and 102 are component failure mode 
nodes. 
6.4.4.1 Centre Tank and Main Tank (Left Wing) 
The left wing unit digraph (reference Figure 6-22) incorporates the manifold and flow structure 
associated with the main and centre tanks in the left hand section. Mass flow enters the 
refuel/jettison manifold through the pipe-work that extends from the main and centre tanks and 
exits through the left jettison nozzle valve. The unit digraph is developed through a process of 
'building-up' from the left main and centre tank level nodes, LMTL and LCTL. More detail 
regarding the digraph development is provided in Appendix D. 
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Figure 6-22. Centre and Main Tank Digraph (Left Wing) 
6.4.4.2 Centre Tank and Main Tank (Right Wing) 
The right wing unit digraph is illustrated in Figure 6-23. The digraph incorporates the manifold 
and flow structure associated with both th~ main tank and centre tanks in the right hand section. 
The development process and exhibited component relationships are similar to those described 
for the left wing. 
Figure 6-23. Centre and Main Tank Digraph (Right Wing) 
6.4.4.3 COlltrol Loop alld Sigllal Structure 
Figures 6-24 - 6-27 illustrate the associated control and signal structure for the left and right 
wing section unit digraphs. Descriptive emphasis throughout this sub-section is placed on the 
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relationships associated with the left wing section. Similar relationships, however, are true for 
the right wing section. 
Figures 6-24 and 6-25 illustrate the control signal structure associated with the left and right 
jettison nozzle switches. Activating the switch results in the opening of the nozzle and isolation 
valves in addition to the starting of the jettison pump by the ELMS. The noted association 
between the left jettison nozzle switch and the ELMS (nodes SLNSW -7 SELMS) is dependent 
on the switch position as indicated by the signing of the edges connecting the two signal nodes. 
The relationship is positive given the switch is in the ON position (+1 :LJN Switch on) and 
negative given a CLOSED position (+ 1 :LJN Switch off). There are two failure modes associated 
with the jettison nozzle switch node; switch failed open (LJNSO) resulting in a large positive 
disturbance and switch failed closed (LJNSC) leading to a large negative deviation. 
Should the switch be in the ON position, the ELMS relays a valve open command to the jettison 
nozzle and isolation valves, thus creating a positive effect on mass flow at location one (Ml) and 
location nine-teen (M19). A 'pump on' command is also relayed to the jettison fuel pump. These 
commands are reversed for the scenario which incorporates the jettison nozzle switch in the 
CLOSED position. 
Figure 6-24. Left Jettison Nozzle Switch Digraph 
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Figure 6-25. Right Jettison Nozzle Switch Digraph 
Figure 6-26 illustrates the control structure associated with the jettison/override pumps. The 
jettison/override pumps are controlled by the pilot using an associated fuel pump switch as 
represented by the nodes SLJOSW -7 SELMS -7 PJOL (left side) and SRJOSW -7 SELMS -7 
PJOR (right side). The pilot input is represented through the switch nodes. The relationship 
between the switch and pump nodes is positive for the switch on condition and conversely, 
negative for when the switch is closed. 
~ 
,\0 
os 
+1: UOP switch on 
-1: UOP switch off -1: Remove oncornrnand 
+l.FJOP slli.tch on 
-1: FJOP sMtch off -1: Reroove on conunand 
Figure 6-26. Jettison/Override Pump Control Digraph 
The fuel pumps encompass a low pressure switch. Figure 6-27 illustrates the signal structure 
between the low pressure switches and their respective low pressure indicating lights on the PS 
fuel panel. When the condition of low pressure at the left jettison pump outlet is met the switch 
closes and thus a low pressure signal is sent from the pump to the respective low pressure light 
on the PS fuel panel. The specific relationship exhibited by left jettison pump is illustrated by 
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nodes PJPL -7 SJPLPS -7 SELMS -7 JPLL. There are two failure modes associated with the 
low pressure switch node SJPLPS; pressure switch stuck high (LJPSH) and stuck low (LJPSL) 
leading to large positive and negative disturbances respectively. Similar links are observed for 
the right jettison pump and both the left and right jettison/override pumps. 
+l:!.<>wP 
+1:!.<>wP 
+l:!'<>wP 
OPS 
+10 
+l:!.<>wP 
Figure 6-27. Pump Pressure Indicating Digraph 
6.4.5 System Fault Diagnostics 
6.4.5.1 Diagllostic Program 
The diagnostic program follows a similar format to that previously described in Sections 6.2.5 
and 6.3.5 for the Boeing 777-200 fuel system engine feed and pressure refuel operating modes. 
Noted differences in the program for the fuel jettison mode are highlighted in this section. 
During the 'input' stage the individual tank level transmitter readings, flow, jettison nozzle 
switch position and indication light statuses are 'read into' the program by way of four text files. 
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The program determines the expected readings for the operating mode gIven the system 
information. The data contained in the text files represents: 
(i) Tank levels: [Time LMTL LCTL RCTL RMTL] 
(ii) Jettison nozzle switch position and valve indication lights: 
[Time LJNSwitch LJNVLight RJNSwitch RJNVLight] 
(iii) Jettison pump status and indication lights: 
[Time LJPLight RJPLight LJOPSwitch LJOPLight RJOPSwitch RJOPLight] 
(iv) Flow status: [Time LJettison RJettison] 
Where, 
LMTL Left main tank level 
RMTL Right main tank level 
LJNSwitch Left jettison nozzle switch 
LJNVLight Left jettison nozzle valve light 
LJ ettison Flow at left jettison nozzle valve 
LJPLight Left jettison pump low pressure 
LJOPSwitch Left jettison/override switch 
LJOPLight Left jettison/override pump low 
pressure light 
LCTL Left centre tank level 
RCTL Right centre tank level 
RJNSwitch Right jettison nozzle switch 
RJNVLight Right jettison nozzle valve light 
RJettison Flow at right jettison nozzle valve 
RJPLight Right jettison pump low pressure 
RJOPSwitch Right jettison/override switch 
RJOPLight Right jettison/override pump low 
pressure light 
The expected jettison nozzle and jettison/override pump switch positions and the status of their 
respective valve and pump indication lights are determined from the retrieved tank levels. For 
each tank section a fixed set of expected readings are generated according to a precise set of 
rules: 
• For a tank level above its maximum landing weight the corresponding jettison nozzle 
switch is expected to be in the ON position with all indicating lights off. Should the 
centre tank level be above its maximum landing weight then the associated 
jettison/override pump switch is to be in the ON position. 
• Conversely, if a tank level is equal to or less than its maximum landing weight the 
switches are expected to be in the OFF position with no indicating lights highlighted. 
The expected flow readings are also dependent on the specific tank levels as follows: 
• Full flow is to be registered should both the main and centre tank levels in the same 
wing section be above their maximum landing weight values. 
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• For the scenario whereby only one tank level is above the maximum landing weight, 
reduced flow is expected from the respective wing section. 
• No flow is expected when both tank levels equal or are less then the maximum landing 
weight. 
During the first interval the retrieved tank levels are simply compared with their respective 
maximum landing weight values in order to determine the expected flow, pump and valve 
readings. After the first sampling interval, the tank level data is used to calculate the rate of 
change in the fuel system tanks. The rate of change data ,is utilised, along with the comparison 
between the actual tank levels and maximum landing weight values, to determine the presence of 
further deviations. Level deviations are noted for any of the following scenarios: 
• Above the maximum landing weight and not decreasing. 
,. Above the maximum landing weight and not decreasing sufficiently. 
• Below the maximum landing weight and decreasing. 
• Below the maximum landing weight and decreasing slowly. 
Note: The boundary between decreasing at an adequate rate and decreasing at an insufficient rate 
is allocated an arbitrary value. 
6.4.5.2 Diagnostic Considerations 
The fault diagnostics process commences from the status of the flow readings at the jettison 
nozzles. The registering of no flow is deemed to be caused by a refuel/jettison manifold fault or 
multiple failures originating from the main and centre tanks on the side of the flow deviation. 
The 'no flow' reading is assumed to have originated from a pump or valve failure if their 
respective fault indicating lights are highlighted. Depending on the jettison/override pump switch 
position and indicating light, it is possible to differentiate between a switch and pump failure. A 
jettison nozzle switch failure is believed to have occurred should the valve, jettison pump and 
tank levels all note the same deviation. 
6.4.5.3 Example Scenarios 
Six sets of test data are used to validate the results yielded from the fault diagnostics strategy for 
the fuel jettison mode. The test cases and their associated failure combinations are expanded in 
detail in Appendix D. Table 6-15 provides a summary of the scenarios taken into consideration. 
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Test 
Case 
2 
No. of Registered Devia tions 
No deviations 
5 
- Left centre tank level: Static 
- Left main tank level: Static 
- Left jettison flow transmitter: No flow 
- Left jettison pump low pressure light: On 
...... .. _ .. _-=-_Le1!j~_t!!~.<?P.!~~~f!:iE~J2~!!?:J2!~~E!:~~~!:~)!g~!: 0n. __ 
3 
- Right main tank level: Static 
- Right jettison flow transmitter: No flow 3 
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No. of Failure Combinations 
o 
4 
- 4 second order 
2 
- 2 first order 
___ - Right jettison pump' low Eressure lige::.:hc:.,:t:.....:O:..:n-=---_________ . _________ . ______ _ 
3 
- Left Centre tank level: Static 5 
- 1 first order 
- Left main tank level: Static 4 
- 4 second order 
___ . ...::.. Lef!j~tison flow transl1!i!ter ______ ... ___ . __ . ___ .. ____ .. _._ .... _ .. ___ . ___ ._ .. _ .. __ .... ____ .. _____ _ 
4 
- Left Centre tank level: Static 
- Left main tank level: Static 
- Left jettison flow transmitter: No flow 
- Left jettison nozzle valve position light: On 
7 5 
- In addition to above 
- Right jettison flow transmitter: Reduced flow 
- Right jettison nozzle valve position light: On 
I (after initial 4 deviations) 
- I second order 
4 (after 7 deviations) 
- 4 third order 
___ .. _ . .: Rig;htjetti~~~J2.':!..I!:lE_1.~~_E!:essure lig~!:_Q~___ ________ .__________ _____________ . ___ . _______ _ 
4 
- I second order - Left & right jettison flow transmitters: Flow 
- Left & right jettison nozzle switches: Armed 
6 
Table 6-15. Summary of Fuel Jettison Example Scenarios 
In a similar manner to the test cases illustrated for both the engine feed and pressure refuel 
operating modes, example scenarios are selected to cover the fuel jettison phases identified in 
Section 6.4.2. 
6.5777-200 Fuel System Application Review 
Individual digraphs are generated for the 777 fuel system operating modes. Sections of the fuel 
system which are considered to have no functional value in specific modes are disregarded 
during the digraph development phase. From the research conducted in Chapters Four and Five it 
is noted that an increase in system complexity leads to the development of larger digraph 
models. Through removing irrelevant sections of the system under investigation, simplified 
models with regards to size are created, thus addressing the issue raised in Chapter Four. This is 
exemplified in Sections 6.2.4, 6.3.4 and 6.4.4 where the revised system illustrations for the 
particular operating modes are presented. 
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The mass flow and signal structure associated with the three modes of operation is aptly 
modelled in the digraphs. However, it is noted that for future applications the development of 
both operator function and error nodes may facilitate a more precise modelling arrangement. The 
digraphs associated with the engine feed and fuel jettison modes incorporate pilot controlled loop 
structures. These relationships are represented by th~ connections between switch specific signal 
nodes and their respective controlled variable nodes. The pressure refuel mode incorporates both 
operator controlled and fully automatic loop structures. In the fully automatic case complete 
loops are formed in the digraph connecting the controlled variables to the FQPU. The control 
aspect in Chapter Six is encountered in much greater detail when compared with Chapter Four. 
Multi-component control structures are present with both pilot operated loops and override 
functions affecting similar variables. 
During the fault diagnostics procedure sections of the digraphs are masked depending on the 
specific operating mode phase. For example, if engin.e feed to the left engine occurs through the 
suction bypass valve (phase 5) then the only section of the left wing digraph (Figure 6-8) that is 
of relevance, with regards to the investigation, is that incorporating nodes LMTL ~ M40 ~ 
M49 ~ M50. This process aids in zooming-in on the branches of the digraph that are key to 
determining the diagnostic results for a scenario in a particular operating mode phase. More 
specifically, in the pressure refuel mode the fully integrated automatic refuel control loop is only 
considered should the system not be set to manual by the operator. Back-tracing in the automatic 
phase takes into account the loop operators discussed in Chapter Two. 
The rate of change in tank height is utilised in the pressure refuel and fuel jettison modes to 
highlight level deviations in terms of not increasing or decreasing sufficiently. The rate of 
change value in the engine feed mode is simply used to distinguish between increasing, 
decreasing and steady levels. Should the throttle position (from the propulsion system) be 
included into the analysis then incorporating the rate of change in height in a similar manner to 
the fuel jettison and pressure refuel modes would be a viable option. 
The fundamentals behind the application of the diagnostic strategy to the three operating modes 
are the same; intrinsic differences are described in the diagnostic considerations sections 
associated with each mode. The diagnostic results retrieved for the example scenarios in Sections 
6.3 - 6.4 are deemed valid given the transmitter readings and component failure modes identified 
for the system. The test cases input into the diagnostic program for a particular operating mode 
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consider dynamically changing phases. The diagnostic results yielded using the program are 
verified through conducting manual back-tracing; no deviations are noted between the results. 
The fault causes determined for the test cases are established as being valid after consultation 
with individuals within the Aeronautical & Automotive Engineering Department at 
Loughborough University who are familiar with the fuel system under investigation. Numerous 
results are, however, revealed for some test cases and therefore there is a requirement for honing-
in on the most likely fault cause. 
6.6 Summary 
• The fault diagnostics strategy outlined in Chapter Four is extended through application 
to the Boeing 777-200 fuel system. 
• Three modes of operation are taken into account; engine feed, pressure refuel and fuel 
jettison. 
• Individual digraphs are generated for each mode in order to simplify the process and 
produce digraph models that are considered to be of a manageable size. 
• The 'diagnostics procedure is automated in a similar manner to that conducted in 
Chapter Five for the fuel rig system. Redundancy elements associated with the Boeing 
777-200 fuel system are also modelled and integrated into the diagnostics procedure. 
• Control loop structures, both pilot controlled and automatic, are encountered in greater 
detail in the 777 fuel system. 
• It is unclear how interactions between an aircraft fuel system and propulsion system, 
for example, would be modelled. It is anticipated that further research regarding the 
modularity ofthe procedure is to produce a solution. 
• The next phase in the research however, is to investigate methods for determining the 
most probable fault cause from a list of diagnostic results for a given deviating 
scenano. 
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Chapter Seven 
Honing-in Mechanism 
Numerous fault options are yielded during the diagnostics process involving the deviating fuel 
system scenarios detailed in Chapter Six. A honing-in mechanism is therefore required as a 
means of locating the 'most likely' cause for a noted system malfunction. A method, based on 
reliability theory, is suggested. An extension to this involving the use of technical logs is also 
discussed. Finally, a procedure for reducing the digraph model size is suggested. The honing-in 
mechanism is applied to the faulty scenarios previously considered in Sections 6.2 - 6.4. 
7.1 Reduction in Diagnostic Fault Lists 
With regards to reduction, there are two avenues considered in this chapter. The first relates to 
reducing the size of the diagnostic lists, whilst the second suggests a method for decreasing the 
size of digraph models. The latter is discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter in Section 
7.5. The first method is based on the principle of retrieving the diagnostic results from the full 
analysis and then reducing the list through removing the component failure modes and simply 
listing the components which may be faulty. It is assumed that the operator conducting the 
diagnostic analysis is primarily interested in the actual component which is known to be faulty. 
For example, if Pipe X is noted as either leaking or ruptured, it is Pipe X which is of significance 
as opposed to the definitive failure mode. Simply identifying the faulty component aids in 
speeding up the diagnostic process. Should further information be required regarding the precise 
failure mode, an analyst is able to conduct a detailed investigation once the component has been 
inspected within the relevant system. 
The reduction procedure is applied to three test cases as a means of exemplifying the proposed 
process. A scenario is selected from each of the Boeing 777-200 operating mode sections in 
Chapter Six. 
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Engine Feed Test Case Three 
The diagnostic results retrieved from application of the digraph approach yield four second order 
fault combinations and sixteen combinations of both the orders three and four. Through 
considering the removal of specific failure modes and simply listing the relevant components, 
the fault list is cut down to twelve multiple faults, four of the orders two, three and four. The 
revised list is thus presented: 
(l)ABL.FBL ABL.P59 FBL.P58 P58.P59 
(2) LM.ABL.FBL LM.ABL.P59 LM.FBL.P58 LM.P58.P59 
(3) ABL.FBL.P55.P56 ABL.P59.P55.P56 FBL.P58.P55.P56 P55.P56.P58.P59 
Where; LM - left manifold, ABL - left aft boost pump, FBL - left forward boost pump, P55 -
Pipe 55, P56 - Pipe 56, P58 - Pipe 58, P59 - Pipe 59. 
Pressure Refuel Test Case Two 
Four faults of the order two are obtained for the given pressure refuel scenari~. Application of 
the reduction procedure does not decrease the size of the diagnostic list as follows: 
(1) LMORV.LMIRV LMORV.LMIFT LMIRV.LMOFT LMOFT.LMIF 
Where; LMORV - left main outboard refuel valve, LMIRV - left main inboard refuel valve, 
LMOFT -left main outboard flow tube, LMIFT -left main inboard flow tube. 
Fuel Jettison Test Case Five 
The digraph diagnostic process yields four multiple faults of the order three for the noted test 
case. Through the reduction process this is condensed to one: 
(1) JNVL.PI6.PI4 
Where; JNVL -left jettison nozzle valve, P14 - Pipe 14, P16 - Pipe 16. 
From the three example test cases it is noted that, depending on the precise component failure 
modes retrieved for the scenario under investigation, the reduction process may not have a 
noticeable effect. There is no decrease in the number of fault combinations listed for pressure 
refuel test case two. This is due to the fact that the failure modes retrieved from the initial 
analysis are all associated with separate components. There are no multiple failure modes linked 
to the same component as in the circumstances surrounding engine feed test case three and fuel 
jettison test case five. In both cases two and five, multiple failure modes relating to pipe faults 
are obtained. For scenarios where the process is applicable, it is effective in reducing the 
diagnostic list previously yielded and can also be implemented through programming. In order to 
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enhance the honing-in capabilities of the reduction process it may be used in conjunction with 
reliability theory. Further infonnation regarding the key areas behind reliability theory in this 
domain are expanded in Section 7.2. 
7.2 Reliability Theory 
Quantitative reliability is defined as the probability that an item, be it a component, equipment or 
system, will operate without failure for a stated period of time (t) under specified operating 
conditions. In short, reliability is a measure of the probability of successful component 
(equipment or system) perfonnance over time t. Reliability theory regarding unavailability 
functions and importance measures is utilised as a means for ranking the cut sets yielded from 
the fault diagnostics process accordingly. The fault combination results which are ranked, are 
those obtained when back-tracing within the system digraph from a specified deviating location. 
7.2.1 Unavailability Function 
The probability that a component or system does not work at any time t is tenned unavailability. 
The manner in which components or systems are maintained has a bearing on their respective 
unavailability. Maintenance repair policies are categorised into three basic sections: 
(i) No repair. 
(ii) Unscheduled maintenance whereby the repair process is initiated upon revealing a 
failure. 
(iii) Scheduled maintenance involving inspections at fixed, scheduled time intervals during 
which any repair processes, if required, are initiated. 
Continuous monitoring is utilised in the Boeing 777-200 fuel system scenano examples 
highlighted in Chapter Six. It is assumed, that wherever possible, a repair process would be 
initiated once a failure is revealed. The unavailability function (Q(t)) is given by Equation 7-1. 
Where; A - failure rate, t - time. 
Q(t) = _A_(l_e-(A(») 
A+V 
(Eq 7-1) 
Generic failure rate data [82] is used in equation 7-1 in order to quantify the unavailability of 
relevant fuel system components for a given deviating scenario. Companies may use either their 
own or the manufacturer's data, where available. It is also noted that the unavailability function 
may alter depending on the maintenance policy that is utilised by the system operator. 
. . 
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7.2.2 Cut Set Measure of Importance 
Probabilistic measures for importance assessment are utilised to both assess system availability 
and calculate top event probability of failure. The Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set 
importance ranks component failure combinations in order of their contribution to the top event. 
The top event in this case is the noted system deviation from whence back-tracing commences in 
the digraph. The Fussell-Vesely measure is illustrated in Equation 7-2: 
J. = P(C;) 
I QSys(q(t)) (Eq 7-2) 
The importance measure is defined as the probability of occurrence of cut set i [P(CJ] given that 
the system has failed (represented by the denominator in Eq 7-2). QSYS is calculated using the 
rare event approximation as opposed to calculating an exact value. No difference is noted in the 
ranking of the cut sets, for the examples used in this section, when considering either the rare 
event or exact values for QSys. Furthermore, for cases whereby many cut sets are produced, it is 
computationally demanding to determine an exact value for QSys. 
7.2.3 Procedure 
The generalised procedure for applying the reliability theory described in Sections 7.2.1 & 7.2.2 
to a list of retrieved failure combinations is described: 
(i) Obtain generic failure rate data for the relevant components if exact values are 
unknown. Ensure the failure rate data is in the format Jailures per second (fls). 
(ii) Calculate the unavailability of the relevant system components using Equation 7-1, 
where t is the time at which the corresponding system deviation(s) is noted. (The precise 
unavailability function may vary depending on the maintenance policy that is selected 
by the system operator, as mentioned in Section 7.2.1). 
(iii) Calculate the probability of the individual fault combinations using the component 
unavailability values. 
(iv) From the cut set probabilities formulate a value for QSYS USlllg the rare event 
approximation. 
(v) Rank the cut sets accordingly using the Fussell-Vesely measure. 
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7.3 Application of Honing-in Mechanism to Boeing 777-200 Results 
The honing-in mechanism, described in Section 7.2 is applied to the diagnostic results achieved 
for the Boeing 777-200 fuel system example scenarios highlighted in Chapter Six. The fault 
combinations yielded in Chapter Six for the three operating modes are ranked accordingly. The 
honing-in mechanism is only applied to those scenarios noting two or more failure combinations. 
The component failure mode codes referenced in this section have been defined in Tables 6-2, 
6-11 and 6-20. The generic failure rate data [82] utilised during the analysis of the relevant 
Boeing 777-200 fuel system components is illustrated in Table 7-1. 
Component 
Manifold [valve] 
Pipe [generic] (Flow tube) 
Pipe [pressure] 
Pump [jet] (Scavenger) 
Pump [motor] (Jettison, Boost) 
Sensor [flow] 
Sensor [level] 
Switch [control] (Valve, Pump etc) 
Switch [level float] 
Switch [pressure] 
Tank [pressure] 
Valve [check] (Suction bypass) 
Valve [diaphragm] (Drain) 
Valve [float actuated] (Inlet/Outlet float) 
Valve [motor actuated] (Spar, Cross-feed, Refuel) 
Valve [relief] (Vacuum relief) 
Failure Rate (fIMhrs) 
6.80E+00 
1.00E-04 
1.20E-04 
9.30E-Ol 
4.86E+Ol 
2.90E+Ol 
1.1 OE+O 1 
3.00E-02 
2.62E+Ol 
8.30E+00 
8.00E-02 
2.00E+00 
7.50E+00 
2.62E+Ol 
3.42E+00 
5.00E-03 
Valve relay position [electrical relay] (Valve position) 2.90E+00 
Table 7-1. Boeing 777-200 Component Failure Rate Data 
7.3.1 Engine Feed Example Scenarios 
Failure Rate (f/s) 
1.89E-09 
2.78E-14 
3.33E-14 
2.58E-1O 
1.35E-08 
8.06E-09 
3.06E-09 
8.33E-12 
7.28E-09 
2.31E-09 
2.22E-11 
5.56E-1O 
2.08E-09 
7.28E-09 
9.50E-1O 
1.39E-12 
8.06E-1O 
The test case scenarios referenced in this section are described in detail in Section 6.2.5. The 
procedural steps followed for ranking the fault combinations are highlighted for test case two. 
The ranking results for the remaining test cases are simply listed in order of the 'most probable'. 
Test Case Two 
Two failure combinations (LMB and P56B.P55B) are yielded through back-tracing from the 
location of the given deviation highlighted by the engine flow meter. Using the failure rate data 
from Table 7-1 in Equation 7-1, the unavailability for the relevant components is found to be 
within the range 1.7E-7 to 3E-12, as illustrated in Table 7-2. 
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Failure Mode Failure Rate (f/s) Time (s) Q(t) 
LMB 1.8888889E-09 90 1.6999999E-07 
P56B 3.3333333E-14 90 3.0000447E-12 
P55B 3.3333333E-14 90 3.0000447E-12 
Table 7-2. Test Case Two Component Unavailability 
The probability for a given cut set is calculated using the component unavailability values. 
Through transcribing this information into Equation 7-2 it is possible to determine the ranking 
order. The results achieved using the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance (li) are shown in 
Table 7-3. From Table 7-3 the most likely failure cause is deemed to be LMB (blockage in the 
left engine feed manifold). 
Test Case Three 
Min Cut Set (i) 
LMB 
P56B.P55B 
P(C;) 
1.699E-07 
9.000E-24 
QSYS 
1.699E-07 
1.699E-07 
I; 
- 1.000E+00 
5.294E-17 
Table 7-3. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Two) 
A total of thirty-six failure combinations are yielded for the given test case scenario. Values 
ascertained for the Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set importance range from 
approximately 1 to 5.487E-35. The top five ranked failure combinations are illustrated in Table 
7-4. The highest ranked failure combination involves the 'no running' of both the aft and 
forward boost pumps. 
Min Cut Set (i) I; 
ABLNR.FBLNR 9.999E-Ol 
ABLNR.P59B 2.469E-06 
P58B.FBLNR 2.469E-06 
LMB.ABLNR.FBLNR 1.699E-07 
P58B.P59B 6.096E-12 
Table 7-4. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Three) 
Test Case Four 
A total of six failure combinations are retrieved for test case four. Table 7-5 illustrates the 
ranking hierarchy, according to the values obtained from the cut set importance calculations. The 
results indicate that the single component failure mode OFVRC (right outlet float operated valve 
failed closed) is the most probable cause. 
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Min Cut Set (i) I j 
OFVRC 9.657E-Ol 
FSRNR 3.427E-02 
P21B 4.423E-06 
P20B.IFVRI 3.862E-12 
P20B.P22B 1.769E-17 
P20B.P23B 1.769E-17 
Table 7-5. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Four) 
Test Case Six 
Twenty-eight failure combinations are listed for test case six. The results achieved from the 
application of Equations 7-1 and 7-2, indicate a categorising of the cut sets into three distinct 
groups: 
(i) Cut sets of the order two yield an importance measure result of2.499E-Ol. 
(ii) Cut sets of the order three yield an importance measure result of 4.249E-OS. 
(iii) Cut sets of the order four yield an importance measure result of2.250E-24. 
The top four ranked cut sets are illustrated in Table 7-6. The four noted minimal cut sets have the 
same measure of importance since they are all combinations of pipe failures (P13 and PI4). Each 
pipe fault is given an identical failure probability from Table 7-1. 
Test Case Seven 
Min Cut Set (i) 
Pl3B.PI4B 
Pl3B.PI4F 
Pl3F.PI4PB 
PI3F.PI4F 
I j 
2.499E-Ol 
2.499E-Ol 
2.499E-Ol 
2.499£-01 
Table 7-6. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Six) 
Three single failure combinations are obtained for the gIven scenano. With regards to the 
ranking results illustrated in Table 7-7, the most likely failure for the deviation is a blockage in 
the left engine feed manifold. 
Min Cut Set (i) 
LMB 
BVLC 
P40B 
I j 
7.727£-01 
2.272£-01 
1.363£-05 
Table 7-7. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Seven) 
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7.3.2 Pressure Refuel Example Scenarios 
The pressure refuel test case scenarios referenced in this section are described in detail in Section 
6.3.5. In a similar manner to Section 7.3.1, the procedure followed for ranking the fault 
combinations is highlighted for test case two only. Table 7-10 illustrates the top ranked result for 
each of the pressure refuel example scenarios considered. More detailed ranking results for test 
cases three, four and six are documented in Appendix E. 
Test Case Two 
Four failure combinations are yielded through back-tracing from the location of the given 
deviations highlighted by the left main tank level transmitter and refuel lights. The relevant 
component failure rate data contained in Table 7-1 is input into Equation 7-1 to calculate the 
unavailability, as illustrated in Table 7-8. 
Failure Mode Failure Rate (f/s) Time (s) Q(t) 
LMORFC 9.500E-1O 60 5.700E-08 
LMIRFC 9.500E-1O 60 5.700E-08 
LMOFTB 2.778E-14 60 1.667E-12 
LMIFTB 2.778E-14 60 1.667E-12 
Table 7-8. Test Case Two Component Unavailability 
The probability for a given cut set is calculated using the component unavailability values. 
Through transcribing this infonnation into Equation 7-2 the ranking order is detennined. The 
results achieved using the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance are shown in Table 7-9. From 
Table 7-9 the most likely failure cause is deemed to be LMORFC.LMIFC (Left main outboard 
refuel valve failed closed AND Left main inboard refuel valve failed closed). 
Min Cut Set (i) P(Ci) QSYS Ii 
LMORFC.LMIRFC 3.249E-15 3.249E-15 9.999E-l 
LMORFC.LMIFTB 9.500E-20 3.249E-15 2.924E-5 
LMOFTB.LMIRFC 9.500E-20 3.249E-15 2.924E-5 
LMOFTB.LMIFTB 2.778E-24 3.249E-15 8.549E-1O 
Table 7-9. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Two) 
The most likely failure cause, detennined through application of the reliability theory procedure 
to the pressure refuel test cases which yield more than one fault after conducting the diagnostic 
process, are presented in Table 7-10. Test cases one, five and seven are not referenced in the 
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table; test case one is a no fault example scenario and only one failure combination is retrieved 
for test cases five and seven. 
Test Case Top Ranked Minimal Cut Set 
2 LMORFC.LMIRFC [left main outboard and inboard refuel valves failed closed] 
3 CRRFC [Centre right refuel valve failed closed] 
4 NFS(left) [No fuel supply to the left wing] 
6 NFS(left).NFS(right) [No fuel supply to the left and right wings] 
Table 7-10. Pressure Refuel Test Cases: Top Ranked Results 
7.3.3 Fuel Jettison Example Scenarios 
The fuel jettison test case scenarios referenced in this section are described in detail in Section 
6.4.5. In a similar manner to Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, the ranking procedural steps are 
highlighted for test case two only. 
Test Case Two 
Four failure combinations are yielded through back-tracing from the location of the gIven 
deviations highlighted by the left main and centre tank level transmitters and the left jettison 
flow transmitter. The relevant component failure rate data contained in Table 7-1 is input into 
Equation 7-1 to calculate the unavailability, as illustrated in Table 7-11. 
Failure Mode Failure Rate (f/s) Time (s) Q(t) 
JPLNR 1.350E-08 60 8.100E-07 
JOLNR 1.350E-08 60 8. 1 00E-07 
PIOB 3.333E-14 60 2.000E-12 
P12B 3.333E-14 60 2.000E-12 
Table 7-11. Test Case Two Component Unavailability 
The probability for a given cut set is calculated using the component unavailability values. 
Through transcribing this information into Equation 7-2 it is possible to determine the ranking 
order. The results achieved using the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance are shown in Table 
7-12. From Table 7-12 the most likely failure is deemed to be JPLNRJOLNR (Left jettison 
pump no run AND Left jettison/override pump no run). 
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Min Cut Set (i) P(C;) QSYS I; 
JPLNRJOLNR 6.561E-13 6.561E-13 9.999E-Ol 
JPLNR.PI2B 1.620E-18 6.561E-13 2.469E-06 
JOLNR.PlOB 1.620E-18 6.561E-13 2.469E-06 
PlOB.PI2B 4.000E-24 6.56lE-13 6.096E-12 
Table 7-12. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Two) 
The most likely failure cause, detennined through application of the reliability theory procedure 
to the fuel jettison test cases which yield more than one fault after conducting the diagnostic 
process, are presented in Table 7-13. Further infonnation is provided in Appendix E. In a similar 
manner to Table 7-10, test case one is not referenced since it is a no fault example scenario and 
the results for test case six only yield one failure combination. 
Test Case Top Ranked Minimal Cut Set 
2 JPLNR.JOLNR [Left jettison andjettisonloverride pumps no run failure] 
3 JPRNR [Right jettison pump no run] 
4 LMB [Left manifold blockage] 
5 JNVLC [Left jettison nozzle valve failed closed] 
Table 7-13. Fuel Jettison Test Cases: Top Ranked Results 
7.3.4 Application of Reliability Theory to Reduced Diagnostic Fault List 
The reliability theory procedure is applied to the reduced diagnostic list retrieved from Section 
7.1 for the engine feed mode test case three. The procedure followed is identical to that 
conducted in Sections 7.3.1 ~ 7.3.3. 
Twelve component failure combinations are yielded through application of the reduction process 
to test case three. The relevant component failure rate data contained in Table 7-1 is input into 
Equation 7-1 to calculate the unavailability [Q(t)], as illustrated in Table 7-14. 
Component Failure Rate (f/s) Time (s) Q(t) 
LM 1.889E-09 90 1.700E-07 
ABL 1.350E-08 90 1.215E-06 
FBL 1.350E-08 90 1.215E-06 
P55 3.333E-14 90 3.000E-12 
P56 3.333E-14 90 3.000E-12 
P58 3.333E-14 90 3.000E-12 
P59 3.333E-14 90 3.000E-12 
Table 7-14. Test Case Two Component Unavailability 
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The probability for a given component cut set is calculated using the component unavailability 
values. Through transcribing this information into Equation 7-2 it is possible to determine the 
ranking order. The results achieved using the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance (Ii) are 
shown in Table 7-15, where the top five ranked faulty component combinations are listed. On 
comparing the results achieved from Table 7-15 with those in Table 7-4, it is noticed that the 
ranking order remains unaltered. The only differences are associated with the numeric values 
obtained for QSYS and Ii. This is explained by the reduced diagnostic fault list considered for test 
case three in this section. With the removal of specific failure modes the number of minimal cut 
sets is decreased thus resulting in a different value being obtained for QSys. Following on from 
this, the cut set measure of importance is also altered since it is a function of QSys. For the 
engine feed mode test case three it is determined that reducing the diagnostic fault list and then 
utilising reliability theory to rank the component cut sets does not have an adverse effect on the 
ranking procedure. 
Component P(C j) QSYS I j Min Cut Set (i) 
ABL.FBL 1.823E-16 -1.823E-16 9.999E-OI 
ABL.P59 4.500E-22 -1.823E-16 2.469E-06 
FBL.P58 4.500E-22 -1.823E-16 2.469E-06 
LM.ABL.FBL 3.443E-25 -1.823E-16 1.889E-09 
P58.P59 l.lllE-27 -1.823E-16 6.097E-12 
Table 7-15. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Two) 
7.4 Extension to Honing-in Mechanism 
The honing-in mechanism described in Section 7.2 and applied in Section 7.3, relies on ranking 
the failure combinations yielded for a given scenario according to the importance measure values 
obtained. The cut sets are ultimately ranked through the use of generic failure rate data. A 
possible drawback associated with the method involves the fact that the failure combination 
identified as the 'most likely' fault cause may in fact not be the actual cause of the registered 
system deviation(s). Consequently, an extension to the honing-in method that may highlight such 
cases is required. An ideal situation would entail placing sensors wherever possible in the system 
under investigation, in order to determine the actual cause without the need for honing-in 
mechanisms. There are clear disadvantages linked to this procedure which centre on over-
complexity, application system mass issues and additional time required during system design 
phases. System mass issues refer to the additional mass involved with the inclusion of more 
sensors into a system and their respective components (e.g. increased wiring, control units). An 
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extension to the honing-in mechanism previously described in Section 7.1, is proposed based on 
technical logs. 
Technical logs for differing systems note numerous dissimilarities. Aircraft technical logs are 
referenced in this section since the primary application system, to which this method will be 
applied and analysed, is the Boeing 777-200 fuel system. Please note, for the benefit of 
anonymity, the airline from which the technical log structure has been obtained is not referenced. 
The complete aircraft technical log consists of three volumes: 
(i) Aircraft Technical Log 
(ii) Cabin Discrepancy Log 
(iii) In Flight Entertainment Defect Log 
The complete aircraft technical log reflects the current status of defects, repairs, replacements, 
adjustments and inspections whilst the aircraft is in service. The entries placed in the log form a 
permanent part of the aircraft records. 
The extension method proposed considers part one of the complete aircraft technical log since it 
is the only branch of relevance regarding the application system. The cabin discrepancy log is 
used for the purpose of recording defects within an aircraft cabin such as damage to the main 
aircraft structure or doors. The in flight entertainment (lFE) defect log is simply used for 
recording defects within the IFE systems. 
The main content of interest in the aircraft technical log, as required for background knowledge 
of the proposed honing-in mechanism extension, is: 
• Active Concessions 
A concession is an approval to operate the aircraft with a defect that is either not 
covered by the minimum equipment list (MEL) or dispatch is not permitted by the 
MEL. It is considered commonplace for limitations to apply regarding the operation of 
the aircraft should an active concession be in place. 
• Certificate of Maintenance Review (CMR) 
An aircraft is not permitted to be dispatched once the CMR has expired. A CMR is 
comprised from a variety of checks including compliance of airworthiness directives 
and assessment of maintenance schedules. 
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• Maintenance Statements 
An aircraft is not permitted to be dispatched when a scheduled maintenance inspection 
is due as recorded in the technical log. 
• Aircraft Damage Charts 
The location of known external damage to aircraft, including windshields, is detailed in 
an aircraft damage chart. If further action, such as repeat inspection or permanent 
repair, is required a deferred defect (described later) is raised. 
• Sector Record Page 
Basic information regarding the aircraft and flight details are input into the Sector 
Record. Maintenance personnel also note the status of all fluid levels (fuel, oil, 
hydraulic). A specific area of consequence relates to the 'maintenance check 
accomplished' section. There are three types of applicable checks. A transit check is 
performed when an aircraft transits through a station without a daily check being 
performed. If a transit check has been performed a pre-departure inspection is not 
necessary (PDI). A pre-departure inspection is necessary only if a daily check has been 
conducted. Aircraft are required to be within the coverage period of the most recent 
daily check. A daily check is considered valid for 48 hours for a Boeing 777. 
• Sector Record Page (Defects) 
- Entering Defects 
The defect block of the Sector Record is completed by either the flight crew for 
noting any defects that have occurred in flight or by the maintenance crew for 
defects observed on the ground. The defect description entered by the crew 
describes the symptoms and additional work requirements accurately and 
precisely. 
- Action of Defects 
The action block describes clearly and concisely the work required to certify the 
aircraft and produce a Certificate of Release to Service. During defect 
rectification, should new components be used the new details are input alongside 
those of the components replaced. 
- Deferring of Defects 
If a defect is not cleared and it is considered acceptable for the aircraft to continue 
in service, details of the entire defect are transferred to the Deferred Defect 
Record. There are two main types of deferred defect that are of relevance. A line 
deferred defect is one that occurs during normal line maintenance operations of 
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the aircraft and cannot be corrected prior to the next aircraft dispatch. A base 
deferred defect is not nonnally apparent during the line operations of the aircraft 
and is usually used to record defects discovered during routine inspections. 
- Action of Deferred Defects 
Once a deferred defect is acted upon the full deferred defect infonnation is re-
entered in the Deferred Defects section of the Sector Record and actioned 
accordingly. 
• Fault Reporting Manual (FRM) 
The Boeing FRM lists possible aircraft defects and an associated fault reporting 
number. An engineer is then able to refer to the Fault Isolation Manual regarding the 
procedure specified by Boeing for the reported fault. 
On entering a defect into the technical log, the Certificate of Airworthiness is invalidated and 
thus a Certificate of Release to Service must be signed in order to return the aircraft to legal 
airworthiness. 
The extension to the honing-in mechanism using aircraft technical logs is applicable once the 
initial analysis, based on reliability theory, has been conducted. Throughout the analysis it is 
assumed that the aircraft holds a valid Certificate of Airworthiness and all relevant maintenance 
checks have been conducted before departure. The proposed extension procedure to be followed 
is expanded: 
(i) The 'Defect' section of the Sector Record is referenced. 
(ii) The list of defect descriptions is cross-referenced with the ranked failure combinations. 
Any failure combinations that are not associated with the noted defects are initially 
masked. 
(iii) The action taken by maintenance personnel is then researched. From the noted defects 
in the technical log it is possible to re-rank the cut sets accordingly. The revised ranking 
is dependent on the categories in which the defects are listed. The severity order of the 
categories (high to low) is noted: 
- Concession: If a fault cannot be rectified, it may be deferred under the provisions 
of the MEL with a concession applied to allow dispatch. A concession is issued as 
a 'one-off special procedure to allow the aircraft to be operated strictly for the 
purpose of returning or proceeding to a place where it is deemed reasonably 
practical to conduct the necessary repairs. 
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- Deferred: A deferred defect is considered acceptable for an aircraft to remain in 
service 
- Rectified: Detail of the work conducted is noted in the 'action' block. When 
components are used in defect rectification the new component details are entered 
alongside those of the component replaced. The defect item, serial, part and stores 
numbers are noted. 
- Action arising from noted airframe corrosion is recorded in both the Airframe 
Damage Chart and Defect Sector, should repeat inspection or repair be necessary. 
(iv) For scenarios involving fault combinations that are not associated with the entered 
defects, technical engineering knowledge of the system must be used to locate the actual 
system fault within the ranked results list, previously obtained using reliability theory.' 
The extension method is based upon the presumption that 'NIL DEFECTS' is not entered in the 
Defect section of the Sector Record. For scenarios incorporating no defects in the technical log, 
the initial honing-in results achieved must be followed in-hand with experienced technical 
acumen, should it be deemed necessary to alter the ranking order. 
7.4.1 Application of Extension Mechanism 
The extension to the honing-in mechanism is applied to the diagnostic results achieved from two 
Boeing 777-200 fuel system example scenarios highlighted in Section 7.3.1. The test cases are 
taken from the engine feed operating mode phase. 
Test Case Two 
The diagnostic results for the given test case yield two faults, one first order and one second 
order. The initial honing-in mechanism ranks the failures in the order: 
(i) LMB (left manifold blocked). 
(ii) P56B.P55B (Pipes at location 56 and 55 blocked). 
From the aircraft technical log it is noted that: 
(i) The aircraft recently underwent a scheduled maintenance review during which the left 
spar valve in the engine feed manifold was replaced along with partial manifold 
resealing work. 
(ii) There are no deferred fuel system defects listed. 
(iii) Daily and PDI checks revealed no fuel system defects. 
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Since the noted fuel system repair work was conducted on components associated with the 
engine feed manifold, the most probable fault cause is deemed to be a blockage in the left 
manifold. It is likely that a foreign object, left by maintenance after undertaking repairs, resulted 
in the blockage. In test case two, both the initial honing-in mechanism and the extension to the 
method list 'LMB' as the most probable fault cause. 
Test Case Three 
Thirty-six failure combinations are retrieved for the noted deviations in test case three. The 
initial honing-in mechanism ranks the multiple fault ABLNR.FBLNR as the top failure likely to 
cause the registered system deviations. 
From the aircraft technical log it is noted that: 
(i) The Certificate of Maintenance Review is in date. 
(ii) After the previous flight, fuel system defects were input in the technical log by the 
captain. The defects were associated with the activation of the left ~el boost pump low 
pressure lights. No issues however, were noted regarding the flow of fuel into the left 
engme. 
(iii) From the 'defect action' section it is noted that maintenance personnel rectified the fault 
by replacing two electrical components. 
(iv) Maintenance also revealed a minor leak in the left engine feed manifold at the spar 
valve connection point. The necessary rectification work was conducted. 
(v) All defect action was deemed suitable to allow for the Certificate of Release to Service 
for the specified aircraft. 
The technical information logged leads the analysis towards two potential failure combinations: 
(i) LMB.ABLNR.FBLNR 
(ii) ABLNR.FBLNR 
Where; LMB - left manifold blocked, ABLNR - left aft boost pump no run, FBLNR - left 
forward boost pump no run. 
Since electrical components related to the functioning of the fuel boost pumps were replaced it is 
considered highly probable for a pump failure to have occurred. Furthermore, from the 
maintenance action conducted on the engine feed manifold, a foreign object may have been left 
in the system thus leading to an additional failure involving a 'manifold blockage'. Further 
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investigation of the actual components would be necessary in order to distinguish between the 
two highlighted failure causes_ 
One specific feature of the extension to the honing-in mechanism is that it is utilises the detailed 
information logged by expert maintenance personnel and therefore can be deemed highly 
accurate. However, as the information is compiled by a human it is subjective and would 
therefore be difficult to incorporate into an automated tool. A potential downside is that by being 
based upon the technical log of a specific aircraft, the outlined procedure would have to be 
adapted for other types since each associated technical log possesses a unique structure and 
varying features. The benefit associated with this is that since the mechanism is based upon 
individual aircraft history, the resulting analysis will be more precise with respect to the system 
under investigation. In the majority of cases involving severe failures, the cause has often been 
found to be directly related to one of the most recent maintenance issues. 
7.5 Reduction in Digraph Model Size 
The digraphs generated in Chapters Five and Six are constructed from numerous nodes; the 
larger the system under investigation, the larger the size of the digraph. Digraph models for 
complex systems may become unwieldy when illustrating the inter-relationships which exist 
between process variables and component failure modes. A method suggested for overcoming 
this noted deficit involves grouping component failure modes, which lead to a similar deviation, 
into a single node. This procedure is exemplified using the illustration of the centre and main 
tank fuel pump and manifold digraph from Figure 6-8. The component failure mode nodes 
giving rise to the same disturbance are amalgamated as shown in the revised digraph (Figure 7-
1). The most common categorising of faults involves pipe partial blockage (P_PB) and fracture 
(P_F) failures. This is demonstrated by the component failure mode nodes associated with the 
mass flow process variables in Figure 7-1. In Figure 6-8 mass flow node M50 is directly affected 
by six component failure mode nodes_ This is reduced to three in Figure 7-1 using the groupings: 
(i) SVLO leading to a large positive deviation (+10). 
(ii) LMB and SVLC leading to a large negative deviation (+ 10). 
(iii) LMPB, LMF and SVLI leading to a small negative deviation (-1). 
It is noted that similar relationships are evident at the remaining process variable nodes in the 
digraph. In total, Figure 7-1 is constructed from 98 nodes in comparison with the 115 nodes 
contained in Figure 6-8. 
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In addition to the honing-in mechanisms described in Sections 7.1 - 7.3, a procedure for 
reducing the number of fault causes yielded for a given deviating scenario is expanded. Failures 
associated with similar components are grouped together. For example, back-tracing from node 
M48(-I) to LMTL in Figure 7-1 yields five failures, four of which are pipe faults (P56PB, P56F, 
P59PB, P59F). Without inspecting the pipes it is difficult to locate the precise fault site and so 
differentiating between the two locations is impossible. The proposed solution to reduce the size 
of the obtained faults list is to group the pipes into sections. Thus, for the example involving 
node M48 only two pipe faults would be yielded (pipe section X partially blocked and pipe 
section X fractured). A similar understanding can be applied to valve failures in a given section, 
even if the valves belong to different genres (e.g. powered isolation and back pressure). The key 
issue is for the failure type to be identical (e.g. valve failed closed). 
To lefl enQne 
(f1owlftttn) 
+1 
+l 
+1 
Figure 7-1. Reduced Centre & Main Tank Fuel Pump and Manifold Digraph (Left Wing) 
Test case three from the engine feed scenanos in Chapter Six (reference Section 6.2.5.3) is 
employed in order to illustrate the manner in which the obtained results list can be reduced. The 
failure causes determined in Chapter Six are displayed in Table 7-16 along with their respective 
reduced fault cause, if reduction is a viable option. 
Thirty-six failures are retrieved in Chapter Six for the given scenario. Through following the 
reduction process the total number of fault causes is condensed to twenty-two. It is noted that 
nine of the original faults determined remain 'unreduced'. In Table 7-16 identical pipe partial 
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blockage and fracture failures are joined using the notation 'PB/F'. Pipe failures associated with 
a similar section within the system are allocated section letters. For test case three, Pipes 55 and 
'58 are referred to as 'X' whilst Pipes 56 and 59 are referred to as 'Y'. 
Chapter Six Chapter Seven Chapter Six Chapter Seven 
ABLNR.FBLNR ABLNR.P59B 
-----_._ ... _ ...-. __ . __ .. __ . __ ... _--_ .. _-----_._-.... _-_ .... _ .... _._. __ . __ .... __ ._----_ .... _-._._-.... _ ... _-_ ... _-
P588.P59B P588.FBLNR 
LM8.ABLNR.FBLNR 
····_--------·1---- ----------
------------
LM8.ABLNR.P59B 
LM8.ABLNR.P59PB 
LM8.ABLNR.P59F 
LM8.ABLNR.P59PB/F 
LM8.P58P8.FBLNR 
LM8.P58F.FBLNR 
LM8.P58P8.P59B 
LM8.P58F.P59B 
LM8.P588.FBLNR LM8.P58P8.P59PB 
LMB.P58B.P59B LM8.P58F.P59PB 
LMB.P588.P59PB 
LM8.P588.P59F 
LM8.P588.P59PBIF 
LM8.P58P8.P59F 
LM8.P58F.P59F 
LM8.P58PB/F.FBLNR 
LMB.P58PB/F.P59B 
LM8.P58PB/F.P59PB/F 
.. _ .... -.. -._ ...... __ . __ .. __ ..... _. __ ..... __ ._---.---- ._ .... _. __ ._ .. _ ..... __ ._-_._-_._--_ .. _---_._._ .. _ .. _._ .. _-
P568.P558.ABLNR.FBLNR 
----_._----------
P568.P558.ABLNR.P59B PY8.P55B.ABLNR 
P568.P558.P58P8.FBLNR 
P568.P558.P58F.FBLNR 
P568.P558.ABLNR.P59PB P568.P558.P58P8.P59B 
P568.P558.P58PB/F.FBLNR 
P56B.P55B.ABLNR.P59PB/F PY8.P558.P58PB/F 
P568.P558.ABLNR.P59F P568.P558.P58F.P59B 
P568.P558.P588.FBLNR 
P568.P558.P588.P59B 
P56B.P558.P588.P59PB 
P568.P558.P58B.P59F 
P568.PXB.FBLNR 
PX8.PYB 
P568.PXB.P59PB/F 
P56B.P55B.P58PB.P59PB 
P56B.P558.P58F.P59PB 
P568.P558.P58PB.P59F 
P568.P558.P58F.P59F 
Where; '---': Same as previous column, 'X': Pipes 55 and 58, 'V': Pipes 56 and 59. 
P56B.P55B.P58PB/F.P59PB/F 
Table 7-16. Comparison of Results Retrieved for Engine Feed Test Case Three in Chapters Six & Seven 
The procedure followed in the noted example aids in reducing both the size of the digraph model 
and the retrieved fault diagnostic list. The method described in Section 7.1 is however more 
efficient in condensing the fault list obtained from conducting the diagnostic process. Should the 
actual failure modes be of more .significance to an analyst, over the highlighting of individual 
faulty components, then the method applied in this section is of greater use when compared with 
the results listed in Section 7.1. 
There are complications associated with the procedure suggested for reducing the size of digraph 
models. The joining of failures which lead to the same deviation is considered relatively 
straightforward by the manner in which it is conducted. The main issue regards dynamic 
scenarios whereby failure modes may give rise to a similar deviation but cause different effects. 
For example, a valve closure, pipe blockage and pipe rupture are all considered to have a large 
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negative effect on mass flow at a given location. Both a closure and blockage result in the non-
transferral of fluid through the pipe. A rupture, however, causes both the non-transferral of fluid 
through the pipe and spillage through the pipe fracture. Consequently, grouping these failures 
together and implying that they lead to the same effect is erroneous. It is therefore assumed 
necessary that rules be created depending on both the system and scenario which is under 
investigation. 
Overall, the method described in Section 7.1 is considered the most effective since it is presumed 
that both the engineer and maintenance personnel will be most interested in the actual 
component that may be faulty, as opposed to the failure mode. Through simply noting the 
locations of the faulty components, the operator is provided with essential maintenance 
information. This in turn aids in speeding up the maintenance response and decreasing system 
downtime. 
7.6 Summary 
• A method for retrieving the 'most likely' cause for a given deviating system scenario is 
determined. 
• The proposed honing-in mechanism is a two-step process based on the use of both 
reliability theory and technical log data. 
• Two forms of reduction are considered. 
(i) Reduction of a diagnostic fault list is instigated through removing the individual 
component failure modes and only noting the relevant faulty components for the 
gtven scenano. 
(ii) Reduction in digraph model sizes is suggested by combining component failure 
mode nodes which give rise to an identical disturbance on an associated process 
variable. 
• The ranked results obtained from the application of the mechanism to the Boeing 777-
200 fuel system scenarios appear credible given the generic failure rate data utilised. 
• Development of a perfect honing-in mechanism is considered unfeasible However, the 
procedural steps developed in Chapter Seven illustrate a potential method for ranking 
, the failure combinations of a specific system malfunction. 
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Chapter Eight 
Mechanism for Modularisation 
The digraph approach described in Chapter Four is applied predominantly to systems involving 
mass flow as the primary variable of significance. In Chapter Six an aircraft sub-system; the fuel 
system, is considered. The results from which raised the possibility of investigating the potential 
for developing a digraph model of a complete system under investigation and thus extending the 
diagnostic strategy to include further sub-systems. The prospective procedure for conducting this 
future research is explored. Following on from the aircraft fuel system in Chapter Six, a civil 
aircraft is used for demonstrative purposes. 
8.1 System Architecture 
A modem civil aircraft is represented by a collection of sub-systems, as illustrated in Figure 8-1 ; 
each of which is designed to perform a specific task and act in a synergistic manner: 
• Airframe. 
• Vehicle Systems. 
• A vionic Systems. 
I 
I Airframe! St111ctm'e I 
Fuselage 
"'~s 
A.ero-dynamics 
Structural Integrity 
1 __________________ _ 
I Civil Aircraft I 
I Vehicle Systems I 
Propulsion 
Fuel 
Flight Control 
Hydraulics , 
EmrUorunental Control, 
Pressurization , 
1 ______ ------- ______ 1 
I 
I Aviollic System~ 
Na\rigation 
Displays & Controls 
Conuns 
Warnings 
1 ______ -------------
Figure 8-1. Civil Aircraft as a Set of Subsystems 
I 
The airframe is comprised from an extremely complex and integrated set of structural 
components. It carries various loads and stresses throughout the structure, and for this reason is 
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referred to as a system. Any failures associated with the airframe are considered in the 
diagnostics of the vehicle systems, as illustrated in Chapter Six. In this case a tank leakage due to 
a faulty wing seal is taken into account. 
Vehicle systems are commonly referred to as general systems. Systems within this category can 
affect flight safety and thus, whilst they cover a range of characteristics and functions, failure to 
operate one of the systems correctly may lead to a hazardous situation. A brief description of the 
main elements found in this category is provided: 
(i) Propulsion system: provides the primary source of thrust and motive power. 
(ii) Fuel system: provides a source of fuel for the propulsion system (aircraft engines). 
(iii) Flight control system: converts pilot and guidance system commands into control 
surface movements to control the aircraft altitude and manoeuvres. 
(iv) Hydraulic power generation and distribution: generates hydraulic power from engine 
connected pumps and distributes to connected systems. 
(v) Landing gear: ensures the aircraft is able to land safely on all runway surfaces with a 
range ofloads. 
(vi) Brakes / antiskid: provides a safe form of braking without loss of adhesion on all 
runway surfaces under a range a loads. 
(vii) Steering: provides a means for steering the aircraft under its own power or whilst being 
towed. 
(viii)Environmental control system: provides air at a preset temperature and humidity level 
to the cockpit and cabin. 
(ix) Pressurization: establishes a pressure setting that is comfortable for both the cockpit and 
cabin. 
(x) Emergency power generation: provides an emergency source to allow safe recovery of 
the aircraft in the event of a major power loss. 
(xi) Ice protection: external ambient conditions are monitored to detect and prevent the build 
up of ice. 
(xii) Probe heating: ensures the sensor probes on the external aircraft skin remain free of ice. 
(xiii)Fire protection: monitors all bays where there is the potential hazard of fire, smoke or 
overheating and warns crew members as and when is appropriate. 
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The avionics system enables the aircraft to fulfil its operational role through performing the 
collection, processing and transferring of, as well as responding to data. The avionics category 
comprises: 
(i) Navigation: provides a world-wide and high accuracy navigation capability. 
(ii) Displays and control: provides the crew with information and warnings related to the 
operation of the aircraft. 
(iii) Communications (comms): provides a means of communication between the pilot and 
the air traffic control tower and/or other aircraft. 
(iv) Flight management system: contains flight plans thus allowing for the automatic control 
of the aircraft. 
(v) Automated landing system: provides the capability for automatic landing and approach. 
(vi) Weather radar: provides infonnation on the weather and visibility conditions. 
(vii) Warning systems (traffic collision avoidance, ground proximity): reduces the risk of a 
collision with other aircraft or the ground. 
(viii)Measurement systems: provides information regarding distance from allocated beacons, 
altitude, air speed and Mach number. 
(ix) Accident data recorder: continuously records specified aircraft parameters for use in 
analysis of accidents. 
(x) Cockpit voice recorder: continuously records aircrew speech for use in analysis of 
accidents. 
General Systems Avionic Systems 
Provide source of fuel and propUlsion Provide navigation, COllUM and aircraft 
for the aircraft and cooling (or heating) display and control functions. 
for the crew, passengers and equipment. 
I I 
DATi'.BUS 
Cabin Systems 
Provide passenger services. 
E.g. Entettainment., communciation, 
safety fe ature s (oxygen masks). 
Figure 8-2. Civil Aircraft Top Level System Architecture 
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Figure 8-2 illustrates the top level system architecture for a civil aircraft. The aircraft systems are 
contained in specific groups with a common means for communication (data bus). The integrity 
requirements for each group varies. General systems are considered safety critical and thus must 
be designed with the intention for failure being remote, since the occurrence of failure is likely to 
endanger both crew members and passengers. A vionic systems are described as safety involved 
and loss of such may place the aircraft in a hazardous situation. The loss of cabin and 
entertainment systems is safety tolerable; however it may lead to passenger unrest. 
8.1.1 Integration of Aircraft Systems 
The systems highlighted in Figure 8-3 contribute towards the overall aircraft function. The loss 
of anyone system denies the normal operation of those remaining due to interdependencies 
which exist. A brief example describing these interrelationships is expanded. 
The flight control system is of no functional value should the aircraft not have sufficient thrust 
allowing it to follow a designated strategy. The propulsion (engine control) system is in turn 
reliant on the energy source provided by the fuel system. The flight control system is also 
incapable of operating without electrical power activating the control computers (and displays) 
or hydraulic power providing the actuator 'muscle'. The pilot is unable to fly the aircraft safely 
within the designated flight envelope should data regarding the aircraft attitude and surroundings 
be unavailable. In addition, air data is required in order for flight control and engine system 
contro11aws to be executed both effectively and efficiently. 
Fuel System Air Data System I-*--~ Flight Control System 
~ / 
Attitude System Aircraft Function Engine Control System / 
Elecuical System Hydraulic System 
Figure 8-3. Aircraft System Integration 
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The key elements of the avionics system and their interactions are illustrated in Figure 8-4. The 
four main categories identified along with their functions are: 
(i) Navigation: flight management, inertial navigation, satellite navigation. 
(ii) Flight control: fly by wire, air data, attitude, autopilot, auto-throttle. 
(iii) Comms: traffic collision avoidance system, satellite communication, high frequency and 
very high frequency communication. 
(iv) Displays: primary display units (E.g. EICAS), system overhead panels, equipment 
control panels, multipurpose control and display units. 
Navi.,.aation Flight Control 
Comms Di~L'ys 
Figure 8-4. Major Avionic Systems Interrelationships 
8.2 Incorporation of Sub-System Diagnostics (Digraph Approach) 
The potential for expanding the fault diagnosis strategy developed in Chapter Four and further 
analysed in Chapters Five and Six is investigated. Emphasis is placed on firstly developing a 
topology digraph model (Section 8.2.1) of the system under investigation. The anticipated fault 
diagnosis process is described in Section 8.2.2. A civil aircraft is used to exemplify the steps 
involved in following the noted procedures. 
8.2.1 Digraph Development 
Three stages are identified for the development of a complete system digraph. 
(i) The individual systems are considered to be modules. In a civil aircraft, to name a few, 
this would include fuel, electrical and hydraulic systems, as illustrated in Figure 8-3. A 
top level system digraph is generated from a collection of module nodes. The edges 
connecting the nodes represent the interdependencies which exist. The edges remain 
unsigned since some modules possess a two-way positive relationship. The aim at this 
stage is to indicate the direction of dependencies between modules. The top level 
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system digraph is generated from data regarding the system architecture under 
investigation. 
(ii) For each module node an integrated sub-system digraph is formed, illustrating the 
specific 'functions' which are controlled in a given mode of operation. For example, the 
engine control system in the Boeing 777-200 comprises two engines and thus two sub-
system nodes would represent the propulsion units. Edges connecting the nodes indicate 
the relationships which exist between sub-systems in either the same or different 
modules. Three of the discrete values employed in standard edge signing are used to 
indicate the extent of the exhibited relationships; + 1, 0 and -1. The aim at this stage is to 
indicate if the relationships which exist are positive, negative or cause nullification. 
(iii) The sub-system digraph nodes are expanded to reveal the exact interrelationships which 
exist between the relevant components. The process followed at this stage is similar to 
that described in the digraph development phase in Section 4.1.1. 
A flowchart illustrating the general procedure identified in Steps (i) - (iii) is presented in Figure 
8-5. 
Step One: 
Develop top 
displaying the 
modules. 
level system digraph 
inter-relationships between 
Module nodes are represented using solid-
line ovals. 
Step Two: 
Generate sub-system digraphs for each 
identified operating mode. 
Sub-system nodes are represented using 
dotted-line circles. 
Step Three: 
Expand sub-system digraph nodes. 
Process variable and component failure 
mode nodes are represented using solid-line 
circles. 
Figure 8-5. Digraph Development Flowchart 
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With regards to the identification and classification of digraph nodes (more specifically in Steps 
(i) and (ii)), it is necessary for the analyst conducting the investigation to be aware of the 
information and data that is to be included. The categorising of the overall system into modules 
and sub-system nodes may arise through addressing an FM EA style table breakdown of the 
system. It is considered highly probable that an FMEA would have been produced for a safety 
. case and therefore an analyst is able to use information that is already in existence to aid the 
digraph development procedure. 
During the digraph development phase it is anticipated that specific components may be 
identified as affecting more than one system, or that systems may share common components. 
These forms of dependency must therefore be considered in any analysis; starting with the 
identification of such components. The actual function performed by the component is of 
primary significance, since failure of the component may lead to different disturbances in 
relevant systems. The proposed solution for illustrating the dependencies between sub-system 
nodes is to employ a novel styled edge that indicates the type of dependency and expected 
disturbance on the system, given the extent of the component deviation. 
A simple example is related to an electrical failure which affects the traffic light sequencing at a 
junction. It is assumed that a failure has occurred and the lights for cars approaching from the 
North remain red, whilst the lights for cars approaching from the South remain green. The 
electrical fault leads to a light failure in both cases; the effect however is different. It would 
therefore be necessary for a digraph representation to illustrate this fact; noting that for the given 
fault, cars in one direction are stopped at the lights whilst cars from the opposite direction are 
able to permanently pass through. 
8.2.2 Fault Diagnostic Approach 
The proposed diagnostics strategy is primarily based on the procedure described in Section 4.1.2. 
The exact system digraph formation utilised during the diagnostics phase is dependent on the 
operating mode of the aircraft. For example, the engine feed phase during flight can be sub-
divided into normal and emergency power modes. The emergency power mode is considered 
should a failure arise with regards to obtaining propulsive power from the engines. Under these 
circumstances only necessary aircraft functions are undertaken with the electrical and hydraulic 
systems powered by either a ram air turbine or permanent magnet generator. 
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Six stages are identified for the fault diagnosis strategy: 
(i) The retrieved readings from all module system indicators are compared with those 
expected for the given operating phase of the aircraft. During this stage all transmitter 
readings, indication lights and switch positions are taken into consideration. 
(ii) System deviations, if present, are identified from the comparison phase. 
(iii) Modules displaying no deviations are flagged. It is assumed that the components within 
the module function as per the operating mode and are therefore not included in the 
diagnostics process. 
(iv) The deviating variables III non-flagged modules are examined in more detail to 
highlight potential fault propagation routes for the variables under investigation. Non-
deviating sections of the module nodes, as identified in the expanded sub-system 
digraph, are flagged. For example, in a scenario which involves purely flow deviations 
in the fuel system with no lights indicating a pump or switch failure, the fault 
propagation will most probably only take into account pipe and valve component failure 
modes upstream ofthe noted deviation (reference Chapter Six). 
(v) Possible component failure modes are determined through conducting back-tracing 
from known deviating nodes in the sub-system digraphs in a similar manner to the 
procedure described in Section 4.1.2. 
(vi) Engineering and system experience must be called upon to determine whether a failure 
in one specific module has led to the registering of deviations in another. In this manner, 
it must be decided whether a fault has actually occurred in a deviating module. For 
example, if a fuel cock in an aircraft engine fails closed during the engine feed phase, 
fuel flow is unable to pass from the tank to the engine. Consequently, a non-decreasing 
tank level and no flow at the engine inlet is registered along with no propulsive power 
from the engine in question. In this case deviation,S are noted in two modules, the actual 
fault however is only present in one. The fuel cock closure is noted by an indicating 
light in the cockpit. Whilst back-tracing from the registered deviating nodes, the 
possibility of faults being present within both the fuel and propulsion systems is 
recorded. An individual familiar with the system is more likely to conclude that a single 
fault in the propulsion system (given the fuel cock indicating light) led to the overall 
failure. 
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8.2.3 Civil Aircraft Example 
The Boeing 777-200 is utilised to exemplify the manner in which the digraph development 
procedure, identified in Section 8.2.1, is applied. Firstly, the main systems of relevance are noted 
in order to determine the module nodes (represented using solid-line ovals) for the top level 
system digraph, as illustrated in Figure 8-6. Unsigned edges are used to connect the module 
nodes which exhibit interrelationships. 
Figure 8-6. Civil Aircraft Top Level System Digraph 
The direction followed by the edges indicates the precise dependency paths between nodes; this 
is briefly described: 
• Bleed air (engine control system) from the engines is used to provide a source of: 
- air (and means of pressurisation) for the cabin environmental temperature control 
system (cabin systems). 
- hot air for both anti and de-icing functions of the pitot-static system used to sense 
air data parameters (air & attitude systems). 
- pressurisation for the hydraulic system. 
• The engine gearbox (engine control system) drives an AC generator, thus enabling 
electrical power to be generated and distributed where required. 
• The fuel source for the propulsion units (engine control system) originates from the fuel 
storage and distribution systems (fuel system). 
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• In the event of a failure occurring with either the fuel system and/or engine control 
system, power for the hydraulic and electrical systems is retrieved from an emergency 
power source (emergency power systems). 
• The emergency power system, with regards to the ram air turbine, is released manually 
through using hydraulic controls (hydraulic system). The permanently magnetised 
generators can supply several hundred watts of independently generated power to the 
DC system. 
• The electrical system is connected through two-way signal communication with the 
hydraulic, fuel, flight control and engine control systems. 
• The hydraulic system provides 'actuator power' for the fuel and engme control 
systems. It also controls the primary and secondary control surfaces according to flight 
control and electrical system inputs. Additionally, the utility systems such as 
undercarriage functions and wheel brakes are considered to be part of the hydraulic 
system. 
• The engine control system is ultimately dependent on the flight strategy determined by 
the flight control system. 
The next phase in the digraph development process involves generating sub-system digraphs. 
This procedure is illustrated using the fuel and engine control systems (Figure 8-7), a similar 
process is followed for all module nodes. For ease of illustration the electrical and hydraulic 
system module nodes are indicated in Figure 8-7. The assumed mode of operation is 'cruise' and 
thus engine feed is required. 
The fuel system module node is split into three sub-system nodes (represented using dotted-line 
circles); left main, right main and centre tank. The main tank nodes also represent the surge 
tanks. The edges connecting the nodes indicate the direction of 'information' flow between the 
sections. Under normal conditions during engine feed, fuel flow is expected to follow the route 
centre tank -7 main tank, as indicated by the edges signed '+1 (mass flow),. Cross-feed of fuel 
occurs in the event of a failure being present within either of the main tanks. This is illustrated by 
the conditional edges noting the direction of flow from left to right ('+ 1: cross-feed L-R') and 
vice versa ('+1: Cross-feed R-L'). The engine control system module node is sub-divided into 
two sub-system nodes; left and right engines. The edges connecting the sub-system nodes from 
the fuel and engine control systems signify the exhibited relationships. Under normal conditions 
fuel flow passes from the tanks to the engines, as denoted by the signing '+1 (flow),. The 
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conditional edge connecting the engine and main tank nodes represents the fact that a failure 
within the propulsion units is likely to lead to a negative effect within the fuel system. The 
engine sub-system nodes act independently of one another and are thus not directly connected by 
an edge. 
.~~I. ~~_~~) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _, 
, , 
: .. " ...... +1:Cross-feedL-R ... . .. +1 (mass flow) ............... : 
Electlical System )--__ --:: .:Left Main··.~· Centre ....... ,_-------...'Right MauL : + I acutator ower 
+ 1: Control and : ;( &. surge), '. Tank : :( &. surge)} , 
indicating signals' ... Tank .:~'. ,~ ... Tank... : ~") 0i~~~o/ l_ -1(··--·)···~ _ ~_I_(~::_~o~ _____ .~~.~. __ . __ ~:_~~~s:_~~~~~1·(·-- -)~'1:--J " ....~".;..b'O~<104 
ij> .. ~~~ '--if --- fl:--------------------------------------if --- ~---, 
-~ ,bJ '0"../ bJ -.-, 
: ~. :..: : 
, i Left , 
".. Engine -,' 
Right 
~ Engine .' 
. . 
........... 
~-------------------------------------------~--------- -------! (Engine Control System) 
Figure 8-7. Civil Aircraft Sub-System Digraph 
The signing of the edges connecting the electrical and hydraulic system module nodes to the fuel 
and engine control systems note the relationships of primary significance. Two way 
communication occurs between the electrical system and the fuel and propulsion categories with 
regards to control and indicating signals. The hydraulic system provides actuator power to the 
fuel and engine control systems and receives bleed air from the engines for pressurisation 
purposes. 
The final stage in the development procedure involves 'zooming in' on the sub-system digraph 
nodes and considering all process variables and component failure modes. The sub-system nodes 
comprising the fuel system are further modelled by the digraphs presented in Chapter Six. 
Taking the engine feed mode into consideration the sub-system nodes are represented by: 
• Left main (& surge) tank: Figure 6-8 (electrical system interface, Figure 6-l3). 
• Right main (& surge) tank: Figure 6-14 (electrical system interface, Figure 6-15). 
• Centre cross-feed: Figure 6-16. 
A deviating scenario is used to exemplify the manner in which the diagnostics procedure is 
conducted. The aircraft is assumed to be in the cruise phase of flight (engine feed occurring) with 
the following readings retrieved from the system: 
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Fuel System 
• Spar valve and relay disagree (deviation: expect valve and relay to agree). 
• No low pressure indicating lights on. 
• All control switches in required position. 
Engine Control System 
• No fuel flow into left engine (deviation: expect fuel flow). 
• Left engine speed decreasing towards zero (deviation). 
• Right engine readings as expected. 
Hydraulic System 
• Left section pressurised by an electrically motored driven pump (deviation: expect 
pressurisation by primary pump - engine driven pump). 
• Right and centre sections operate as required. 
Electrical System 
• Some emergency power sources are utilised (deviation). 
From both the readings and top level digraph illustrated in Figure 8-6, it is determined that the 
deviation present in the fuel system is the primary source for the remaining module deviations. 
No propulsive power is obtained from the left engine due to the registered 'no fuel flow'. The 
major deviating factor in this case is no fuel flow in and thus the sub-system digraphs associated 
with the fuel and engine control systems are referenced (Figure 8-7). In order to determine the 
component failure modes which may have led to the deviations, back-tracing commences from 
the location of the noted flow disturbance and thus follows the path flow transmitter ~ M50 
(Figure 6-8). The disagreement between the spar valve switch position and the actual valve 
position must be taken into account. The switch is in the required setting (ON) and therefore the 
failure mode SVLC (left spar valve failed closed) is assumed to be the given cause. The retrieved 
failure mode is deemed valid since closure of the left spar valve would lead to the removal of 
fuel supply to the left engine and ultimately loss of propulsive power. 
With regards to the lowest level system digraphs it has been shown in Chapter Six that the 
procedure lends itself towards the modelling of fuel flow, where the process variable of primary 
significance is mass flow. Electrical and control signals are also represented in the fuel system 
digraphs through utilising signal process variable nodes. When considering the system digraphs 
for the remaining module nodes in Figure 8-6, a number of additional process variables are 
identified as being required. 
247 
Chapter Eight: Mechanism for Modulatisation 
The electrical signal process variable can be split into three main sections: signals regarding data 
information, control and lights. Dividing the signal variable allows for a more specific 
representation of the functions conducted by the electrical system. Further process variables 
recognised as being necessary during the development of system digraphs cover air flow, 
temperature, pressure and mechanical motion. Examples of their usage include, respectively, 
bleed air flow, cabin temperature, hydraulic fluid pressure and actuator motion. 
8.3 Summary 
• Guidelines for expanding the digraph approach, so as to incorporate a complete system 
architecture, are considered. 
• A top level digraph is generated from data regarding the system architecture under 
investigation. It presents a clear representation of the interdependencies which exist 
between systems. 
• More detailed sub-system and component interrelationships are visible through 
'zooming in' on the nodes comprising the top level digraph. 
• The diagnostics process is based on comparing retrieved and actual system behaviour. 
System operator experience is called upon to determine if a deviation in one system 
leads to the registering of deviations in another, through investigating the inter-
relationships between sub-system nodes. 
• Further investigation into the construction of all sub-system digraphs for the civil 
aircraft example is required in order to determine conclusively that the digraph 
diagnostics approach can be scaled up and applied to a complete system (comprised 
from modules). Future diagnostics based on the revised digraphs may yield the need for 
forward-tracing as well as back-tracing. Given the location of fault indicating 
components, forward-tracing may be presumed essential in order to reveal additional 
faults 'downstream' that may have led to the registered upstream deviation. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions and Further Work 
9.1 Introduction 
The research conducted has achieved the aims laid out in the objectives section of Chapter One. 
The concept of conducting system fault diagnostics based on a digraph model of the system 
under investigation has been introduced. Consistency checks have been 'in-built' into the 
diagnostic process through considering a 'flagging' function which is associated with non-
deviating system variables. The general procedure outlined in the research for developing a 
system digraph model and the subsequent fault diagnostic process is represented in a flowchart 
illustration (Figure 9-1). The overall procedure is split into two main sections, of which each 
section is then sub-divided into three key steps. Figure 9-1 thus summarises the fundamental 
points raised regarding the application of the digraph approach in Chapter Four. 
Digraph Model Formation I---
(1) Derme System ~ (2) Generate Unit Digraphs f-t::- (3) Generate System Digraph 
• I dentilY pro c es s variables and * IdentilY process variables. • Combine unit digraph models at 
component failure modes .. • ClassilY signed edges. common nodes . 
• Split system into sub-units. 
L-c:> System Fault Diagnostics 
(1) Detemrine Devi"tions 
----D (1) 'Fl'lg.,aing' ~ (3) Back-tracing Process 
• Identifj system deviations by • Fhg non-deviating sections of • Obtain diagnostic results through 
comparing retrieved and the digraph model. back-tracing from kno.vn 
expected sensor readings. deviating nodes. 
Figure 9-1. Generalised Digraph Application Illustration 
Figure 9-2 illustrates the four specific phases considered during the development of the fault 
diagnostic program, along with the key functions associated with each phase. The program 
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automates the system fault diagnostics section from Figure 9-1 and outputs the failure 
combinations for given scenarios which record abnorma~ities from the expected operating mode . 
Input ... Comparison .-
* System infonnation obtained. * Determine s~stem deviations: 
comparison etween retrieved 
and expected readings. 
Output "'"" Fault Diagnostics f::l--
--
* Display recorded system * Flag non-deviating sections. 
deviations. * Determine back-tracing results 
* Contain diagnostic results in text for given deviations. 
file. * AND result lists together. 
Figure 9-2. General Program Format Illustration 
9.2 Achievements 
Nine key fault diagnostic system features are highlighted in Chapter One. The attributes and their 
associated presence or non-presence, in the digraph based fault diagnostic strategy developed, 
are noted: 
(i) Problem Identification 
The actual and retrieved system readings are compared in order to illustrate the 
presence of deviations. A deviation is assumed to indicate that a problem has occurred 
leading to abnormal behaviour. In the automated diagnostic procedure the comparison 
is conducted using matrices. 
. (ii) Fault Localisation 
Through utilising non-deviating sensor readings the diagnostic strategy is able to 
highlight sections of the system digraph model which correspond to respective sections 
of the system which are deemed 'working'. From this it is possible to mark the sections 
within which the faults must lie (deviating sensor readings). The flagging procedure 
developed in Chapter Four thus enables the fault localisation process. 
(iii) Fault Identification 
Sensor deviations are employed to determine the magnitude of the faults which may 
have led to registered abnormal readings. Discrete values are used to distinguish 
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between effects of different faults on the system. For example in an expected no flow 
situation, should flow be registered it is assumed a '+10' failure has occurred. A '+10' 
failure in this case indicates the presence of a complete fault such as a valve failed 
open. 
(iv) Fault Diagnosis 
Actual fault diagnosis is conducted through a procedure termed back-tracing. Back-
tracing is associated with the manner in which the fault propagation route is followed 
backwards through the digraph from the node registering the initial deviation. Flagging 
is utilised in order to ensure that the back-tracing procedure only takes the relevant 
digraph sections into account. 
(v) Repair 
No clear repair process is initiated in the diagnostic strategy developed. The failure 
modes identified are assessed, a honing-in mechanism is then applied in order to both 
shorten the diagnostic list and identify the actual cause. 
(vi) Quick Detection and Diagnosis 
The automated procedure is efficient with regards to the calculation time and speed for 
the systems considered. More effective programming is required for (i) systems of 
increased complexity and (ii) an automated procedure which takes system integration 
into consideration. 
(vii) Multiple Fault Identification 
Multiple failure combinations are determined in the diagnostic analysis of the systems 
considered. 
(viii)Isolability 
The isolability associated with distinguishing between faults is addressed in the 
development of honing-in mechanisms. The rate of change in the tank levels is initially 
utilised as means of determining between blockage (and closure) and rupture faults 
which give rise to the same flow sensor deviation. A reduction process is proposed for 
reducing obtained failure lists. In this manner all focus is on the actual faulty 
component as opposed to the precise failure mode. Failure rates are also used in order 
to highlight a potential ranking order for the fault combinations yielded. 
(ix) Adaptability 
The adaptability of the diagnostic strategy developed is not fully assessed, since whilst 
the three systems considered are of increasing complexity they are all of a similar vein. 
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It is noted however, that differing modes of operation are taken into account for the 
systems. 
In summary: 
• Three systems of increasing complexity are considered, these comprise the simple 
water tank, BAE Systems fuel rig (simulation test stand) and Boeing 777-200 fuel 
system. 
• The digraph based fault diagnostic strategy takes into ~ccount both steady-state and 
dynamic behavioural patterns of the systems under investigation. 
• The fault diagnostics process is automated through coding the back-tracing procedure 
and consistency checks in Matlab. 
• Control loop structures are successfully modelled and incorporated into the digraph 
based diagnostic strategy. These are considered in greater detail in the Boeing 777-200 
fuel system where manual, automatic and override loops are considered. 
• A honing-in mechanism has been developed to highlight the most probable fault causes 
for specific deviations. This considers three routes involving maintenance. data, 
reliability theory and reducing the digraph model size' by combining common 
parameters. 
• Finally, a modularisation approach is considered for expanding the diagnostic strategy 
to incorporate complete system architectures. 
9.3 Research Discussion 
A novel fault diagnostic strategy based on the application of a system digraph model has been 
developed and assessed through the consideration of three systems of increasing complexity; 
namely, the simple water tank, fuel rig and Boeing 777-200 fuel systems. Through applying the 
method to the previously noted systems, the scalability of the procedure is addressed. 
Deficiencies associated with the initial method tested on the simple water tank system were 
identified and evaluated. This resulted in the development of an improved diagnostic strategy 
which was applied to all three systems and ultimately led to the automation of the procedure in 
order to prove its effectiveness and validity of the results obtained. Analysis is conducted under 
both steady-state and dynamic conditions. Initial application of the diagnostic strategy only 
considered the simple water tank system in steady-state. The addition of system dynamics allows 
for an improved method which in turn results in a more realistic investigation of system faults. 
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Specific system dynamics are incorporated through assessing the rate of change of a particular 
variable (e.g. tank level). 
Digraphs provide a suitable method for representing relationships between entities and are 
considered a useful tool in modelling the information flow within systems. It is this characteristic 
which makes digraphs appropriate for the three systems considered. Whilst conducting testing no 
discrepancies were noted between the digraph model and the physical system under 
investigation. This can be attributed to the fact that the digraphs are developed from detailed 
piping and instrumentation illustrations. Discrepancies may be evident if numerous system 
variables (e.g. mass flow, temperature) are to be taken into account at a given location in the 
digraph model. 
As one of the means for determining the effectiveness of the application of digraphs in fault 
diagnostics, failures were injected into the fuel rig system. The fuel rig system is an experimental 
facility which is unique in offering the ability to realistically simulate various scenarios within a 
research environment. The fuel rig operator is able to manually override specific functions and 
thus simulate scenarios which are altered from the normal operating mode of the system. For 
example, it is possible to close a manual valve in one of the tank feed lines so as to replicate a 
pipe blockage situation. The retrieved fuel rig readings are then compared with those expected in 
order to determine the component failure modes that may have led to the registered deviation(s). 
Having the ability to inject faults into the system yields the capacity to thoroughly test the 
diagnostic strategy. Table 9-1 illustrates the deviations associated with five fuel rig test cases. 
The actual injected fault(s) and the number of failure modes determined are also highlighted. It is 
noted that for all ofthe test cases the actual injected fault is generated as a probable cause. 
The readings obtained from the fuel rig system are sub-divided into categories depending on the 
transmitter variable under investigation. In order to overcome the issue regarding the sensitivity 
of fuel rig transmitter readings to high frequency influences such as noise, set boundaries are 
constructed for normal pressure (or flow), no pressure (or no flow) and partial pressure (or 
partial flow). Thresholds for the level, flow and pressure readings are determined so as to prevent 
'false alarms' with respect to registered deviations. 
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Case Injected Fault(s) 
Main Tank 
Both tray powered isolation valves open. 
Both tray peristaltic pumps on. 
Registered Deviations 
Main Tank 
Feed line flow transmitter: 
Flow 
16 
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No of Faults 
Determined 
- 1 second order. 
- 6 third order. 
Feed line pressure transmitter: _ 9 fourth order. 
Pressure 
•••••••• _ •••••• _ .... __ .................. " •••••••••••• H .................. _ .......... _._ •••••• _ ............................. __ ............. _ •••• __ ........ _._ .......................................... _ •• ___ •• _ ...................... __ •••••• • .............. _._ ............. _ •••• H ............. . 
Wing Tank Wing Tank 10 
2 Pipe rupture at location 217 (open globe Feed line flow transmitter: - 1 first order. 
_______ val~~ to simulateL _________________ .. _._._. No flow _. __ ._. ____ . __ -=-2..~~~ond or~_~r: _____ _ 
Main Tank Main Tank 2 
_.~ __ ... ~~:.~~~~)~ (~~_~n ~:~~~:~_dra~n ~:~.:_._ .. _~~~~~~:~~~j:~;L .. ________ =_~_~~st order:. __ .. _ .. ___ _ 
4 
5 
Main Tank 
Tank rupture. 
Collector Tank 
Single tray powered isolation valve shut. 
Main Tank 
Both tray powered isolation valves open. 
Both tray peristaltic pumps on. 
Collector Tank 
Single tray powered isolation valve shut. 
Main Tank 2 (Main Tank) 
Level transmitter: 
- 2 first order. Decreasing level 
Collector Tank 49 (Collector Tank) 
- 13 first order. Feed line flow transmitter: 
Partial flow 
Main Tank 
Feed line flow transmitter: 
Flow 
Feed line pressure transmitter: 
Pressure 
Collector Tank 
Feed line flow transmitter: 
Partial flow 
- 36 second order. 
16 (Main Tank) 
- 1 second order. 
- 6 third order. 
- 9 fourth order. 
49 (Collector Tank) 
- 13 first order. 
- 36 second order. 
Table 9-1. Fuel Rig Scenario Results (Injected Faults) 
The digraphs generated for the Boeing 777-200 fuel system were specific to the operating mode 
under investigation; the modes were determined to be mutually exclusive. A direct relationship is 
noted between systems of increased complexity and the subsequent development of larger 
digraph models. Consequently, so as to prevent the construction of a system digraph model 
which may be construed unwieldy, individual operating mode digraphs were addressed. With 
regards to the application of the diagnostic method to the Boeing 777-200 fuel system, various 
deviating scenarios for the operating modes considered were simply assumed. The diagnostic 
results retrieved for the example scenarios are deemed valid given the transmitter readings and 
component failure modes which have been identified for the system. The diagnostic solutions 
yielded using the automated program are verified through conducting manual back-tracing; no 
deviations are noted between the results. The fault causes determined for the test cases are 
established as being valid after consultation with individuals within the Aeronautical & 
Automotive Engineering Department at Loughborough University who are familiar with the fuel 
system under investigation. In a similar manner to the fuel rig system, retrieved sensor readings 
are sub-divided into assumed groups. 
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The key issue with the diagnostic strategy lies within the area of distinguishability, where 
numerous fault options may be retrieved for a given scenario. During these cases, reliability 
theory and human knowledge have to be called upon in order to highlight the 'most probable' 
cause. Honing-in mechanisms are considered as a means of reducing the obtained fault lists. The 
precise mechanism utilised depends on the exact situation and whether the priority is to identify 
the faulty component or the specific component failure mode. The rate of change in height of a 
particular tank level is used to distinguish between failures which may be the cause for a given 
deviation. This has proved successful in cases where there are registered deviations of no flow 
and no pressure. A noted negative rate of change highlights pipe rupture faults. Conversely, a 
positive or zero rate of change indicates the presence of faults incorporating blockages or 
closures. A mechanism to further identify the 'most likely' causes of a registered deviation is 
based on the use of failure rate data and maintenance logs. The addition of further transmitters 
into the system would allow for increased isolability. A compromise has to be found though 
between the over-complexity issues involved in the addition of further sensors and the precise 
identification of failures. 
On dealing chiefly with mass flow relationships, the diagnostic back-tracing procedure is 
sufficient for the given system since transmitter readings are taken downstream of prospective 
failure locations. The incorporation of 'flagging' into the diagnostics process eradicates the 
potential for inconsistent failure mode results and anomalies. 'Flagging' therefore acts as a form 
of consistency check and removes the possibility of conflicting results. between non-deviating 
transmitter nodes and failure modes yielded through back-tracing from specific deviating nodes. 
This process is adapted when considering the dynamics of a system. For scenarios whereby a 
tank level is noted to be within an abnormal boundary in consecutive intervals; if the rate of 
change in height of the tank level is a non-negative value, it is assumed that the tank failure has 
been rectified and therefore the deviation is masked. For example, consider a low main tank level 
with a decreasing rate of change in the first time interval. If the tank failure is rectified a low 
level is still likely to be retrieved in the second interval. The low level is however considered a 
non-deviation. 
Digraphs provide a clear representation of the relationships between system variables since they 
closely reflect the physical structure of the system under investigation. Consequently, digraphs 
aptly model systems which comprise integrated control loop structures. The discrete values used 
to describe the relationships between nodes have proved to be sufficient with the addition of '+/-
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5' enabling the introduction of partial failures. This adaptation overcomes one of the noted 
limitations of the established digraph development procedure with regards to the 
misrepresentation of some variable relationships. 
The results from the application of the automated diagnostics process, based on the digraph 
method, to the fuel rig and Boeing 777-200 fuel systems have been proven to be credible. The 
digraphs have successfully modelled the process flow structure of the systems under 
investigation. Injecting faults into the fuel rig has allowed various scenarios to be tested using 
the diagnostic method. Valid failure mode results are obtained when considering single or 
multiple faults in either individual tank sections of the fuel rig or across the whole system. 
Similarly consistent failure mode results are retrieved from the investigation of abnormal 
scenarios associated with the Boeing 777-200 fuel system. This in turn, leads to the applicability 
of the method in a complex system and lends itself towards employment in real-time fault 
diagnostic mechanisms. 
9.4 Further Work 
The scope of this research leads to the possibility of further areas of investigation. The potential 
areas which have been highlighted are described: 
Unreliable Sensors 
The research conducted does not take into account the possibility of imperfect sensors being 
present within the system under investigation; the retrieved sensor readings are deemed reliable. 
Adaptations to the diagnostic strategy should thus be considered so as to allow for unreliable 
sensors. 
Sensor Locations 
The diagnostic strategy concentrates on utilising the readings obtained from the system 
observation points in order to perfonn fault diagnosis if deviations are registered between the 
retrieved and expected readings. The addition of further transmitters into the system would allow 
for improved isolability; however, this may lead to increased over-complexity and mass issues. 
A possible solution would therefore involve assessing the diagnostic results achieved for a 
number of scenarios and developing an optimum sensor location method based on the initial 
results. 
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Offline Monitoring 
The automated diagnostic strategy applied in the research generates a list of potential causes for 
a given deviating scenario. It may be considered beneficial, from a maintenance perspective, for 
offline testing to be conducted in order to further hone-in on the potential faulty component(s). 
Application to Integrated System 
The implementation of the modularisation mechanism proposed in Chapter Eight would fully 
verify the application of the diagnostic strategy to a collection of systems. This would however 
yield the requirement for improved programming in order to maintain the quick generation of a 
diagnostic solution. 
Automated Digraph Construction 
Previous research has considered automated digraph construction. The main noted limitation is 
that the digraph model produced does not fully represent the system under investigation. Further 
work in this area would however facilitate the application of digraphs in system fault diagnostics. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A: Additional Digraph Information 
Further background infonnation covering the wider application of digraphs within the field of 
reliability is presented. Appendix A is aimed at complementing Section 2.3.2.4 from Chapter 
Two. 
Automating the generation of fault trees from digraphs is an area in which it is agreed would be 
highly difficult [1-3]. This can be mainly attributed to the fact that human judgement and 
involvement is required in order to prevent the creation of inconsistent, incorrect or half 
complete failure modes. A further problem involves the fact that a deviation in a process variable 
of magnitude 10 is considered to be beyond the capacity of control loop rectification. This poses 
a problem ifthere are two negative NFBLs in series. If the first NFBL fails and the value coming 
out of it into the second NFBL is of a magnitude 10, then it is required that this be considered a 
moderate correctable disturbance. The reason being that if the second NFBL is fully functional, 
it should be able to rectify the problem 
Iverson [4] also considers a technique for converting digraph models into a FT fonnat. It is noted 
that translating digraph models into FT models would be a straightforward task if loops were not 
illustrated in digraphs. The translation process developed addresses this problem through using 
repeated events in the FT model. A repeated event corresponds to a node that is met more than 
once during the digraph translation process. Iverson utilises the FTs in a diagnosis system. The 
FTs however require further development in order to provide a richer knowledge base which 
would allow the diagnosis system to use its heuristic reasoning features more effectively. 
Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian [5] consider the use of digraph-based models for 
automated HAZOP analysis. HAZOP analysis is considered an extremely time intensive 
procedure which would benefit from automation. One of the main objectives stated in [5] is to 
develop an approach which a non-expert user would find relatively easy to use when defining a 
new system process model or adding infonnation to existing HAZOP models. Digraphs are 
utilised as a graphical representation of causal system process models simply because the cause-
effect infonnation held within digraphs is fundamental to HAZOP analysis. 
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The HAZOP-digraph (HDG) model which is generated is applicable to a wide range of systems. 
The HDG model is based upon standard digraphs and includes abnormal cause and adverse 
consequence nodes. These nodes can be related to the process variable nodes within the model, 
so introducing hazard identification information; a necessity for HAZOP analysis. Nodes can 
assume the value zero corresponding to the term NONE in HAZOP analysis. Analysis of the 
HDG model occurs in HAZOPExpert; a knowledge based system which performs automated 
analysis. Table A-I illustrates the differences between automated and manual HAZOP analysis 
when applied to a case study. 
HAZOP Analysis (team) 
Not all process deviations can be considered. 
E.g. connected pipes are grouped together, 
not analysed individually. 
HAZOPExpert 
Computed process and therefore more time 
efficient. All process deviations are analysed. 
--------- ----------------------------------------
132 total process deviations established. 
734 total process deviations established. 
Same adverse consequences and abnormal 
causes were among these as identified by the 
manual analysis. Twice as many cause and 
consequences were identified due to the 
qualitative procedure of the process. 
Difficult and time consuming process to C t d 11 th onsequences are propaga e a e way 
propagate consequences as far as d t thr h th 1 t HAZOPExpert. owns ream oug e p an . 
Table A-I. Differences Between Manual and Automated HAZOP Analysis 
Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian [6] discuss the possibility of using a hybrid Petri-net 
digraph model during the automation of HAZOP analysis. The proposed use of digraph models 
by Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian in HAZOP analysis focussed on a continuous 
chemical.plant case study. Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian extend this research through 
considering the analysis of batch processes. The issues involved in automating the HAZOP 
analysis of a batch process are different from those for continuous plants. In a batch process the 
operations associated with production are performed in a sequence of steps and discontinuities 
occur between the starting and stopping of the individual steps. The relationships between 
process variables vary depending on the specific step. Furthermore, an additional degree of 
complexity is introduced into batch plants when considering the role of the operator since the 
operator can cause deviations in the plant operation. 
A Petri net is simply a mathematical representation of a discrete distributed system. Petri nets 
consist of place nodes, transition nodes, and directed arcs connecting places with transitions. 
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Arcs run between places and transitions, not between places and places or transitions and 
transitions. The places from which an arc runs to a transition are called the input places of the 
transition. Conversely, the places to which arcs run from a transition are called the output places 
of the transition. Petri nets are suitable for modelling discrete event systems but cannot amply 
describe the continuous changes which occur in a batch process subtask. Similarly, methods used 
for modelling continuous plants such as digraphs cannot account for the discontinuities in batch 
processes. 
Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian propose a model, Batch HAZOPExpert, to perform HAZOP 
analysis for plant mal-operations and process variable deviation scenarios generated by the user. 
HAZOP analysis for batch plants is split into two sections; analysis of process variable 
deviations and analysis of plant mal-operations. Investigation of process variable deviations 
consists of propagating deviations between the subtask digraphs. Batch HAZOPExpert is 
successfully tested on a real-life industrial case study. Petri nets and digraphs are integrated into 
a multi-tier framework to represent batch plant operations. Further work is required though in 
developing subtask digraphs for more complex units and in handling control loops and 
interlocks. 
Maione and Dicesare [7] propose an approach to prevent deadlocks in automated manufacturing 
systems utilising both digraphs and Petri nets. A deadlock is formed by two processes, each 
waiting for the other to complete before proceeding. The occurrence of a deadlock is therefore 
deemed a hazardous event. Through combining the two methods the strong points from both 
techniques are used in the approach. Deadlock detection is conducted through analysing digraph 
. structures. The information attained from the digraph is then translated into the Petri net model 
of the system to implement necessary control strategies. Results achieved by the authors further 
promote the application of the hybrid approach. 
A methodology based on the digraph and matrix methods is developed for the evaluation of 
alternative flexible manufacturing systems [8]. A flexible manufacturing system consists of a 
group of processing workstations interconnected by an automated material handling and storage 
system and controlled by a distributed computer system. The respective attributes are defined as 
factors which influence the selection of a flexible manufacturing system for a given application 
(e.g. costs involved, floor space required, labour requirements). The matrix representation of the 
attributes digraph gives a one-to-one representation in a similar manner to that contained in [9]. 
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A second matrix is defined to provide more detailed data; the selection attributes matrix 
considers all of the attributes and their relative importance. A selection attributes function 
equation is then defined in order to obtain a flexible manufacturing system selection index. This 
index is a measure of degree or extent by which a flexible manufacturing system can be 
successfully selected for a given industrial application. 
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Appendix B: Water Tank System FMEA 
The FMEA worksheets for the water tank system units one, two and four, referenced in Section 
3.2.1.3 from Chapter Three, are illustrated in Tables B-1 - B-3. 
IdentiU:anon FUJU:Dm FailureMnde Failure Effect Failure DelE<tim s.,.erity Remarll1 
Lo.al Effed I 9,ostem Effect Method 
........ __ ._ ........ ___ ... __ ._._._._._._ .... _ .... _ 'QtI~!\JJ)~~, ... _ !'<>~~ .. Qf!!U!<!!!>r.o.~ ... _. J::!9/lit~.P'~~~ .. __ ._ .... ~..P.!. __ ._._ ... _. _____ ....... _. ______ _ 
.. _._._._._._._._......_. ____ ._. __ . __ ._. . __ . __ ...... __ ._. __ . 1.~ .. ~.!¥..i<,? ... '!!.>4.!'.?.~.~, .... !!.Q~1:J.'l!:o_'!l::!ly ... ~._. __ ..... _._._._._._._._. __ . _. __ .:'1.. __ ._ ~~~"'~~-'-__ ._._ 
.... _._ ..... ___ ._._..... ._ ...... _._ ..... _._ .... _ ......... _. __ ._._._ ............. _ ......... ___ ._ ................. __ ....... _. ~~.~.!~~!'L_ ...... _ ..... ___ ... __ . __ ._ ..... ___ . ___ .... _____ . __ . __ 
sy.;temfUl'Ction. 
Table B-l. FMEA of Unit One 
Identifu:.mn Fwo:tim Failure I1Iod. Failure Effett Failure Deteonon s.,.erity Remarks 
Lo.al Effect Svstem Eft'ed Metmd 
~·~t:l:J~to.:»l!lIitJ. Y.~Lp:lsi!iclll ......... _.)I'~~!Ug~O! ....... VI cIo,", .... no fluid ..... I~<loe.~t@tlP ................ .Y.I'.1..L5.1. EInpty!~Qrtlyif 
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command IJ VI d'l> ~1l6.h.f.!.~.:P.~(.ll:\ ... g .• ~~.!r.!'Q .. ~'.:"1l'.' ........................................ . 
. b;f,;;;]ivsi·········· inlJ the hnk). rel • .,.,dvia V2 or V3 
2.:J .. F'ire..l ........ . AlJov./S~ui~f)c>I'f1l:J ....• )/.'IP.'lolc>Cy,e<:l ..... No flu>1 transfer lJ11.l. trartl<<loe'!'Qt~~up VFI/SI 
. ... ................... ...... 11.1 ............. .. ._ ............................... (,;,;l<of~chy) 
.............................. :EInP~it>I1l<,O'llIY 
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2 .. ~ .. F'ireJ.. ............f.>llo"lS~~~f)c>l'ffrortl ~l./.'IP.'»J,:,~~,;<:I .......... No~~~<fe!1l:JYl.artl<<lo~s!'Qt~~"p . YFJlSI. ..... insufIicient \'",ter 
.... ylin~ ... ~ "~1l'.!.~!J< ... m .m. ........m...... . ... (';';l<.of~ <:\':Y.l ... 3 .. 1l:J~tn,lillinJire 
1:-:-:::-__ -:--t:::-:-:--:---::--_-t::-::-=--:---:--=::--+_-::::::-:c:-:-_+-__ --l:13lc>c.y,,~.piP.' 
b):p'iP.'!tlJ11l!"<I,. . .... fI)li<lle~~t;"rn ...... Tart)<!il1~slQl'fly(:p'~......... YI'1J..S I ................. ~""o.rn}Jl!',., •. 
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Table B-2. FM EA of Unit Two 
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Identification Fun<tion Failure Mode Failure Efffd Failure Detection Severity 
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Table B-3. FMEA of Unit Four 
A-6 
Appendix C: Water Tank System Digraph 
Analysis 
Appendix C 
Table C-l contains the full list of failure modes determined for the water tank system scenarios 
FS 1-15 using method one from the digraph diagnostic approach. 
Sensor Readings Cause for Deviating Sensor Readings 
Scenario VFl VF2 VF3 SPl VFl VF2 VF3 SPl IM2(-lO)1 IM7(-lO)1 IM9(+lO)1 IWOST(+10/1)1 
FSl F F F W ... .- V3FO. C2FH. S2FH. VIFO. TR. TL, £4(./0) CIFL,SIFL, 
FS2 F F F NW ... ... V3FO.C2FH.S2FH. VIFO. . .. CIFL,SIFL, 
PIB. PIR. NMWS. P2B. P2R. 
VIFC,CIFH.SIFH. TLVIFS. 
V3FO. C2FH. S2FH. VIFO. FS3 NF F F W TLCIFS. TLSIFS. C2FH. ... TR. TL. L4(·1 0) 
S2FH. TLC2FS. TL,S2FS. CIFL,SIFL 
TLV3FS. 
PIB. PIR. NMWS. P2B. P2R. 
VIFC. CIFH. SIFH. TLVIFS. V3FO. C2FH. S2FH. VI FO. FS4 NF F F NW TLCIFS. TLSIFS. C2FH. .. .. 
S2FH. TLC2FS. TLS2FS. CIFL,SIFL 
TL.V3FS. 
PIB. PIR. NMWS. P2B. P2R. V2FC. P7B. P7R. P6B. P6R. 
VIFC.CIFH.SIFH. TLVIFS. U(·/O): TR. P2B. P2R. PIB. 
FS5 NF NF F W TLCIFS. TLSIFS.C2FH. PIR. NMWS. VIFC. CIFH. V3FO. C2FH. S2FH. V I FO. TR. TL, L4(·IO) 
S2FH. TL.C2FS. TLS2FS. SIFH. TLVIFS. TL.CIFS. Cl FL, SIFL 
TL.V3FS. TLS IFS. C2FH. S2FH. TL. V3FS. TL.C2FS. TL.S2FS. 
PIB. PIR. NMWS. P2B. P2R. V2FC. P7B. P7R. P6B. P6R. 
VIFC. CIFH. SIFH. TLVIFS. £4(·10): TR. P2B. P2R. PIB. 
FS6 NF NF F NW TLCIFS. TLSIFS.C2FH. PIR. NMWS. VIFC.CIFH. V3FO. C2FH. S2FH. VIFO. . .. 
S2FH. TLC2FS. TLS2FS. SIFH. TLVIFS. TL.CIFS. CIFL, SIFL 
TLV3FS. TLS IFS. C2FH. S2FH. TL.V3FS. TL.C2FS. TL.S2FS. 
-
PIB. PIR. NMWS. P2B. P2R. V2FC. P7B. P7R. P6B. P6R. 
VIFC.CIFH.SIFH. TLVIFS. UI·/O): TR. P2B. P2R. PIB. 
FS7 NF NF NF W TL.CIFS. TL.SIFS.C2FH. PIR. NMWS. VIFC. CIFH. ... TR. TL. £4(./lij SIFH. TLVIFS. TL.CIFS. S2FH. TL.C2FS. TL.S2FS. TLS IFS. C2FH. S2FH. TL.V3FS. TL V3FS. TL.C2FS. TL.s2FS. 
PI B. PI R. NMWS. P2B. P2R. V2FC. P7B. P7R. PI>B. PI>R. 
VIFC. CIFH.SIFH. TLVIFS. UI·IO): TR. P2B. P2R. PI B. 
FSS NF NF NF NW TLCIFS. TLSIFS. C2FH. PIR. NMWS. VIFC. CIFH. --. --. 
S2FH. TL.C2FS. TLS2FS. SI FH. TL. V IFS. TL.C IFS. 
TLV3FS. TL.S IFS. C2FH. S2FH. TL.V3FS. TL.C2FS. TL.S2FS. 
V2FC. P7B. P7R. PI>B. P6R. 
U(·IO): TR. P2B. P2R. PIB. 
FS9 F NF F W --. PIR. NMWS. VIFC. CIFH. V3FO. C2FH. S2FH. V I FO. TR. TL. L4(·/II) SI FIl. TL V IFS. TL.C IFS. CIFL.SIFL 
TL.S IFS. C2FH. S2F11. 
TL.V3FS. TL.C2FS. TL.S2FS. 
V2FC. P7B. P7R. PI>B. P6R. 
LJI·/O): TR. P2B. P2R. PI B. 
FSIO F NF F NW --. PIR. NMWS. VIFC.CIFII. V3FO. C2FH. S2FH. VIFO. ---SIFH. TL.VIFS. TL.CIFS. CIFL,SIFL. 
TL.S IFS. C2FH. S2FH. 
TL.V3FS. TL.C2FS. TL.S2FS. 
FSII F F NF W --. --. --. TR. TL. UI·IO) 
FSI2 F F NF NW --. --. --. --. 
PIB. PI R. NMWS. P2B. P2R. 
VI Fe. CIFI!. SIFH. TL.VI FS. 
FSI3 NF F NF W TL.CIFS. TL.SIFS. C2F11. --. --. TR. TL. UI·/O) 
S2FlI. TL.C2FS. TL.S2FS. 
TL.V3FS. 
.--
PIB. PIR. NMWS. P2B. P2R. 
VI FC. Cl FII. SI FlI. TL.VIFS. 
FSI4 NF F NF NW TL.C IFS. TL.S IFS. C2F11. --. --. --. 
S2FU, TLC2FS. TL.S2FS. 
TL.V3FS. 
V2FC. P7B. P7R. PI>B. PI>R. 
U(·IO): TR. P2B. P2R. PIB. 
FSI5 F NF NF W --. PIR. NMWS. VIFC. CIFII. --. TR. TL. L41·/II, SIFII. TL.VIFS. TL.CIFS. 
TL.S IFS. C2FH. S2FII. 
TL.V3FS. TL.C2FS. TL.S2FS. 
Table C-l. FSl-15 Results (Method One) 
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The failure modes noted for FS 1 are used to exemplify the manner in which the table is to be 
interpreted. The results determined for the two deviating variables are ANDed together 
[M9(+ 10) AND WOST(+ 10)] to yield twelve failure combinations including V3FO.TR. 
Table C-2 contains the full list of failure modes determined for the water tank system scenarios 
FS 1-15 using method two from the digraph diagnostic approach. The diagnostic solutions for a 
given scenario are determined in a similar manner to that described for FS 1 in Table C-l. 
Sensor Readings Cause for Deviating Sensor Readings 
Scenario VFI VF2 VF3 SPI VFI VF2 VF3 SPI IM2(-IO)1 IM7(-IO)1 IM9(+UI)1 IWOST(+lO/I)1 
FSI F F F W - -- V3FO, C2FH, S2FH. TR, TL, L4(-10). 
FS2 F F F NW -- --- V3FO, C2FH, S2FH. ---
PIB, PIR, NMWS_ P2B, P2R_ 
FS3 NF F F W V I FC, Cl FH, SI FH, --- V3FO, C2FH, S2FH. TR, TL, L4(-/o). 
TLVIFS, TL.CIFS, TL.SIFS. 
FS4 NF F F NW PIB, PIR, NMWS, P2B, P2R, --- V3FO, C2FH, S2FH. --VIFC,CIFH,SIFH. 
PIB, PIR, NMWS, P2B, P2R, 
FSS NF NF F W VIFC, CIFH, SIFH, VIFR, V2FC, P7B, P7R, P6B, P6R, V3FO, C2FH, S2FH. TR, TL, L4(-IO). CIFR, TL.VIFS, TL.CIFS, £4(-/0) ~ TR. 
TL.SIFS. 
FS6 NF NF F NW PIB, PI R, NMWS, P2B, P2R, V2FC, P7B, P7R, P6B, P6R. V3FO, C2FH, S2FH. ---VIFC,CIFH,SIFH. 
PIB, PIR, NMWS, P2B, P2R, V2FC, P7B, P7R, P6B, P6R, FS7 NF NF NF W VIFC, CIFH, SIFH, L4(-/o) ~ TR. --- TR, TL, L4(-IO). TLVIFS, TL.CIFS, TL.SIFS. 
FS8 NF NF NF NW PIB, PIR, NMWS, P2B, P2R, V2FC, P7B, P7R, P6B, P6R. -- ---VIFC,CIFH,SIFH. 
FS9 F NF F W --- V2FC, P7B, P7R, P6B, P6R, V3FO, C2FH, S2FH. TR, TL, £4(- /(~. £4(-/0) ~ TR. 
FSIO F NF F NW --- V2FC, P7B, P7R, P6B, P6R. V3FO, C2FH, S2FH. ---
FSll F F NF W --- -- --- TR. TL. L4(-IO). 
FS12 F F NF NW --- --- --- ---
PIB, PIR, NMWS. P2B, P2R. 
FSI3 NF F NF W VIFC,CIFH,SIFH, --- --- TR. TL, L4(-/()). 
TL.VIFS. TL.CIFS, TL.SIFS. 
FSI4 NF F NF NW PIB. PI R, NMWS, P2B, P2R, --- --- ---VIFC, CIFH, SIFll. 
FSIS F NF NF W M2(+lO): VIFO, CIFL. SIFL V2FC. P7B, P7R. P6B. P(IR. M9(-IO): V.1FC. C2FL. 5 I FL TR. TL. L4(-/O). L4(-III) ~TR. 
Table C-2. FSl-15 Results (Method Two) 
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Appendix D: Boeing 777-200 Digraph 
Development & Analysis 
Appendix D contains relevant data associated with Chapter Six. Detailed digraph development 
information for the three operating modes considered for the Boeing 777-200 case study is 
presented. In addition, the test cases taken into account for validating the diagnostic procedures 
in each of the operating modes are also expanded. The back-tracing routes followed in three of 
the test cases (one from each mode) are described through illustrating the fault propagation 
paths. The relevant digraph figures contained within Appendix D highlight the location of the 
nodes from whence the back-tracing procedure, conducted during the fault diagnostics process, 
commences. The location nodes are highlighted using a bold circular outline and the sections of 
the digraphs which are flagged for the respective example scenarios are 'blacked-out' using 
diagonal lines . 
. 
Appendix D is sub-divided into three main sections which are associated with the engine feed 
(Section D.I), pressure refuel (Section D.2) and fuel jettison (Section D.3) modes. 
D.I Engine Feed Operating Mode 
D.1.1 Digraph Development 
The upper branch in Figure D-l, incorporating mass flow nodes M44 to M50, represents mass 
flow along the left engine feed manifold. The direction of flow in the manifold, and hence the 
direction of the edges connecting the mass flow nodes, is towards the spar valve which allows 
fuel to pass to the left engine. The left spar valve is denoted by the relationship between nodes 
M49 and M50. If the spar valve is closed then this normally positive relationship is nullified, as 
indicated by the conditional edge signing '0: SPVL Closed'. There are three spar valve failure 
modes which may result in a disturbance of mass flow entering the left engine: spar valve open 
(SVLO), spar valve closed (SVLC) and spar valve intermediate position (SVLJ). The failure 
modes generate a large positive, large negative and small negative disturbance respectively; 
These deviations are indicated by the signs, '+10', '-10' and' -1' on the edges connecting the 
failure mode nodes to M50. 
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Figure D-l. Centre & Main Tank Fuel Pump and Manifold Digraph (Left Wing) 
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The conditional edges between mass flow nodes M44 to M47 symbolise the situation whereby 
the cross-feed system has been engaged and the right fuel pumps are not running (+ 1: RPNP & 
CFO). In this scenario, both ofthe engines receive fuel from the left tanks. Should the left centre 
tank still contain fuel, then fuel feeding occurs via the centre tank. For this reason, the edges 
connecting the nodes have two directional arrows, as fuel pumped from the centre tank has to be 
distributed across both left and right sides of the engine feed manifold. There are three identical 
failure modes associated with the mass flow nodes that represent the left engine feed manifold. 
Two failure modes, left engine feed manifold fractured and partially blocked (LMF, LMPB), 
result in a small negative disturbance whilst the mode left engine feed manifold blocked (LMB), 
results in a large negative disturbance. These disturbances are indicated by signing the edges, 
connecting the failure mode nodes to the process variable nodes, '-1' and '-10'. 
Three branches extend from the main tank level node. Two of these branches, illustrated in 
Figure 0-2, represent the infonnation flow structure associated with the forward and aft boost 
pumps (both branches exhibit identical relationships). In the case of the forward boost pump 
branch, mass flow is drawn from the main tank via pipe 59 (M59) and then pumped into the 
engine feed manifold through pipe 56 (M56). Mass flow at location 59 has a positive effect on 
the pressure produced by the forward boost pump (PFBL), as indicated by the '+ l' signing of the 
directed edge connecting the process variable nodes. However, node PFBL only has a positive 
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effect on the mass flow entering the manifold if the centre tank is empty. The operational phases 
of the engine feed mode dictate that the boost pumps are only turned on once the centre tank is 
effectively empty. There are two failure modes associated with the boost pumps. These relate to 
both 'run' (FBLR and ABLR) and 'no run' (FBLNR and ABLNR) scenarios. The failure mode 
'run' results in a large positive disturbance and the failure mode 'no run' produces a large 
negative disturbance, as indicated by the '+10' and '-10' signing of the directed edges 
respectively. There are three failure modes associated with the mass flow nodes: pipe blocked 
generating a large negative disturbance and partially blocked or fractured pipes resulting in a 
small negative disturbance. 
Figure D-2. Forward and Aft Boost Pumps Digraph Section (Left Wing) 
Figure D-3 illustrates the third branch which extends from the main tank level node; branch 
encompassing the suction bypass valve. The relationship between the level node LMTL and the 
mass flow node M40 represents the suction bypass valve. The tank level normally has no effect 
on mass flow at location 40. Should circumstances change, as defined by the conditional edge 
connecting LMTL and M40, then mass flow is drawn from the main tank. For mass flow to pass 
through to the manifold it is required that the left fuel pumps do not run and for the cross-feed 
section to be disengaged. There are three pipe failure modes associated with node M40; pipe 
blocked (P40B), partially blocked (P40PB) and fractured (P40F). A further failure mode 
considered is suction bypass valve failed closed (BVLe), leading to a large negative disturbance. 
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Figure D-3. Suction Bypass Valve Digraph Section (Left Wing) 
In a similar manner to the flow structure exhibited by the forward and aft boost pumps, Figure 
D-4 illustrates the relationships displayed by the left jettison/override pump and related pipe-
work. The branch extends from the centre tank level node (LCTL). 
Figure D-4. Jettison/Override Pump Digraph Section (Left Wing) 
The tank level has a positive effect on mass flow at location 57. The fuel drawn from the tank 
also has a positive effect on the pressure produced by the jettison/override pump (PJPL). The 
relationship between the jettison/override pump and the left engine feed manifold is considered 
to be positive when the centre tank is not empty, as indicated by the conditional signing of the 
edge connecting nodes PJPL and M53. This is once again attributed to the pre-defined specific 
phases of the engine feed operating mode. The fuel jettison isolation check valve is represented 
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by nodes M53 and M54. There are three failure modes associated with each mass flow node that 
are akin to the previously noted pipe failures. There is an additional failure mode related to node 
M54. A large negative disturbance may be determined by the jettison isolation check valve 
failing closed (JCVLC). 
The left centre tank fuel scavenge section of the unit digraph is displayed in Figure D-5. The 
upper branch leading into the 'AND' gate (represented by a horizontal line) stems from the 
forward and aft boost pumps. The pump nodes (PABL and PFBL) possess a positive relationship 
with the motive flow (MTABL and MTFBL) produced by their respective pumps. In turn the 
motive flow process variables positively affect mass flow along the paths MTABL - M65 - M63 
and MTFBL - M66 - M64 - M63. 
Nodes M63 and M62 represent the left inlet float operated shut-off valve. The relationship 
between M63 and M62 is only positive when the condition 'valve open' is met, as indicated by 
the '+1: IFVL Open' signing of the conditional arc. As with previously described mass flow 
nodes, there are three associated pipe failure modes. Mass flow node M62 has three additional 
linked failure modes: inlet float valve open (IFVLO), closed (IFVLC) and intermediate position 
(IFVLI) resulting in a large positive, large negative and small negative disturbance respectively. 
Figure D-S. Centre Tank Fuel Scavenge Digraph Section (Left Wing) 
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Mass flow nodes M60 and M62 feed into the' AND' gate. An 'AND' gate is utilised in this 
situation due to the fact that mass flow is required from both branches in order for the left centre 
tank fuel scavenge pump to generate a positive pressure and thus transfer mass flow into the 
main tank via pipe 61 (M61). There are two failure modes associated with the fuel scavenge 
pump. These relate to the large positive effect of a 'run' (FSL~) scenario and large negative 
effect of a 'no run' (FSLNR) scenario. The relationship between nodes M61 and M61a 
represents the left outlet float operated shut-off valve. In a similar manner to the characteristics 
exhibited by the inlet float operated shut-off valve, the relationship is only positive when the 
condition 'valve open' is met, as indicated by the '+1: OFVL Open' signing of the conditional 
arc. 
The cross-feed section unit digraph is illustrated in Figure D-6. The edges connecting the mass 
flow nodes indicate that flow is able to travel in two directions. This is dependent on which 
conditions are satisfied. The upper branch incorporating nodes Ml - M41 - M42 - M43 - M44 
symbolises mass flow in the cross-feed manifold using cross feed valve one. The cross-feed 
manifold links both the left and right engine feed manifolds. 
+1:RPNR&CV~Open 
+1: LPNR & CV2 Open 
Figure D-6. Cross-feed Section Digraph 
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Under nonnal conditions, it would be expected for no transfer of flow to occur between the left 
and right sides, hence the nonnal edges joining the nodes (MI - M41 - M42 - M43 - M44) are 
signed '0'. Should the cross-feed system be engaged and if the right fuel pumps are in the 'no 
run' phase, then mass flow follows the route M44 -7 MI, as indicated by the conditional signing 
'+ I: RPNR & CFO'. Conversely, mass flow in the direction MI -7 M44 occurs when the left 
fuel pumps are in the 'no run' phase, as denoted by the conditional signing '+ I: LPNR & CFO'. 
Cross-feed valve one is represented by the relationship between nodes M42 and M43. 
The illustrated mass flow nodes are affected by three failure modes: cross-feed manifold partially 
blocked or fractured leading to a small negative disturbance and cross-feed manifold blocked 
leading to a large negative deviation. Nodes M43 and M42 have two additional associated failure 
modes. The failure mode, cross-feed valve one open (CVI 0) results in a large positive deviation, 
whilst cross-feed valve one closed (CVIC) leads to a large negative disturbance. The direction of 
flow dictates which process variable is affected. For example, if the cross-feed system is engaged 
and the direction of flow is left to right (M44 -7 MI), then the failure modes are linked to node 
M42. 
As a fonn of redundancy, mass flow is able to follow a second path in the cross-feed section 
should a failure occur in the route which incorporates cross-feed valve one. The second path 
encompasses nodes M41 - M51 - M52 - M44, with the relationship between M51 and M52 
representing cross-feed valve two. The redundancy section of the cross-feed digraph contains 
similar features to those illustrated along the upper branch. The conditional statements on the 
edges joining the mass flow nodes in the redundancy path differ only in that 'CVI C', 
representing the occurrence of a failure in cross-feed valve one, is added. 
D.1.2 Test Case Two Back-tracing Example 
Test Case Two 
The deviation no flow into the left engine is registered after the left spar valve, this location is 
represented by node M50 in the digraph (Figure D-7). The fault diagnostics process takes into 
account M50( -10), where' -10' illustrates the large negative deviation no flow. Since the fuel 
system is in Engine Feed Phase 2, the routes LMTL -7 M40 and LCTL -7 M45 are flagged; no 
engine feed via fuel suction or the centre tank is expected. Back-tracing commences from node 
M50( -10) and ceases at nodes M55 and M56. This is due to reaching flagged areas ofthe digraph 
which are associated with the functioning sections of the fuel system. The route takes into 
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account the paths M48 ~ MS6 and M48 ~ MSS since engine feed in phase 2 occurs from the 
main tank via both the aft and forward boost pumps. 
Back-tracing thus follows the route: 
MSO( -1 0) ~ LMB, SVLC (spar valve faults are ignored however since the spar valve indication 
lights register no spar deviations). 
MSO(-10) ~ M49(-10) ~ M48(-10) ~ MS6(-10) AND M47(-10). 
MS6(-10) ~ PS6B AND M47(-1O) ~ MSS(-10) ~ PSSB 
The faults giving rise to the registered flow deviation are: LMB, PSSB.PS6B. 
Note: the fault LMB repres"ents a blockage in the left engine feed manifold. It is only listed once 
in the results list despite being directly associated with the mass flow nodes MSO, M49, M48 and 
M47. The precise location of the manifold blockage, if present, would be unknown and therefore 
a generic manifold blockage fault is used to describe it. 
Figure D-7. Test Case Two (Engine Feed) Back-tracing Route 
D.2 Pressure Refuel 
D.2.1 Digraph Development 
The unit digraph illustrated in Figure 0-8 incorporates the manifold and flow structure 
associated with both the main and centre tanks in the It?ft wing. The unit digraph is developed 
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through a process of 'building-up' from the centre and left main tank level nodes, LCTL and 
LMTL, and 'building-down' from the fuel supply node. Mass flow nodes M1 to M7 represent 
fuel flow through the refuel manifold. There are three failure modes associated with the manifold 
mass flow nodes which relate to a manifold blockage (LMB/CMB), partial blockage (LMPBI 
CMPB) and fracture (LMFICMF). A blockage leads to a large negative disturbance on flow 
whilst the remaining two failures simply result in a small negative disturbance. These deviations 
are indicated by signing the edges connecting the failure modes to the process variable nodes, ,-
l' and '-10'. 
Figure D-S. Centre and Main Tank Digraph (Left Wing) 
Three branches extend from refuel manifold mass flow nodes leading to the left main and centre 
tank level nodes. The structure represented by M5 -7 LCTL illustrates both the direction of flow 
and the positive relationship exhibited between the refuel manifold mass flow and the centre tank 
level nodes. The centre left refuel valve is represented by the relationship between nodes M 18 
and M28. This relationship is nullified should the valve be closed, as indicated by the conditional 
signing of the edge, '0: Valve closed'. There are six failure modes associated with mass flow at 
location 28: refuel valve closed (CLRFC) and refuel valve flow tube blocked (CLFTB) leading 
to a large negative disturbance, refuel valve stuck intermediate (CLRFI) and refuel valve flow 
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tube partially blocked and fractured (CLFTPB, CLFTF) giving rise to a small negative 
disturbance and refuel valve open (CLRFO) resulting in a large positive disturbance. 
The branch incorporating the mass flow node M2 and left main tank level node LMTL illustrates 
the direction of flow from the refuel manifold through the left main outboard refuel valve to the 
main tank. Flow through the left inboard refuel valve is represented by the branch M4 ~ M17 ~ 
M27 ~ LMTL. These two branches are connected by an 'AND' gate (horizontal line in Figure 
6-18) as they extend to the left main tank level node. An 'AND' gate is utilised since it 
demonstrates the fact that should a large disturbance be detected at the level node, back-tracing 
, must take into account the two refuel valve branches. The left main tank outboard and inboard 
refuel valves are represented by the relationship between mass flow nodes MI6 ~ M26 and 
M17 ~ M27 respectively. The exhibited relationships are nullified should the refuel valves be 
closed. There are six failure modes associated with nodes M26 and M27. These follow a similar 
format to those previously described as affecting the mass flow node M28. 
Mass flow enters the refuel manifold via the fuel supply source. There are two noted failure 
modes nodes that may affect the fuel supply: no fuel supply (NFS) leading to a large negative 
disturbance and faulty refuel station (FSRL) giving rise to a small negative disturbance. Two 
branches extend from the fuel supply node to nodes M40 and M41. This represents the fact that 
the flow divides and passes through two pipes before joining at an 'AND' gate at mass flow node 
M42. Node M42 feeds into the refuel manifold at node M3. 
D.2.2 Example Scenarios 
Seven sets of test data are used to validate the results yielded from using the fault diagnostics 
strategy for the pressure refuel phase. For each test case illustrated in this section, both the 
expected and 'retrieved' readings are noted for the sampling intervals in Tables D-l - D-7. Any 
system deviations are indicated through highlighting in 'bold' case in Tables D-2 - D-7. The 
back-tracing route followed in the pressure refuel system digraph for test case seven is expanded 
in detail. 
Test Case One 
The retrieved data, as illustrated in Table D-l, contains no registered deviations. Inputting the 
readings into the diagnostic program yields the expected results with the following message 
output for each interval: 
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No deviations noted in the left main tank section. 
No deviations noted in the centre tank section. 
No deviations noted in the right main tank section. 
Variable Expected Time: (autlll 0 
CT Level < LSV (5) 0.2 
Left MT Level < LSV (6) 0.25 
Right MT Level <LSV (6) 0.25 
CT Refuel Valve Control Switch 
Left MT Refuel Valve Control Switch 
Right MT Refuel Valve Control Switch 
Left CT Refuel Valve Light ON ON 
Right CT Refuel Valve Light ON ON 
Left MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON 
Left MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON 
Right MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON 
Right MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON 
Time: Time: Time: 
60s 120s 180s 
0.85 1.7 2.9 
0.9 1.8 2.9 
09 1.8 2.9 
ON ON ON 
ON ON ON 
ON ON ON 
ON ON ON 
ON ON ON 
ON ON ON 
Table D-l. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Pressure Refuel Test Case One) 
Test Case Two 
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Time: 
240s 
4 
4 
4 
ON 
ON 
ON 
ON 
ON 
ON 
From the retrieved data in Table D-2, it is noticeable that deviations are registered at t = 240s. 
The left main tank level remains at 5.3 for two intervals despite being below the LSV. The left 
outboard and inboard refuel lights are also recorded as OFF as opposed to ON. 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Time: Time: Time: (man) 0 60s 120s 180s 240s 
Left MT Level < LSV (7) 3.2 3.9 4.6 5.3 5.3 
Left MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON ON ON ON OFF 
Left MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON ON ON ON OFF 
Table D-2. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Pressure Refuel Test Case Two) 
Since no deviations are noted in the right main and centre tank sections their respective flags are 
signed '0'. The left main tank section and left refuel valve flags are, however, signed' 1 '. Back-
tracing commences from node LMTL( -10) where -10 takes into consideration the large negative 
disturbance noted in the left main tank level. Back-tracing ceases at nodes M26 AND M27 since 
the refuel indication lights indicate that the fault leading to the non increase in the main tank 
level is as a result of a valve failure. Four second order faults are yielded: 
LMORFC.LMIFC LMORFC.LMIFTB 
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LMOFTB.LMIFC LMOFTB.LMIFTB 
Note: Since the fuel system is in the manual refuel mode the digraph sections correlating to the 
automatic mode and overfill function are 'turned off. Valve control switch failures associated 
with the manual operation are not considered since no switch deviation is exhibited in the 
retrieved readings. 
Test Case Three 
It is noted from the retrieved data in Table D-3 that deviations are registered at t = 180s. A low 
rate of increase in the centre tank level is recorded and the right centre refuel indication light is 
OFF. 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Time: Time: (auto) 0 60s 120s 180s 
Right CT Refuel Valve Light ON ON ON ON OFF 
Table D-3. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Pressure Refuel Test Case Three) 
Time: 
240s 
OFF 
The centre tank section and centre refuel valve flags are signed '1'. In a similar manner to test 
case two, back-tracing commences from the level node (LCT) and ceases at the refuel valve 
noting the deviation (M29). A tank level not increasing at the required rate would usually 
warrant noting failures that may lead to a small negative disturbance (-1). In this case however, a 
deviation is noted with one of the centre refuel valves and therefore it is assumed that a failure 
associated with the right refuel valve is the cause for the given deviation. Two single order faults 
are determined: 
CRRFC CRFTB 
Test Case Four 
A double deviation is registered at t = 180s (reference Table D-4). A non-increasing left main 
tank level and a low rate of increase in the centre tank level is recorded. No deviations are noted 
regarding the refuel valve indication lights. 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Time: Time: Time: (man) 0 60s 120s 180s 240s 
CT Level < LSV (5) 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.95 2.1 
Left MT Level < LSV (6) I 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Table D-4. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Pressure Refuel Test Case Four) 
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The left main tank section and centre tank section flags are the only flags signed '1' from the 
noted deviations. From the retrieved readings it is assumed that the fau1t(s) leading to the non-
increase in the left main tank level also causes the low rate of increase in the centre tank. Only 
faults in the left tank section are considered and therefore the centre tank section sign is 
effectively reversed to '0'. Back-tracing from node LMTL( -10) only notes faults unrelated to the 
refuel valves since there are no registered valve deviations. In total four fault causes are 
obtained; three fist order and one second order: 
NFS LMB P40B P41B.P42B 
Test Case Five 
Deviations are noted in the retrieved data at t = 180s, as illustrated by the bold highlighting in 
Table D-5. Non increasing left main and right main tank levels are recorded. Deviations 
associated with both the left and right tank refuel valves are also noted. 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Expected Time: Time: (man) 0 120s (man) 180s 240s 
eT Level < LSV (3) 1.5 2.5 = LSV (3) 3 3 
Left MT Level < LSV (4) 1.5 2.5 < LSV (4) 2.5 2.5 
Right MT Level <LSV (4) 1.5 2.5 < LSV (4) 2.5 2.5 
Left MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON ON ON OFF OFF 
Left MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON ON ON OFF OFF 
Right MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON ON ON OFF OFF 
Right MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON ON ON OFF OFF 
Table D-5. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Pressure Refuel Tes1Case Five) 
Back-tracing commences from the level nodes of the tank section flags that are signed' 1'. In test 
case five back-tracing follows the route: 
LMTL(-IQ) -7 M26(-10) AND M27(-10). 
LMTR( -10) -7 M30( -IQ) AND M31 (-IQ). 
Back-tracing ceases at the digraph representation for the manual operation of the refuel valves. It 
is assumed from the noted refuel valve deviations that associated valve failures are the cause for 
the non-increasing main tank levels. Since the left and right main tank section valve control 
switches are in the CLOSED position instead being 'OPEN', a single fault combination is 
obtained: LRSC.RRSC. 
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Test Case Six 
From the retrieved data in Table D-6, deviations are noted in all of the tank sections. The main 
and centre tanks record a non-increasing level. However, no deviations associated with the refuel 
valves are noted 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Time: Time: Time: (auto) 0 60s 120s 180s 240s 
eT Level <LSV (5) 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.3 
Left MT Level <LSV (6) 3 3.6 4.2 4.8 4.8 
Right MT Level < LSV (6) 3.1 3.7 4.3 4.9 4.9 
Table D-6. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Pressure Refuel Test Case Six) 
It is assumed that the faults leading to the left and right main tank level deviations result in the 
given centre tank level reading variation. This is attributed to the refuel manifold design, as 
illustrated in Figure 6-1 (Chapter Six). No deviations are linked to the tank section refuel valves 
and therefore back-tracing from the level nodes only takes into account failures associated with 
both the refuel manifold and fuel source-manifold connection nodes. Sixteen fault combinations 
are yielded; nine of the order two, six of the order three and one of the order four: 
NFS(left).NFS(right) LMB.P45B P43B.P44B.LMB 
LMB.NFS(right) P42B.RMB P40B.P41 B.P45B 
NFS(left).RMB P42B.P45B P43B.P44B.P42B 
LMB.RMB P40B.P41 B.NFS(right) P40B.P41 B.P43B.P44B 
P42B.NFS(right) P43B.P44B.NFS(left) 
NFS(left). P45B P40B.P41 B.RMB 
The most probable fault cause is deemed to be no fuel supply at both the left and right fuel 
adapter points. 
Test Case Seven 
From the retrieved data in Table D-7, deviations are noted in all of the tank sections at t = 120s. 
The tanks record increasing levels despite reaching the required LSV. Deviations associated with 
the refuel valves are also noted. 
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From the registered refuel valve deviations a single fault of the order three is yielded: 
LRSO.CRSO.RRSO. Back-tracing commences from the tank level nodes and ceases upon 
reaching the refuel valve manual control section nodes, given the noted variations in the refuel 
valve control switches. 
Variable Expected Time: Expected Time: Time: Time: (man) 0-60s (man) 120s 180s 240s 
CT Refuel Valve Control Switch OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN OPEN 
Left MT Refuel Valve Control Switch OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN OPEN 
Right MT Refuel Valve Control Switch OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN OPEN 
Left CT Refuel Valve Light ON ON OFF ON ON ON 
Right CT Refuel Valve Light ON ON OFF ON ON ON 
Left MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON OFF ON ON ON 
Left MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON OFF ON ON ON 
Right MT Outboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON OFF ON ON ON 
Right MT Inboard Refuel Valve Light ON ON OFF ON ON ON 
Table D-7. Expected & Retneved Readmgs (Pressure Refuel Test Case Seven) 
At t = 240s, fuel is noted to be above the float switch in the left surge tank. Back-tracing from 
the tank level nodes therefore considers the overfill digraph section. A single fault is yielded in 
addition to the previously noted multiple fault combination. The fault of ultimate importance at 
this stage is LFSL, since it represents the fact that the override function of the pressure refuel 
phase has failed. 
The back-tracing procedure for the given test case is described in more detail. Numerous system 
deviations are noted during test case seven. These are categorised into three groups: 
(i) Tank levels increasing - at LSV, expected to remain steady. 
(ii) Refuel valve control switches open - expected closed. 
(iii) Refuel valve lights on - expected off. 
The back-tracing route followed for the given example is explained usmg the left wmg 
illustration; the same process is however applicable for the right wing. 
The increase in tank level is treated as a large positive deviation and thus the first back-tracing 
route commences from nodes LMTL( + 10) and LCT( + 10), representing the left main tank and 
centre tank respectively, in Figure D-9. Large sections of Figure D-9 are flagged; this is due to 
the fact that both the refuel valve control switches and valve indication lights register the ·same 
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deviation. From Section 6.3.5.2, it is assumed that a refuel valve control switch failure exists for 
the given scenario. 
The second back-tracing path followed from the refuel valves (in the left section) commences at 
nodes M26, M27 and M28, as noted in Figure D-IO. A large positive deviation is again taken 
into account since this represents the registered 'on' light. 
Figure D-9. Test Case Seven (Pressure Refuel) Back-tracing Route 1 
~ ~ 
+I 
')-----'-'----.,;FQP 
SIRP)----=---..j 
+1: Vam.-open command +lProviJ,POW"'@ 
M27 
-1 RelTt()"ole power 
Figure D-IO. Test Case Seven (Pressure Refuel) 
Back-tracing Route 2 
Back-tracing thus follows the route: 
LMTL(+lO) -7 M26(+lO) AND M27(+lO). 
+l:LSTLalsW'ltch +1 LSWlldclosed 
~~olST 0 
+1 -10 
S ,LFS 
Figure D-l1. Test Case Seven (Pressure Refuel) 
Back-tracing Route 3 
M26(+lO) -7 LMORFO (Refuel valve faults are ignored from the given assumption). 
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M26(+10) ~ SELMS(+10) ~ SFQPU(+10) ~ SIRP(+10) ~ LRSO. 
AND 
M27(+10) ~ LMIRFO (Refuel valve faults are ignored from the given assumption). 
M27(+1O) ~ SELMS(+10) ~ SFQPU(+10) ~ SIRP(+10) ~ LRSO. 
CTL(+10) ~ M28(+ 10) [AND M29(+10) - right section]. 
M28(+10) ~ CLRFO (Refuel valve faults are ignored from the given assumption). 
M28(+1O) ~ SELMS(+10) ~ SFQPU(+10) ~ SIRP(+10) ~ CRSO. 
A similar process is followed for the right section. 
The back-tracing results from all of the registered deviations are combined together to form the 
diagnostic results list. In this case a single multiple fault is retrieved: LRSO.CRSO.RRSO. 
In test case seven a critical deviation is registered at the end of the data sampling; fuel is noted to 
be above the float switch in the left surge tank. The refuel valve control switches remain in the 
open position with the indication lights on. Again, since the refuel valve switches and indication 
lights note the same deviation, back-tracing (route three) commences from the refuel valve 
locations and takes into account the overfill digraph structure associated with left surge tank 
(Figure 0-11). 
Back-tracing thus follows the route: 
M26(+1O) ~ SELMS(-10) ~ SLSTS(-10) ~ LFSL 
M27(+10) ~ SELMS(-10) ~ SLSTS(-10) ~ LFSL 
M28(+10) ~ SELMS(-10) ~ SLSTS(-10) ~ LFSL 
A similar process is followed for the right section. 
The diagnostic results yield a single failure with the left surge tank float switch (LFSL). 
D.3 Fuel Jettison 
D.3.1 Digraph Development 
The left wing unit digraph (reference Figure D-12) incorporates the manifold and flow structure 
associated with the main and centre tanks in the left hand section. Mass flow enters the 
refuel/jettison manifold through the pipe-work that extends from the main and centre tanks and 
exits through the left jettison nozzle valve. The unit digraph is developed through a process of 
'building-up' from the left main and centre tank level nodes, LMTL and LCTL. 
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Mass flow nodes M1 to M5 represent fuel flow through the refuel/jettison manifold. There are 
three failure modes associated with the manifold mass flow nodes which relate to a manifold 
blockage (LMB/CMB), partial blockage (LMPB/ CMPB) and fracture (LMF/CMF). A blockage 
leads to a large negative disturbance on flow whilst a partial blockage or fracture results in a 
small negative disturbance. These deviations are indicated by signing the edges connecting the 
failure modes to the process variable nodes, '-1' and' -10'. 
Figure D-12. Centre and Main Tank Digraph (Left Wing) 
Two branches extend from the tank level nodes and converge on an 'AND' gate (represented by 
a diagonal line). An 'AND' gate is utilised since it demonstrates the fact that should a large 
disturbance be detected at the fuel jettison nozzle, back-tracing must take into account the two 
branches. The left jettison nozzle valve is represented by the relationship between mass flow 
nodes M1 and M2. This relationship is nullified should the valve be closed, as indicated by the 
signing '0: LJNV Closed'. There are three valve failure modes associated with node Ml; left 
jettison nozzle valve closed (JNVLC), stuck intermediate (JNVLJ) and open (JNVLO) leading to 
a large negative, small negative and large positive disturbance respectively. 
The branch incorporating nodes LMTL -7 M 11' indicates the direction of flow from the left main 
tank to the refuel/jettison manifold. Node PJPL represents the pressure generated by the left 
jettison fuel pump. There are two known failure modes that affect node PJPL; left jettison pump 
run (JPLR) and no run (JPLNR) giving rise to a large positive and large negative disturbance 
respectively. The direction of flow from the left centre tank to the refuel/jettison manifold is 
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illustrated by the branch incorporating nodes LCTL to M3. Node PJOPL represents the pressure 
generated by the left jettison/override pump. In a similar manner to the left jettison pump there 
are two associated failure modes: left jettison/override pump run (JOLR) and no run (JOLNR). 
The positive relationship between mass flow nodes M18 and M19 represents the left jettison 
isolation valve. This relationship is nullified should the valve be closed, as indicated by the 
signing '0: LHV Closed'. There are three valve failure modes associated with node M 19; left 
jettison isolation valve closed (HVLC), stuck intermediate (HVLI) and open (HVLO) leading to 
a large negative, small negative and large positive disturbance respectively. 
D.3.2 Example Scenarios 
Six sets of test data are used to validate the results yielded from the fault diagnostics strategy for 
the fuel jettison mode. For each test case illustrated in this section, both the expected and 
retrieved readings are noted for the sampling intervals in Tables D-8 - D-13. System deviations, 
if present are highlighted in 'bold' case. The back-tracing route followed in test case six is 
documented in more detail. 
Test Case One 
The retrieved data, as illustrated in Table D-8, contains no registered deviations. Inputting the 
readings into the diagnostic program yields the expected results with the following message 
output for each interval: 
• No deviations noted in the left wing . 
• No deviations noted in the right wing . 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Time: (Phase 1) 0 120s 240s 
Left CT Level >MLW 5 4 3 
Right CT Level >MLW 5 4 3 
Left MT Level >MLW 7 6 5 
Right MT Level >MLW 7 6 5 
Left Jettison FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW 
Right Jettison FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW 
Left Jettison Nozzle Switch ARMED ARMED ARMED ARMED 
Right Jettison Nozzle Switch ARMED ARMED ARMED ARMED 
Left Jettison/Override Pump Switch OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN 
Right Jettison/Override Pump Switch OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN 
Left Jettison Nozzle Valve Position light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Right Jettison Nozzle Valve Position light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Left Jettison Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Right Jettison Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
A-27 
Appendix D 
Variable Expected Time: (Phase 1) 0 
Time: 
120s 
Time: 
240s 
Left Jettison/Override Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Right Jettison/Override Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Table D-8. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Fuel Jettison Test Case One) 
Test Case Two 
From the retrieved data in Table D-9, it is noticeable that deviations are registered at t = 180s. 
The left main and centre tank levels remain constant despite being above their maximum landing 
weight values. The left jettison and jettison/override pump lights are also recorded as being 'on'. 
Variable Expected Time = Time = Time = Time = (Phase 1) 0 120s 180s 240s 
Left eT Level >MLW 5 4 4 4 
Left MT Level >MLW 7 6 6 6 
Left Jettison FLOW FLOW FLOW NO NO FLOW FLOW 
Left Jettison Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF ON ON 
Left Jettison/Override Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF ON ON 
Table D-9. Two Expected & Retrieved Readings (Fuel Jettison Test Case Two) 
Since no deviations are noted in the right main and centre tank sections their associated flags are 
signed '0'. The left wing tank levels, pump and jettison nozzle flow flags are, however, signed 
'1'. Back-tracing takes into consideration the five recorded deviations. It is noted that an 
identical large negative deviation is registered by the tank level, flow and pressure readings. It is 
therefore assumed that the registered 'no flow' results from the failure combination which led to 
the pump indication lights turning on. Four second order fault combination results are yielded: 
JPLNRJOLNR 
JPLNR.P12B 
Test Case Three 
JOLNR.PIOB 
PlOB.P12B 
It is noted from the retrieved data in Table D-IO that deviations are registered at t = 240s. A 
constant main tank level is recorded and the right jettison pump low pressure indication light is 
'on'. 'No flow' is also registered at the left jettison nozzle outlet. 
Since no deviations are noted in the left main and centre tank sections their associated flags are 
signed '0'. The right main tank level, jettison pump and jettison nozzle flow flags are, however, 
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signed' 1 '. Back-tracing commences from the right jettison nozzle and right jettison pump. Since 
an identical deviation (-10) is noted at both locations and from the previously stated diagnostic 
considerations, it is assumed that the flow and pump pressure deviations are caused by the same 
fault. It is determined that a complete failure must have occurred since the recorded rate of 
change in the main tank level is zero. Two single order faults are yielded: 
JPRNR P16B 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Time: Phase 112 120s 180s 240s 
Right MT Level >MLW 4 3.5 3.5 
Right Jettison FLOW REDUCED REDUCED NO FLOW FLOW FLOW 
Right Jettison Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF ON 
Table D-10. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Fuel Jettison Test Case Three 
Test Case Four 
A double tank level deviation is registered at t = 180s (reference Table D-ll). Non-increasing 
left main and centre tank levels and no flow at the left jettison nozzle are recorded. No deviations 
are noted in the right wing. 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Time: (Phase 1) 60s 180s 240s 
Left CT Level >MLW 2.5 2 2 
Left MT Level >MLW 3.5 3 3 
Left Jettison FLOW FLOW NO NO FLOW FLOW 
Table D-11. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Fuel Jettison Test Case Four) 
The left mam tank level, centre tank level and flow flags are signed '1' from the noted 
deviations. From the retrieved readings, it is assumed that the fault leading to the zero rate of 
change in the tank levels resulted in the no flow deviation at the jettison nozzle outlet. Back-
tracing commences from the left jettison nozzle node and follows the left main tank and centre 
tank branches. Faults related to the jettison nozzle valve are ignored since no valve discrepancies 
are highlighted on the fuel panel. Five fault causes are obtained; one first order and four second 
order: 
LMB 
PIIRJIVLC 
PIIRP13B 
PllRP18B 
PIIRP19B 
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Test Case Five 
Deviations are noted in the retrieved data at t = 180s, as illustrated by the bold highlighting in 
Table D-12. Non-increasing levels in the left main and centre tanks are recorded in addition to 
'no flow' at the left jettison nozzle outlet. The left jettison nozzle valve indication light is also 
'on'. At t = 240s further deviations are noted in the right wing and reduced flow is recorded at 
the right jettison nozzle outlet. 
Variable Expected Time: Time: Time: (Phase 1) 120s 180s 240s 
Left eT Level >MLW 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Left MT Level >MLW 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Left Jettison FLOW FLOW NO NO FLOW FLOW 
Right Jettison FLOW FLOW FLOW REDUCED FLOW 
Left Jettison Nozzle Valve Position light OFF OFF ON ON 
Right Jettison Nozzle Valve Position light OFF OFF OFF ON 
Right Jettison Pump Low Pressure Light OFF OFF OFF ON 
Table D-12. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Fuel Jettison Test Case Five) 
Back-tracing after the initial deviations are recorded at t = 180s commences from the left jettison 
nozzle. The flags associated with the left main tank level, centre tank level, jettison flow and 
jettison valve are signed '1'. Since the left jettison valve indication light is highlighted, it is 
assumed from Section 6.4.5.2 that the no flow reading and zero rate of change in tank levels is 
attributed to a valve failure (JNVLC). At t = 240s, reduced flow is noted at the right jettison 
nozzle outlet in addition to low pressure at the jettison and jettison/override pump outlets. It is 
assumed that the small negative deviation in flow is caused by the fault combination leading to 
the registered low pressure. No other deviations are detected in the right wing and therefore it is 
assumed the fault originates from between the jettison pumps and the tanks. In total four 
diagnostic results are yielded after t = 240s: 
JNVLC.P16B.P14PB 
JNVLC.P16PB.P14F 
Test Case Six 
JNVLC.P16F.P14PB 
JNVLC.P16F.P14F 
From the retrieved data in Table D-13 identical deviations are noted in both wings. The main and 
centre tank levels are at their maximum landing weight values however, flow is recorded at the 
jettison nozzle outlets and the nozzle switches are 'anTIed'. 
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Back-tracing commences from the jettison nozzle outlets and propagates through the structure 
which controls the mass flow at the nozzle valves. A single multiple fault related to the jettison 
nozzle switches failing open (anned) is yielded: 
LJNSO.RJNSO 
Variable Expected Time = Time = Expected Time = (Phase 1) 0 120s Phase 1/2 240s 
Left Jettison FLOW FLOW FLOW NO FLOW FLOW 
Right Jettison FLOW FLOW FLOW NO FLOW FLOW 
Left Jettison Nozzle Switch ARMED ARMED ARMED D'ARMED ARMED 
Right Jettison Nozzle Switch ARMED ARMED ARMED D'ARMED ARMED 
Table D-13. Expected & Retrieved Readings (Fuel Jettison Test Case Six) 
The back-tracing procedure for the given test case is expanded. Identical deviations are noted in 
both wing sections with flow registered at the jettison outlets and the jettison switches in the 
anned position. From the noted deviations, it is assumed that the faults present in the system are 
related to the jettison nozzle switches being anned. When considering the diagnostics process, 
since the deviations are of the same magnitude (+10) and given the previous assumption, the 
digraphs illustrated in Figures D-13 and D-14 are referenced. Back-tracing commences from the 
locations of the flow deviations. In this case nodes Ml (left section) and M9 (right section) are 
addressed. The jettison nozzle switches are represented by nodes SLNSW (left) and SRNSW 
(right). The back-tracing route from Nodes Ml and M9 takes into account the jettison nozzle. 
switch nodes. Since an identical deviation is considered at all nodes only the back-tracing path 
from M 1 and M9 is taken into account. 
Back-tracing thus follows the routes: 
.1) Ml(+lO) ~ SELMS(+lO) ~ SLNSW(+lO) ~ LJNSO. 
2) M9(+lO) ~ SELMS(+lO) ~ SRNSW(+lO) ~ RJNSO. 
Combining the results yields a single multiple fault: LJNSO.RJNSO. 
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Figure D-13. Test Case Six (Fuel Jettison) Back-tracing Route 1 
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Figure D-14. Test Case Six (Fuel Jettison) Back-tracing Route 2 
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Appendix E: Boeing 777-200 Honing-in Results 
The detailed ranking results obtained from the application of the reliability theory based honing-
in mechanism to the example scenarios considered for the pressure refuel and fuel jettison. 
operating modes from the Boeing 777-200 case study are presented (reference Chapter Seven). 
E.I Pressure Refuel Examples 
Test Case Three 
Two single failures, related to the centre right refuel valve, are obtained for the given scenario. 
Calculating the importance measure values yields the results ranking illustrated in Table E-l. 
Test Case Four 
Min Cut Set (i) 
CRRFC 
CRFTB 
9.999E-OI 
2.923E-05 
Table E-l. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Three) 
A total of six failure combinations are retrieved for test case four. Table E-2 illustrates the 
ranking hierarchy, according to the values obtained from the cut set importance calculations. The 
most likely failure cause is deemed to be no fuel supply (NFS). 
Min Cut Set (i) I j 
NFS(left) 5.952E-OI 
LMB 4.047E-OI 
P40B 7.142E-06 
P41B.P42B 1.428E-17 
Table E-2. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Four) 
Test Case Six 
Sixteen failure combinations are listed for the given test case. The cut set importance measure 
values lie in the range 3.54E-1 to 2.04E-34. Table E:.3 illustrates the top four ranked cut sets, 
where the fifth ranked failure combination is noted as having an importance measure value of 
4.25E-06. 
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Mill Cut Set (i) 
NFS(Ieft).NFS(right) 
LMRNFS(right) 
NFS(left).RMB 
LMB.RMB 
3.543E-01 
2.409E-01 
2.409E-01 
1.63SE-01 
Table E-3. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Six) 
E.2 Fuel Jettison Examples 
Test Case Three 
Appendix E 
Two single faults are obtained for the given scenario which incorporates a tank level, flow and 
pressure deviation. Calculating the importance measure values yields the results ranking 
illustrated in Table E-4. The most probable failure cause is noted as no run of the right jettison 
pump. 
Test Case Four 
Mill Cut Set (i) 
JPRNR 
P16B 
9.999E-01 
2.469E-06 
Table E-4. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Three) 
A total of five failure combinations are retrieved for test case four; one single order and four 
second order failures. Table E-5 illustrates the ranking hierarchy, according to the values 
obtained from the cut set importance calculations. The top ranked combination is the single order 
fault LMB (left manifold blocked) 
Mill Cut Set (i) I j 
LMB ~ 1.000E+00 
PI IB.JIVLC 1.006E-12 
PIIB.Pl3B 3.529E-17 
PI IB.PISB 3.529E-17 
PIIB.PI9B 3.529E-17 
Table E-S. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Four) 
Test Case Five 
Five failure combinations are listed for the given test case; one single order and four of the order 
three. Table E-6 illustrates the cut sets in order of the 'most probable' according to the 
A-34 
Appendix E 
importance measure results. In a similar manner to test case four the single order fault is arrived 
at as the most likely cause for the given scenario (left jettison nozzle valve failed closed). 
Min Cut Set (i) I; 
JNVLC -1.000E+00 
JNVLC.PI6PB.PI4PB 4.000E-24 
JNVLC.PI6PB.PI4F 4.000E-24 
JNVLC.PI6F.PI4PB 4.000E-24 
JNVLC.PI6F.PI4F 4.000E-24 
Table E-6. Ranking of Diagnostic Results (Test Case Five) 
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